Hadley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-22162-BLOOM/Louis

DEMOREE HADLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DESIREE PEREZ, ROC NATION, ICONIC

CREATIVE, LLC, DANIEL BOBER,

NATALIE ANDERSON, SIG 9, LLC, JAMES

FONDO, STEVEN CADY, JESSICA CADY,

SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,

ODYSSEY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE,

LIFE SKILLS SOUTH FLORIDA

OUTPATIENT, LLC, BROWARD COUNTY

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, JOHN DOE #1,

JOHN DOE #2, and RACHEL BERNSTEIN,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Counter-Defendant Demoree Hadley’s (“Hadley”)

Motion to Dismiss Daniel Bober’s Counterclaim Complaint, ECF No. [281] (“Motion”). Counter-

Plaintiff Daniel Bober (“Dr. Bober”) filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [306]. The Court

has reviewed the Motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise

fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Hadley’s Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Hadley’s Involuntary Examination

In October 2023, Dr. Bober—a psychiatrist who served as the Chief of the Department of

Psychiatry at Memorial Regional Healthcare System in Hollywood, Florida—was introduced to

Hadley’s mother, Desiree Perez (“Perez”). ECF No. [256] ¶¶ 22, 25. Perez contacted Dr. Bober

seeking his professional opinion regarding appropriate psychiatric intervention for Hadley and

inquiring whether an involuntary psychiatric evaluation pursuant to the Baker Act might be

warranted. Id. ¶ 26.

Between October 2023 and March 2024, Perez contacted Dr. Bober multiple times,

expressing severe concern for Hadley’s mental health and wellbeing based on family accounts and

information she had obtained. Id. ¶ 27. Perez shared with Bober that she believed Hadley’s then-

boyfriend, Javon Hadley, had physically and sexually abused Hadley on multiple occasions and

more generally mistreated and controlled her. Id. ¶ 28. Perez conveyed that she had reported Javon

Hadley’s abuse to Miami-Dade County State Attorney’s Office, Javon Hadley had been arrested

in response, and police were actively investigating the relevant allegations. Id. ¶ 29.

On March 26, 2024, Perez informed Dr. Bober that Hadley had threatened to commit

suicide by drug overdose that day. Id. ¶ 30. That evening, Perez informed Dr. Bober that she heard

Hadley, on a phone call earlier that day, tell a longstanding family friend that she was going to

“take pills and kill herself, just now” because the family friend had disclosed Javon Hadley’s rape

and abuse of Hadley to Hadley’s psychologist. Id. ¶ 31. Perez further expressed that, later that

same day, Hadley made erratic, delusional, and false statements to third parties, including

statements, (a) that her grandfather had raped both her and her brother, (b) that she witnessed her

father pulling someone’s eyes out, and (c) that she witnessed her father tie up her siblings with

belts. Id. ¶ 32. Perez described Hadley as “unhinged” and cautioned Dr. Bober that, if not

immediately treated, Hadley would hurt herself. Id. ¶ 33. Perez further expressed that Hadley was

“either on drugs or had just completely lost her mind.” Id. ¶ 34.

The next day—March 27, 2024—Perez advised Dr. Bober that the prior evening, Hadley

was “speaking in delirium” during a phone call; however, later in the evening, she presented as

“calm” and “extremely serene,” deepening Perez’s concern that Hadley was abusing drugs and

was at imminent risk of self-harm. Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Bober asked Perez if there was anyone else Hadley

had been in contact with recently so that he could speak with them and corroborate Perez’s account

of Hadley’s condition. Id. ¶ 36. Perez recommended that Dr. Bober speak to the longstanding

family friend, as well as Hadley’s aunt. Id. ¶ 37.

