Ismael Perez v. Assistant Field Office Director, Krome North Service Processing Center

USCA11 Case: 25-14065 Document: 74-1 Date Filed: 05/06/2026 Page: 1 of 110

FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-14065

____________________

FIDENCIO HERNANDEZ ALVAREZ,

Petitioner-Appellee,

versus

WARDEN, FEDERAL DETENTION CENTER MIAMI,

MIAMI FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND

CUSTOM'S ENFORCEMENT'S ENFORCEMENT AND

REMOVAL OPERATIONS,

ACTING DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT,

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents-Appellants.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-24806-KMW

____________________

____________________

No. 25-14075

____________________

ISMAEL CERRO PEREZ,

Petitioner-Appellee,

versus

ASSISTANT FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, KROME NORTH

SERVICE

PROCESSING CENTER,

MIAMI FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND

CUSTOM'S

ENFORCEMENT'S ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL

OPERATIONS,

ACTING DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT,

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY,

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents-Appellants.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 3

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-24820-KMW

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

The question we face today is whether unadmitted aliens

found in the interior of the United States are eligible for bond while

they go through immigration proceedings. For nearly thirty years,

the answer to that question was, for most aliens, “yes.” Last year,

the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took a different

view. It now maintains that these aliens must be detained without

bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

We are called on to decide if the Government’s new reading

of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is correct. Hundreds of district courts and four

other circuits have already weighed in, reaching well-reasoned yet

distinctly contrary conclusions. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141,

2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th

1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th

Cir. 2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th

1048 (7th Cir. 2025); see also Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., No. 25-3050, 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026). This is

the first time our Court has addressed the question.

In these consolidated appeals, Petitioners -- Fidencio Her-

nandez Alvarez and Ismael Cerro Perez -- were detained without

the possibility of a bond hearing pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Each

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

challenged his detention under the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“INA”), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208,

110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,

and 28 U.S.C.). On review of Petitioners’ habeas claims, the district

court held that the discretionary detention provisions found in

§ 1226 governed their detention instead, rendering each of them

eligible for bond. The Government appeals that decision. It insists

that under § 1225(b)(2)(A), Petitioners -- as aliens present in the

United States without having been lawfully admitted -- are “appli-

cants for admission,” and so they must be detained without the

possibility of bond unless they can establish clearly and beyond a

doubt that they are entitled to be admitted.

We are unpersuaded by the Government’s re-interpretation

of § 1225(b)(2)(A). That provision limits no-bond detention to ap-

plicants for admission who are “seeking admission,” and on the

facts of this case, neither Petitioner was seeking lawful entry into

the United States after inspection by an immigration officer when

he was arrested, nor was either Petitioner taking any cognizable

step to obtain the rights and privileges of lawful entry. In fact, nei-

ther Petitioner was pursuing any object, let alone “lawful entry,”

when he was detained following a traffic stop.

The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the

long history of detention across our immigration laws and the con-

gressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-

bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful

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entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.

Finally, we reject the Government’s claim that even if it has mis-

read the INA, Petitioners are now “seeking admission” because

they did not voluntarily self-deport after the initiation of removal

proceedings.

We do not hold that Congress is without the power to au-

thorize the detention of unadmitted aliens who are simply present

in the country. That question is not before us. We hold only that

Congress has not done so under the provisions found in the INA.

Nor do we decide whether either Petitioner is a flight risk or would

pose a danger to the community if he were released on bond. That,

too, is not before us.

We affirm the grant of habeas relief in each of these consol-

idated cases.

I.

A.

The INA supplies three general pathways to detain an alien.

First, “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may

be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien

is to be removed from the United States.” 1 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For

those aliens, DHS “may continue to detain the arrested alien,” or

1 Following the relocation of immigration-enforcement functions to DHS in

2002 and 2003, this authority was transferred from the Attorney General to

the DHS Secretary. See 6 U.S.C. § 557; 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

“may release the alien” on either bond or “conditional parole.” Id.

§ 1226(a)(1)–(2). However, not all detained aliens are eligible for

release. Thus, under § 1226(c), certain classes of “inadmissible” or

“deportable” aliens with criminal records or who are suspected of

terrorism-related activity must remain in DHS custody. Id.

§ 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E); see also id. § 1226(a) (instructing that release

may occur “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c)”). Federal regu-

lations additionally explain that bond-eligible aliens detained pur-

suant to § 1226 are generally entitled to a review of their custody

determination (including whether they may be released on bond)

at a hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)(1).

Second, § 1225 provides for the detention of certain other

aliens without need of a warrant. That section applies to “appli-

cants for admission,” which the INA defines this way:

An alien present in the United States who has not

been admitted or who arrives in the United States

(whether or not at a designated port of arrival and in-

cluding an alien who is brought to the United States

after having been interdicted in international or

United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of

this chapter an applicant for admission.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1225 requires the detention of certain

classes of applicants for admission, depending on the applicant’s

status. For instance, an alien “who is arriving in the United States”

without appropriate entry documents, or who is in possession of

fraudulent entry documents, is to be “removed from the United

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 7

States without further hearing or review” unless the alien raises a

claim for asylum or a credible fear of persecution, and is detained

pending expedited removal. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1182(a)(6)(C),

(a)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii).

For applicants to whom expedited removal does not apply,

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) further provides that some applicants for admission

may be detained for a fuller review of their admissibility. That pro-

vision reads this way:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of

an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the ex-

amining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for

a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Applicants for admission detained pursu-

ant to § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) may be released from DHS cus-

tody on a grant of “humanitarian parole,” which allows an appli-

cant to be released for “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “signifi-

cant public benefit,” provided he “present[s] neither a security risk

nor a risk of absconding.” Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).

Finally, but of no moment in this case, an alien may be de-

tained and held upon the issuance of a final order of removal, pend-

ing the execution of the order and the return of the alien to his

country of origin or a different country as provided by the statute.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A)–(b)(1)(B).

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

B.

Petitioners Hernandez Alvarez and Cerro Perez are Mexican

nationals who entered the United States without inspection, but

have resided in the United States since 2019 and 2015, respectively.

Hernandez Alvarez has no criminal history, and is the father of two

children who are U.S. citizens. Cerro Perez has three children who

are American citizens as well. Before this encounter with law en-

forcement, he has been cited only for minor traffic violations since

entering the United States.

Petitioners were arrested by immigration authorities follow-

ing two traffic stops; Hernandez Alvarez was arrested on Septem-

ber 16, 2025, and Cerro Perez was arrested a day later. Petitioners

were placed in removal proceedings, and were charged with,

among other things, being inadmissible as aliens who entered the

United States without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

Following their arrest, Petitioners were transferred to the

Florida Soft-Sided Facility-South (“Alligator Alcatraz”). Each was

then transferred again; Hernandez Alvarez to the Miami Federal

Detention Center, and Cerro Perez to the Krome North Service

Processing Center. DHS issued custody determinations for each of

the Petitioners, continuing their detention without the possibility

of bond. Because of these determinations, and in light of recent

precedent from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), no im-

migration judge had the authority to consider either Petitioner’s

bond request. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 227–28

(BIA 2025).

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Thereafter, Hernandez Alvarez and Cerro Perez sought re-

lief in federal court, each filing a petition for habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Florida. They claimed

their continued detention without bond violated federal law, and

asserted three grounds for relief: (1) violation of the INA, because

the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not ap-

ply; (2) violation of applicable bond regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1,

1003.19, 1236.1; and (3) violation of their Fifth Amendment due

process rights.

As for the first ground, each of the Petitioners claimed that

§ 1226(a) governs their detention. They argued that although they

were statutorily “applicants for admission,” they were not “seeking

admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus they fell instead under

the default rule of detention supplied by § 1226(a). The Govern-

ment replied that § 1225(b)(2)(A) extends to all unadmitted aliens,

because an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admis-

sion.” It observed that under the ordinary meaning of both

phrases, one who “applies” for something is inherently “seeking”

it.

On October 27, 2025, the district court granted both peti-

tions for habeas corpus. Interpreting the INA, the court concluded

that § 1226 governed Petitioners’ detention, thus entitling each of

them to a bond hearing. It made no finding on Petitioners’ other

grounds for relief. The Government filed notices of compliance in

November 2025, indicating Petitioners had been granted bond

hearings and were subsequently released from DHS custody.

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

This timely appeal followed. On November 25, 2025, the

Government moved to consolidate both appeals. We granted the

motion on December 11.

On January 5, 2026, we asked whether the appeals had be-

come moot in light of the Government’s notices of compliance and

the fact that Petitioners were granted a bond hearing. Petitioners

and the Government responded on January 19, and agreed that the

consolidated appeals were not moot, since this Court could still

grant relief to the Government by reversing the district court and

allowing renewed detention.

On February 14, 2026, the Government moved to expedite

oral argument or, alternatively, to submit the consolidated appeals

on the briefs, observing that expeditious resolution was necessary

given the “hundreds, if not thousands,” of similar habeas claims

filed in district courts all around the country, including in our Cir-

cuit. Petitioners agreed to an expedited schedule but reiterated

their request that this Court hold oral argument. We granted the

motion to expedite on February 26, and heard argument one

month later.

II.

We review our own jurisdiction de novo, and “always have

an obligation to examine sua sponte” our power to hear a case be-

fore reaching the merits. Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir.

2003). In addition, we review de novo a district court’s grant or

denial of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Djadju v. Vega, 32

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F.4th 1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 2022). Finally, the correct interpretation

of a statute is a question of law that we also review de novo. Simone

v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 156 F.4th 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2025).

As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have

jurisdiction. Our Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “cases” and “con-

troversies,” which requires, among other things, that the issue has

not become moot. Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662

F.3d 1182, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2011). “[A]n issue is moot when it no

longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court

can give meaningful relief.” Zinni v. ER Sols., Inc., 692 F.3d 1162,

1166 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). However, a party’s vol-

untary compliance with an order does not usually render an appeal

moot unless the appellate court cannot grant the parties any addi-

tional relief. See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for

Ala., 105 F.4th 1324, 1329 n.3 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing, inter alia, Bur-

nett v. Kindt, 780 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1986)).

Habeas petitions ordinarily present “a live case or contro-

versy only when a petitioner is in custody.” Djadju, 32 F.4th at

1106–07 (citation modified). Thus, when a petitioner is no longer

being held, there must be a “concrete or continuing injury” or a

“collateral consequence” for the suit to be maintained. Id. (citation

modified). In Djadju, we held that a habeas petitioner’s challenge

to his detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings

was rendered moot by his conditional release, as his “prayer for re-

lief ha[d] been satisfied.” Id. at 1107. Important to that holding,

there was “no reasonable basis for [the Court] to believe” that the

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12 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

petitioner would be “re-detained unlawfully upon termination of

[his] suit.” Id. at 1109.

Djadju was a petitioner’s appeal, not the Government’s. Id. at

1105. That petitioner had gotten what he wanted, so there was

nothing more this Court could do for him. Here, the Government

did not get what it was seeking -- Petitioners were released on bond

over its objection. So, this Court could still offer the Government

relief; it could reverse the district court and give the Government

the authority to re-detain the Petitioners (which it has expressed its

unambiguous intention to do). See Zinni, 692 F.3d at 1166; Greater

Birmingham Ministries, 105 F.4th at 1329 n.3.

We therefore have jurisdiction over the appeals, since the

controversy has not become moot.

III.

We turn, then, to the merits. When confronted with a ques-

tion of statutory interpretation, our analysis principally turns on

the text. United States v. Moore, 115 F.4th 1370, 1374 (11th Cir.

2024). Our Circuit has long recognized that “courts must interpret

the relevant words of a statutory provision not in a vacuum, but

with reference to the statutory context, structure, history, and pur-

pose of the law.” Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296, 1308 (11th Cir.

2024) (citation modified) (quoting Abramski v. United States, 573

U.S. 169, 179 (2014)); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plas-

tics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2011). Thus, to discern which provision

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is applicable to Petitioners’ detention, we look to (first and fore-

most) the text, then to the broader statutory structure, history, and,

if necessary, to the congressional purpose of the INA as amended

by IIRIRA.

A.

Beginning with the text, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to

Petitioners. This conclusion follows from the application of three

basic principles of statutory interpretation.

First, absent any evidence that a term carries a specific mean-

ing, “those whose lives are governed by law are entitled to rely on

its ordinary meaning, not left to speculate about hidden messages.”

