Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Mar 16, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.5%

defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”

How later courts described this case

  • defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”
  • “[A] successful plaintiff in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory damages even where its actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”
  • statutory damages are “specially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-24346-CIV-MARTINEZ/SANCHEZ

GARRETT ELECTRONICS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS,

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,

PARTNERSHIPS, AND UNINCORPORATED

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON

SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against

Defendants, ECF No. 67, filed by Plaintiff Garrett Electronics, Inc. (“GARRETT

ELECTRONICS”).1 A clerk’s default was entered against those Defendants listed in the Revised

Schedule “A” attached hereto (“Defendants”).2 ECF No. 66 (Clerk’s Entry of Default); ECF No.

67-4 at 19 (Revised Schedule “A”). Despite having been served with process, see ECF No. 46,

Defendants failed to appear, answer, or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff now

seeks entry of final default judgment against Defendants. ECF No. 67. Having carefully

considered Plaintiff’s motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and being otherwise fully

1 The Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge, referred Plaintiff’s motion to the

undersigned for a report and recommendation. ECF No. 68.

2 The original Schedule “A” that identified the Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability

Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associations that were the subject of the complaint

in this case listed 152 defendants. See ECF No. 14-1. Plaintiff, however, has filed notices of

voluntarily dismissal for 144 of the defendants, ECF Nos. 23, 29, 30-32, 35-36, 44, 48, 53, 55-62,

64, and, as a result, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and this Report and Recommendation

address only the eight remaining Defendants that are listed in the attached Revised Schedule “A.”

advised, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry

of Final Default Judgment Against Defendants, ECF No. 67, be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants, alleging claims for trademark

infringement and counterfeiting under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count I); and

design patent infringement under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Count II). ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff is the registered owner of federally registered trademarks for GARRETT

ELECTRONICS products: U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 3,802,639; 3,809,839; 1,164,465;

4,223,990; 1,162,578; 3,713,177; 3,787,349; 2,506,112; 1,654,807; 3,818,179; 3,790,254;

4,001,143; 3,713,049; 1,636,048; 4,279,627; 3,236,345; and 3,787,350 (the “GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks”). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 50; see also ECF No. 1-1 (Certificates of

Registration for the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks). The GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Trademarks are used in connection with the marketing and promotion of Plaintiff’s products. See

ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16-20. Plaintiff owns all rights to the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks.

Id. at ¶ 1, 14, 18, 50.

Plaintiff is also the registered owner and lawful assignee of certain design patents: U.S.

Patent Nos. D513,706 S and D583,261 S (the “GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents”). ECF No 1

at ¶¶ 2, 14, 21; ECF No. 4-1. Plaintiff owns all “right, title, and interest in and to the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents,” and its products often “embody at least a portion of the designs depicted

in the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patent.” Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.

Plaintiff has not licensed or authorized any Defendant to use the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks or the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents, and none of the

3 The following facts are admitted as a result of Defendants’ default. See, e.g., Amguard Ins. Co.

v. Super Winn Nail Spa, Inc., No. 23-61304, 2024 WL 996444, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2024);

Section II infra.

Defendants are authorized retailers of genuine GARRETT ELECTRONICS products. ECF No. 1

at ¶ 31; see also id. at ¶ 45.

The complaint establishes that Defendants are advertising, marketing, offering to sell,

and/or selling unauthorized, counterfeit, and noncompliant products (the “Counterfeit Products”)

by using marks that are identical or substantially identical to the GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Trademarks and by embodying designs depicted in the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents. ECF