That same day, Dr. Bober spoke with both parties. Id. ¶ 38. The family friend, who

identified herself as being a friend of 20 years, told Dr. Bober that, “as recently as March 26, 2024,

Hadley had been fabricating stories about events that never occurred.” Id. ¶ 39. For example, on a

phone call, Hadley told the family friend that multiple family members had been raped. Id. The

family friend conveyed to Dr. Bober that, during that same call, Hadley had threatened to take her

own life by overdosing on pills. Id. Hadley’s aunt told Dr. Bober that Hadley’s behavior was

“erratic” and “out of control,” that Hadley had paranoid delusions that people were out to harm

her, and that Hadley felt she was being followed. Id. ¶ 40.

Based on the information conveyed by Perez, Hadley’s family friend, and Hadley’s aunt—

including Hadley’s explicit threat to take her own life by overdose—Dr. Bober determined that an

immediate psychiatric evaluation was warranted to assess whether Hadley met the criteria for an

involuntary examination under the Baker Act. Id. ¶ 41. Perez explained that Hadley would likely

refuse to submit voluntarily to any psychiatric evaluation, so Dr. Bober arranged to meet with

Hadley at the Dania Beach Marina (“Marina”) to conduct a psychiatric examination. Id. ¶ 42. Sig

9, LLC (“Sig 9”), a private security firm, was retained to attend the meeting that the Marina. Id. ¶

43. Sig 9 coordinated with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office to have law enforcement officers

present during the meeting. Id. ¶ 44.

Later in the afternoon on March 27, 2024, Hadley arrived at the Marina. Id. ¶ 45. Dr. Bober

introduced himself and told Hadley that Perez and other family members had informed him of

Hadley’s recent statements regarding her intent to commit suicide by drug overdose. Id. ¶ 46. Dr.

Bober further conveyed that he intended to examine Hadley to determine whether she qualified for

involuntary examination under the Baker Act. Id. ¶ 47. Hadley denied taking drugs or having any

intention of committing suicide. Id. ¶ 48.

However, based on his experience, Dr. Bober believed it was “common for individuals

suffering from mental illness to deny their symptoms or need for treatment. Indeed, oftentimes,

these individuals are either undiagnosed, unmedicated, delusional, or simply in denial regarding

their condition.” Id. ¶ 49. Similarly based on his experience, Dr. Bober knew that it was common

for suicidal individuals to be reluctant to admit their intentions when confronted. Id. ¶ 50.

Therefore, it would not have been “medically or clinically appropriate” for Dr. Bober to have

accepted Hadley’s denial at face value. Id. ¶ 51.

Hadley told Dr. Bober about her therapist, a licensed psychologist at the South Miami

Psychology Group. Id. ¶ 53. Hadley provided her psychologist’s phone number to Dr. Bober and

gave him express permission to speak with the psychologist. Id. Dr. Bober immediately called

Hadley’s psychologist, who told him that “she was deeply concerned for Hadley’s wellbeing,

particularly because Hadley strictly limited” the psychologist’s contact with others and, as a result,

the psychologist’s entire understanding of Hadley’s condition was based on her own reports. Id. ¶

54. Based on his in-person examination at the Marina and the information conveyed by Hadley’s

psychologist, Hadley’s family friend, Hadley’s step-grandmother, Hadley’s aunt, and Perez—

including Hadley’s recent threat to end her life—Dr. Bober determined that there was reason to

believe Hadley was suffering from mental illness at the time and that, because of that illness, she

was unable to determine whether examination was necessary. Id. ¶ 55. Further, Dr. Bober found

that there was a substantial likelihood that, without care or treatment, Hadley would cause serious

bodily harm to herself in the near future. Id. This qualified her to be taken to a receiving facility

for an involuntary examination under the Baker Act. Id.

Dr. Bober explained this determination to Hadley and asked if she would, instead, submit

to a voluntary examination. Id. ¶ 56. Hadley refused, and around 6 p.m. on March 27, 2024, Dr.

Bober executed the Certificate of Professional Initiating Involuntary Examination (the “Baker Act

Certificate”). Officers from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office transported Hadley to Memorial

Regional Hospital, a designated receiving facility. Id. ¶ 59.

