Huff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI

MATTHEW HUFF, ; Case No. 1:24-cv-150

Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland

CEDAR FAIR, L.P.,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 28)

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 28). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 29), to which Defendant filed a

Reply in Support (Doc. 30). This matter is therefore ripe for the Court’s review. For the

following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) is GRANTED.

FACTS

Plaintiff Matthew Huff was diagnosed with autism and an eye condition known

as keratoconus. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 78.) Because of his eye condition, Plaintiff

used a white cane to navigate and a magnifying glass to read fine print in 2022; after

subsequently undergoing eye surgery, Plaintiff now describes his eyesight as “pretty

good.” (Id. at Pg. ID 79.) Defendant Cedar Fair, L.P. operates an amusement park, Kings

Island, in Mason, Ohio. (Defendant’s Proposed Undisputed Facts, Doc. 28-1, § 5;

Plaintiff's Response to Proposed Undisputed Facts, Doc. 29-1, ¥ 5.)

Plaintiff began working at Kings Island in 2020 in the role of Food Service - Beer

Pourer. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 89-92; see also Onboarding Paperwork, Doc. 22, Ex. A,

Pg. ID 181-85.) During his onboarding process, Plaintiff filled out paperwork asking if he

was able to perform the duties of the job. (Onboarding Paperwork, Doc. 22, Ex. A, Pg. ID

181-85.) The signature page of the form includes a section for the employee to certify that

he or she is able perform the essential functions of the position. This certification has two

checkboxes: “Without Accommodation,” and “With Accommodation (Please list any

suggested accommodation(s) in detail on the Accommodations Request Form.)” (Id. at

Pg. ID 185.) Further, under the signature block is another checkbox that reads, “Please

check here if attaching the Accommodations Request Form.” (Id.) Plaintiff signed the

certification, indicating that he was able to perform the essential functions of the position,

and then checked “Without Accommodation.” (Id.) He made no other markings in the

other checkboxes. (Id.) Plaintiff also never submitted an Accommodation Request Form.

(Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 103.)

On May 22, 2022, Plaintiff's area supervisors reported that he had improperly

adjusted the carbon dioxide levels himself for the draft beer, which caused the cart to

close early. (See Memo to File, Doc. 22, Ex. C, Pg. ID 188.) Then, on June 7, 2022, Plaintiff

received disciplinary action because he violated Kings Island’s harassment policy with

comments he made to a female coworker. (See Letter of Agreement, Doc. 22, Ex. D, Pg. ID

189.) Plaintiff signed this letter, acknowledging that “violation of this policy could result

in immediate disciplinary action, not to exclude termination of employment.” (Id.) Then,

on July 12, 2022, Plaintiff was disciplined for customer tip theft. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg.

ID 127-30; Associate Counseling Report #1, Doc. 22, Ex. E, Pg. ID 194.) The discipline

report notes that Plaintiff violated company policy when he overcharged a guest more

than what they had listed on the tip line. (Id.) Specifically, although the guest left a tip of

$2.00, Plaintiff input $2.77 into the payment system. (Id.) The report indicated that, as a

result of this policy violation, Kings Island terminated Plaintiff's employment. (Id.; see

also Associate Counseling Report #1, Doc. 22, Ex. E, Pg. ID 194.) Plaintiff testified that he

did not know why he entered the incorrect tip amount, but speculated that “[i]t might

have been... a mistake,” and that he “either typed it in wrong or [he] just didn’t see it

right or... it was just being rushed.” (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 139.)

Immediately following his termination, Plaintiff, along with his father, appealed

the decision and attended a meeting with Brian Stover, the employee relations manager

at Kings Island, who represented Defendant. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 136-38; Stover

Dep., Doc. 26, Pg. ID 219.) Stover testified that, during the meeting, Plaintiff stated that

his error was due to eyesight issues. (Stover Dep., Doc. 26, Pg. ID 270.) Stover then

reversed the termination and asked Plaintiff to submit a formal Accommodation Request

Form, which is the same form referenced in the paperwork that Plaintiff initially signed

during the onboarding process. (Id. at Pg. ID 181-85, 270.) Filling out this Accommodation

Request Form initiates the interactive process between Defendant and an employee. (Id.

at Pg. ID 264.) Plaintiff testified that, during the meeting, his dad asked for certain

accommodations, like a bigger screen, better lighting, and the ability to input the tip

amounts at the end of the day. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 141.) Plaintiff also testified that

he did not remember if Stover told him he needed to fill out the Accommodation Request