Feliciano v. Dep’t of Transp., 605 U.S. 38, 45 (2025) (first citing Henson

v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 86 (2017); then citing

Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 163 (2021)). The ordinary-

meaning canon is “the most fundamental semantic rule of interpre-

tation,” and instructs us that “[w]ords are to be understood in their

ordinary, everyday meanings -- unless the context indicates that

they bear a technical sense.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012); see

also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 157–58 (1833).

Second, a corollary of the ordinary-meaning canon is that

where a term carries a technical or specific meaning, a court must

apply that meaning, even if doing so is counterintuitive or contrary

to the term’s ordinary meaning. SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 73–77.

After all, “statutory terms can carry meanings that depart from

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14 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

their ordinary ones.” Feliciano, 605 U.S. at 45. Thus, for example,

Congress may “define a word or phrase in a specialized way or em-

ploy a term of art with long-encrusted connotations in a given

field.” Id. And “[w]hen Congress takes the trouble to define the

terms it uses, a court must respect its definitions as ‘virtually con-

clusive.’” Dep’t of Ag. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S.

42, 59 (2024) (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 56 (2019)). This

is especially so where, as in the case of the INA and IIRIRA, the

statute is replete with technical terms that bear little resemblance

to their ordinary, everyday usage.

Finally, “[i]t is . . . a cardinal principle of statutory construc-

tion that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word

of a statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (citation

modified); see Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 236 (2011).

When reading statutory text, “every word and every provision is

to be given effect,” and “[n]one should needlessly be given an in-

terpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have

no consequence,” since we presume Congress acts intentionally in

drafting the language of its laws. SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 174;

see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words

cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”).

With these principles in mind, we begin with the text at issue

here, drawn from § 1225(b)(2)(A). The provision reads, in relevant

part:

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[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admis-

sion, if the examining immigration officer deter-

mines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly

and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien

shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a

of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The competing interpretations of this

provision offered by the Government and Petitioners require us to

examine and compare two critical phrases -- “an alien who is an

applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission” -- to de-

termine what conditions justify an alien’s detention pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).

The Government argues that under the ordinary meaning

of the two phrases, it is clear they denote only one condition. It

maintains that all “applicants for admission” are “seeking admis-

sion,” since one who applies for something is necessarily seeking it.

It offers the example of a college applicant, who by applying to col-

lege is necessarily “seeking admission” to that college. Two of our

sister circuits have found this reasoning persuasive, concluding that

“the ordinary meanings of the phrases ‘applicant for admission’ and

‘seeking admission’ are the same.” Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134; see also

Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502. Those courts said that “‘apply’

means ‘[t]o make a formal request,’ while ‘seek’ means ‘to request,

ask for.’” Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134 (citation modified); see Buenrostro-

Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502.

If our task ended with the ordinary meaning of the two

phrases, we would agree that they are synonymous. However, as

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16 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

with many other terms found in the INA, we are required to look

beyond ordinary meaning, because Congress has chosen to define

the phrase “applicant for admission” in a technical and specific way.

Section 1225(a)(1) defines the term to mean “[a]n alien present in

the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the

United States,” whether or not the alien has “applied” for some-

thing in common parlance. On the face of the text, no actual “ap-

plication” is necessary to be an applicant for admission -- nor, for

that matter, is any other affirmative step required on the part of an

alien. Rather, the statute defines “applicant for admission” to be a

passive condition, and “deems”2 an alien to be an applicant merely

by arriving or being present in the United States without having

been admitted. In reading § 1225(b)(2)(A), then, we cannot accept

2 Congress’s use of the word “deemed” confirms that the term “applicant for

admission” is a technical one. To “deem” something is to “treat [it] as if (1) it

were really something else, or (2) it has qualities that it does not have.” Deem,

v., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). The word is “a useful word when

it is necessary to establish a legal fiction either positively by ‘deeming’ some-

thing to be what it is not or negatively by ‘deeming’ something not to be what

it is.” Id. (citation modified); see Sturgeon, 587 U.S. at 47 (public lands were

“deemed” to be parkland, and “non-public lands (everything else) were, by

negative implication, ‘deemed’ not” to be). Thus, Congress has told us to ig-

nore what ordinarily constitutes an “applicant for admission,” and instead

“deem” any arriving alien or present unadmitted alien to be an applicant, to

the exclusion of all other aliens who might otherwise be considered applicants.

See Sturgeon, 587 U.S. at 47. This legal fiction functions not in spite of the term

“applicant for admission” carrying its ordinary meaning, but precisely because

it does not. Where Congress has given a term a specialized meaning, we are

obliged to follow it.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 17

the ordinary meaning of “applicant for admission” -- rather, an “al-

ien who is an applicant for admission” means one who is “arriving”

or just “present in” the country without admission.

We consider next the second phrase, “an alien seeking ad-

mission.” Congress has not specifically defined “seeking.” The

term, which functions as an adjectival modifier of the noun “an al-

ien,” 3 must be afforded its ordinary meaning -- indicating an affirm-

ative step of search or pursuit. Seek, v., Oxford English Dictionary,

https://www.oed.com/dictionary/seek_v

[https://perma.cc/9MMT-73L9] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026) (“To

go in search or quest of; to try to find, look for . . . [a] person, thing,

or place . . .”); see also Seek, v., Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seek

[https://perma.cc/V3ZM-7MKV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). That

the word is written as a present participle (“seeking”) underscores

that it is describing some active and temporally ongoing step or

process on the part of the alien. See Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.

Evanston Ins. Co., 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022) (“A present

participle is used to signal present and continuing action.”); Carr v.

United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (looking to verb tense to dis-

cern temporal reach).

Moreover, the remainder of the phrase “alien seeking admis-

sion” clarifies the type of pursuit that is relevant for § 1225(b)(2)(A)

to apply. While the INA does not define the joint phrase “seeking

3 As defined in the INA, an “alien” refers to “any person not a citizen or na-

tional of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).

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18 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

admission,” it clearly denotes the object of the alien’s pursuit by

defining the technical term “admission” in this way:

The terms “admission” and “admitted” mean, with

respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into

the United States after inspection and authorization

by an immigration officer.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). So, the complete phrase “an alien seek-

ing admission” refers to an alien who is pursuing “lawful entry . . .

into the United States after inspection and authorization by an im-

migration officer.” This also means that the phrase “clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” refers to an entitlement to

“lawful entry” following inspection. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Beyond its definition in the INA, “admission” bears “long-

encrusted connotations” in the field of immigration law. Feliciano,

605 U.S. at 45. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Sanchez

v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409 (2021), an alien’s status as “admitted” con-

veys more than a right to lawfully remain in the United States --

indeed, there are many forms of “lawful status” that grant an alien

the right to remain, yet do not necessarily amount to “admission,”

such as asylum and temporary protected status (“TPS”). Id. at 415

(holding that “[l]awful status and admission . . . are distinct con-

cepts in immigration law,” and “[e]stablishing one does not neces-

sarily establish the other”). Within the broad scheme of the INA, a

grant of admission carries a bundle of rights and privileges not

available to those who bear other lawful statuses. Among other

things, admission potentially renders an alien eligible to adjust his

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status to that of a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”),4 see id. at

415–16; 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(3), and shifts the bur-

den of proof in removal proceedings. Unadmitted aliens must

prove “clearly and beyond a doubt” that they have a right to ad-

mission, whereas the Government has the burden to prove admit-

ted aliens are deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.8(a).

To seek “admission,” then, is a legally salient act under the

INA. The consequences of doing so stretch beyond securing a right

to enter or remain in the United States, since that right may be af-

forded on many other grounds that do not constitute admission.

See, e.g., Sanchez, 593 U.S. at 415; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(c)(1),

1254a(a)(1)(A) (instructing that aliens with asylum or TPS shall not

be removed). Instead, the act of seeking admission constitutes the

pursuit of “lawful entry . . . after inspection and authorization by

an immigration officer,” and all the rights and privileges that follow

from lawful entry, which is quite distinct from seeking another law-

ful status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). This tees up a legal fiction of

considerable importance in the INA -- an alien may be lawfully pre-

sent in the United States, but nevertheless not “admitted.”

Putting the pieces together, the plain text of § 1225(b)(2)(A),

as supplemented by the definitions chosen by Congress in the INA,

4 Although an alien who was never granted admission may still apply for LPR

status, approval in that case is difficult, and requires an immigration judge to

forgive the alien’s original illegal entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); Patel v. Garland,

596 U.S. 328, 332 (2024).

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20 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

yields this command: an alien shall be detained for a § 1229a pro-

ceeding if he (1) is arriving in the United States or is present in the

United States without having been granted lawful entry; (2) is seek-

ing lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigra-

tion officer; and (3) is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to

lawful entry, as determined by the examining immigration officer.

See id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). When read this way, the function of the

provision is clear -- arriving or present aliens who are seeking to be

inspected and granted lawful entry must demonstrate that they are

“clearly and beyond a doubt entitled” to get it, else they will be

detained and referred by the inspecting officer for a proceeding be-

fore an immigration judge to determine whether or not they are in

fact entitled to lawful entry. This understanding gives every word

and clause found in § 1225(b)(2)(A) full meaning and effect, and

uses the definitions supplied by Congress.

Applying this construction, it seems to us that Petitioners do

not fall within the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A). All agree that Petition-

ers satisfy the first condition of being “present in the United States

without having been admitted,” because they were discovered in

the interior but were never granted lawful entry. However, on this

record, we cannot also say that they were “seeking lawful entry af-

ter inspection and authorization by an immigration officer” when

they were detained. Petitioners were not applying for entry in any

literal sense when they were detained following a traffic stop, nor

were they taking any cognizable step to obtain the rights and priv-

ileges of lawful entry. They were only present in the country.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 21

They were not seeking or pursuing any object, let alone “lawful

entry.”

The Government argues, nevertheless, that Petitioners’

mere presence in the interior transforms them into applicants who

are “seeking admission,” since applicants for admission may with-

draw their application by simply leaving the country. This reading

runs contrary to both the ordinary meaning of “seeking,” which,

after all, requires taking an affirmative step or commencing some

process, see Westchester Gen. Hosp., 48 F.4th at 1307, and the partic-

ularized meaning Congress has given to the word “admission,” a

legally significant status that transcends simply the right to remain

in the country. As we see it, the Government has conflated the

passive condition of “presence” with actively “seeking” something

specific, in contravention of the actual words and definitions Con-

gress chose.

Moreover, it is indisputable that there are many other ways

to be lawfully present in the United States under the INA, without

having been lawfully admitted into this country. Because admis-

sion confers benefits beyond lawful presence in the United States,

the INA recognizes many shades of gray between an alien who is

unlawfully in the United States and one who has been “admitted.”

Consider some examples. First, DHS “may grant [an] alien

[TPS] . . . and shall not remove the alien from the United States

during the period in which such status is in effect.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(a)(1). Second, an alien may be granted asylum if he

demonstrates a credible fear of being persecuted on account of his

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22 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(A). Third,

the INA provides pathways to obtain nonimmigrant visas for coop-

erating criminal witnesses, victims of human trafficking, and vic-

tims of domestic abuse. See id. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T)–(U), (a)(51),

1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii), (D)(i)(II), 1158(d)(2). Finally, an alien or-

dered removed may seek a deferral or withholding of removal if,

for instance, DHS determines that the “alien’s life or freedom

would be threatened,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(A), such as by violent perse-

cution under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.16(a), 208.17(a). 5

The Government’s proffered reading would create a binary

choice for unadmitted aliens present in the interior: they either

seek admission or they voluntarily self-deport. Yet any fair and

thorough review of the complex text of the INA yields the obser-

vation that an alien present in the United States may inhabit many

other statuses that do not amount to an admission, but which nev-

ertheless confer a lawful basis to remain in the United States. We

think the binary choice offered by the Government has oversimpli-

fied the broad and multifaceted nature of the INA. It has pared

5 DHS may also protect certain aliens through deferred action under national

immigration enforcement policies and priorities, such as Deferred Action for

Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). 8 C.F.R. § 236.21(c)(1).