Although the Baker Act allows for involuntary examination periods of up to 72 hours, the

doctors at Memorial Regional Hospital elected to release Hadley after 38 hours because, “after

conducting a thorough psychiatric examination, they concluded that Hadley failed to present any

acute psychiatric symptoms that placed her at imminent risk of serious bodily harm to herself or

others in the near future.” Id. ¶ 60.

B. Hadley’s Subsequent Care

Before Hadley could be discharged, at approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 28, 2024, the

psychiatry unit at the hospital received a Marchman Act Order. Id. ¶ 61. The Order identified Perez

as the “Petitioner” who petitioned the court for the “involuntary assessment and/or stabilization”

of Hadley. Id. ¶ 62. The court granted Perez’s ex parte petition, finding “a good faith reason to

believe” Hadley was either impaired by substance abuse or had a co-occurring mental health

disorder that impeded her ability to execute self-control with respect to the substance abuse. Id. ¶

63. The court found intervention needed and ordered that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office

take Hadley into custody and bring her to Life Skills in Deerfield. Id. at ¶ 63–64. Hadley was

transferred to Life Skills on March 28, 2024, and released on April 8, 2024. Id. ¶ 69.

Dr. Bober had no knowledge of or involvement in the petition that led to the Marchman

Act Order or the issuance of the Marchman Act Order. Id. at ¶ 65–66. He first learned of the

Marchman Act Order following Hadley’s planned discharge from the hospital on March 28, 2024.

Id. ¶ 67.

C. Hadley’s Allegedly Defamatory Actions

On May 9, 2025, Hadley filed the instant action. Id. ¶ 70. On June 3, 2025, she filed an

Amended Complaint. Id. ¶ 71. On October 8, 2025, the Court dismissed Counts XIV and XIX

against Dr. Bober. Id. ¶ 72.

Hadley maintains and controls an Instagram account and an X (formerly Twitter) account.

Id. ¶ 74. Hadley has over 3,400 followers on Instagram and over 4,800 on X. Id. ¶ 75. However,

because both profiles are public, Hadley’s accounts are “viewable, accessible, and shareable by

the millions of users of each platform.” Id. ¶ 76.

On May 28, 2025, Hadley began posting about Dr. Bober on her Instagram and X accounts,

engaging in what Dr. Bober describes as a “defamatory campaign.” Id. ¶ 77. For example, she

uploaded a post to her Instagram story stating that she was “abducted” by Dr. Bober and accusing

Dr. Bober of having been part of a “team” of “abusers.” Id. ¶ 78.

Also in May 2025, Hadley was interviewed by NBC 6 South Florida, a prominent news

outlet, regarding her claims. Id. ¶ 79. “On May 27 and 29, 2025, NBC 6 news published two multi-

page articles and accompanying video segments—each over five minutes long—concerning

Hadley’s false accusations.” Id. ¶ 80. Among other things, Hadley claimed that Perez “conspired”

with Dr. Bober to have Hadley committed for a mental health evaluation. Id. ¶ 81. On May 28 and

29, 2025, Hadley shared the NBC 6 news stories on her Instagram profile, reiterating her claims

of “abuse” and stating that “multiple corrupt” and “paid individuals” took part in her abuse. Id. ¶

82. On May 28, 2025, Hadley posted a photograph of Dr. Bober on her Instagram story, further

identifying him as the “man she accused of abducting and abusing her.” Id. ¶ 83.

On June 5, 2025, “Hadley began to continuously post on her Instagram page and Instagram

story pictures and videos of Dr. Bober, accompanied by false, defamatory and malicious captions

and commentary.” Id. ¶ 84. For example, on June 5, 2025, Hadley posted a photograph identifying

Dr. Bober, a photograph of Dr. Bober alongside colleagues from Life Skills, and a video clip from

March 27, 2024, with a caption stating that Dr. Bober had been “paid” by Perez. Id. ¶ 84(a).

On June 6, 2025, she again posted the photograph of Dr. Bober alongside his Life Skills

colleagues to her Instagram page. Id. ¶ 84(b). In another post from that same day, she posted a

photograph of Dr. Bober with a caption implying that he had been “paid” to subject her to the

Baker Act. Id. Hadley further posted to her X account again, again accusing Dr. Bober of

“abducting” her. Id. ¶ 84(c).

