Paglio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JARET G. PAGLIO, ) Case No. 1:26-cv-88

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

REINHART UNIVERSITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jaret Paglio filed suit in State court against Reinhart University and

Dr. Walter May, its dean of students. Defendants removed the action then moved to

dismiss it. For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction and REMANDS the case to State court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in favor

of Plaintiff as the non-moving party, Plaintiff bases his claims on the following facts.

In or around 2024, Mr. Paglio received a scholarship to play lacrosse at

Reinhardt University. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 7, PageID #10.) Reinhart University is a

private university in Georgia. (Id., ¶ 2, PageID #9.) Dr. Walter May is the Dean of

Students at Reinhart University. (Id., ¶ 3, PageID #10.)

At the beginning of the 2025 lacrosse season, “Defendants began firing their

lacrosse coaches, resulting in upper-class players having to organize and supervise

the lacrosse team.” (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #10.) Because the lacrosse coaches were fired,

the upper-classmen players were coaching the lacrosse practices and games. (Id.,

¶ 11, PageID #10.)

By Reinhart University’s 2024–2025 winter break, Mr. Paglio had “paid his

part of the tuition” for the spring semester. (Id., ¶¶ 9–10, PageID #10.) In fall of

2024, Mr. Paglio sought tuition reimbursement. (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #13.) At some

point, Mr. Paglio left Reinhart University, but he does not allege the date on which

he left or when he sought tuition reimbursement. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #11.) He left

Reinhart University “because the coaching staff he relied upon as the coaches to

further his sports career in choosing to enroll [there] were all terminated.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that firing the coaches “is a significant coaching change which

aligns with a breach of contract and a violation of Plaintiff’s right to a stable athletic

environment.” (Id., ¶ 12, PageID #10.) Also, Plaintiff alleges that the “unstable

athletic environment aggravated the goal of Plaintiff’s attending Defendant

University.” (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #11.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been “directly

damaged by Defendants’ actions through…having the coaches no longer able to coach

him despite his relying on those coaches being the ones in place when he enrolled at

Defendant University.” (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #11.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff sued Reinhart University and Dr. Walter May, bringing eight State-

law claims, including contract claims, unjust enrichment, and various negligence

claims. (Id., ¶¶ 16–65, PageID #11–16.) Defendants timely removed the action to

federal court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants move to dismiss. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff did

not respond to the motion.

JURISDICTION

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, possessing only the power that the

Constitution and Congress authorize. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a case to federal court only if it

could have been filed there in the first place. Strong v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,

78 F.3d 256, 256 (6th Cir. 1996). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, a

defendant seeking to remove the case bears the burden of establishing that the Court

would have had original jurisdiction if the plaintiff filed suit in federal court in the

first instance. See, e.g., Conrad v. Robinson, 871 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1989). Courts

strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remand.

Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendants

removed this case from State court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1,

¶ 6, PageID #2.)

Although no party directly raises the issue, the Court has an independent

obligation to examine its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310,

315 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted); Mercurio v. American Express

Centurion Bank, 363 F. Supp. 2d 936, 938 (N.D. Ohio 2005). In general, “[f]ederal

courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases: cases that involve a federal

question . . . and cases in which there is complete diversity of citizenship between the

parties and the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.” Nessel ex rel. Mich.

v. AmeriGas Partners, L.P., 954 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

& 1332(a)).

I. Complete Diversity

Section 1332 provides federal jurisdiction over a dispute between citizens of

different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

“[F]or diversity jurisdiction to be proper under § 1332, no plaintiff and no defendant

can be the citizen of the same state.” Tennial v. Bank of America, No. 17-6377, 2020

WL 2530872, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020). Plaintiff is domiciled in Ohio. (ECF

No. 1-2, ¶ 1, PageID #1; ECF No. 1, ¶ 5, PageID #2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is a citizen

of Ohio. Defendant Reinhart University is a private university in Georgia. (ECF

No. 1, ¶ 5, PageID #2.) Defendant May is domiciled in Georgia. (Id.) Accordingly,

Defendants are citizens of Georgia. (Id.) Because Plaintiff and Defendants are not

citizens of the same state, the Court determines that complete diversity exists.

II. Amount in Controversy

When determining the amount in controversy, punitive damages count,

unless—the law of this Circuit says—it appears to a legal certainty that they cannot

be recovered. Heyman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 781 App’x 463, 471 (6th Cir.

2019) (quoting Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2001)).

