The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-250
Filed 6 May 2026
Rowan County, No. 24CVS000239-790
DANNY WYATT, Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Defendant/Respondent.
Appeal by petitioner from order entered 23 September 2024 by Judge William
A. Long in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 January
2026.
Koontz & Smith, by Peter C. Smith, for petitioner-appellant.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General M. Denise
Stanford, for respondent-appellee.
DILLON, Chief Judge.
Petitioner Danny Wyatt appeals an order upholding a final agency decision
revoking his license from our Department of Insurance (“NCDOI”) to work as a motor
vehicle damage appraiser (“MVDA”), based on alleged violations of the ethical
standards promulgated by the NCDOI for MVDAs, as contained in 11 NCAC 06A
.1002 (the “Ethics Standards”).
I. Background
Petitioner became licensed as a MVDA through the NCDOI in 2017.
WYATT V. N.C. DEP’T ON INS.
Opinion of the Court
In April 2021, Petitioner sent an email to another licensed MVDA, Mr. Taylor,
who lived out of state, accusing Mr. Taylor of being biased and financially interested
in evaluating insurance claims. A complaint was filed against Petitioner alleging he
violated the Ethics Standards by sending the email.
In July 2021, Petitioner executed a Voluntary Settlement Agreement, agreeing
he violated Ethics Standards and that he would obey all North Carolina laws and
regulations governing MVDAs. Additionally, the Agreement stated it was an order
of the Commissioner and that any future violation of the Agreement could lead to a
revocation of Petitioner’s license.
Shortly after entering the Agreement, Petitioner sent emails, similar to the
one he had sent in April, to five other licensed MVDAs residing outside of North
Carolina, questioning the validity of their MVDA licenses and refusing to work with
many of them on claims.
Specifically, on 5 August 2021 Petitioner sent an email to a licensed, non-
resident MVDA, stating she was not lawfully licensed as a non-resident MVDA.
In September 2021 Petitioner sent an email to another non-resident licensee
suggesting that the licensee should voluntarily turn in his MVDA license.
In October 2021, Petitioner sent an email to another licensee, stating he
refused to work with the licensee because the licensee was not lawfully licensed as a
non-resident MVDA. Petitioner also accused this licensee of falsifying his North
Carolina licensure application.
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Opinion of the Court
In December 2021, Petitioner sent an email to another non-resident MVDA,
claiming that licensee was not lawfully licensed, refusing to work with that licensee
on a claim that they had been assigned.
Finally, in January 2022, Petitioner sent an email to another non-resident
licensee, claiming the licensee was not lawfully licensed, refusing to work with that
licensee on a claim that they had been assigned.
In November 2023, NCDOI conducted a hearing to determine whether
Petitioner violated NCDOI’s administrative rules. In January 2024, the NCDOI
issued a Final Agency Decision, concluding that Petitioner’s statements to the five
licensees were disparaging to their professional reputation and therefore violated 11
NCAC 06A .1002(b)(1). Additionally, the NCDOI concluded Petitioner’s statements
impeded the appraisal process, in violation of 11 NCAC 06A .1002(b)(4) and
constituted giving legal advice, in violation 11 NCAC 06A .1002(b)(7).
Petitioner appealed the Final Agency Decision. Petitioner filed a petition for
judicial review in superior court. On 19 September 2024, after a hearing on the
matter, the trial court entered an order affirming the Final Agency Decision.
Petitioner timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in affirming the
Department’s Final Agency Decision.
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b):
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Opinion of the Court
The court reviewing a final decision may affirm the
decision or remand the case for further proceedings. It may
also reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights
of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency or administrative law judge;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under
G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire
record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
The reviewing court shall review the final decision using the de novo standard of
review when reviewing subsections (1)-(4). N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(c). A whole record
standard of review shall be used when reviewing subsections (5) and (6). Id.
“When the issue on appeal is whether a state agency erred in interpreting a
statutory term, an appellate court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the
agency and employ de novo review.” In re Appeal of N.C. Sav & Loan League, 302
N.C. 458, 465 (1981). “Although the interpretation of a statute by an agency created
to administer that statute is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate
courts, those interpretations are not binding.” Id.