On June 13, 2025, Hadley posted a caption on her Instagram page accusing Dr. Bober of

“harassing” and “abus[ing]” her and her husband. Id. ¶ 84(d). On June 21, 2025, Hadley again

posted a photograph of Bober on her X account, accusing him of having “abducted” her. Id. ¶

84(e). On June 22, 2025, Hadley posted pictures of Dr. Bober and others on her Instagram story

with the caption, “Let’s make these go viral too since they abducted me.” Id. ¶ 84(f).

On other occasions, Hadley shared statements made by other parties. Id. ¶ 85. On May 30,

2025, an Instagram user shared one of Hadley’s Instagram posts regarding the NBC 6 videos. Id.

¶ 85(a). After thanking the user for sharing, Hadley responded, “Yes,” to another user’s question,

“[S]o they basically used a [B]aker [A]ct to kidnap you?” Id. On June 2, 2025, Hadley reposted an

X post that stated that “everyone involved” in her Baker Act examination “should be in prison.”

Id. ¶ 85(b).

Dr. Bober alleges that the accusations that he “abducted,” “kidnapped,” or “harassed” her

were defamatory. Id. ¶¶ 87–89. Similarly, the accusations that Dr. Bober was part of a “team” of

abusers, was “paid money” in connection with Hadley’s alleged abduction or “should be in prison”

were defamatory. Id. ¶¶ 90–92.

Hadley’s story ultimately did “go viral.” Id. ¶ 94. On June 20, 2025, “an internationally

acclaimed musical artist publicly endorsed Hadley’s defamatory narrative by posting the hashtag

#JusticeForDem to her X account, which boasts over 28 million followers. Hadley publicly

thanked the artist for her support.” Id. ¶ 95. Within an hour of the artist’s post, the hashtag

#JusticeforDem became one of the top 22 trending topics nationwide on X. Id. ¶ 96.

D. Court Order Regarding Extrajudicial Statements

Following the viral spread of Hadley’s story, Defendant Roc Nation LLC filed an

Expedited Motion for Special Order Regarding Extrajudicial Statements. Id. ¶ 97. On June 25,

2025, the Court granted Roc Nation LLC’s Motion and ordered that all parties, including Hadley,

refrain from giving or authorizing extrajudicial statements or interviews about the case, including

through interactions with media outlets or posts on social media or other public platforms. Id. ¶

98.

E. Hadley’s Subsequent Statements

Through June and July 2025, Hadley continued to make public statements about Dr. Bober.

Id. ¶ 100. Specifically, Hadley participated in a four-part interview series published on a YouTube

channel with 99,000 subscribers. Id. ¶ 101. The series, titled Defending Your Freedom: The

Demoree Hadley Story, prominently featured Hadley’s allegations against Bober. Id. On June 29,

2025, episode three of the series, titled Power, Psychiatry, & Surveillance, was published. Id. ¶

102. The 30-minute interview, which has garnered over 7,000 views, reiterated Hadley’s claims

about a “conspiracy” involving Dr. Bober. Id. ¶ 102. During the interview, Hadley stated that Dr.

Bober had been “bought” by Perez, Dr. Bober acted in an “unethical way,” Dr. Bober was a

“disgusting bully” and an “abuser.” Id. On July 22, 2025, Hadley appeared in episode four of the

series. Id. ¶ 103. That episode, titled Betrayals Unveiled—Exposing the Web of Deceit, has

received over 8,900 views. Id. In the video, Hadley falsely claimed that Dr. Bober had called her

to apologize, admitted that he had “messed up,” and stated that he had been “bought” by Perez. Id.

¶ 103.

On June 19, 2025, Hadley gave an interview on the YouTube channel, BJ Investigates,

which has over 319,000 subscribers. Id. ¶ 104. In the interview, titled ROC Nation CEO’s

Daughter SPEAKS OUT! / Alleged ABDUCTION & Baker Act CORRUPTION, which has amassed

over 150,000 views, Hadley stated that Bober “wanted to essentially [] drug me up to make me

drowsy and not be able to talk.” Id.