The removal statute requires only a short and plain statement of the grounds for

jurisdiction that need not contain evidence. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC

v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84 (2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)). To assert the

amount in controversy, the defendant need only plausibly allege in its removal the

that the claim exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Id. at 87. To do so, the defendant

need not “research, state and prove the plaintiff’s claim for damages.” Hayes, 266

F.3d at 572.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he amount in controversy exceeds $25,000.00”

(ECF No. 1-2, ¶4, PageID #10), and seeks compensatory, punitive, and treble

damages (id., ¶¶ 1–3, PageID #16). In their notice of removal, Defendants allege that

“[t]hese amounts, on their face, show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000”

and, therefore, exceed the jurisdictional threshold. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 6, PageID #2.) As

an exhibit to the complaint, Plaintiff attached an invoice, which shows the following

payments:

Description Charges Payments

Residence Hall Fines $50.00

Art Fee $50.00

Block Tuition $14,082.00

Room and Board $5,300.00

Student Activity Fee $125.00

Technology Fee $200.00

Public Safety Fee $60.00

Campus Fee $490.00

Health Fee $80.00

Fed Parent PLUS Loan $9,578.00 - $9,578.00

Fed Direct Subsidized Loan $1,732.00 - $1,732.00

Fed Direct Unsubsidized Loan $990.00 - $990.00

Federal PELL Grant - $3,225.00

Men’s Lacrosse Scholarship - $6,000.00

Reinhart Opportunity Scholarship - $1,000.00

Spring 24 Parent Refund $2,088.00

Fed Parent PLUS Loan - $3,093.00

Total charges: $34,825.00

Total payments: $25,618.00

(ECF No. 1-2, PageID #17.)

Plaintiff’s total amount of payments for the 2024–2025 spring semester, which

are loans and scholarships, is $25,618.00. This amount exceeds the jurisdictional

threshold for bringing suit in the common pleas court. But it does not place more

than $75,000 in controversy between the parties. Even if Plaintiff paid all

outstanding charges in the invoice, the amount still fails to meet the federal

jurisdictional threshold. For that reason, Defendants rely on Plaintiff’s prayer for

punitive damages to meet the federal jurisdictional threshold for the amount in

controversy.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s contract claims are viable, punitive damages are

not available for breaches of contract under Ohio law. See, e.g., Lucarell v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St.3d 453, 2018-Ohio-15, 97 N.E. 3d 458,

paragraph one of the syllabus. Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment presents a

quasi-contractual theory of recovery, making punitive damages unavailable for it as

well. See Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 776, 794–95

(N.D. Ohio 2018), aff'd, 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is well-settled that claims

for unjust enrichment sound in contract rather than tort.”). If a breach of contract

claim is “accompanied by a connected tort that is fraudulent, wanton, reckless,

malicious, or oppressive,” punitive damages might be available. Id. at 794; see also

Raze Int’l., Inc., v. Southeastern Equip. Co., 2016-Ohio-5700, 69 N.E.3d 1274, ¶ 74

(Ohio Ct. App.) (holding that fraudulent misrepresentations, but not negligence

misrepresentations, “can lead to both compensatory damages and punitive

damages.”) (emphasis in original). In this case, Plaintiff brings claims for negligence.

To the extent Plaintiff’s negligence claims are viable, and to the extent that

those negligence claims survive the economic loss rule, though they might not, Ohio

law requires more than mere negligence to sustain an award of punitive damages.

Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syllabus (1987); Simpkins

v. Grace Brethren Church of Del., 2014-Ohio-3465, 16 N.E.3d 687, ¶ 88 (Ohio Ct.

App.), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122 (noting that punitive

damages require a showing of malice). However, Plaintiff does not allege malice.

Nor does Plaintiff allege malice in his remaining claims for conversion and

tortious interference with a contract. See Koehler v. PepsiAmericas, Inc., 268 F. App’x

396, 407 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[C]onversion is such an independent tort that allows

punitive damage recovery upon a showing of malice.”); Developers Three v.

Nationwide Ins. Co., 64 Ohio App.3d 794, 805, 582 N.E.2d 1130 (1990) (“Punitive

damages are recoverable in a tortious interference action” but “only if plaintiff proves

actual malice.”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, Ohio law leaves no doubt that Plaintiff cannot recover punitive

damages, assuming the merits of his claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that it does not have subject-

matter jurisdiction over this action and REMANDS the case to the Geauga County

Court of Common Pleas.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio