Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-01524-NJR

$66,600 IN UNITED STATES

CURRENCY,

Defendant,

and

KHALID PERVEZ,

Claimant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

This is a civil action in rem in which Plaintiff, the United States of America (the

“Government”), seeks the forfeiture of $66,600, which, it claims, constitutes money

“furnished or intended to be furnished . . . in exchange for a controlled substance.”

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). Claimant Khalid Pervez (“Pervez”) has declared an interest in the

property and contests the Government’s forfeiture efforts.

Now before the Court is Pervez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 16).

For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The Court accepts as true the following facts, which are taken from the

Government’s amended complaint (Doc. 23).

On February 9, 2024, officers from the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)

stopped Pervez as he was driving westbound on Interstate 270 in Madison County,

Illinois, after observing several traffic violations and a cracked windshield on his vehicle.

(Doc. 23-1 ¶¶ 1-2). Before initiating the stop, one of the officers, Lucas Ward, ran Pervez’s

plates using License Plate Reader (LPR) technology and learned he had traveled

eastbound on February 6, 2024 (three days prior), through Joplin, Missouri, St. Clair,

Missouri, and Granite City, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 3).

When Officer Brandon Smiley approached Pervez’s vehicle, an RV registered in

Oklahoma, Pervez exited from the driver’s side door and met him on the passenger side,

locking his keys and wallet inside. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 7). DEA officers know, based on their training

and experience, that “it is common for individuals involved in criminal activity” to exit a

vehicle and approach an officer “in an attempt to distract the officer’s focus.” (Id. ¶ 4).

After the officers informed Pervez of the reason for the stop, he explained that he

had been driving since 6 a.m. and that he was planning to fix his windshield. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6).

The officers noticed that Pervez was “looking around constantly,” which they attributed

to “nervous behavior.” (Id. ¶ 5). Pervez explained that he was traveling from his home in

Pennsylvania to Tulsa, Oklahoma, to visit his 14-year old son, who resides there. He also

stated that he was going to find a job in Tulsa. He added that he did not intend to move

to Tulsa but was looking for a trucking job that would allow him to drive between

Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 13). Pervez noted that he owned a semi-truck in

Oklahoma. (Id.). The officers observed that Pervez “constantly” moved his hands

“nervously” while they spoke with him. (Id. ¶ 14).

While Officer Smiley spoke with Pervez, Officer Ward returned to his patrol

vehicle to run Pervez’s information through law enforcement databases and to issue a

warning. (Id. ¶ 18). He also requested that another officer bring a drug dog to the scene.

(Id.). Officer Ward noted that Pervez had been convicted of theft in 2005 and of leaving

the scene of a traffic accident with a fatality in 2009 but did not have any outstanding

warrants. Pervez also possessed a valid driver’s license, issued the day prior. (Id. ¶ 19).

Shortly thereafter, Officer Stephen Moravec arrived on the scene with the drug

dog, Tobi. (Id. ¶ 20). Officer Moravec asked Pervez whether he had anything illegal in the

RV; Pervez stated that he did not. (Id.). Officer Moravec then asked Pervez whether he

was traveling with large amounts of United States currency. (Id.). Pervez said he was not.

Pervez denied Officer Moravec’s request to search the vehicle and stated that he did not

sell drugs. (Id.).

Officer Smiley confirmed that he only intended to give Pervez a warning for the

traffic violations but again requested Pervez’s permission to search the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 21).

Pervez stated that there was nothing illegal inside and asked what the officers were

looking for. (Id.). The Government alleges that Pervez then “changed his story” and

stated that he had some money inside the vehicle but “not that much.” (Id. ¶ 22). When

the officers sought further clarification, Pervez asked how much money it would be

illegal to transport. (Id.). Officer Smiley responded that there was no set amount that

would be illegal and asked once again how much was in the vehicle. (Id.). Pervez

responded that he did not understand the officers’ intentions. (Id.). Officer Smiley asked

if Pervez had $1 million inside the vehicle; Pervez laughed and denied that he had that

much. (Id. ¶ 23).

Officer Moravec handed Pervez a wedge and a metal rod so that he could attempt

to get inside the RV. (Id. ¶ 25). Pervez was unsuccessful. (Id.). Officer Moravec then asked

Pervez why he had told him earlier that he did not have a large amount of cash in the

vehicle. (Id.). Pervez denied that he said that and stated that “he did not have a large

amount of currency inside the RV that was being used to buy drugs.” (Id.). He told Officer

Moravec that he had approximately $40-50,000 inside the RV and that he was hoping to

buy another semi-trailer with the funds. (Id. ¶ 26). Pervez noted that he always carries a

large amount of cash because of his religious beliefs, which forbid him from earning

interest on funds placed in a bank. (Id.). Approximately five minutes later, Pervez was

escorted to the officers’ patrol vehicle while drug dog Tobi completed a pass around the

RV. (Id. ¶ 29). Officer Smiley noticed that Pervez, on observing the drug dog, appeared

“defeated,” “dropping his head and shoulders in a downward motion.” (Id. ¶ 30). Pervez

explained that he carried the money with him so that he could buy a new trailer, items

for his truck, the RV, and another vehicle he owns. (Id. ¶ 31).

At that point, Officer Moravec told Officer Smiley that the drug dog had detected

narcotics in the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 32). Officer Smiley read Pervez his Miranda rights, which

Pervez stated he understood. (Id.). Officer Smiley then asked Pervez where the money in

the RV came from. Pervez explained that he had been saving it for a long time and that

the funds came from his past work as a truck driver. (Id. ¶ 33). He said he was planning

to make purchases at an upcoming auction in Oklahoma and hoped to buy commercial

property and a new semi-trailer and to give the remaining funds to his son. Pervez stated

his current truck is too old to use, so companies refuse to give him jobs. (Id.). Pervez also

informed the officers where the money was located inside the vehicle. (Id.).

When Officer Moravec told Pervez that the drug dog had alerted to the odor of

narcotics, Pervez put his hands down and “dropped his head down in a defeated

manner.” (Id. ¶ 34). Officer Moravec asked Pervez again why he had said there was not

a large amount of cash in the vehicle. (Id.). Pervez explained that he gets confused. (Id.).

Pervez told the officers that the money was not bound in rubber bands and

advised the officers he had $60,000, banded in increments of $10,000. (Id. ¶ 36). When

Officer Smiley asked whether there were receipts for the funds, Pervez stated that they

were in Pennsylvania but then stated they were in Tulsa. (Id.). He said that he should not

have exited his vehicle so quickly. He also said that he does not travel back and forth to

Pennsylvania but later stated that he was using the funds in the vehicle to travel back and

forth between Oklahoma and Pennsylvania every few months. (Id.). Officer Smiley

noticed that Pervez was rubbing his hands together while speaking, suggesting

nervousness. (Id. ¶ 39). Pervez also reported that his lips were dry, which the Government

says is another sign of nervousness. (Id.). Pervez proceeded to share more details about

his life and plans. The Government alleges that several of these statements, particularly

those regarding his employment history, travel plans, and smoking habits, contradicted

earlier statements he made to the officers. (Id. ¶ 41). Pervez also informed the officers that

he had paid $3,500 in cash for the RV and that the money inside the vehicle was all in

$100 bills. (Id. ¶ 43).

Within an hour, a tow company was able to gain access to the interior of the RV.

(Id. ¶ 44). The officers entered the RV and located the cash inside wrapped in several

plastic bags that had been placed inside of a lunch box. (Id. ¶ 45). Officer Ward placed the

funds in an evidence bag, and Pervez acknowledged that the money was his. (Id. ¶ 46).

The RV was transported to the DEA’s Fairview Heights office for a more thorough search.

(Id. ¶ 47). The Government does not allege that any narcotics ever were located in the

vehicle.

Pervez participated in a recorded interview with the agents. He told the officers,

among other things, that he resides in Tulsa “most of the time,” that his Pennsylvania

house is in foreclosure and he is in the process of moving to Oklahoma, that he was

carrying the cash to use at an auction in Tulsa, that he owns several vehicles but only the

RV and truck are registered in his name, that he does not travel between Pennsylvania

and Oklahoma anymore because of the cost, and that he stopped looking for a job and

was going to “do his own thing.” (Id. ¶ 48).