Dr. Bober alleges that he “has suffered and continues to suffer damages because of

Hadley’s knowingly false, defamatory, and injurious campaign. In particular, Dr. Bober has

suffered, and will continue to suffer, substantial economic, professional, and reputational damages,

including in connection with his reputation and business interests.” Id. ¶ 105. Following Hadley’s

accusations, Dr. Bober “received dozens of online threats and accusations, including public calls

for revocation of his medical license, and comparisons to criminal figures such as Sean ‘Diddy’

Combs.” Id. ¶ 106. Also following Hadley’s statements, Dr. Bober was asked to resign from his

position as Medical Director of the Jewish Adoption and Foster Care Option. Id. ¶ 107.

F. Bober’s Counterclaim

On November 4, 2025, accompanying his Answer to Hadley’s Amended Complaint, Dr.

Bober filed his Counterclaim. ECF No. [256] at 69. In it, he alleges defamation in the form of libel

(Count I), defamation per se in the form of libel (Count II), defamation in the form of slander

(Count III), and defamation per se in the form of slander (Count IV). Id. at 91–95. On December

9, 2025, Hadley moved to dismiss the Counterclaim, contending that her statements were truthful

and protected by Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. ECF No. [281] at 10.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s

pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570).

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the

plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor

of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d

1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp.

2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts

“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 449 F.3d 1342,

1352 (11th Cir. 2006). “[T]he court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual

allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas

Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

Although a court primarily considers only facts contained within the four corners of the

complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider an additional document “if

the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its

authenticity is not challenged” Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024).

III. DISCUSSION

For purposes of her Motion to Dismiss, Hadley does not dispute that she published (or

republished) each of the social media posts or media statements that Dr. Bober alleges. ECF No.

[281] at 10. Instead, she fundamentally argues that her statements were “truthful and protected by

Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute.” Id.

A. Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute

Hadley’s first argument is that her speech was protected by Florida’s anti-strategic lawsuits

against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute. Id. Florida's anti-SLAPP statute prohibits a

plaintiff from filing a lawsuit that is (a) “without merit” and (b) “primarily because such person or

entity has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue . . . as

protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and s.5, Art. I of the State

Constitution.” Fla. Stat. § 768.295(3). As used in that statute, “free speech in connection with a

public issue” is “any written or oral statement that is protected under applicable law and is made

before a governmental entity in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a

governmental entity, or is made in or in connection with a play, movie, television program, radio

broadcast, audiovisual work, book, magazine article, musical work, news report, or other similar

work.” Fla. Stat. § 768.295(2)(a). The Florida legislature enacted the statute to deter such

problematic suits, deeming them “inconsistent” with the constitutional right of free speech—the

preservation of which is a “fundamental state policy[.]” Fla. Stat. § 768.295(1)

Hadley argues that the Counterclaim should be dismissed because Hadley’s lawsuit “is a

matter of public concern.” ECF No. [281] at 12. That is because the lawsuit implicates: “(1) the

government’s authority to seize individuals, (2) misuse of involuntary psychiatric detention

procedures by a public hospital’s ‘mobile crisis unit,’ (3) the role of mental health officials acting

jointly with police, and (4) civil rights violations under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Thus, she

contends her statements fall squarely within Florida’s anti-SLAPP protections. Id. at 13.

Dr. Bober responds that Hadley has failed to show that the anti-SLAPP statute bars the

Counterclaim for two main reasons. ECF No. [306] at 3. As an initial matter, Bober contends it is

Hadley’s burden to establish that his claims satisfy both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute and

Hadley cannot show that the Counterclaim is without merit. Id. Dr. Bober argues that courts

applying Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute have consistently held that where the pleading states at least

one viable cause of action, the court cannot conclude at the motion to dismiss stage that the action

is without merit. Id. at 4 (collecting cases). Here, each of the Counts was adequately pled,

containing allegations for each element of defamation and defamation per se. Id. The sole pleading

deficiency identified by Hadley is an alleged lack of actual malice. Id. But actual malice is not

required because Dr. Bober is not a public figure. Id. at 4–5.