No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 46, 48-49, 55; see also id. at ¶¶ 32-33. The Counterfeit Products are made to appear

to be genuine GARRETT ELECTRONICS products but are inferior and unauthorized imitations

of such products. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 5; see also id. at ¶¶ 20, 28, 32-33. Furthermore, Defendants

have “sold, offered to sell, marketed, distributed, and advertised, and are still selling, offering to

sell, marketing, distributing, and advertising products in connection with the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks without Plaintiff’s permission,” and “have been making, using,

selling, offering for sale, and/or importing into the United States for subsequent sale or use, without

authority, Counterfeit Products that infringe directly and/or indirectly the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents.” Id. at ¶¶ 49, 55; see also id. at ¶¶ 50, 56; ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff asserts

that Defendants’ unlawful infringing activities caused and will continue to cause irreparable harm

to Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill “from the loss of its exclusivity of its intellectual property

rights, as well as through consumer confusion, dilution, and tarnishment of its valuable trademark.”

ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 53, 58; see also id. at ¶¶ 46, 52.

Plaintiff seeks entry of final default judgment against Defendants and requests that the

Court (1) permanently enjoin Defendants from continuing to infringe on Plaintiff’s intellectual

property rights, that is, the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents; and (2) award Plaintiff damages. See ECF No. 67 at 2-3, 12-24.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead

or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the

party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d

1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). The effect of a clerk’s default is that all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded

allegations are deemed admitted. See, e.g., Giovanno v. Fabec, 804 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir.

2015); see also Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.

1975) (defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts

that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”).

Only well-pleaded allegations are admitted because “entry of default judgment is only

warranted when there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered, with the

standard for ‘a sufficient basis’ for the judgment being akin to that necessary to survive a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Singleton v. Dean, 611 F. App’x 671, 671 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face, which is met when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”);

Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2015). Therefore, before

entering a default judgment, a court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint

state a substantive cause of action and provide a sufficient basis for the particular relief sought.

Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., Luxottica

Group S.p.A. v. Individual, P’ship or Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 17-CV-61471, 2017 WL

6949260, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (“Because the defendant is not held to admit facts that are

not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law, the Court must first determine whether there is a

sufficient basis in the pleading for the judgment to be entered.”). If the admitted facts are sufficient

to establish liability, then the Court must ascertain the appropriate amount of damages. Nishimatsu

Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. Where all the essential evidence needed to determine damages is

found in the record, an evidentiary hearing on damages is not required. See, e.g., SEC v. Smyth,

420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005); Bandyopadhyay v. Defendant 1, No. 22-CV-22907,

2023 WL 2395475, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2023).

Here, Plaintiff stated in its motion that there are no allegations of joint and several liability

against Defendants, who are the only remaining defendants in the case. See ECF No. 67 at 9.

Defendants have not appeared and have defaulted. See ECF No. 66. Therefore, there is no

possibility of inconsistent liability between the Defendants, and a final default judgment against

Defendants may be ordered.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting (15 U.S.C. § 1114)

Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides liability for trademark

infringement if, without the consent of the registrant, a defendant uses “in commerce any

reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark” which is “likely to

cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). To prevail on its

trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) it had prior rights to the mark at

issue; and (2) Defendants adopted a mark or name that was the same or confusingly similar to

Plaintiff’s trademark such that consumers were likely to confuse the two. Frehling Enters., Inc. v.

Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Planetary Motion, Inc. v.

Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon,

Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1997)).

To establish its claim, Plaintiff alleged that it is the registered owner of the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks and the official source of GARRETT ELECTRONICS products, see

ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 16, 50; ECF No. 1-1, that Defendants have no license or authorization to

use the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks, see ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 31, 49, that Defendants are

“willfully infringing and intentionally using counterfeits of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Trademarks” that are “identical or substantially identical to the GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Trademarks,” id. at ¶¶ 31, 50, and that Defendants “have sold, offered to sell, marketed,

distributed, and advertised, and are still selling, offering to sell, marketing, distributing, and

advertising products in connection with the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks without

Plaintiff’s permission,” id. at ¶ 49. According to the complaint, the Defendants’ use of counterfeits

of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks is “likely to cause and is causing confusion,

mistake, and deception as to the origin and quality of the counterfeit goods among the general

public” and injury to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52. Therefore, Plaintiff has properly established the

necessary elements to state a claim for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under § 32 of

the Lanham Act and is entitled to default judgment on this claim.