During the investigation, agents used another drug dog (Blu) to inspect the cash

they recovered from Pervez’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 49). They placed the cash in a brown bag and

put the bag in a conference room with four similar bags. Blu reviewed two of the bags

but did not alert. On sniffing the third bag, Blue came to a sitting position, suggesting

that he had smelled narcotics. (Id. ¶ 51). That bag contained the cash. (Id. ¶ 51). The agents

counted the currency and determined that it totaled $66,600.

The DEA initiated an administrative forfeiture proceeding for the cash, and Pervez

filed a claim contesting forfeiture. (Gov. Mot. to Strike ¶ 1 (Doc. 11)). On June 18, 2024,

the Government filed a Verified Complaint of Forfeiture in this Court. (Doc. 1). Pervez

filed a verified claim of interest in the Defendant property approximately two months

later. (Doc. 8). The Government moved to strike Pervez’s answer and verified claim as

untimely and thus not in “strict compliance” with the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty

or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental Rules”), which govern

the procedural aspects of this action. On September 30, 2025, the Court denied that

motion. (Doc. 15).

On November 25, 2025, Pervez moved for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 16).

The Government thereafter requested leave to file an amended complaint to add details

regarding the second drug dog’s detection. The Court granted the Government’s request

and permitted the parties to file supplemental memoranda on the pending motion for

judgment on the pleadings in light of the amended complaint. (Doc. 22).

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), all money furnished or intended to be furnished by a

person in exchange for a controlled substance, and all proceeds traceable to such an

exchange, are subject to forfeiture to the United States. Civil forfeiture is a proceeding

in rem, where the property itself is treated as being guilty of the wrongdoing. United States

v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One Hundred Twenty Dollars

($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2018). The property owner’s culpability is not

considered in determining whether the property should be forfeited. United States v.

$128,915.00, No. 20-00667, 2021 WL 2432064, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 15, 2021). Thus, even

when there is no criminal prosecution, the Government can seize cash that it believes is

traceable to drug trafficking. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3). The

Government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the property is subject to forfeiture. United States v. Funds in Amount of Thirty Thousand

Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670), 403 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(c)(1)).

Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset

Forfeiture Actions governs the proceedings here. United States v. Funds in the Amount of

$239,400, 795 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2015). Supplemental Rule G(2) provides that a

forfeiture complaint must: (a) be verified; (b) state the grounds for subject-matter

jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction over the defendant property, and venue; (c) describe the

property with reasonable particularity; (d) if the property is tangible, state its location

when any seizure occurred; (e) identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is

brought; and (f) state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the

government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.

R. G(2)(a)-(f). The Government must carry its burden by a preponderance of the evidence.

18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). The preponderance of the evidence standard requires a greater

showing than “probable cause.” United States v. 5 S. 351 Tuthill Rd., Naperville, Ill., 233 F.3d

1017, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000); $100,120.00, 730 F.3d 711, 716 n.5. To meet its burden, the

Government must demonstrate a “substantial connection” between the property seized

and a criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3). It may rely on evidence gathered both

before and after the filing of the forfeiture complaint to do so. Id. § 983(c)(2). While the

claimant may move to dismiss a forfeiture action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b), “the complaint may not be dismissed on the ground that the government did not

have adequate evidence at the time the complaint was filed to establish the forfeitability

of the property.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(8)(b)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(D); United States

v. 286,161 bottles, et al., No. 19-3876, 2020 WL 550598, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2020).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is governed by the same

standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Adams v.

City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014).1 “When a plaintiff moves for

judgment on the pleadings, the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that the nonmovant cannot prove facts sufficient to support its position, and that

the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d

307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc., 972 F.3d 915,

919 (7th Cir. 2020)). The Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago,

810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). Generally, a complaint need only state a “plausible

claim for relief” and provide fair notice to the defendant. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

When considering such a motion in a civil forfeiture setting, the court need only

decide whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief there

was a substantial connection between the currency and a criminal offense. United States

v. $42,600.00 United States Currency, 409 F. Supp. 3d 671, 676 (S.D. Ind. 2019). The court

1 A motion under Rule 12(c) must be brought “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to

delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

looks to the totality of the evidence in making this determination. See $30,670, 403 F.3d at

455; $100,120.00, 730 F.3d at 716 n.5.