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 23

down the branching pathways of classifications of present aliens

into the single divergent status of admitted or not. 6

The Government returns to the example of a college appli-

cant, suggesting that the college applicant necessarily seeks admis-

sion to college. Again, this example is driven by giving these words

their ordinary meaning, even though in this case the critical phrase

“applicant for admission” has a particularized and technical mean-

ing chosen by Congress. Thus, we think the better example is the

one supplied by the Petitioners. Suppose a statute defined a “reg-

istered voter” as “a person aged eighteen or older, who is listed and

in good standing on the roll of registered voters maintained by their

state of residence.” Then suppose the statute provided that “any

registered voter seeking to vote in an election shall submit to an

inspection.” On a review of the statute’s ordinary meaning, it is

natural to think that a “registered voter” is “seeking to vote,” since

6 Indeed, the Government’s reading would threaten the legal fiction that runs

through the INA. The INA’s safe harbors permit some aliens to remain in the

country notwithstanding the fact that they were never “admitted.” So, these

aliens would continue to be “applicants for admission” for however long they

remain in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). If the Government’s read-

ing were correct, it seems these aliens would therefore be subject to manda-

tory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), since the relevant inquiry would begin

and end with whether they were admitted, or else whether they are “clearly

entitled” to admission. This would read out all statutory nuance. Even if an

alien secures TPS, asylum, or a deferral of removal, under the Government’s

reading, he nevertheless “shall be detained” until he can establish “clearly and

beyond a doubt” a right to be admitted, or is granted humanitarian parole. Id.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).

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24 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

a voter is a “person who votes.” Voter, n., Oxford English Diction-

ary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/voter_n

[https://perma.cc/88F8-B4PM] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026). And

yet, the statute’s definition of “registered voter” counteracts that

ordinary meaning; one can satisfy the statutory conditions of being

a “registered voter” by being on the state’s registered voter roll,

above eighteen years of age, and in good standing. None of those

conditions require the voter to vote -- indeed, the statute does not

require any affirmative act from a registered voter at all.

This example tracks the INA’s own statutory scheme. Sec-

tion 1225(b)(2)(A) pairs an active, present-tense condition with a

passive term of art, so that the two do not overlap by default. Just

as one can be both a “registered voter” and one who is “seeking to

vote,” an alien may well be an “applicant for admission” who is also

“seeking admission.” But not necessarily. Not all voters need vote

in every election, and analogously, not all aliens “present in the

United States” without having been admitted are “seeking admis-

sion.” The phrases denote distinct conditions.

The provision’s grammatical structure confirms our read-

ing. It outlines two conditions with differing grammatical frame-

works, so that each must be independently met. Most obviously,

both “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” are intro-

duced by separate conditional phrases. The provision begins “in the

case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,” and continues

with “if . . . an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted,” giving rise to two prerequisites. 8

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 25

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The second condition

also lacks any definite article, such as “the,” “this,” or “such,” which

would indicate that the “alien seeking admission” is necessarily the

same alien who is an “applicant for admission.” See, e.g., Nielsen v.

Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 407–08 (2019) (plurality opinion) (interpreting

“the” in “the alien” to be “a function word” that “a following noun

or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by

context”). Instead, the provision refers to “an” applicant for admis-

sion (denoting a first category) and “an” alien seeking admission

(denoting a second category). Small variations in grammar can

make all the difference in giving text its most accurate meaning.

The Government’s proffered reading also renders the phrase

“an alien seeking admission” surplusage in the operation of

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “an interpretative no-no.” Doe v. Princess Cruise

Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted);

see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. Again, when reading a statute we

are obliged to give each word and phrase independent meaning

wherever possible. If Congress in fact wanted an alien’s status as

an “applicant for admission” to be the sole condition for no-bond

detention, it could have simply written the provision this way:

[I]f the examining immigration officer determines

that an applicant for admission is not clearly and beyond

a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be de-

tained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this ti-

tle.

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26 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Congress chose another path. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) first es-

tablishes the general pool of aliens to whom the provision applies

(“in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission”), only

to subsequently impose a second condition limiting that pool to “al-

ien[s] seeking admission.” On this circuitous and layered text, we

cannot conclude that Congress wanted us to ignore an express con-

dition of the provision and equate two phrases with different

words, one of which it has specifically defined, to require detention

for every unadmitted alien. 7 For “[i]f Congress had wanted the pro-

vision to have that effect, it could have said so in words far simpler

than those that it wrote.” Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 798 (2022).

The Government downplays the importance of the canon

against surplusage, declaring that it is not a “silver bullet.” Doubt-

less, redundancies in law can happen, and where otherwise clear

text steers us toward repetition, we need not veer out of the way --

especially when the redundant phrases are synonymous. See Hey-

man v. Cooper, 31 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022). But here, the

plain text cuts against the Government. Congress employed two

7 Our dissenting colleague suggests that our reading -- that “applicant for ad-

mission” imposes a distinct condition from the phrase “alien seeking admis-

sion” -- renders the inclusion of present aliens in the definition of “applicant

for admission” surplusage throughout § 1225. But the phrase appears in its

unqualified form several times in § 1225, where the statute applies to all appli-

cants. Thus, for instance, as outlined in § 1225(a)(3), all applicants for admis-

sion shall be inspected, whether or not they are seeking admission. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(3); see also id. § 1225(a)(2) (stowaways are not applicants for admis-

sion regardless of what they are seeking). And more broadly, a present alien

could seek admission -- he just doesn’t have to, on the INA’s text.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 27

different phrases, introduced by separate conditional terms, which

carry distinct definitional meanings within the statute. They are

not “synonymous” on the text supplied. See SCALIA & GARNER, su-

pra, at 170 (“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in

meaning.”).

Finally, the Government theorizes that “seeking admission”

is itself a term of art that subsumes all “applicants for admission.”

This position is also unsupported by the text. To discern whether

a phrase is a term of art, we consider what evidence of particular-

ized usage is present, including specialized definitions or “long-en-

crusted connotations in a given field.” Feliciano, 605 U.S. at 45.

Again, the INA does not define “seeking admission,” only “admis-

sion.” That definition makes it abundantly clear that Petitioners

were not “seeking admission,” that is, seeking “lawful entry follow-

ing inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

The other uses of “seeking admission” within § 1225 also do

not support the Government’s interpretive theory.8 Outside of

8 In addition, while “seeking admission” appears elsewhere in the statute, it is

not given a specialized meaning beyond its ordinary one, as supplemented by

the definition of “admission”: that the phrase denotes a class of aliens taking

some affirmative step to gain lawful entry into the United States. See, e.g., 8

U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (proclaiming that an otherwise inadmissible foreign na-

tional “who is in possession of appropriate documents . . . and is seeking ad-

mission, may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmi-

grant”); id. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (lawful resident is not seeking admission unless

certain conditions are met). And to the extent the joint phrase carries a clear

meaning within the general field of immigration law, this meaning likewise

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28 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the phrase appears only twice. First, in a subpara-

graph titled “Statements,” the section states:

An applicant for admission may be required to state

under oath any information sought by an immigra-

tion officer regarding the purposes and intentions of

the applicant in seeking admission to the United States,

including the applicant’s intended length of stay and

whether the applicant intends to remain permanently

or become a United States citizen, and whether the

applicant is inadmissible.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (emphasis added). The usage of “seeking ad-

mission” in this context further suggests that the phrase refers to

one who is actively seeking to enter the United States. After all,

the questions supplied -- length of stay, purpose of entry, and inad-

missibility status -- are only relevant to those who have not yet en-

tered the country. Moreover, that “applicant for admission” is de-

scribed separate and apart from the phrase “seeking admission”

again indicates that the two are not coterminous; an applicant may

be seeking admission, and thus “may” be asked by an inspecting

officer for their “purposes and intentions” “in seeking admission to

the United States,” but does not have to be.

Second, “seeking admission” appears in the inspection pro-

vision of § 1225(a)(3). That subparagraph reads this way:

aligns with the ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Alvarado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 984 F.3d

982, 986 (11th Cir. 2020) (describing two aliens arriving at a port of entry as

“seeking admission to the United States”).

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 29

All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are appli-

cants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or re-

admission to or transit through the United States shall

be inspected by immigration officers.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). In what is perhaps its

strongest textual argument, the Government cites the phrase “or

otherwise seeking admission” from this provision, claiming that be-

ing an applicant for admission is necessarily a subset of those “seek-

ing admission,” and thus being an applicant for admission satisfies

the condition of “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A).

At the outset, even if this reading of § 1225(a)(3) were cor-

rect, it would not contravene the plain text of § 1225(b)(2)(A). For

the reasons we have explained at some length, § 1225(b)(2)(A) lists

“applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” as discrete and

separate conditions for detention. The most the inspection provi-

sion of § 1225(a)(3) can offer is further illumination of the relation-

ship between “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.”

By insisting that we must effectively read “seeking admission” out

of § 1225(b)(2)(A) on account of language found in a different pro-

vision, the Government offers a reading that fails to produce a “har-

monious whole.” FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959);

see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995) (courts

are obliged to read statutes “as a symmetrical and coherent regula-

tory scheme”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 180 (“The provisions of

a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible,

not contradictory.”).

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30 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Furthermore, there are two different ways to read the am-

biguous phrase “or otherwise.” The Government focuses on the

standalone meaning of the word “otherwise” as “in a different way

or manner,” and so proposes to read the phrase “or otherwise” in

§ 1225(a)(3) to mean that being an applicant for admission is neces-

sarily one way to be “seeking admission.” By doing so, it requires

us to ignore the critical language found in § 1225(b)(2)(A). There

is, however, a second, equally accepted and quite distinct reading

of “or otherwise.” As a joint term, the phrase can also “refer to

something that is different from something already mentioned.”

Or otherwise, idiom, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/or%20otherwise

[https://perma.cc/BQ3Q-7L37] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026); see also

Or otherwise, idiom, Cambridge Dictionary, https://diction-

ary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/or-otherwise

[https://perma.cc/4U7U-PKKF] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026)

(“[R]efer[ring] to the opposite of the word that comes before it.”);

Or otherwise, adverb, Oxford English Dictionary,

https://www.oed.com/dictionary/otherwise_n

[https://perma.cc/FYD9-52T3] (last visited Apr. 10, 2026) (defin-

ing “or otherwise” to “signify a corresponding word, thing, idea,

etc., of opposite or alternative meaning,” “the converse”). Indeed,

in other statutes, Congress has used the phrase “or otherwise” to

broaden a provision to include other, different conditions, espe-

cially when “otherwise” is followed by a series of terms. See, e.g.,

38 U.S.C. § 8102(b) (“No medical facility may be constructed or oth-

erwise acquired or altered except [under certain circumstances].”

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 31

(emphasis added)). And the Supreme Court has rejected a purely

subsumptive reading of “or otherwise” in other contexts, including

where, as here, the term following “or otherwise” “captures mate-

rial that does not fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated categories

but is nevertheless meant to be covered.” Cunha, 2026 WL

1146044, at *9 (quoting Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA,

Inc., 586 U.S. 123, 125 (2019)).

Thus, § 1225(a)(3) provides that any applicant for admission,

along with any alien who is seeking admission, readmission, or

transit through the United States, shall be inspected, to ensure that

“[a]ll aliens” -- no matter their goal upon arrival at the border -- will

be inspected. This reading is wholly consonant with both the ac-

tual subject of § 1225(a)(3) (“Inspection”), and the broader focus of

§ 1225 itself -- which, given its title, concerns the inspection of “ar-

riving aliens.” 9 And by preserving the distinction between “appli-

cants for admission” and “alien[s] seeking admission,” this reading

harmonizes § 1225(a)(3) with § 1225(b)(2)(A). It does not displace

the “seeking admission” language in § 1225(b)(2)(A) by importing

in a technical meaning from a related but collateral provision on

9 The section’s full title is “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited re-

moval of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

Section 1225(a) is also titled “Inspection,” and if Congress could not be any

clearer, § 1225(a)(3) is again titled “Inspection.” Id. § 1225(a)(3). Titles may

“shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase,” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Bal-

timore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947), and are “permissible indica-

tors of meaning,” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 221. In this case, all the titles

point not to a technical meaning of “seeking admission” buried in § 1225(a)(3),

but instead to merely a description of the aliens who must be inspected.

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32 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

inspection. See Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. at 389; Gustafson, 513

U.S. at 569.

Our reading of “or otherwise” also has the added virtue of

statutory modesty. When evaluating interpretations of an agency’s

statutory authority, a court must greet claims to the exercise of

great power with greater skepticism. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“When an agency claims to discover in a

long-extant statute an unheralded power . . . [courts] typically greet

its announcement with a measure of skepticism.”). The Supreme

Court has long distinguished between “everyday exercise[s] of fed-

eral power” and “extraordinary cases” where the impact of the au-

thority claimed is vast. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 595 U.S.