B. Count II: Design Patent Infringement (35 U.S.C. § 271)

Under the Patent Act, “whoever without authority makes use, offers to sell, or sells any

patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented

invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A

design patent infringement action requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that “‘during the term of a

patent for a design, without license of the owner[,]’ a defendant ‘(1) applies the patented design,

or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells

or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been

applied.’” XYZ Corp. v. Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sched.

“A”, 668 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289). “Determining

whether a design patent is infringed is a two-step process. First, when appropriate, the design

patent’s claims are construed. Second, the patented design is compared to the accused device.”

Pride Fam. Brands, Inc. v. Carl’s Patio, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1223-24 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

“The ‘ordinary observer’ test is the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been

infringed.” Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d

1119, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Under this test, “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such

attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance

is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other,

the first one patented is infringed by the other.” Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528

(1871); see also, e.g., XYZ Corp., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1274. “Minor differences between a patented

design and an accused article’s design cannot, and shall not, prevent a finding of infringement.”

Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Payless

Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

Here, Plaintiff has established that it is the registered owner of the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents, which “were duly and legally issued by the United States Patent and

Trademark Office.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 14, 21; ECF No. 4-1; see also ECF No. 13-3. Additionally,

the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents contain illustrated images depicting the patented designs,

ECF No. 4-1; ECF No. 13-3, and the Court need not construe claims language here in light of the

patents’ illustrations. See, e.g., Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1302-03; Believe Pursue LLC v.

Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Cos., P’ships, & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule

“A”, No. 25-CV-20162, 2025 WL 2427675, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted in part, 2025 WL 4349865 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2025). Moreover, the

Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants applied the Plaintiff’s patented designs to articles

of manufacture for the purposes of sale. Indeed, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants

“are improperly advertising, marketing and/or selling unauthorized and noncompliant products . . .

that embody the design(s) depicted in the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents (the ‘Counterfeit

Products’)” and “have been making, using, selling, offering for sale, and/or importing into the

United States for subsequent sale or use, without authority, Counterfeit Products that infringe

directly and/or indirectly the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents.” Id. at ¶¶ 3, 55; see also id. at

¶ 32 (“Defendants deceive unknowing consumers by using the . . . GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Patents without authorization . . . as embodied by the Counterfeit Products themselves.”). Plaintiff

also provided images of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents and Defendants’ Counterfeit

Products as evidence of Defendants infringement of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents

under the ordinary observer test. See id. at ¶¶ 55-58; compare WCF No. 4-1; ECF No. 13-3, with

ECF No. 67-2 (screenshots of Counterfeit Products from each Defendant’s Seller Name).

Given the circumstances present in this case, Plaintiff has established the necessary

elements to state a claim for design patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 and is entitled to

final default judgment on this claim.

Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to establish the elements of both of its claims, and

the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint have been additionally substantiated by sworn

declarations and other evidence establishing Defendants’ liability under both claims, see, e.g., ECF

Nos. 67-1 to 67-3. Under the circumstances presented here, entry of default judgment in favor of

Plaintiff and against Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is appropriate.

IV. RELIEF

Plaintiff, in its motion, ECF No. 67 at 2-3, 12-24, requests equitable relief, statutory

damages, and lost profits. The undersigned first addresses Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief,

and then addresses the monetary damages for each claim individually.

A. Injunctive Relief

Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction “according

to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable,” to prevent

violations of trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, “[i]njunctive relief is the remedy

of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for

the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. Agad, 911 F.