Form, but Plaintiff remembers discussing the form in the meeting and that it “had to be

online or something.” (Id. at Pg. ID 145-46.) However, he does not recall if Stover

informed him that filling out the form would require medical documentation and would

result in a meeting with human resources. (Id. at Pg. ID 147-48.)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not fill out an Accommodation Request Form. (Huff

Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 149, 159.) Plaintiff did discuss with his supervisors the

accommodations he mentioned during his appeal; however, he never received the

accommodations discussed. (Id. at Pg. ID 149-50.) Instead, Plaintiff used a magnifying

glass to read receipts, which he claimed sometimes helped. (/d. at Pg. ID 152-53.) Then,

on September 30, 2022, Plaintiff received a second disciplinary action for customer tip

theft. (Id.; see also Associate Counseling Report #2, Doc. 22, Ex. G, Pg. ID 206-08.) This

report states that the customer entered $0.00 for a tip, but Plaintiff input $1.00 into the

payment system. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he does not remember why he would include

a different number than the customer had written, but states that he “would never”

intentionally type ina wrong number. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 166.) As a result of this

action, Plaintiff was again terminated. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant would not allow

him to appeal this termination, although he requested to do so. (Id. at Pg. ID 168-69.)

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), charging Defendant with violating the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in February 2023. (See Compl., Doc. 1, § 15.) On December 21,

2023, the EEOC issued Plaintiff his right to sue letter. (Id.; see also Right to Sue Letter, Doc.

1-1.) On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (See Doc. 1.) Plaintiff brings claims

of disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A)

against Defendant. These discrimination claims allege both that Defendant failed to

accommodate Plaintiff's disability, and that Defendant terminated Plaintiff because of his

disability. (Id. at 15-25.) Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment

on May 12, 2025, which the parties have fully briefed. (See Docs. 28, 29, 30.)

LAW

When there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the district court shall grant summary judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden to conclusively show that no

genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If the moving party

meets that burden, then it becomes the nonmoving party’s responsibility to point to

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). A court is under no obligation to search the record for genuine issues of

material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996).

Moreover, a “mere scintilla” of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s

position is not enough to avoid summary judgment. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734

(6th Cir. 2005). Rather, to preclude summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put

forth probative evidence on which a jury could reasonably reach a verdict in that party’s

favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at 1347. If the nonmoving party

fails to make the necessary showing for an element on which it has the burden of proof,

then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 US. at 323.

ANALYSIS

At the summary judgment stage, when a plaintiff has not presented any direct

evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Under this framework, a plaintiff faces the initial

burden of presenting a prima facie case, which creates a rebuttable presumption of

discrimination that requires the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged action.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319

F.3d, 866 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th

Cir. 2000)) (cleaned up). Once the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must prove

that the defendant’s proffered reason was a “pretext to hide unlawful discrimination.” Id.

(quoting Johnson, 215 F.3d at 573) (cleaned up).

In federal court, federal and Ohio discrimination claims are analyzed under the

same standards. Knox v. Neaton Auto Prods. Mfg., 375 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, as Plaintiff brings concurrent claims under both the ADA and Ohio Revised

Code § 4112, the Court will consider them together. Defendant asserts that it is entitled

to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg. ID 355.) Defendant

first contends that Plaintiff cannot support a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate

based on disability because Plaintiff never requested an accommodation within the

meaning of the ADA. (Id.) And, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish a

prima facie case of disability discrimination because similarly situated non-disabled

employees were treated the same. (Id.) The Court will address each argument in turn.

I. Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate Claims

Defendant states that Plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie claims for his

failure-to-accommodate causes of action. To establish a prima facie failure-to-

accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the

ADA; (2) he was otherwise qualified for the position, either with or without a reasonable

accommodation; (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know of the disability; (4) the

plaintiff requested an accommodation; and (5) the defendant failed to provide the

necessary accommodation. King v. Steward Trumbull Mem‘ Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 560

(6th Cir. 2022). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the fourth and

fifth elements. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg. ID 364-65.) Additionally, Defendant notes that the

Sixth Circuit has stated that “when an employee requests an accommodation for the first

time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a

request can be too little, too late.” (Id. (quoting Parsons v. Auto Club Group, 565 F. App’x

446, 449 (6th Cir. 2014)) (cleaned up).) The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to properly request an accommodation

and initiate the interactive process to receive that accommodation. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg.