Second, Dr. Bober contends that Hadley has failed to establish that the Counterclaim was

filed primarily because she had exercised protected speech in connection with a public issue. Id.

at 5. For one, the constitutional right to free speech does not protect defamatory statements. Id.

(citations omitted). Because the Counterclaim alleges defamation, she cannot establish that the

speech was constitutionally protected and therefore cannot satisfy the second prong of the anti-

SLAPP statute. Id. Moreover, Hadley’s contention that her statements were made in connection

with a “public issue” fails, as no allegations in the Counterclaim support that contention, and

Hadley’s only factual support comes from improperly pointing to her own underlying Complaint.

Id. at 6. An analysis of the Counterclaim shows that Hadley’s statements were not made in

connection with a public issue. Id. at 6–7. She accused a private individual of engaging in felonious

conduct; she cites to no authority that “allegations of misconduct by private professionals . . . rise

to the level of public issue discourse.” Id. at 7. And finally, some of the statements were made in

a medium not covered by the statute, including via interview, which is not a “news report” or a

statutorily protected work. Id.

The Court agrees with Dr. Bober.1 First, as Dr. Bober correctly points out, Hadley does not

even attempt to show that the Counterclaim is without merit. Nor could she. The Counterclaim

states viable claims for defamation and defamation per se.

1 The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed whether Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute can be applied

to actions in federal court. See Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that

appellant waived the argument “that Florida's anti-SLAPP statute should not be applied in federal court”

by raising it for the first time on appeal).

There is some indication that it may not be applicable. The majority of Florida district courts to apply

Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute have done so solely in the fee-shifting context, not as an argument for

dismissal. See Bongingo v. Daily Beast Company, LLC, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2020)

(addressing “whether [Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute’s] fee-shifting provision applies in a federal court

exercising diversity jurisdiction.”); Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 20-CV-81396-RAR, 2021 WL

626855, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2021) (granting an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the anti-

Defamation, which includes libel and slander,2 “may generally be defined as the

unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to

another.” Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 433 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (quoting

Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)). To state a claim for defamation, a

plaintiff must plead the following elements: “(1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with

knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least

negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must

be defamatory.” Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558B, 580A–580B).

Additionally, defamatory statements are of a per se “character when, ‘considered alone

without innuendo,’ they contain [] charges that a person has committed an infamous crime, or []

has contracted an infectious disease, or [] they carry statements tending to subject a person to

hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace, or [] to injure a person in his trade or profession.”

Adams v. News-Journal Corp., 84 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1955) (citing Richard v. Gray, Fla., 62

So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1953)); see also Harwood v. Bush, 223 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). “In

a per se action, the statements are ‘so obviously defamatory’ and ‘damaging to reputation’ that the

SLAPP statute as requested in 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Vibe Ener v. Duckenfield, No. 20-cv-22886-

UU, 2020 WL 6373419, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2020) (same).

The concern, ultimately, is that the anti-SLAPP statute, applied as a motion to dismiss standard, “answers

the same question” as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12; this happens where a statute raises the bar

for a plaintiff to overcome a pretrial dismissal motion. See Carbone v. Cable News Network, 910 F.3d 1345,

1356 (11th Cir. 2018) (addressing Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, which requires the “plaintiff to establish

‘a probability’ that he ‘will prevail on the claim’ asserted in the complaint”). It has not been decided by the

Eleventh Circuit whether Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute raises the bar for overcoming dismissal.

For purposes of resolving the instant motion, the Court assumes that it can properly engage with the

requirements of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute because, even doing so, Bober’s Counterclaim survives.

2 A claim for slander is confined to defamatory spoken words, whereas a claim for libel refers to

defamatory written statements. See Fortson v. Colangelo, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378, n.11 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

(citing Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 1999)).

injurious nature of the statement is apparent from the words in the statement itself[.]” Paulson v.