Supp. 1499, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d

1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)). Similarly, the Patent Act provides that a district court “may grant

injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured

by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283; see Atmos Nation, LLC

v. Pana Depot, Inc., No. 14-CIV-62620, 2015 WL 11198010, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2015)

(granting default judgment and a permanent injunction for patent infringement claim, among

others). Indeed, a plaintiff has little other recourse where defendants fail to respond or appear in

a case. See Atmos Nation, LLC, 2015 WL 11198010, at *2.

Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) it has

suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship

favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public’s interest. eBay,

Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).

In trademark cases, “a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion . . . may by

itself constitute a showing of a substantial threat of irreparable harm.” McDonald’s Corp. v.

Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l

Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no doubt that the continued sale of

thousands of pairs of counterfeit jeans would damage LS & CO’s business reputation and decrease

its legitimate sales.”). Further, “[i]n order for an injury to be irreparable, it cannot be undone

through monetary remedies.” Alpha Signs & Designs v. Individuals, No. 24-cv-20096, 2024 WL

3543724, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2024) (quoting VAS Aero Servs., LLC v. Arroyo, 860 F. Supp. 2d

1349, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2012)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3543702 (S.D. Fla.

May 24, 2024).

Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that Defendants are improperly infringing on the

GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and Patents by using them to advertise, promote, and

sell goods by using marks that are identical or substantially identical to the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks and by embodying designs depicted in the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 45-46, 48-49, 50, 52, 58; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-29,

32-33. These infringing activities are deceiving consumers and causing consumers to confuse and

mistake Defendants’ counterfeit products with Plaintiff’s genuine products that use the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks or embody the designs depicted in the GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Patents. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 46, 32-33, 50; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-29. Defendants’ infringing actions

have caused Plaintiff irreparable injury, including to Plaintiff’s good will and reputation, and will

continue to do so if Defendants are not permanently enjoined. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 53, 58.

Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law so long as Defendants continue to use GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents in connection with their

Internet-based e-commerce stores under the Seller Names because Plaintiff will have no control

over the quality of what appears to be its products in the marketplace and will be unable to exclude

Defendants from using its intellectual property. See, e.g., XYZ Corp., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1276. An

award of monetary damages alone will not cure the injury to Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill

that will result if Defendants’ counterfeiting and infringing actions are allowed to continue.

Plaintiff has a significant interest in enforcing its Trademark and Patent rights and expends

significant resources in promoting its Trademarks and genuine products and protecting and

enforcing its rights. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 17, 20; see id. at ¶ 43; ECF No. 13-1. Enjoining Defendants

is critical to prevent hardship to Plaintiff from loss of sales and injury to Plaintiff’s reputation and

goodwill. By contrast, Defendants face no hardship if they are prohibited from the continued

infringement of GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Patents, which are unlawful acts.

Finally, the public interest supports the issuance of a permanent injunction against

Defendants to prevent consumers from being misled by Defendants’ products. Chanel, Inc. v. Sea

Hero, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2016); see Nike, Inc. v. Leslie, No. 85-960 Civ-T-

15, 1985 WL 5251, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1985) (“[A]n injunction to enjoin infringing behavior

serves the public interest in protecting consumers from such behavior.”). Defendants have created

an Internet-based infringement scheme in which they are profiting from the deliberate

misappropriation of GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Patents. Unless Defendants are enjoined, they will be free to continue infringing on Plaintiff’s

GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT ELECTRONICS Patents.

Having established all four elements necessary for injunctive relief, Plaintiff is entitled to

a permanent injunction.

Plaintiff additionally requests that the Court order that all listings and associated images of

goods that infringe on the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Patents be permanently removed from Defendants’ online marketplace stores.

See ECF No. 67 at 3, 15-16. The Court’s broad equity powers allow it to fashion such relief to

stop Defendants’ infringing activities, see, e.g., Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *10,

and such relief is appropriate and recommended in this case.