DISCUSSION

Pervez argues that the amended complaint fails to allege a plausible nexus

between the currency recovered from his RV and a drug trafficking crime. He reasons

principally that the dog sniff evidence here is of limited utility because it is possible the

dogs reacted to the smell of cannabis, which is legal in Illinois, and given the reality that

much of the currency in circulation is contaminated with narcotics. He adds that

possessing a large sum of U.S. currency is not indicative of criminal activity. Pervez also

argues that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in the first instance by

prolonging the traffic stop to allow a dog-sniff of the vehicle.

In response, the Government asserts that it has satisfied its pleading standard by

pointing to multiple factors connecting the cash to a drug transaction, including Pervez’s

decision to exit the RV abruptly and lock his keys in the vehicle, certain statements he

made to officers that the Government alleges were contradictory and evasive, the nature

of his travel plans, and the positive alerts by the drug dogs. The Government further

contends that the present motion is an inappropriate vehicle to address Pervez’s Fourth

Amendment arguments. It adds that even if the Court were to consider the issue, the

length of the stop was at least partially attributable to Pervez being locked out of the

vehicle while on the side of the highway, and his behavior gave them a reasonable basis

to continue their investigation in any event.

The Court finds that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support a

reasonable belief that the Government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial of

demonstrating the $66,600 was furnished by a person in exchange for a controlled

substance or is proceeds traceable to such an exchange, as required by 21 U.S.C.

§ 881(a)(6). Accepting the alleged facts as true, Pervez was pulled over on Interstate 270

on the way to Oklahoma after conducting a short trip to Pennsylvania. The Government

alleges that the short trips are a possible indicator of criminal activity. (Doc. 23-1 ¶ 23).

When the officers approached his vehicle, Pervez exited quickly, approaching the

officers, locking himself out of the car in the process. The Government notes that

individuals involved in criminal behavior often approach officers in an attempt to distract

their focus. (Id. ¶ 4). The officers also observed Pervez acting nervously during their

interaction with him — looking around and gripping his hands tightly. Pervez’s dry lips

were another indicator of his nervousness. (Id. ¶ 39). Perhaps most relevant to the issues

here, two dogs alerted to the presence of drugs. The first dog alerted at the scene during

a walk-around of the RV. The second alerted to the currency itself at the DEA office. The

Court finds that the facts alleged in the amended complaint support a reasonable

inference that the currency has a substantial connection to a criminal offense — drug

trafficking. Although a factfinder ultimately may discount some or all of these facts and

conclude that the Government has not met its burden of demonstrating by a

preponderance of the evidence that the cash is connected to a drug crime, its allegations

are sufficient to satisfy the initial pleading burden.

This Court considered similar circumstances in United States v. $24,000.00 in United

States Currency, No. 21-1073, 2022 WL 1692444 (S.D. Ill. May 26, 2022). There, the

Government’s complaint described cash seized from a claimant who had been driving an

illogical route to his stated destination, possessed a firearm, and was exhibiting visible

signs of nervousness. 2022 WL 1692444 at *3. The officers also noted a strong odor of air

freshener emanating from the vehicle and ultimately located a large sum of money in the

car’s center console. A dog sniff alerted to an odor of narcotics on the money. Id. The

Court held that those circumstances were sufficient to state a claim. Id. To be sure, some

of the facts at issue there are distinguishable from this case, but material aspects are

similar. In both cases, officers discovered large quantities of concealed cash from vehicles

where the driver had unusual travel plans and exhibited nervous behavior. Most

important, in both cases, drug dogs alerted to the currency.