Cosm. Dermatology, Inc., No. 17-cv-20094, 2017 WL 2484197, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2017)

(citing Alan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 604 F. App’x 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2015)). Thus, in

determining whether a publication is defamatory per se, “consideration is given only to the ‘four

corners’ of the publication and the language used should be interpreted as the ‘common mind’

would normally understand it.” Paulson, 2017 WL 2484197, at *3 (citing Ortega Trujillo v. Banco

Central Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1998); McIver v. Tallahassee

Democrat, Inc., 489 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)).

Here, Dr. Bober has clearly alleged all the required elements of both defamation and

defamation per se, whether via libel or slander. As to defamation, he alleges (1) publication via

interviews (i.e., slander) and social media posts (i.e., libel) (2) of false statements3, (3) with

Hadley’s knowledge that the statements were false,4 (4) actual damages,5 and (5) that the

statements were defamatory.6 As to defamation per se (libel), Dr. Bober adequately alleges that

Hadley accused him of abducting and kidnapping her and stated that he should be in prison. ECF

3 These statements include that Bober “abducted,” “kidnapped,” “abuse[d],” and “harassed”

Hadley, was “paid money” in connection with the alleged abduction, “should be in prison,” is an “abuser,”

was “bought” by Perez, is a “disgusting bully,” acted in an “unethical way,” called Hadley to apologize for

his conduct and admitted that he “messed up,” and “drug[g]ed [Hadley] up to make [her] drowsy and not

be able to talk.” ECF No. [256] at 92–95.

4 Dr. Bober alleges on multiple occasions that Hadley knew the statements were false. ECF No.

[256] ¶¶ 10, 87–93, 112, 119, 122, 129.

5 Dr. Bober alleges “substantial economic, professional, and reputational damages, including in

connection with his reputation and business interests.” ECF No. [256] ¶ 105. He further alleges having

“received dozens of online threats and accusations, including public calls for revocation of his medical

license, and comparisons to criminal figures such as Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs.” Id. ¶ 106. He further alleges

being asked to resign from his position as Medical Director of the Jewish Adoption and Foster Care Option.

Id. ¶ 107.

6 Dr. Bober alleges that the statements were defamatory at multiple points. ECF No. [256] ¶ 1, 7,

8, 77, 84–92, 94–97, 100–102, 105–107, 111, 116–118, 121, 126, 127.

No. [256] ¶ 116. Those statements constitute defamation per se because they “(a) falsely accuse

Dr. Bober of committing infamous crimes and/or felonies, (b) subject Dr. Bober to hatred, distrust,

ridicule, contempt, or disgrace, and (c) tend to injure him in his professional capacity as a licensed

psychiatrist.” Id. ¶ 117. Similarly, as to defamation per se (slander), Dr. Bober adequately alleges

the false statements Hadley made about him which “impute to Dr. Bober (a) a criminal offense

amounting to a felony, and (b) conduct incompatible with Dr. Bober’s proper exercise of his lawful

profession as a licensed psychiatrist.” Id. ¶ 127. Those are sufficient allegations, so the Court

cannot say the Counterclaim is “without merit” at this point.

Similarly, Hadley has not shown that the Counterclaim was brought primarily in response

to protected speech about an issue of public importance. Fla. Stat. § 768.295(3). Dr. Bober has

successfully stated claims for defamation and defamation per se. As such, the Court cannot say his

Counterclaim was brought “primarily” to suppress Hadley’s free speech, as it could instead well

have been brought to vindicate his legal rights. See, e.g., Itamar Med., Ltd. v. Ectosense NV, No.