109, 117 (2022) (per curium) (citation modified); West Virginia v.

EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022). In an extraordinary case, the nature

of our review may change, since we “expect Congress to speak

clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast eco-

nomic and political significance.” Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of

Health & Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (per curiam) (citation

modified).

Here, the Government’s theory relies on the “oblique [and]

elliptical language” of “or otherwise” to justify a new and “funda-

mental” change to the detention provisions found in the INA. West

Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723. The Government would have us believe

that Congress effected a mass detention campaign of every unad-

mitted alien present in the country, not by simply commanding

that every applicant for admission be detained, nor by including the

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 33

phrase “seeking admission” within the definition of applicant for

admission, see Castañon-Nava, 161 F.4th at 1061, but instead by join-

ing “applicant for admission” with “seeking admission” (and sev-

eral other distinct terms, in the conjunctive) in a different part of

the statute, which itself says not a word about detention. This read-

ing “taxes the credulity of the credulous,” falling well short of clear

congressional authorization. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466

(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It produces a paradigmatic “elephant

in a mousehole” that we are reluctant to embrace, hiding a sweep-

ing reorientation of § 1225 inside an otherwise innocuous and sep-

arate provision that only addresses inspection. See Whitman v. Am.

Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not

alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms

or ancillary provisions . . . .”). Not surprisingly, we remain skeptical

that § 1225(a)(3) carries the “hidden message[ ]” the Government

posits. 10 Feliciano, 605 U.S. at 45.

To bolster its interpretation, the Government relies on Vil-

larreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (en

banc). In that case, we held that the phrase “or otherwise” can con-

nect a statute’s verbs so as to subsume a first listed action into a

10 Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, our conclusion does not rely on

the major questions doctrine. The principles of skepticism that we recount

were adopted by the Supreme Court before the major questions doctrine took

on its present form. They have long instructed us to exercise some caution

before reading unclear statutory text in a manner that would yield sweeping

consequences for the rest of the statute. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468. We do

no more than apply those longstanding principles.

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34 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

second one. Id. at 963. But Villarreal is of no help in this case, since

we are confronted with a markedly different statutory structure.

For one thing, the subsuming quality of “or otherwise” in Villarreal

was perfectly consistent with the statute’s broader focus and text,

and did not (unlike in this case) introduce a real tension into the

statute by producing an atextual result in a separate provision. See

id. at 963, 966 (noting “[s]tatutory context confirms [the] reading”

of “or otherwise”). For another, in that case the “or otherwise”

language was the central text at the heart of the parties’ dispute,

rather than a different and ancillary mention of “or otherwise” out-

side of the disputed text. See id. at 963 (describing “or otherwise”

as the “key phrase” to interpret in the contested provision). 11

Nor is the Government’s citation to Villarreal consonant

with § 1225(a)(3)’s grammatical structure. Unlike in that case, here

the provision includes “a mix of parts of speech: the noun ‘appli-

cants for admission’ alongside the adjectival present participle

11 The Government’s narrow focus on “seeking admission” as the subsuming

term is also logically unsupported by the full text of the provision. Its reading

might be more persuasive if the provision at issue followed the structure of “A

or otherwise B.” This would denote a clear referent (“A”) subsumed by a sec-

ondary concept (“B”). Instead, § 1225(a)(3) says more. See Arkansas Game &

Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36 (2012) (“[T]he first rule of . . .

statutory interpretation is: Read on.”). The full text requires inspection of al-

iens “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or re-

admission to or transit through the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis

added). So, the structure is: “A or otherwise B or C or D.” This does not mean

all applicants are necessarily seeking admission.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 35

‘seeking’ and participial phrase ‘seeking admission or readmis-

sion.’” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting);

contra Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (“This use of ‘or otherwise’ to con-

nect verbs is a familiar construction.” (emphasis added)). “Thus, the

subsection Congress actually wrote is more like saying, at the end

of football season, ‘All students who are football players or other-

wise seeking to play football or cheerlead should come to the gym

for an info session this evening.’” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at

518. Although “[i]n a grammatical void, we might be tempted to

equate ‘football players’ with ‘students seeking to play football,’ or

deem the former a subset of the latter,” those “players on the actual

football team (the high school equivalent of a statutory term of art)

would likely disagree.” Id.; see Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 976–77 (Ros-

enbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that mandatory detention

applies only to a narrower category of applicants for admission:

those seeking lawful entry into the United States. In sweeping Pe-

titioners (and all unadmitted aliens present in the country) into

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s scope, the Government offers a false, binary

choice between admission and self-deportation. Its textual com-

parison makes the critical error of adopting the INA’s terms of art

when it is convenient to do so (for instance, to render Petitioners

“applicants for admission”), but ignoring those same terms of art

and instead relying on a comparison of ordinary meanings to define

the provision’s outer bounds. See Avila, 170 F.4th at 1138 (Erickson,

J., dissenting). As we see it, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Peti-

tioners or to other present aliens not seeking admission.

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36 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

B.

“Statutory structure confirms our conclusion.” Biden, 597

U.S. at 799. When interpreting a statute, it is incumbent upon the

court to situate text in context, and consider the broader structural

ramifications of a proffered reading. See, e.g., Kasten, 563 U.S. at 7;

Perez, 110 F.4th at 1308. Here, reading § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to

all present unadmitted aliens would have real consequences for the

broader statutory scheme, which cannot easily be reconciled with

either the text of the INA or Supreme Court precedent.

Reading § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to all unadmitted aliens

present in the country would shift the center of gravity for deten-

tion authority under the INA, transforming an ancillary catchall

provision into the statute’s chief detention mechanism, and blur-

ring the line between two different detention pathways. The INA’s

text confirms that the two relevant sections on detention govern

distinct classes of aliens: § 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking

entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in

the interior. By interpreting § 1225 to stretch far beyond the border

and ports of entry, the Government vitiates this longstanding dis-

tinction.

On its face, § 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration offic-

ers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for

hearing,” stakes out the provisions and procedures applicable to

the nation’s borders, describing how arriving and traveling aliens

seeking to enter the United States are to be inspected, processed,

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 37

and -- when necessary -- detained or removed. The section accom-

plishes this through two basic concepts: inspection and admission.

It begins with § 1225(a), titled “Inspection,” which addresses defini-

tions and procedures that inform the rest of § 1225: most im-

portantly, as we have seen, it defines an “applicant for admission”

as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admit-

ted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). It

explains that an “arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible to

apply for admission . . . and shall be ordered removed upon inspec-

tion by an immigration officer,” unless he applies for asylum. Id.

§ 1225(a)(2).

Section 1225(a)(3) lays out the imperative that “[a]ll aliens

(including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or oth-

erwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the

United States shall be inspected by immigration officers.” Id.

§ 1225(a)(3). Again, this provision, most naturally read, covers all

potential classes of aliens at the border, ensuring that all are in-

spected. See supra Part III(A). Then, § 1225(a)(4) instructs that at

any time, an alien “applying for admission” may “withdraw the ap-

plication for admission” by departing from the United States. Id.

§ 1225(a)(4). Finally, § 1225(a)(5) notes that applicants for admis-

sion may be required to provide oath-sworn statements to immi-

gration officers “in seeking admission to the United States,” includ-

ing about their “intended length of stay,” whether they “intend[ ]

to remain permanently or become a United States citizen,” and

whether they are inadmissible. Id. § 1225(a)(5).

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38 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Section 1225 continues with § 1225(b), titled “Inspection of

applicants for admission.” First, § 1225(b)(1), titled “Inspection of

aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who

have not been admitted or paroled,” lays out the procedure for the

first class of aliens at the border: those subject to expedited removal

proceedings. Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (titled “Screening”) says that

arriving aliens who lack proper papers or who possess fraudulent

papers are removed “without further hearing or review,” unless

they claim asylum -- a procedure detailed throughout the subse-

quent sections. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)–(B).

Only then does § 1225(b)(2) appear, titled “Inspection of

other aliens.” It commands that an “alien who is an applicant for

admission” “shall be detained for a proceeding” if he is “an alien

seeking admission” and “if the examining immigration officer de-

termines” that he is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has explained

that this provision “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all

applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1),” meaning

those not subjected to expedited removal. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583

U.S. 281, 287 (2018). This makes sense; even if an alien seeking

admission has the necessary papers to pass screening, he may nev-

ertheless be inadmissible on any number of other grounds. Section

1225(b)(2)(A) ensures that these aliens do not slip through the

cracks, and instead orders that they be detained for fuller review.

The remainder of § 1225(b)(2) reinforces its applicability to

the border. Section 1225(b)(2)(B) lays out certain exceptions for

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 39

crewmen, stowaways, and those “to whom [§ 1225(b)(1)] applies.”

Then, § 1225(b)(2)(C) narrows the field, explaining that applicants

for admission described in § 1225(b)(2)(A) (that is to say, those

“seeking admission”) who are “arriving on land (whether or not at

a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to

the United States” may be returned to that territory pending the

completion of a § 1229a proceeding. This provision indicates that

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) describes those entering the United States, specifi-

cally applying to a subset of that group: those arriving by land from

a contiguous territory.

Finally, the last provisions of § 1225 lay out additional pro-

cedures for border inspection. Section 1225(c) (“Removal of aliens

inadmissible on security and related grounds”) concerns the re-

moval of arriving aliens who “may be inadmissible” on an expe-

dited basis for certain security-related concerns. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(c)(1). And § 1225(d) (“Authority relating to inspections”)

authorizes border agents to conduct routine inspections, including

“board[ing] and search[ing] any vessel . . . or vehicle in which they

believe aliens are being brought into the United States.” Id.

§ 1225(d)(1).

In view of this text, § 1225 seems to us to have been designed

by Congress to govern arriving aliens. It lays out the procedures

and authority for officers to inspect arriving vessels and people,

couching its scope in the language of “arriving aliens,” “alien[s]

seeking admission,” and aliens seeking “transit through the United

States.”

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40 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Section 1226, conversely, supplies a different rule of deten-

tion that applies to aliens DHS seeks to remove from the interior.

Recall that § 1226(a) authorizes DHS to detain any alien “pending

a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United

States.” This language applies to both admitted and unadmitted

aliens, since either may be subject to removal proceedings. See id.

§ 1229a(a)(1)–(2), (c)(2)(A), & (e)(2)(A). While the Government

claims that § 1226(a) applies only to aliens who were first admitted,

nothing in the provision itself supports this reading. The statute

uses the catchall term “removed,” bolstering the provision’s role as

a default rule of detention.

Section 1226(c) then limits the detain-or-release authority of

§ 1226(a), by rendering ineligible for release aliens who are either

“inadmissible” or “deportable” for the reasons enumerated in the

statute. See id. § 1226(c). Following the recent passage of the Laken

Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1)(E)), Congress expanded the mandatory detention provi-

sions of § 1226(c) specifically to include present, unadmitted aliens

who were convicted of or charged with certain offenses. Thus, the

provisions of § 1226 set out a general rule of detention for aliens --

like Petitioners -- who are suspected of being unlawfully in the in-

terior, granting DHS authority to detain those aliens at its discre-

tion pending removal proceedings, subject to the bond and condi-

tional parole provisions of § 1226(a)(1)–(2).

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 41

The Supreme Court reinforced this general understanding

in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). There, the Court con-

sidered whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the constitu-

tional avoidance canon in interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226(c)

to require periodic bond hearings. Id. at 285, 292, 304. The Gov-

ernment argued that “[i]n virtually all cases, Section 1225(b) is ap-

plied to aliens seeking initial entry.” Supplemental Brief for Peti-

tioners at 4, Jennings, 583 U.S. 281 (No. 15-1204). And at oral argu-

ment, the Solicitor General explained that § 1226 applied to aliens

in the interior. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, 12, Jennings,

583 U.S. 281 (No. 15-1204) (Oct. 3, 2017) (“1226 is the provision that

we use when we arrest somebody who is . . . within the United

States; 1225 is the one we use when we are dealing with aliens who

arrive at our shores.”).

The Court agreed, opining that “[t]o implement its immi-

gration policy, the Government must be able to decide (1) who

may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering,”

a process that “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports

of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien

seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

286–87. It explained that § 1225 applies at the first step, sorting ar-

riving aliens into classes to process and detain, and § 1225(b)(2)(A)

was a “catchall provision.” Id. at 286–88. Conversely, the Court

observed that § 1226 “generally governs the process of arresting

and detaining” aliens “present in the country,” including aliens

“who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been con-

victed of certain criminal offenses since admission.” Id. at 288–89.

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42 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

The Government insists that Jennings does not control, since

its description of the INA is merely dicta. However, Supreme

Court explications of governing principles of law cannot be so eas-

ily brushed aside. As we have said, “there is dicta and then there is

dicta, and then there is Supreme Court dicta.” Schwab v. Crosby,

451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court’s interpretation of

the INA was not a passing, off-hand remark -- it was an expansive

and detailed account of how the statute is best read. We are

obliged to afford Jennings some weight in how to view the provi-

sions at issue today. Moreover, that the Court construed the INA

in this manner in reaching its ultimate holding again suggests why

our reading of the relevant provisions is most natural. We are re-

quired, if possible, to give full meaning to both sections, and that is

what Jennings did, at least in broad strokes.

The Government’s interpretation cannot readily be recon-

ciled with Jennings. Further, on its face, § 1226(a) embraces deten-

tion for admitted and unadmitted aliens, since either group may be

“removed.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). But if the Government’s

reading were correct, all unadmitted aliens would already be sub-

ject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This risk of re-

dundancy gets worse when we factor in the language of § 1226(c),

which exempts “inadmissible” and “deportable” aliens from release

eligibility. The distinction is critical; “deportability” applies to ad-

mitted aliens, see id. § 1227(a) (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the

United States shall . . . be removed if the alien is within one or more

of the following classes of deportable aliens[.]” (emphasis added)),

whereas inadmissibility applies to unadmitted aliens, see id.

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 43

§ 1229a(a)(1)–(2), (c)(2)(A), & (e)(2)(A). Why, then, would

§ 1226(c) include exceptions for both deportable and inadmissible

aliens, if the provision it limits (§ 1226(a)) only applies to admitted

aliens? What’s more, why would the Laken Riley Act target unad-

mitted aliens who were otherwise already included within the am-

bit of § 1225(b)(2)(A) by later adding a new and separate provision?

The Government offers three answers. None are persua-

sive. First, it points to places in the INA where deportability and

inadmissibility intersect, arguing that the mention of inadmissibil-

ity in § 1226(c) “sweeps more broadly than Section 1225(b)(2).”

The Government’s chief example is § 1227(a)(1)(A), which states

that “[a]ny alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status

was within one or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the

law existing at such time is deportable.” It is unclear how this ob-

servation helps the Government. Section 1227(a)(1)(A) is not one

of the included grounds in § 1226(c), and in any event, an alien ad-

mitted in error is not “inadmissible,” he is “deportable.” The ex-

ample provides no clarity as to which “inadmissible” aliens remain

subject to § 1226(c), but are not already subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Nor does this explain why, through the Laken Riley Act, Congress

targeted aliens who are inadmissible for entering without inspec-

tion in § 1226(c), including those detained pursuant to

§ 1226(c)(1)(E). 12 See id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(i), 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

12 In its Reply Brief, the Government also argues that “the specific governs the

general,” insisting that because § 1226(a) presents a broader rule of detention,

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) should prevail. However, the general/specific canon applies

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44 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Next, the Government suggests that § 1226(c) is in fact com-

plimentary to § 1225(b)(2)(A), because it limits the humanitarian

parole provisions of § 1182. This argument is undermined by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2018)

(plurality opinion), which rejected a Ninth Circuit ruling that any

arrest pursuant to § 1226(c) must be effectuated immediately fol-

lowing an alien’s release from criminal custody. Id. at 396. Just like

in Jennings, the Court in Preap observed that § 1226(a) “sets out the

general rule regarding [an alien’s] arrest and detention pending a

decision on removal,” and grants “discretion either to detain the

alien or to release him on bond or parole.” Id. at 396–97. The

Court was clear that § 1226(c) is “a limit on the authority conferred

by subsection (a),” meaning “[a]ll relevant detainees” subject to

§ 1226(c) are “arrested by authority that springs from subsection

(a).” Id. at 409; see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.

Beyond Preap, the Government overreads § 1226(c), assert-

ing that the provision separately limits the Attorney General’s hu-

manitarian parole authority under § 1182. As written, this limita-

tion would not make much sense. If Congress meant to limit the

Attorney General’s authority, it could well have done so in either

§ 1225(b)(2) or § 1182(d)(5) -- not in an ancillary provision that says

nothing about either part of the statute. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.

“when conflicting provisions simply cannot be reconciled.” SCALIA &

GARNER, supra, at 183; see CSX Corp. v. United States, 18 F.4th 672, 683 (11th

Cir. 2021). Here, a conflict only arises on the Government’s reading, where a

separate account must be made for § 1226(c).

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 45

473, 497 (2015) (Congress does not change fundamental aspects of

a regulatory scheme through “a winding path of connect-the-dots

provisions”). After all, § 1182 parole already has enumerated ex-

ceptions to which Congress could have added if that were its inten-

tion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(B), 1184(f).

Finally, the Government tries to take the sting out of sur-

plusage, contending that under either reading of the INA, there is

overlap between § 1225 and § 1226. But as with the previous itera-

tion of this argument, the Government tries to handwave away a

fatal problem. On the Government’s reading, every unadmitted

alien -- whether a criminal or not -- is subject to mandatory deten-

tion under § 1225(b)(2)(A), even though a significant subset of that

group is also subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). This

is no small overlap, but a serious statutory redundancy. See Bilski

v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010); Henderson v. United States,

568 U.S. 266, 281 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The Petitioners’ reading is considerably more harmonious.

On their view, § 1226 supplies the default rule of detention for an

alien arrested and detained in the interior, whether he is being re-

moved on grounds of deportability or inadmissibility. Section

1226(c), then, limits the alien’s eligibility for bond or parole if he is

deportable or inadmissible on one of the enumerated bases. 13 Sec-

tion 1225(b)(2)(A), conversely, applies to an altogether distinct

13 Because § 1226(c) applies separately from § 1225(b)(2)(A), nothing in our

opinion suggests that an alien with criminal or terrorism-related charges is el-

igible for bond; he is not, as § 1226(c) makes clear in no uncertain terms.

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46 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

group of aliens -- those who have not yet entered the United States,

but are “seeking admission” at the border. Within that group, all

are detained unless they are “clearly” entitled to admission, so they

may be processed for a determination of admissibility. This read-

ing gives effect to each section -- all parts work in concert, and no

statutory gymnastics are required.

C.

Finally, a review of the relevant history of the INA “confirms

the plain import of its text.” Biden, 597 U.S. at 804; see also Niz-

Chavez, 593 U.S. at 165 (resolving residual “doubt . . . about the

meaning of . . . two specific statutes” with “a wider look at IIRIRA’s

statutory structure and history”). Congress did not construct

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) from whole cloth -- the language finds deep roots in

the country’s historical immigration laws and practices.

“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry

into the United States and one who has never entered runs

throughout immigration law.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693

(2001). As documented by amici, near the close of the nineteenth

century, Congress expanded border agents’ powers to specifically

detain arriving aliens pending review. Brief for Amici Curiae Immi-

gration Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners-Appellees [hereinaf-

ter, “ILS Br.”] at 8. Thus, in the Immigration Act of 1893, Congress

wrote that “it shall be the duty of every inspector of arriving alien

immigrants to detain for a special inquiry . . . every person who

may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to

admission,” ch. 206, 27 Stat. 569, 570, first invoking the “clearly and

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 47

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” language still found in

modern law, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And in the Immigration Act

of 1903, Congress added the “shall be detained” instruction, writ-

ing: “Every alien who may not appear to the examining immigrant

inspector at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to land shall be detained for examination in relation

thereto by a board of special inquiry.” Pub. L. No. 57-162, § 24, 32

Stat. 1213, 1219–20.

The INA of 1952 carried this language forward into the mod-

ern immigration regime. It provided that:

Every alien . . . who may not appear to the examining

immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly

and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained

for further inquiry to be conducted by a special in-

quiry officer.

Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 235(b), 66 Stat. 163, 199. When Congress re-

visited this language in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-

alty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), it pro-

duced an iteration close to the one now in effect:

Except as provided in subparagraph (B), if the exam-

ining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking entry is not clearly and beyond a doubt enti-

tled to enter, the alien shall be detained for a hearing

before a special inquiry officer.

Id. § 422(b)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 1271.

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48 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

Since 1893, Congress has employed some version of the lan-

guage now before us in the INA. In each instance, the focal point

has been on detention of arriving aliens. The various statutes have

used analogous terms, such as “arriving alien immigrants,” aliens

“at the port of arrival,” and “alien[s] seeking entry.” Moreover,

each of these iterations has employed the same standard of review:

“clearly and beyond a doubt entitled” to land or enter. Thus, when

Congress drafted IIRIRA in 1996, it should come as no great sur-

prise that it used similar language it had applied unambiguously to

arriving aliens for over a century of practice.

To make sense of this history, the Government argues, as it

must, that IIRIRA changed everything. It insists that when revising

the INA, Congress sought to eliminate any distinction between un-

admitted aliens present in the interior and those arriving at the bor-

der, historically effectuated through the so-called “entry doctrine.”

The Government cites to a line from a House Judiciary Committee

report, which commented that one aim of IIRIRA was to address

the “equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that [were]

not available to aliens who present[ed] themselves for inspection.”

H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996). In addressing the dis-

tinction between unadmitted arriving aliens and those within the

interior, the Government says, Congress must also have meant to

overhaul how each group was detained, to avoid a “perverse incen-

tive to enter.”

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 49

However, the legislative record tells another story. 14 Con-

gress was clear that IIRIRA “modif[ied] the entry doctrine”; it did

not discard the doctrine wholesale. H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 107–

08 (1997). The beginning of the very sentence the Government

relies on undermines its view, explaining that Congress sought to

replace “certain aspects” of the doctrine. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 at

225. And Congress was exceedingly clear about which parts of the

entry doctrine it meant to target: namely, the discordant distinction

between deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings.

Under the old regime, those who entered without inspec-

tion and were later apprehended were subject to deportation pro-

ceedings, just like legal residents who later became deportable. Id.

at 226 (“Currently, aliens who have entered without inspection are

deportable under section 241(a)(1)(B).”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-879 at

107–08 (bemoaning that unlawful aliens were “entitled to the same

rights in deportation proceedings as a long-term legal resident of

the U.S.”). Conversely, arriving aliens were historically subject to

“truncated exclusion proceedings,” which had “several procedural

disadvantages as compared to those in deportability proceedings.”

ILS Br. at 22 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1982)).

Congress addressed this by centralizing removal proceed-

ings. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 at 226. It “eliminate[d] the distinction

between ‘exclusion’ and ‘deportation’ proceedings,” creating a

14 We have looked at this legislative record only because the Government in-

vokes it to assert that IIRIRA changed everything that came before.

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50 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

new, “single form of ‘removal’ proceeding[s]” with “different bur-

dens of proof assigned on the basis of the alien’s status.” H.R. REP.

NO. 104-879 at 107–08. “Thus, an illegal alien would have the bur-

den to prove his or her right to remain in the U.S., while in the case

of a long-term permanent resident of the U.S., the burden would

be on the Government to establish why the alien should be re-

moved.” Id. at 108. Within this new “admission doctrine,” those

“present in the United States who ha[d] not been admitted” and

those “who arrive[d] in the United States” would all be subject to

removal on the same procedural ground of inadmissibility. 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 at 226, 228.

None of these important revisions, however, suggest Con-

gress also sought to throw out the entry doctrine where federal de-

tention authority was concerned. There is no evidence in the rec-

ord that Congress anticipated, much less intended, that its revisions

of § 1225 would mandate potentially the largest detention opera-

tion in the Republic’s history. Rather, the record is replete with

evidence that Congress intended for § 1225 to continue governing

procedures for arriving aliens, laying out how aliens arriving in or

traveling through the country are inspected, detained, and re-

moved on an expedited basis. The House Judiciary Committee be-

labored this point, explaining how the revisions to the section

changed the treatment of “arriving aliens.”15 H.R. REP. NO. 104-

469 at 228–29; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 33, 208–09 (1996).