Pervez argues that the Seventh Circuit has warned courts to be wary of the

persuasiveness of dog sniff evidence in light of a concern that much of the currency in

circulation contains sufficient quantities of narcotics to prompt an alert. See United States

v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the “probative

value of dog sniffs is, at most, minimal.”). More recently, however, the Seventh Circuit

has taken the view that “that a properly trained dog’s alert to currency should be entitled

to probative weight.” $30,670, 403 F.3d at 459. In that case, the court of appeals concluded

that a positive dog sniff was “strong probative evidence of illegal narcotics activity.” Id.

at 470. The court reached that conclusion after consulting scientific research indicating

“that circulated currency, innocently contaminated with [microgram] quantities of

cocaine would not cause a properly trained detection canine to signal an alert even if very

large numbers of bills are present.” Id. at 459. The panel explained that prior Seventh

Circuit cases, including $506,231, cited by Pervez, relied on an “uncritical adoption of the

currency contamination theory.” 403 F.3d at 459. Thus, the Court believes that the dog

sniff evidence here goes a long way toward satisfying the Government’s initial pleading

burden. That is not to say that it will be conclusive. There may be questions about the

reliability of dog sniff evidence in a given case, e.g., $100,120.00, 730 F.3d at 721, but the

Court does not see how those issues could be resolved on a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, absent factual development.

Pervez also cites $506,231 for the proposition that large amounts of currency and

its manner of storage are not sufficient to create probable cause for the connection

between that currency and drug trafficking. To start, this argument presupposes a

“divide-and-conquer approach” to the factors cited by the Government that the Seventh

Circuit has disclaimed. See $30,670, 403 F.3d at 469. In any event, the case he cites does

not support so broad of a rule. The Seventh Circuit merely held that “[t]he existence of

any sum of money, standing alone, is not enough to establish probable cause to believe the

money is forfeitable.” 125 F.3d at 452 (emphasis added). Here, the amended complaint

cites other factors that support the reasonable belief that the Government will be able to

meet its burden, including the dog sniff evidence discussed above.

Relatedly, Pervez appears to take the position that the Government’s complaint is

facially deficient because it fails to allege the existence of probable cause for the seizure.

(Doc. 24, p. 9). That showing certainly was required before the enactment of the Civil

Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), see $100,120.00, 730 F.3d at 716 n.5. The

Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed whether that pleading requirement survived

CAFRA. See United States v. $42,600.00 United States Currency, 409 F. Supp. 3d 671, 675

(S.D. Ind. 2019). However, district courts in this circuit have held that “CAFRA repealed

by implication [the prior statute’s] probable cause requirement for civil-forfeiture

complaints,” meaning the complaint only “must allege facts that support a reasonable

belief that there was a substantial connection between the Currency and a criminal

offense.” Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Lopez-Burgos, 435 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2006); United

States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in United States Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2002));

United States v. $299,745.00 in United States Currency, No. 23-01584, 2024 WL 1908114, at

*7 (S.D. Ind. May 1, 2024).2 For the reasons explained above, the Court believes the

amended complaint satisfies that standard.

Pervez also challenges the seizure under the Fourth Amendment, primarily on the

ground that the officers unlawfully extended the stop without reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015). The Court

agrees with the Government that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not the

proper procedural vehicle to address this issue. Notably, Pervez seems to challenge the

facts as alleged by the Government. For instance, he refers to body worn camera and

dashcam footage that is not before the Court (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 44, 48, 53) and characterizes

locking his keys in the RV as “accidental.” (Id. ¶ 18). He also discusses the training records

of one of the drug dogs, which also are not in the Court’s possession. (Id. ¶ 62). The

2 The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach, holding that the probable cause requirement survived

CAFRA. See United States v. $493,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 518 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). Pervez does

not explicitly cite the Ninth Circuit’s position, much less explain why the Court should adopt it here. Under

the circumstances, the Court will follow the approach of the other district courts in this circuit.

Court's review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is generally limited to the facts

alleged in the complaint. A motion to suppress would permit the parties to present

evidence to the Court.

Even if the Court were to look only to the facts described in the amended

complaint in assessing whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, Pervez has

not adequately responded to the Government's suggestion that the length of the stop was

a natural consequence of being locked out of the vehicle on the side of the highway. This

is not to say the Court agrees with the argument but merely to observe that the briefing

on the issue is insufficient to justify a decision at this time.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Pervez’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 16) is

DENIED. The Court will set a scheduling conference by separate order. Pervez SHALL

answer the amended complaint on or before May 4, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 20, 2026 Tl

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |

United States District Judge

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