III. Analysis
Petitioner makes three arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
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First, Petitioner argues that NCDOI and the trial court interpreted subsection
(1) of the Ethics Standards incorrectly. Specifically, this subsection states “[e]very
licensed motor vehicle damage appraiser shall refrain from. . . disparaging the
professional reputation of a motor vehicle damage appraiser or other persons
associated with the claim[.]” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner contends he should not
have been found violating this Rule because the statements he made were directed at
the respective non-resident licensees and not communicated to a third party.
In support of his argument, Petitioner cites cases involving the civil tort of
defamation and other civil tort claims, which require proof that the statements be
published to a third party. See, e.g., Taube v. Hopper, 270 N.C. App. 604, 608 (2020)
(to prove a defamation tort, the plaintiff “must allege and prove that the defendant
made false, defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which were
published to a third person, causing injury to the plaintiff’s reputation”).
However, this present case does not involve a civil tort claim for defamation or
other tort claims. Rather, it involves the discipline of a licensee and the proper
interpretation of a provision in the Ethics Standards, which proscribes a licensee from
disparaging the professional reputation of another licensee. 11 NCAC 06A
.1002(b)(1). “Disparage,” may be defined in multiple ways. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 591 (11th Ed. 2019) (to “act . . . unfairly castigating or detracting from the
reputation of someone or something[,]” or “[a]ny statement cast in a negative light
may amount to disparagement in a general sense.”); See also The American Heritage
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College Dictionary 400 (3d ed.1997) (“[t]o reduce in esteem or rank”).
We conclude that statements are “disparaging” which “unfairly” accuses a
properly licensed MVDA of not being properly licensed and “unfairly” accuses a
properly licensed MVDA of falsifying his licensure application, especially after
entering an Agreement not to do the same in the future. One can certainly make a
disparaging comment directly to one being unfairly accused. Though an unfair
accusation is not actionable in tort unless published to a third party, the plain
language of the Ethics Standard Code does not require the accusation be published
to a third party. It is reasonable that the NCDOI be able to discipline a licensee who
unfairly disrespects another licensee directly. Accordingly, we conclude the NCDOI
and the trial court did not err in their interpretation of 11 NCAC 06A .1002(b)(1).
Second, Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to support the
determination that he violated subsection (4) of the Ethics Standards, which states
that a licensee shall refrain from “impeding the appraisal process or the settlement
of a property damage claim.”
To determine whether there is substantial evidence to support an agency
decision, we apply the “whole record” test. See Leahy v. North Carolina Bd. of
Nursing, 346 N.C. 775, 779 (1997). “[T]he ‘whole record’ rule requires the court, in
determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the Board’s decision, to take
into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Board’s
evidence.” Thompson v. Wake County Bd. Of Ed., 292 N.C. 406, 410 (1977). “A court
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applying the whole record test may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s as
between two conflicting views, even though it could reasonably have reached a
different result had it reviewed the matter de novo.” Watkins v. North Carolina Bd.
Of Dental Examiners, 358 N.C. 190, 199 (2004).
The record contains evidence that Petitioner refused to work with certain non-
resident licensees on claims to which they were assigned. We have considered
Petitioner’s arguments. However, given Petitioner had previously entered a
settlement after being accused of disparaging another non-resident licensee, we
conclude there was substantial evidence in the whole record to support the NCDOI’s
conclusion that Petitioner violated subsection (4) of the Ethics Standards.
Finally, Petitioner contends that the NCDOI erroneously concluded he violated
subsection (7) of the Ethics Standards, which proscribes a licensee from “giving legal
advice on property damage claims in violation of G.S. 84-4.” General Statute 84-4 is
the statute which proscribes the unauthorized practice of law.
Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal regarding this contention is that only the
State Bar has jurisdiction to make the determination that Petitioner’s actions
constituted the unauthorized practice of law. We disagree. The NCDOI has
jurisdiction over its licensees to enforce the Ethics Standards.
With that said, we note it could be argued that Petitioner did not violate
subsection (7), as there was no allegation that he offered “legal advice on property
damage claims.” That is, he was not accused of advising anyone regarding his
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property damage claim. Rather, he was only accused of giving legal advice regarding
the licensure requirements for non-resident MVDAs. However, Petitioner did not
make this argument; and we decline to invoke Rule 2 of our Appellate Procedure to
consider it. In so deciding, we note that Petitioner’s violations of subsections (1) and
(4) are sufficient to support NCDOI’s decision to revoke Petitioner’s license.
AFFIRMED.
Judges HAMPSON and MURRY concur.
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