15 The law’s final language mirrored this intent.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) recast

the old language of AEDPA to incorporate the new admissibility doctrine into

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 51

Congress was also keenly aware of the limited detention re-

sources available when drafting IIRIRA. In expanding detention

for criminal aliens under § 1226(c), it allocated funding for an addi-

tional five hundred beds in detention centers by the end of fiscal

year 1997, and also added a special escape hatch for the Attorney

General, so that enforcement of § 1226(c) could be delayed for up

to two years if detention space proved to be insufficient -- an escape

hatch the Attorney General actually used. See IIRIRA §§ 303(b)(2),

386(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-586, 3009-653; H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 at

207; ILS Br. at 18. No similar considerations were given for the

sweeping detention provisions the Government says IIRIRA baked

into § 1225. If Congress really had sought to launch such a deten-

tion campaign, it’s a wonder Congress did not factor in the scale of

new detentions when it was crunching the numbers -- despite do-

ing so to execute on a far narrower provision. See H.R. REP. NO.

104-469 at 110–11, 119 (estimating at least four million aliens were

unlawfully within the country).

The original purpose in passing IIRIRA is confirmed by

nearly thirty years of unbroken executive practice. “Since IIRIRA’s

the existing framework, changing “seeking entry” to “seeking admission,” and

defining “admission” as “lawful entry.” Compare AEDPA § 422(b)(2)(A), 110

Stat. at 1271, with IIRIRA § 235(b)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 3009-582. And § 1226 de-

tention pending “removal” “restate[d] the current provisions . . . regarding the

authority of the Attorney General to arrest, detain, and release on bond an

alien who is not lawfully in the United States,” an authority which had long

applied to those who were never admitted. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 at 229; ILS

Br. at 9. These changes are consistent with Congress’s stated aims.

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52 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

enactment [twenty-nine] years ago, every Presidential administra-

tion” has interpreted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply only to people seek-

ing admission, not those who have entered the country. Biden, 597

U.S. at 805. Shortly after IIRIRA’s passage, the Department of Jus-

tice issued federal regulations to give meaning and effect to the law.

It explained in clear terms that “[d]espite being applicants for ad-

mission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or

paroled . . . will be eligible for bond and bond re-determination.”

Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Re-

moval of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Proce-

dures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997). The Executive

has long advised that “inadmissible aliens, except for arriving al-

iens, have available to them bond re-determination hearings before

an immigration judge.” Id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)(1).

To be sure, the usefulness of past executive interpretations

is limited, since past practice does not allow us to ignore clear stat-

utory language. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S.

320, 329 (2015). But that five presidential administrations over

three decades have read IIRIRA to distinguish between arriving and

present aliens 16 is “powerful evidence” that the reading “is natural

16 The Government cites one BIA opinion and a different section of the Federal

Regulations to suggest that earlier authorities considered § 1225(b)(2)(A) to

apply to all unadmitted aliens. See In re Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734, 743

(BIA 2012) (noting that “seeking admission” may not require a literal request

for permission); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii). But in In re Lemus-Losa, the BIA in-

terpreted a different part of the INA, and committed the same error the Gov-

ernment does here -- failing to give full effect to the phrase “seeking admis-

sion” under the statute. And it certainly did not represent an effort on the part

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 53

and reasonable.” Abramski, 573 U.S. at 203 (Scalia, J., dissenting);

see also Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 130 (1983).

The Supreme Court “has long said that courts may consider the

consistency of an agency’s views” to “weigh the persuasiveness of

any interpretation it proffers in court,” and has cautioned us that

“[a] longstanding ‘want of assertion of power by those who pre-

sumably would be alert to exercise it’ may provide some clue that

the power was never conferred.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477,

516 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (first quoting Bittner v. United

States, 598 U.S. 85, 97 (2023); then quoting FTC v. Bunte Brothers,

Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941)).

Congress has also revisited federal immigration laws several

times, yet never has it thought to correct this supposedly glaring

oversight. Congress passed the Laken Riley Act just last year,

which touched upon the same detention authority now in dispute.

If ever there was a time to clarify the contours of § 1225 and § 1226,

it was then. But Congress didn’t do so; instead, it sanctioned Peti-

tioners’ reading by expanding mandatory detention through

of immigration authorities to deny bond to unadmitted aliens within the inte-

rior; rather, the Government made its prior position on the scope of § 1225

clear. See supra Part III(B). Similarly, the Government’s invocation of 8 C.F.R.

§ 235.3(b)(1)(ii) is also unpersuasive, since that provision expressly applies to

the expedited removal of aliens under § 1225(b)(1), not § 1225(b)(2)(A). See 8

C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1) (“The expedited removal provisions shall apply to the follow-

ing classes of aliens . . .” (emphasis added)). On this record, then, until the

Government’s recent change of heart, no prior executive actor clearly consid-

ered or contemplated § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to all unadmitted aliens.

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54 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

§ 1226(c). Where Congress revisits a law but leaves a “longstand-

ing administrative construction . . . untouched,” the lack of correc-

tive action suggests Congress agreed with the construction in

place. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); see also Zemel v. Rusk,

381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965). Thus, the record evidence available leads us

as well to reject the Government’s ahistorical reading.

IV.

As a final thought, the Government argues that even if the

Petitioners are dead right in their interpretation of the INA, each of

them qualifies as an alien who is “seeking admission” because,

upon his arrest and the initiation of removal proceedings, he did

not voluntarily self-deport. It asserts that whatever affirmative step

is required to “seek” admission to the United States, contesting

one’s removal assuredly counts, since an applicant for admission in

§ 1229a proceedings typically has the burden to establish his right

to admission.

This argument fails at the gate. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) makes

it clear that an applicant for admission’s status as one “seeking ad-

mission” becomes relevant upon examination by an immigration

officer, which occurs before a § 1229a proceeding even commences.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (“[I]f the examining immigration officer

determines . . . the alien shall be detained for a proceeding . . . ”).

So, on the face of the text, the proper order of operations follows:

inspection of an applicant for admission first (at which time, if he is

“seeking admission,” he shall be detained), then referral to a

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25-14065 Opinion of the Court 55

§ 1229a proceeding before an immigration judge. The Govern-

ment has reversed the proper ordering contained in the statute, vi-

tiating its temporal language.17 Moreover, a § 1229a proceeding

occurs before an “immigration judge”; it does not constitute an ex-

amination by an “immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1); com-

pare id. § 1101(b)(4), with id. § 1101(a)(18).

Finally, we think the Government’s argument falters be-

cause, as we’ve already observed, seeking relief from removal is

not the same thing as seeking admission, and the notion that con-

testing one’s removal under § 1229a constitutes “seeking admis-

sion” profoundly oversimplifies the manner in which removal may

be contested. As the Supreme Court made clear in Sanchez, there

are other ways in which an alien who enters unlawfully may shield

himself from removal. See 593 U.S. at 415; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4).

While some aliens may be relegated to different proceedings, what

becomes of those who are unadmitted and placed in § 1229a pro-

ceedings, but seek other lawful status? The Government’s reading

would say they are all “seeking admission,” even though their law-

ful status, if granted, would not count as an admission. See supra

Part III(A). The INA does not support this reading.

17 The Petitioners also observe that the Government’s argument would pro-

duce an anomalous result by making bond eligibility turn on whether or not

an alien is seeking relief. So, an alien who fully abandons his claim to relief

and agrees to self-deport may seek bond before self-deporting, but an alien

who has a credible claim to asylum or another lawful status would be ineligi-

ble for bond.

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56 Opinion of the Court 25-14065

V.

Simply put, the language that Congress has chosen to use

does not grant to the Executive unfettered authority to detain,

without the possibility of bond, every unadmitted alien present in

the country. Nowhere in the text, structure, or history of the INA

does that reading find steady footing. We are obliged to read the

words found in the statute -- “an alien who is an applicant for ad-

mission” and “an alien seeking admission” -- in line with the mean-

ing Congress has given them. When we do so, it appears to us that

Congress has instead preserved the longstanding border-interior

distinction for purposes of detention, a position it has taken for

over a hundred years.

We therefore reject the Government’s reading and affirm

the district court’s orders granting each of the Petitioners habeas

corpus relief.

AFFIRMED.

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 1

LAGOA, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

The majority concedes that “applicant for admission” and

“seeking admission,” on their ordinary meaning, are “synony-

mous.” Maj. Op. 15–16. It then spends fifty pages explaining why

the ordinary meaning does not apply. The Fifth and Eighth Cir-

cuits disagree. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th

Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). So do I.

I respectfully dissent.

I.

Begin with what Congress wrote. See Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S.

399, 404 (2020). Section 1225(a)(1) “deem[s]” “[a]n alien present in

the United States who has not been admitted” an “applicant for ad-

mission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 1

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of

an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the exam-

ining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for

a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

1 Although this appeal concerns consolidated cases with two petitioners, I use

the singular “Petitioner” when referring to the Appellees.

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2 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Pe-

titioner is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1). 2 The

majority holds that Petitioner is nevertheless not “seeking admis-

sion.” The statute says otherwise.

A.

There is no daylight between an “applicant for admission”

and an “alien seeking admission.” To “apply” means “[t]o request

or seek employment, acceptance, or admission.” The American

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 63 (1980) (emphasis

added). As the Fifth Circuit put it, “[w]hen a person applies for

something, they are necessarily seeking it.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166

F.4th at 502 (citing Webster’s New World College Dictionary 69,

1299 (4th ed. 1999)). Common usage confirms as much. No one

would say, “she is an applicant for admission to the University of

Miami, but she is not seeking admission to the University of Mi-

ami.”

Petitioner resists that conclusion with an analogy of his own.

He asks us to imagine a statute defining “registered voter” as “any-

one who is a U.S. citizen, over 18 years of age and who has com-

pleted their voter registration form,” and then providing that “in

2 Petitioner Hernandez Alvarez, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States

unlawfully in approximately November 2019 and has resided here continu-

ously since that time. Petitioner Cerro Perez, also a Mexican citizen, entered

the country unlawfully in 2015 and has likewise maintained continuous resi-

dence. Both came to the attention of immigration authorities following rou-

tine traffic stops, which resulted in their respective arrests by federal immigra-

tion officers.

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 3

the case of an individual who is a registered voter, if an election

inspector determines that an individual seeking to vote does not

meet the eligibility requirements, the individual must submit to an

inspection.” A registered voter, he observes, need not be seeking

to vote. The same, he concludes, must be true of an applicant for

admission.

The analogy does not hold. Registering and voting are dif-

ferent acts directed at different objects, and the hypothetical statute

keeps them distinct. One phrase describes a completed qualifica-

tion, the other describes an election-day act. Section 1225 does no

such thing. It pairs “applicant for admission” with “seeking admis-

sion”—the same act, the same object, on both sides of the pairing.

If Petitioner wished to make his analogy parallel, he should

have hypothesized a statute using “applicant for voter registration”

and “seeking to register to vote.” One suspects the reason he did

not is that, so constructed, the analogy would refute the very posi-

tion it was designed to support. An applicant for voter registration

is plainly seeking to register to vote. So too here. “Just as an appli-

cant to a college seeks admission, an applicant for admission to the

United States is ‘seeking admission’ to the same, regardless

whether the person actively engages in further affirmative acts to

gain admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502.

The majority nonetheless adopts the voter analogy. See Maj.

Op. 23–24. But the analogy works only if “registered voter” and

“applicant for admission” are doing the same work. They are not.

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4 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

“Registered voter” looks backward. The Oxford English

Dictionary (OED)—the majority’s preferred source for this exer-

cise—defines “registered” as “[o]f a person: entered on an official

register as having particular qualifications.” Registered, adj., Oxford

English Dictionary (online ed.), [https://perma.cc/D5RV-C2DK].

A registered voter is someone who has completed the registration

process and thereby holds the right to vote in upcoming elections.3

Whether she now seeks to vote is a separate question. A word de-

scribing something already done says nothing about what the per-

son is doing now.