ID 365-67.) In support of this argument, Defendant points to several Sixth Circuit cases

demonstrating that an employer “is not obligated to provide accommodation until the

plaintiff [has] provided a proper diagnosis of her disability and requested specific

accommodation.” (Id. at Pg. ID 365 (quoting Woodie v. Motorola Sols., Inc., No. 24-3267,

2025 WL 754544, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025)).) In Woodie, Defendant notes, the plaintiff

had asked his employer for a reduced travel schedule because of his disability, but the

employer had a specific policy for submitting a disability accommodation request. (Id. at

Pg. ID 366.) The plaintiff knew of the policy but never submitted his formal

accommodation request. (Id.) The Sixth Circuit concluded that “the plaintiff thus failed

to request an accommodation sufficient to start the interactive process.” (Id. (quoting

Woodie, 2025 WL 754544, at *2).) Additionally, the Sixth Circuit found the same in two

other cases with similar facts. (Id.; see Wilson v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health, No. 23-3994,

2024 WL 3814047 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024); Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805

(6th Cir. 2020).) In all of these cases, Defendant points out that the court found that the

plaintiff had failed to initiate the interactive process by submitting the required

paperwork to request an accommodation; thus, the employer had no obligation to

provide the accommodation. (Id. at Pg. ID 366-67.)

Ina similar way, Defendant contends, Plaintiff here failed to initiate the interactive

process and cannot maintain a claim for failure to accommodate. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg. ID

367.) As Defendant notes, Plaintiff requested three accommodations: a larger screen,

better lighting, and the ability to input tips later in his shift. (Id.) However, Defendant

states that Plaintiff did not follow its accommodation policy; as Stover testified, he told

Plaintiff to submit the Accommodation Request Form. (Id.) And, Plaintiff acknowledged

that Stover told him this when he stated, “[Stover] said there was some kind of form you

had to fill out online.” (Id. at Pg. ID 368 (quoting Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 144-46, 148).)

Furthermore, Defendant highlights that, before his termination appeal, Plaintiff indicated

he did not need an accommodation when he filled out his initial employment paperwork,

as he indicated he could perform his job without accommodation. (Id. at Pg. ID 368.) Thus,

according to Defendant, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff (1) was

aware of Defendant's policy for requesting an accommodation but (2) failed to properly

request an accommodation sufficient to start the interactive process. (Id. at Pg. ID 368-69.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant, in fact, failed to accommodate

Plaintiff's verbal requests for accommodation. (Response, Doc. 29, Pg. ID 385-86.)

According to Plaintiff, Woodie is inapplicable because many of the plaintiff's verbal

requests for accommodations were unrelated to his disability and his supervisors

repeatedly directed him to fill out the accommodation form. (/d.) And, in Woodie, the

plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware of the company’s policy that he had to submit

the proper form for accommodation. (Id. at Pg. ID 386.) Conversely, Plaintiff argues that

both he and his father verbally requested accommodations related to Plaintiff's disability

in the meeting with Stover, which “Defendant disputes” were ever made. And, Plaintiff

argues that Stover only made “vague mention of a form for accommodations, but never

gave them the form, told them where to find the form, or notified them that the form was

required before [Defendant] would consider their request. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff

points out that Stover’s testimony is inconsistent about whether and when he hands an

employee the accommodation form. (Id.) He first stated that he only provides the form if

an employee specifically requests one, but then said that he gives the form if an employee

requests an accommodation. (Id.) To this point, Plaintiff states that both he and his father

verbally requested an accommodation, which should have prompted Stover to give them

the accommodation form. (Id. at Pg. ID 386-87.)

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant never informed him that it does not consider

verbal requests; moreover, Defendant cannot point to a policy stating that verbal requests

are not honored and that the form was the sole method of making accommodation

requests. (Response, Doc. 29, Pg. ID 387.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that he was “not

required to use magic words” in order to make a valid request for an accommodation.

(Id. (quoting Fisher v. Nissan N. America, Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020)) (cleaned

up).) Rather, the Sixth Circuit looks to “whether a factfinder could infer that the

interaction constituted a request for an accommodation.” (Id. (quoting Fisher, 951 F.3d at

413) (cleaned up).) According to Plaintiff, he “went beyond” what is required by asking

for specific accommodations, which should have triggered Defendant's interactive

process; such a method for requesting the accommodation is one “widely accepted and

in accordance with the EEOC’s guidance on the topic.” (Id. at Pg. ID 387-88.) Indeed, the

EEOC states that “requests for reasonable accommodation do not need to be in writing.

Individuals may request accommodations in conversation or may use any other mode of

communication.” (Id. (quoting “EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the ADA” (October 17, 2002)).) And, “an

employer may ask the individual to fill out a form or submit the request in written form,

but the employer cannot ignore the initial request.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that

Defendant had a duty to engage in the interactive process and failed to do so. (Id.)

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Addressing Defendant's reliance on Tchankpa to show that employers may require

documentation before granting accommodation requests, Plaintiff states that such

reliance is improper. (Response, Doc. 29, Pg. ID 388-89.) Plaintiff points out that, in

Tchankpa, the plaintiff requested an accommodation for an injury and the employer asked

for medical documentation of his injury, which he failed to provide. (Id. (citing Tchankpa,

951 F.3d at 812).) The court thus granted summary judgment for the employer. But here,

according to Plaintiff, the facts are different, as Defendant never asked Plaintiff for

documentation of his disability. ([d.) Plaintiff states that he never submitted such

documentation because “he didn’t know he had to.” (Id. (cleaned up).) Rather, his and

his father’s verbal requests “clearly qualify as requests for accommodations and mark the

beginning of the interactive process,” in which Defendant failed to engage. (Id.) Indeed,

Plaintiff contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because there is a genuine

dispute of material fact that Defendant informed Plaintiff of its requirement that he fill

out the Accommodations Request Form. (Id. at Pg. ID 390.) Plaintiff claims he was never

told this, and Defendant did not engage in the interactive process. (Id.) Accordingly, as

Plaintiff sees it, Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff's disability. (Id.)

Defendant, however, disagrees with these characterizations. To start, Defendant

takes issue with Plaintiffs claim that Tchankpa, Woodie, and Wilson are inapposite. (Reply,

Doc. 30, Pg. ID 405.) While Plaintiff claims he was never told about the formal request

form, unlike the plaintiffs in the above cases, Defendant declares this is “[n]Jot so.” (Id.) In

support of this contention, Defendant points to several instances in the record where both

Plaintiff and his father admitted that Stover told them about the accommodations request

11

form. (Id. (citing Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 144-46, 148; Richard Huff Dep., Doc. 27, Pg.

ID 331-32).) Furthermore, Plaintiff admits he duly executed his initial onboarding

paperwork which “instructs employees to submit an Accommodations Request Form.”

(id. at Pg. ID 405-06.) This testimony, according to Defendant, aligns with Stover’s

testimony where he stated that he instructed Plaintiff to fill out the form once he reversed

the termination and Plaintiff asked for accommodations. (Id. at Pg. ID 406 (citing Stover

Dep., Doc. 26, Pg. ID 270).) Thus, Defendant maintains that there is no dispute that

Plaintiff was told he needed to fill out the Accommodation Request Form to start the

process. (Id.)

Regarding Plaintiff's arguments that the case law Defendant cites is inapposite to

his situation, Defendant again disagrees. (Reply, Doc. 30, Pg. ID 408.) Beginning with

Woodie, Defendant states that “Plaintiff fails to meaningfully distinguish” this case. (Id.)

Plaintiff claimed that the employee in Woodie asked for accommodations unrelated to his

disability; in actuality, Defendant points out, the record shows that the plaintiff “on

several occasions, asked his supervisors for a reduced travel schedule because of his

disability.” (Id. (quoting Woodie, 2025 WL 754544, at *3).) The Sixth Circuit stated that

“several of [the plaintiff-employee’s] schedule-change requests were tied to his

disability.” (Id. (quoting Woodie, 2025 754544, at *3).) And, just like here, the employer in

Woodie had a policy for submitting a disability accommodation request. (Id.) Defendant

emphasizes that because the plaintiff was informed of the policy, but never submitted the

required paperwork, the Sixth Circuit found that he had failed to request an

accommodation sufficient to start the interactive process under the ADA. (Id. (citing

12

Woodie, 2025 WL 754544, at *3).) As Defendant sees it, there is no material difference

between the situation in Woodie and Plaintiff's claims here. (Id. at Pg. ID 408-09.)

The Court agrees. The record is clear that Plaintiff and his father requested

accommodations during their meeting with Stover. (See Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 141.)

And, as Plaintiff and his father admit, Stover brought up the Accommodations Request

Form during the meeting as the proper vehicle with which to request a disability-related

accommodation. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 144-46, 148; Richard Huff Dep., Doc. 27, Pg.

ID 331-32; see also Stover Dep., Doc. 26, Pg. ID 270.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary

judgment in Woodie for the same reasons: the plaintiff repeatedly discussed his disability

and need for accommodation, was told about the proper request form, but failed to

request an accommodation “sufficient to start the interactive process.” 2025 WL 754544,

at *3.

Furthermore, like here, the plaintiff in Woodie attempted to argue that an

employer's policy, such as a specific request form, does not vary the standard for what

constitutes an accommodation request. 2025 WL 754544, at *3. But the Sixth Circuit was

unconvinced by this argument, pointing out that the plaintiff “offer[ed] no case law to

support his theory that he could sit on his hands and decline to follow” the company’s

policy when he was repeatedly directed to do so. Id. This Court is similarly unconvinced

by Plaintiff's parallel argument. Plaintiff attempts to compare his case to Fisher, where

the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff's repeated proposal for a new job constituted a

request for an accommodation under the ADA because a factfinder could construe the

requests as accommodations. (See Response, Doc. 29, Pg. ID 387-88.) But Fisher is not

13

analogous. In Fisher, the parties were not disputing whether the plaintiff was required to

follow a company policy to formally request an accommodation. 951 F.3d at 419. Instead,

the plaintiff asked for a few accommodations, and the employer simply did nothing. Id.

at Pg. ID 419-20. Here, Plaintiff verbally requested an accommodation and, in response,

Stover informed Plaintiff of the steps he needed to take to formalize that request and

trigger the interactive process. To apply the holding in Fisher to the facts here is a step too

far. The issue in Fisher was whether Plaintiff's request for his accommodations, without

using the words “disability” or “accommodation” should have put the defendant on

notice to begin the interactive process under the ADA. The issue here is whether, after

learning that Defendant had a formal process for accommodation requests, Plaintiff could

fail to follow that policy and still expect Defendant to provide the accommodation. The

two situations are not the same.

Further, the Court is similarly unpersuaded by Plaintiff's claims that Wilson and

Tchankpa are inapplicable. While the facts in Tchankpa are slightly different, the holding

does not change the outcome here. In Tchankpa, the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury

and, once he submitted his accommodation request, the employer requested additional

medical documentation to verify the need for the requested accommodation. 915 F.3d at

812. The Sixth Circuit asserted that an “employee’s failure to provide requested medical

documentation supporting an accommodation precludes a failure to accommodate

claim.” 951 F.3d at 812. And, in Wilson, the Sixth Circuit reiterated this stance when the

plaintiff, who requested an accommodation verbally, was asked to then fill out forms “to

describe her requested accommodation and to show physician support for it.” Id. But, she

14

never did, which “amount[ed] to a voluntary withdrawal that precludes her claim that

the Department failed to accommodate her.” Id. (citing Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at 812).

Plaintiff asserts that, unlike in Wilson, he was never told about the company’s

policy for requesting an accommodation. (Response, Doc. 29, Pg. ID 388.) Yet, it is clear

from the record that this is simply false. As mentioned above, Stover told both Plaintiff

and his father about the form; Plaintiff admitted this. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 144-46,

148; Richard Huff Dep., Doc. 27, Pg. ID 331-32; Stover Dep., Doc. 26, Pg. ID 270.) Before

that, the onboarding paperwork advised Plaintiff of Defendant’s form-based

accommodation process. (Huff Dep., Doc. 22, Pg. ID 185.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not

choose to seek an accommodation through the proper paperwork after stating to Stover

that he needed an accommodation. (Id.) Wilson made clear that an employer is not

required to provide a plaintiff with an accommodation immediately after the plaintiff

requests one. 2024 WL 3814047, at *3. Rather, the plaintiff must follow the employer's

policy; failure to do so amounts to a “withdrawal of the interactive process” and

“precludes a failure to accommodate claim.” Id. at *3-4. Plaintiff's situation is no different

from the one in Wilson.

Plaintiff claims that whether Stover told him he needed to fill out the

accommodations request form is disputed. But, as established, the record is clear that

both Plaintiff and his father remember being told about the form and that it “needed to

be filled out online.” And, Plaintiff testified that he duly executed his initial onboarding

paperwork, which again emphasized that, in order to request an accommodation, the

employee must attach a completed accommodation form. The Sixth Circuit is explicit that

15

a plaintiff who does not follow an employer’s policy for accommodation requests cannot

succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim. See Woodie, 2025 WL 754544, at *3; Tchankpa,

951 F.3d at 812, Wilson, 2024 WL 8714074, at *3.

While Plaintiff is correct that the EEOC does not allow verbal requests to be

ignored, Stover did not ignore the verbal request, but directed him to fill out the form,

which had to be done online. As stated by a court in this district, “both parties must

engage [in the informal, interactive accommodation process] in good faith.” Tucker v.

Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:23-CV-804, 2025 WL 2970152, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2025)

(quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007)) (granting

summary judgment on failure-to-accommodate claim where plaintiff failed to provide

the requested documentation as part of the employer's accommodation request process).

So, like here, when an employee refuses to participate or withholds essential information,

then the employer “is not liable for failing to accommodate.” Id. (citing Tchankpa, 951 F.3d

at 812). Thus, assuming that Plaintiff's verbal request constituted a request for

accommodation, triggering the interactive process, the outcome is unchanged. His failure

to, in good faith, engage in Defendant's interactive process by filling out the online form

as Defendant requested caused a breakdown in the interactive process. See id.; see also

Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Educ. of Danville Independent Schools, 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020)

There is no genuine issue of material fact here. Plaintiff did not properly engage in

Defendant's process for requesting an accommodation; Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on these failure-to-accommodate claims.

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Il. □ Plaintiff’s Disability Discrimination Claims

Looking next to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims for his termination,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not shown direct evidence of discrimination, so the

McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg. ID 369.)

This analysis begins with Plaintiff's demonstration of a prima facie case, which requires

that Plaintiff show: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the job, with or

without a reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; (4)

his employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; and (5) similarly situated,

non-disabled employees were treated more favorably. Booker v. Bd. of Educ. Of the Toledo

Sch. Dist., No. 24-3167, 2024 WL 5440984, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024). Defendant contends

that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination “because

similarly-situated, non-disabled employees were not treated more favorably.” (Motion,

Doc. 28, Pg. ID 369.)

Yet, the Court notes that Plaintiff's argument in response to Defendant's Motion

disposes entirely of Defendant’s use of the indirect evidence test. (Response, Doc. 29, Pg.

ID 391.) Instead, Plaintiff asserts that, because he has established that Defendant failed to

accommodate his disability, this failure to accommodate acts as direct evidence of

disability discrimination. (Id. (citing Fisher, 951 F.3d at 416).) Thus, the McDonnell-Douglas

framework does not apply. (/d.) The remainder of Plaintiff's argument relies on this

finding of direct evidence and never addresses the arguments Defendant made regarding

the indirect evidence test. (Id. at Pg. ID 391-94.) While Plaintiff is correct that a failure to

accommodate does constitute direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff's argument

17

breaks down. As established above, Defendant did not fail to accommodate Plaintiff;

rather, Plaintiff failed to request the accommodation properly in the first place. Without

an actionable failure-to-accommodate claim, Plaintiff cannot use that claim to show direct

evidence of disability discrimination. As Defendant points out, the Sixth Circuit has

affirmed summary judgment in similar cases where a plaintiff has relied on direct

evidence under a failure-to-accommodate claim, but the plaintiff could not establish the

failure-to-accommodate claim. (Reply, Doc. 30, Pg. ID 410 (citing Brumley v. UPS, 909 F.3d

834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018)).)

Without any direct evidence, Plaintiff's theory for his disability discrimination

claims falls flat. And, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s argument for why Plaintiff

has failed to establish a prima facie case under the indirect evidence test. Defendant's

argument solely focuses on the fact that Plaintiff has not shown how he was treated

differently than similarly situated, nondisabled employees, the final element of a prima

facie case. (Motion, Doc. 28, Pg. ID 369.) Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to dispute

this argument. (See generally Response, Doc. 29.) Without rebutting Defendant's claim that

he failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Plaintiff

has essentially abandoned his disability discrimination claims under this theory

altogether. Alexander v. Carter for Byrd, 733 F. App’x 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2018) (“When a

plaintiff fails to address [a claim] in response to a motion for summary judgment, the

claim is deemed waived.”) (cleaned up). The Sixth Circuit’s “jurisprudence on

abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a

plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS

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of Michigan, Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Thus, Defendant

is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) is GRANTED;

2. Summary judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff's

claims; and

3. This case is TERMINATED from the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

By:

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

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