B. Damages for Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting

Because the admitted facts are sufficient to establish liability, the Court must ascertain the

appropriate amount of damages. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. In a case involving

the use of counterfeit marks in connection with a sale, offering for sale, or distribution of products,

15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) provides that a plaintiff may elect an award of statutory damages at any time

before final judgment is rendered in the sum of not less than $1,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00

per counterfeit mark per type of good or service. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). In addition, if the Court

finds that Defendants’ counterfeiting actions were willful, it may impose damages above the

maximum limit, up to $2,000,000.00 per mark per type of good or service. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).

Here, Plaintiff has elected statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) as to Count I of its

Complaint. See ECF No. 67 at 16.

Statutory damages under the Lanham Act are “particularly appropriate in the default

judgment context” because it is difficult to ascertain the defendants’ profits and because the

defendants have not participated in the litigation. See CreeLED, Inc. v. Individuals, Bus. Entities

& Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 22-CV-23683-JEM/Becerra, 2023 WL

6130593, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2023) (citing Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Benefitfortiffany.com, No.

16-60829-Civ-Lenard/Goodman, 2016 WL 8679081, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2016)); see also

PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (statutory

damages are “specially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure”).

The Court has wide discretion to determine the amount of statutory damages awarded. See PetMed

Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (citing Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902

F.2d 839, 853 (11th Cir. 1990)). An award of statutory damages is appropriate despite a plaintiff’s

inability to prove actual damages caused by a defendant’s infringement. Under Armour, Inc. v.

51nfljersey.com, No. 13-62809-civ, 2014 WL 1652044, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2014) (citing

Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[A] successful plaintiff

in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory damages even where its

actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”)); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc.,

No. CIV.A. 96-6961, 1998 WL 767440, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (awarding statutory damages

where plaintiff failed to prove actual damages or profits). An award of statutory damages pursuant

to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) is “intended not just for compensation for losses, but also to deter wrongful

conduct.” See CreeLED, 2023 WL 6130593, at *4 (citing PetMed Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at

1220-21)).

In this case, the allegations in the complaint, which are taken as true, establish that

Defendants intentionally used counterfeits of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks for the

purpose of deriving benefit from Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 45, 50-51;

see also id. at ¶¶ 28-30, 32-33, 48-49, 53. Indeed, the complaint’s allegations establish that the

GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks are “famous marks” that “are widely recognized and

exclusively associated by consumers, the public, and the trade as being products sourced from

Plaintiff,” that “Plaintiff has expended substantial time, money, and other resources in developing,

advertising, and otherwise promoting the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks,” and that

Defendants “are willfully infringing and intentionally using counterfeits of the GARRETT

ELECTRONICS Trademarks.” Id. at ¶¶ 19-20, 50. As such, the Lanham Act permits the Court

to award up to $2,000,000.00 per infringing mark on each type of good as statutory damages to

ensure that Defendants do not continue their intentional and willful counterfeiting actions. See 15

U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).

Here, each Defendant has sold, promoted, distributed, advertised, and/or offered for sale

products bearing marks that were counterfeits of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks and

has done so willfully and intentionally, trading off the reputation and goodwill that Plaintiff has

developed in connection with the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks. See, e.g., ECF No. 1

at ¶¶ 3, 10, 19-20, 45, 48-50; see also id. at ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff has also explained, however, that

because “Defendants have chosen not to participate in these proceedings, Plaintiff has limited

available information, received from the Third Party Providers, regarding . . . Defendants’ profits

from the sale of Counterfeit Products.” ECF No. 67 at 23. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he limited

information provided by the [p]ayment [p]rocessors for the . . . Defendants indicates Plaintiff’s

lost profits are about $1,915.66.” ECF No. 67-1 at 4.

Based on the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff requests that the Court award statutory

damages of $200,000.00 against each of the Defendants. See ECF No. 67 at 18. Recognizing that

Defendants’ default has prevented full discovery concerning Defendants’ sales and profits for their

willful infringement of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks, recognizing that Plaintiff

says it only has evidence of $1,915.66 in lost profits from Defendants’ sales, and recognizing the

prices being charged by Defendants for their counterfeit products, see ECF Nos. 67-2, 67-3, an

award of $200,000.00 against each Defendant (for a combined $1.6 million in damages) appears

excessive and unnecessary to deter continuing infringement of the GARRETT ELECTRONICS

Trademarks. Instead, the undersigned recommends a statutory damages award of $100,000.00 per

Defendant. Such an award should be sufficient to deter Defendants and others from continuing to

counterfeit or otherwise infringe upon the GARRETT ELECTRONICS Trademarks, compensate

Plaintiff, and punish Defendants for their willful infringement, all stated goals of 15 U.S.C.

§ 1117(c). See, e.g., Purple Innovation, LLC v. Individuals, No. 24-25034-CIV, 2025 WL

1754677, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2025). The Court finds that this award of statutory damages—

$100,000.00 per Defendant—falls within the permissible statutory range under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1117(c) and is just. The undersigned accordingly recommends an award of $100,000.00 against

each Defendant on Count 1.

C. Damages for Design Patent Infringement

On its design patent infringement claim, Plaintiff “seeks $250 for the infringement of each

Design Patent[]” pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 289.4 ECF No. 67 at 20; ECF No. 70. Under § 289,

“[w]however during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the

patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose

of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable

imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less

than $250.” 35 U.S.C. § 289 (emphasis added). Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to $250 against

each Defendant on Plaintiff’s patent infringement claim. The undersigned therefore respectfully

recommends that the Court award Plaintiff damages on its patent infringement claim in the amount

of $250 against each Defendant pursuant to § 289.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against Defendants, ECF No. 67, be

GRANTED with respect to Defendants as set forth above; that final default judgment be entered

in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants; that a permanent injunction be issued against

Defendants; that Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages of $100,000.00 against each Defendant

pursuant to the Lanham Act, rather than the requested $200,000.00 against each Defendant; and

that Plaintiff additionally be awarded statutory damages of $250 against each Defendant pursuant

to 35 U.S.C. § 289.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the Court finds good cause to EXPEDITE the

period to serve and file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, the

parties shall have until March 23, 2026, to serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report

4 Although Plaintiff initially sought lost profits of $1,915.66 against Defendant JIELIOU, see, e.g.,

ECF No. 67 at 20 & n.3; see also ECF No. 67-1 at ¶ 2 n.3; ECF No. 67-3 at 2, Plaintiff has

abandoned that request for lost profits and instead “only wishes to request the $250 in minimum

statutory damages contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 289,” ECF No. 70.

and Recommendation with the Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge. Failure

to file timely objections will bar a de novo determination by the District Judge of any issue

addressed in the Report and Recommendation, will constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions,” and will only allow appellate review of the district court order “for plain error if

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Harrigan v.

Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2020).

RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 16th day of

March 2026. EL. /

Aart ¢

Aoki

UNITED STATES MAGISTRA'FE JUDGE

ce: Hon. Jose E. Martinez

Counsel of Record

16

REVISED SCHEDULE “A”

DOE Defendant Seller Name Defendant Marketplace URL

No.

1.0 Shanghai Nachee Imp.& https://nacheemoto.en.alibaba.com/contactinfo.html

Exp. Co., Ltd.

3.0 XI'AN BEICHENG https://victorinstrument.en.alibaba.com/contactinfo.html

ELECTRONICS CO.,

LTD.

35.0 moluyiyu-US https://www.amazon.com/sp?seller=A2YJDB30AM8B3W

63.0 hael_27700 https://www.ebay.com/str/alraghadcompany

72.0 krichin-85 https://www.ebay.com/usr/krichin-85

79.0 rapidwarehouse-office https://www.ebay.com/str/rapidwarehouseoffice

109.0 JIELIOU https://www.walmart.com/seller/101680602

112.0 jinanhaifengxuwangluokeji https://www.walmart.com/seller/101672751

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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