“Applicant for admission” is forward-looking by construc-

tion. “Applicant” identifies the person doing the applying, and “for

admission” identifies what the applicant is after. The majority has

itself said as much, acknowledging that “applicant for admission”

3 Every court I could find to consider the term “registered voter” has under-

stood it this way. See, e.g., State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St. 3d 417, 421

(2002) (“‘registered voters’ . . . means those persons who were registered to

vote . . . rather than those who actually voted”); City of S. Salt Lake v. Salt Lake

Cnty., 925 P.2d 954, 958–59 (Utah 1996) (rejecting the interpretation “that the

term ‘registered voters’ means ‘registered voters voting in the election’” for

the “common and of clear meaning” of the term: “those registered”); Chalmers

v. Funk, 76 Va. 717, 719–20 (1882) (“When these statutes speak of registered

voters, they uniformly refer to the persons whose names are placed upon the

registration books provided by law as the sole record or memorial of the duly

qualified voters of the State. . . . It is believed that no statute can be found,

general or special, in which the word ‘registered’ has been used in any other

sense, or for any other purpose, than that now suggested.”).

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 5

and “seeking admission,” on their ordinary meaning, are “synony-

mous.” Maj. Op. 15–16.

That concession, however, is difficult to square with the ma-

jority’s later description of “applicant for admission” as a “passive

term of art.” Maj. Op. 24. The majority cannot have it both ways.

And the voter analogy does not bridge the gap, because whatever

its other infirmities, a phrase that looks backward cannot tell us

how a phrase that looks forward behaves.

The majority’s choice of dictionary sense illustrates the dif-

ficulty. The OED’s first sense of “voter” is “[a] person who has a

right to vote in an election,” and one illustrative example the OED

gives for that sense is “registered voter.” Voter, Oxford English Dic-

tionary (online ed.), [https://perma.cc/D5RV-C2DK]; see Voter,

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.) (same).

The majority selects the OED’s second sense—the one de-

scribing a person in the act of voting—because it makes “voter”

resemble “applicant.” Maj. Op. 23–24. But the question here is not

what “voter” means standing alone; it is what “registered voter”

means. On that question, the dictionaries, caselaw, and ordinary

usage all point the same way.

The analogy, in short, proves only that a completed-status

phrase, concerning one object, can be separated from an action

phrase concerning another. No one doubts that. Our question is

whether an ongoing-status phrase—“applicant for admission”—

can be similarly separated from “seeking admission.” I agree with

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6 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

the majority’s first instinct, see Maj. Op. 15–16, that the ordinary

meaning of these words means that it cannot.

Up to this point, the majority agrees. “If our task ended with

the ordinary meaning of the two phrases,” it writes, “we would

agree that they are synonymous.” Maj. Op. 15–16. If so, the gov-

ernment is correct, and Petitioner is subject to mandatory deten-

tion. The only question, then, is whether the majority can escape

the ordinary meaning it has conceded. It cannot.

Its attempted escape route runs through the word “means.”

According to the majority, § 1225(a)(1) “defines [‘applicant for ad-

mission’] to mean ‘[a]n alien present in the United States who has

not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.’” Maj. Op.

16 (emphases added). From this recharacterization, the majority

reasons that “applicant for admission” is a term of art whose plain-

English meaning carries no independent force. Id.

That is not what Congress wrote. Section 1225(a)(1) does

not “define” “applicant for admission” by listing its new meaning,

set off by the word “means.” See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,

392 n.10 (1979) (“As a rule, ‘[a] definition which declares what a

term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated.’”) (quot-

ing 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07 (4th

ed. Supp. 1978)); see also Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 86

(1937) (“[W]hen an exclusive definition is intended the word

‘means’ is employed[.]”). Congress chose a different word. The

majority substitutes “means” for it, and from that substitution con-

cludes that “applicant for admission” is a “passive condition.” Maj.

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 7

Op. 16. That conclusion does considerable work in the majority’s

analysis. It should not, because it rests on the majority’s word, not

Congress’s. 4

The word Congress chose is “deemed.” Section 1225(a)(1)

deems aliens “present in the United States who [have] not been ad-

mitted” to be applicants for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “The

key word here is ‘deemed.’ That term is used in legal materials

‘[t]o treat (something) as if . . . it were really something else.’” Stur-

geon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 47 (2019) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

504 (10th ed. 2014)). Here, Congress took a class of persons who

typically have not “applied” for anything—because they chose to

bypass a lawful port of entry—and required they be treated as “ap-

plicants.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (titling the section “Aliens

treated as applicants for admission”). It is, without a doubt, a “legal

fiction,” but the question is whether that congressional declaration

carries consequences, or whether it is a label and nothing more.

Sturgeon answers that question. There, Congress drew na-

tional park boundaries in Alaska that encompassed privately

owned land. It then “deemed” those private lands not “to be in-

cluded as a portion of” the parks in which they sat. 587 U.S. at 47

(citing 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c)); see id. (“The fiction in Section 103(c)

4 Even if Congress had “defined” “applicant for admission” in the traditional

sense (it did not), its ordinary meaning is not simply discarded. Rather,

“[w]hen choosing among interpretations of a statutory definition, the ‘ordi-

nary meaning’ of the ‘defined term’ is an important contextual clue.” Delligatti

v. United States, 604 U.S. 423, 435 (2025) (citation omitted).

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8 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

involves considering certain lands actually within the new national

parks as instead without them.”). Undeterred, the Park Service ar-

gued it could still regulate those private lands under statutes reach-

ing property “within” such parks. Id. at 48 (quoting 54 U.S.C.

§ 100751). The Court unanimously rejected that argument. Id. at

54–55. “There is no reason to pretend,” the Court explained, “that

inholdings are not part of a park if they can still be regulated as

parklands.” Id. at 51. So too here: Congress has mandated that we

must treat all aliens “present in the United States who [have] not

been admitted” as if they are actually “applicants for admission.” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

The majority is no stranger to Sturgeon. Its entire textual ar-

gument rests on it, invoking the principle that “[w]hen Congress

takes the trouble to define the terms it uses, a court must respect

its definitions as ‘virtually conclusive.’” Maj. Op. 14 (quoting Dep’t

of Ag. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 59 (2024)

(quoting Sturgeon, 587 U.S. at 56)). I agree with that principle. But

I would also apply the rest of the opinion. The majority takes Stur-

geon’s instruction on deference to statutory definitions but leaves

behind its instruction about enforcing statutory deeming provi-

sions. Sturgeon is not a buffet—the majority cannot take the rule it

likes and leave the rest behind.

The majority presses further. Even acknowledging the fic-

tion, it characterizes the deeming clause as displacing the ordinary

meaning of “applicant for admission.” Maj. Op. 16 n.2. On that

reading, the phrase “mean[s]” an alien who is “arriving” or “present

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 9

in” the country without admission. Maj. Op. 16. A “specialized

meaning,” says the majority, that “exclu[des] . . . all other aliens

who might otherwise be considered applicants.” Maj. Op. 16 n.2.

That understanding seemingly stems from what Sturgeon called a

fiction operating “by negative implication.” 587 U.S. at 47. But the

statute in Sturgeon deployed the word “only,” a word that is inher-

ently exclusionary. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c)). Section

1225(a)(1) contains nothing comparable. It does not deploy “only,”

see id., nor does it deploy “means,” see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 226 (2012)

(“When, by contrast [to ‘including’], a definitional section says that

a word ‘means’ something, the clear import is that this is its only

meaning.”). Congress told us what unadmitted aliens, like Peti-

tioner, are to be treated as. It said nothing about what “applicants

for admission” means.

And even on its most sympathetic reading, the deeming

clause in Sturgeon did not displace the ordinary meaning of the

deemed category. The phrases “included as a portion of such

[park]” and “within [the park]” are synonymous. But they are not

the same words. Were the majority correct, “included as a portion

of such [park]” would carry no ordinary meaning and thus would

say nothing about whether the lands are “within” the park. Just so

here: “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” are—like

“included as a portion of” and “within,” and as the majority

agrees—synonymous. A deeming clause does not replace the

meaning of the category with the class Congress assigned to it. It

places the class into the category.

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10 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

The principle is straightforward. When a statute deems “A”

to be “B,” it places A in the legal posture of B as a matter of law,

with the consequences that follow. Otherwise, “there [is no] need

to create a special legal fiction” in the first place. Sturgeon, 587 U.S.

at 51.

The Court’s immigration cases have applied this principle

for over a century.

Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925), is illustrative. A thirteen-

year-old Russian national arrived at Ellis Island in 1914 and was or-

dered excluded. When World War I prevented deportation, she

was released to a charitable society and lived with her father for

nearly eight years. Her father was naturalized during that period,

and she claimed citizenship under a provision conferring it on mi-

nor children of naturalized parents “if dwelling in the United

States.” Id. at 230. Justice Holmes rejected the claim. Her release

from Ellis Island, he explained, did not change “the nature of her

stay within the territory.” Id. She remained “in theory of law at

the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States.”

Id. Eight years of physical habitation was not “dwelling” because

“until she legally landed[, she] ‘could not have dwelt within the

United States.’” Id. (quoting Zartarian v. Billings, 204 U.S. 170, 175

(1907)).

Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), carried the prin-

ciple forward. There, a Chinese national arrived in the United

States, was released on parole, and was ordered excluded. She

sought the benefit of a provision protecting “any alien within the

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 11

United States” from deportation if certain criteria are met. Id. at

185–86 (citing the 1952 version of Section 243(h) of the Immigra-

tion and Nationality Act (INA)). Her argument was simple: she

was physically present in the country, so she was “‘within the

United States,’ and hence covered by [§] 243(h).” Id. at 187. The

Court disagreed. Despite her undisputed physical presence in the

country, the Court held she could not invoke the provision. Id. at

190. Instead, a preceding provision treating parolees as aliens

stopped at the border carried through to a subsequent provision

governing those “within the United States.” That phrase, with all

its ordinary-English force, applied to the legal reality Congress had

created, not to the physical reality the alien inhabited. Id. at 188–

90.

The same principle applies here, and what it demands is

more modest. Kaplan required treating a person who had physi-

cally dwelt in the United States for eight years as not dwelling here.

Leng May Ma required treating a person physically within the coun-

try as not within it. 5 Here, we need only treat a person whom Con-

gress has deemed an “applicant for admission” as one who “seeks”

5 I reference Kaplan and Leng May Ma not for the specific statutory frameworks

they applied—Congress substantially restructured those frameworks through

IIRIRA—but for the principles they illustrate concerning the operation of legal

fictions in immigration law. The majority invokes Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.

678, 693 (2001), and its observation that “[t]he distinction between an alien

who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never en-

tered runs throughout immigration law.” Maj. Op. 46. But § 1225(a)(1) col-

lapses that distinction—deeming both unlawfully present aliens and arriving

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12 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

it. 6 That is not a stretch of the legal fiction because, as explained

above, an “applicant” for admission is one who “seeks” it.

Nor is this a principle courts alone have recognized. Section

1182(d)(5)(A) extends parole to “any alien applying for admission.” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Since 1998, the govern-

ment has treated unlawfully present aliens as “applying for admis-

sion” under that provision by operation of § 1225(a)(1). See Paul

W. Virtue, General Counsel, INS, Authority To Parole Applicants

For Admission Who Are Not Also Arriving Aliens, Legal Op. 98-10

(Aug. 21, 1998), 1998 WL 1806685, at *2 (concluding that aliens

“who were once deportable for having entered without inspection

are now considered in law to be applicants for admission” and thus

“within the scope of the statutory parole authority”); see also Mem-

orandum from Gus Coldebella, DHS General Counsel (Sept. 28,

aliens “applicant[s] for admission” and using that term to introduce the deten-

tion provision we are asked to interpret.

6 Others have said the same before this litigation. See Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Gar-

land, 996 F.3d 190, 194 n.2 (4th Cir. 2021) (equating the two concepts: because

the alien “was never lawfully admitted, he qualifies as someone ‘seeking ad-

mission’”); Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 1744422, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23,

2013) (rejecting limitation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to arriving aliens because “Con-

gress has not” used the readily available terms “arriving alien” or “alien arriv-

ing in the United States,” and holding the provision “applies to ‘applicants for

admission’ . . . whether they are arriving in the United States at a port of entry

or are encountered by immigration officers elsewhere in the United States”);

Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I&N Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012) (“[M]any people who

are not actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the ordi-

nary sense are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the im-

migration laws.”).

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 13

2007) (endorsing that conclusion). Two of our sister circuits have

concurred. See Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 197–98 (2d Cir.

2011); Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir.

2007).

In December 2019, Congress expressly referenced “parole in

place under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5))” for military family members who entered

without inspection, 7 directed DHS to consider, on a case-by-case

basis, whether such parole would constitute a “significant public

benefit,” and declared that “the importance of the parole in place

authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security is reaffirmed.”

Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1758, 133 Stat. 1860–61 (2019), codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1182 note. The word “reaffirmed” presupposes the au-

thority existed.

What follows from these interpretations is plain. If the

deeming provision makes an unlawfully present alien one who is

“applying for admission” for purposes of parole, it makes him one

7 See, e.g., USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0091, Parole of Spouses, Chil-

dren and Parents of Active Duty Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Se-

lected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, and Former Members of the U.S. Armed

Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and the Effect of Parole on

Inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (Nov.

15, 2013) (explaining that parole, though ordinarily used to admit aliens from

outside the country, may also be granted to aliens already present without

admission—so-called “parole in place”—because § 1225(a)(1) treats any such

alien as an “applicant for admission” subject to the Secretary’s parole discre-

tion under § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

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14 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

who is “seeking admission” for the purposes of detention. The stat-

ute does not say its legal fiction applies only when it benefits the

alien. 8

Where does that leave us? The ordinary meaning of the two

phrases is synonymous—a point the majority concedes. The

deeming clause, for its part, creates a legal fiction—a concept the

majority describes as “run[ning] through the INA.” Maj. Op. 23

n.6. What remains is whether that fiction carries through to the

provision that uses the synonymous phrase. Sturgeon, Kaplan, Leng

May Ma, and § 1182(d)(5)(A) each say it does. If a person whom

Congress has deemed an applicant for admission is not seeking ad-

mission, it is hard to know what Congress thought it was deeming

him to be.

In the end, my colleagues describe this interpretative exer-

cise as “tee[ing] up a legal fiction of considerable importance in the

INA.” Maj. Op. 19. Quite right. We should not ignore it.

8 Because the majority holds that an unlawfully present alien is not “seeking

admission,” it must follow that such an alien is not “applying for admission.”

“Applying,” like “seeking,” is an undefined present participle. By nullifying

Congress’s express deeming clause in § 1225(a)(1) for purposes of

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the majority’s reading calls into serious question whether un-

lawfully present aliens remain eligible for parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A)—a split

from the Second and Ninth Circuits, a contradiction of 8 U.S.C. § 1182 note,

and itself upending nearly three decades of agency practice.

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 15

B.

The structure of § 1225 confirms what the text inde-

pendently establishes. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341

(1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is deter-

mined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in

which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute

as a whole.”).

First, § 1225(a)(3) provides that “[a]ll aliens (including alien

crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking

admission or readmission to or transit through the United States

shall be inspected by immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3).

The phrase “or otherwise” has a settled meaning. It “operates as a

catchall: the specific items that precede it are meant to be sub-

sumed by what comes after the ‘or otherwise.’” Villarreal v. R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 964 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

(citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 153 (2008) (Scalia, J., con-

curring in the judgment)); accord Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d

480, 483 (7th Cir. 2019) (en banc). “Applicants for admission” pre-

cedes “or otherwise.” “Seeking admission” follows. Section

1225(a)(3) thus makes plain that applicants for admission are a sub-

set of those seeking admission. An unremarkable premise.

The majority resists. It invokes what it calls “a second,

equally accepted and quite distinct reading of ‘or otherwise’”—one

in which the phrase “refer[s] to something that is different from

something already mentioned.” Maj. Op. 30. The reading is nei-

ther equally accepted nor distinct. It is the very reading this Court

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16 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

rejected en banc in Villarreal. As we explained, that approach “dis-

cusse[s] ‘or’ and ‘otherwise’ in isolation. Words can acquire differ-

ent meanings when combined in a phrase, and the phrase ‘or oth-

erwise’ is different from the sum of its parts.” Villarreal, 839 F.3d at

964. The majority offers no reason to revisit that conclusion be-

yond the assertion that its interpretation is more appropriate “es-

pecially when ‘otherwise’ is followed by a series of terms.” Maj.

Op. 30 (relying on a sole reference to 38 U.S.C. § 8102(b)).

But the majority need not have looked beyond the four cor-

ners of IIRIRA. Congress used “or otherwise” followed by a series

of terms elsewhere in the same act. The construction confirms Vil-

larreal. One provision reaches anyone who “murders or otherwise

causes death, bodily injury, or serious bodily injury to an individ-

ual.” Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Title II, § 203(e), Sept. 30, 1996,

110 Stat. 3009-566. Another authorizes States to “prohibit or oth-

erwise limit or restrict” alien eligibility for public assistance pro-

grams. 8 U.S.C. § 1624.

In both, the specific precedes “or otherwise” and a broader

disjunctive series follows. In both, subsumption is the only plausi-

ble reading. Murder is a way of causing death. Prohibiting is a way

of limiting. “The normal rule of statutory construction assumes

that identical words used in different parts of the same act are in-

tended to have the same meaning.” Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury,

475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 17

majority’s reading of “or otherwise” finds no support in the statu-

tory text. And it directly contravenes this Court’s decision in Vil-

larreal.

The majority’s attempts to distinguish Villarreal are no more

persuasive. It first argues that applying the case here would “intro-

duce a real tension into the statute.” Maj. Op. 34. The tension the

majority perceives, however, exists only if its reading of

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is already correct. That is the very question Villar-

real helps answer. It is not a basis for distinguishing a case. It is a

reason for applying it. The majority next contends that Villarreal is

inapposite because there the disputed language was “the central

text at the heart of the parties’ dispute,” whereas § 1225(a)(3) is

merely contextual. Maj. Op. 34. Yet the majority itself described

the government’s reliance on § 1225(a)(3) as “perhaps its strongest

textual argument.” Maj. Op. 29. Apparently, the provision is

strong enough to demand several pages of rebuttal but not im-

portant enough to warrant application of the en banc precedent

that governs it. In any event, the meaning of “or otherwise” does

not change depending on whether the provision in which it appears

is “central” or peripheral.

The majority then retreats to grammar. Villarreal, it says,

applies only where “or otherwise” connects verbs, and § 1225(a)(3)

pairs a noun phrase (“applicants for admission”) with a participial

phrase (“seeking admission”). Maj. Op. 34–35. The distinction has

no basis in law and little (if any) basis in practice. Elsewhere in the

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18 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

federal code, Congress uses “or otherwise” to subsume noun

phrases into participial catchalls.

The National Security Act, for example, caps the number of

professional staff of the National Security Council, “including per-

sons employed by, assigned to, detailed to, under contract to serve

on, or otherwise serving or affiliated with the staff[,]” at 200. 50

U.S.C. § 3021(e)(3). “Persons … under contract to serve on,” like

“applicants for admission,” is a noun phrase. “Serving,” like “seek-

ing,” is participial. Being under contract to serve on a staff is one

way of serving it—just as being an applicant for admission is one

way of seeking it. No one reads “or otherwise” in § 3021 to mean

that persons under contract to serve on the staff are doing some-

thing different from “serving” it simply because the grammar is

mixed. 9

The majority’s reliance (at 31) on Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v.

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 123 (2019), is misplaced. Helsinn

9 The majority’s football analogy suffers the same defect as its voter analogy.

See Maj. Op. 35. It works only by substituting a different object for the one

Congress chose. That is moving the goal posts. Had the majority correctly

used “applicants for football tryouts” rather than “football players,” the anal-

ogy would refute the majority’s position. And on the majority’s own defini-

tion of “seeking,” see id. at 17, football players have plainly taken an “affirma-

tive step” toward playing football—they are football players. That the analogy

quietly adds “at the end of the football season” illustrates the problem with

analogies in the first place: they can be structured to reach any result. We

need not resort to inapposite hypotheticals when Congress has provided real

examples.

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 19

asked whether the catchall phrase “otherwise available to the pub-

lic” limits the specific terms that precede it—whether it narrowed

“on sale” to only public sales. The Supreme Court said no. But it

said no because “on sale” had acquired a settled meaning over two

centuries of precedent, which included “secret sales,” and the addi-

tion of the catchall was “simply not enough of a change for [the

Court] to conclude that Congress intended to alter the meaning of

the reenacted term.” Helsinn, 586 U.S. at 131. That is a holding

about reenactment, not about the function of “or otherwise.” Hel-

sinn resolved the former, not the latter. And the reenactment pre-

sumption on which it turned has no purchase here. Congress

coined “applicants for admission” in the same enactment in which

it wrote “or otherwise seeking admission.” There is no settled

meaning to preserve.

The majority nonetheless seizes on Helsinn’s observation

that the catchall “otherwise available to the public” “captures ma-

terial that does not fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated catego-

ries but is nevertheless meant to be covered.” Id. at 132. But even

transplanting that observation into § 1225(a)(3), far from the reen-

actment context that produced it, the result is entirely compatible

with subsumption. A catchall, by definition, sweeps more broadly

than the specific terms it accompanies. For example, “causes

death” sweeps more broadly than “murders.” See Pub. L. No. 104-

208, Div. C, Title II, § 203(e), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-566. The

broader term captures additional material; the specific remains sub-

sumed within it. Nothing in Helsinn disturbs what this Court held

in Villarreal.

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20 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

The statute itself proves the point. Stowaways are not “ap-

plicants for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2). Yet they must be

inspected and “shall be ordered removed upon inspection.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(2) (emphasis added); id. § 1225(a)(3). And stowaways can

apply for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2). Stowaways thus do not

“fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated categor[y]” of “applicants

for admission” but are “nevertheless meant to be covered.” Hel-

sinn, 586 U.S. at 132. Section 1225(a)(3) covers them—not by treat-

ing “seeking admission” as something different from applying for it,

but by treating it as something broader. A stowaway is not an ap-

plicant for admission; a stowaway is, however, someone otherwise

seeking admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2) (“An arriving alien who is

a stowaway . . . ”); cf. Maj. Op. 36 (“§ 1225 applies to arriving aliens

seeking entry at the border”). The catchall sweeps in what the spe-

cific term does not, precisely because the specific is a subset of the

general. That is not in tension with Helsinn but an illustration of it.

The word “all” leaves little room for doubt. “All al-

iens . . . who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking ad-

mission . . . shall be inspected.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). If “or other-

wise” selected only a subset of applicants for admission—arriving

aliens as the majority suggests, see Maj. Op. 36—the provision

would not require inspection of all such aliens. It would require

inspection of some. “All means all.” City of Jacksonville v. Jackson-

ville Hosp. Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2023).

Second, § 1225(a)(5) provides “[a]n applicant for admission

may be required to state under oath any information sought by an

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25-14065 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 21

immigration officer regarding the purposes and intentions of the

applicant in seeking admission to the United States.” (emphasis

added). The subject of that sentence is “an applicant for admis-

sion.” The gerund phrase “in seeking admission” describes what

that subject is doing. Congress did not treat “seeking admission”

as a separate condition the applicant may or may not satisfy. See

Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134. It presupposed the connection. See Texas

Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.

519, 537 (2015). One cannot have purposes and intentions in seek-

ing admission without seeking admission. See Chen v. Almodovar,

2026 WL 100761, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026) (Cronan, J.).

The majority waves this away, observing that the listed in-

quiries—intended length of stay, intent to remain permanently or

become a citizen, inadmissibility—are “only relevant to those who

have not yet entered the country.” Maj. Op. 28. That is not quite

right. An immigration officer can ask an unlawfully present alien

each of those questions, and the alien can answer them. How long

do you intend to stay? Do you intend to remain permanently or

become a United States citizen? Are you inadmissible? These ques-

tions are perfectly intelligible, and the answers perfectly informa-

tive.

In any event, § 1225(a)(5) draws no distinctions. Its subject

is “an applicant for admission.” Not “an arriving alien.” Not “an

applicant for admission who happens also to be seeking admis-

sion.” There is no dispute that unlawfully present aliens are appli-

cants for admission pursuant to the deeming provision. That

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22 LAGOA, J., Dissenting 25-14065

makes them the subject of § 1225(a)(5). The majority’s argument

amounts to the claim that the provision fits arriving aliens better.

Maybe so. But a more comfortable fit does not allow us to read an

exception into § 1225—particularly when Congress provided none.

The foregoing provisions confirm what “seeking admission”

means. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) forecloses what the majority says it

means.

The majority, like the Petitioner, defines “seeking admis-

sion” as “pursuing ‘lawful entry . . . into the United States after in-

spection and authorization by an immigration officer.’” Maj. Op.

18. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) provides:

In the case of an alien described in subparagraph (A)

who is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated

port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguou

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