20-60719-CIV, 2021 WL 12095119, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2021) (“Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a claim as to each Count. On this basis, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that Plaintiff's

lawsuit was brought ‘primarily’ to suppress [Defendant]’s free speech . . .”); Buckley v. Moore,

No. 20-CIV-61023-RAR, 2021 WL 3173185, at *10 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2021) (determining that

because plaintiff's claims were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the court could not

“conclude on the face of the complaint that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was ‘primarily’ filed to suppress

Defendants’ exercise of free speech”); Pierre-Paul v. ESPN Inc., No. 16-21156-CIV, 2016 WL

4530884, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Assuming [Florida's Anti-SLAPP statute] applies, this

suit plainly has merit since two of its original three counts remain.”). Because Dr. Bober has stated

a claim for defamation, it does not appear from the face of the Counterclaim that chilling speech

was his primary motivation. Moreover, to the extent Dr. Bober has stated a claim for defamation,

he has also adequately alleged that Hadley’s statements were not even constitutionally protected

speech in the first place, as the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not protect defamatory

statements. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (finding “no constitutional value

in false statements of fact”).

Moreover, at this phase of the proceedings—taking all facts and reasonable inferences in

Dr. Bober’s favor—it does not appear that Hadley’s claims dealt with “public issues” at all. A

public issue is defined in the statute as one made “before a governmental entity in connection with

an issue under consideration or review by a governmental entity, or [] made in or in connection

with a play, movie, television program, radio broadcast, audiovisual work, book, magazine article,

musical work, news report, or other similar work.” Fla. Stat. § 768.295(2)(a). Nothing in the

Counterclaim indicates that Hadley’s statements concerned “(1) the government’s authority to

seize individuals, (2) the misuse of involuntary psychiatric detention procedures by a public

hospital’s mobile crisis unit, (3) the role of mental health offices acting jointly with police, and (4)

civil rights violations under the Fourth Amendment.” ECF No. [281] at 12. To the contrary, the

Counterclaim alleges that Hadley was publicizing a private dispute with her mother and Dr. Bober,

both private figures. To read motivations into Hadley’s statements would require looking beyond

the Counterclaim, which the Court may not do at the motion to dismiss stage. Aerokool Aviation

Corp. v. Dofflemeyer, No. 21-CV-20626, 2021 WL 12311287, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2021)

(“[T]he Court's inquiry on a motion to dismiss is limited to the plausible facts and relief alleged in

the four corners of the counterclaim.”). Certainly, the Court cannot look to Hadley’s Amended

Complaint as a source of contradictory fact.

Thus, Hadley’s Motion, to the extent it relies on Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute, must be

denied.

B. Truthfulness

Hadley also alleges that the Counterclaim should be dismissed because Hadley told the

truth, and true statements undermine any claim of defamation. ECF No. [281] at 13–14. For

instance, Hadley points to the dictionary definition of “abducted” to argue that her statements

regarding abduction and kidnapping were true. Id. Dr. Bober, she contends, “had no legal right to

force an involuntary assessment to determine if [Hadley] qualified for an involuntary examination

under the Baker Act statute.” Id. at 14. She argues that a physician is not permitted to conduct a

non-consensual psychiatric “assessment” to determine whether an individual qualifies for Baker

Act involuntary examination. Id. at 4 n.3. Thus, Dr. Bober and his team abducted (or kidnapped

Hadley. Id. at 14.

Though she raises this argument in a separate section, Hadley also asks the Court to

consider footage from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office body-worn cameras. ECF No. [281]

at 6. She says that the “unbiased and undisputed” footage contradicts Dr. Bober’s claims about

what happened in the Marina, showing that Dr. Bober already intended to involuntarily examine

Hadley before meeting with her. Id. Hadley further alleges that she showed no signs that would

justify involuntary examination under the Baker Act and that Dr. Bober did not “ask her a single

question about her mental health or how she was feeling.” Id. at 7–8. She alleges that he further

stated, “No doctor is going to see you for free,” which she deems “an admission that [Perez] paid

him.” Id. at 9. All of this demonstrates that Hadley’s account of the situation is correct.

Dr. Bober responds that this “truthfulness” defense relies on facts outside those pled in the

Counterclaim. ECF No. [306] at 7. For example, Hadley claims that “Dr. Bober and the ‘mobile

crisis unit’ lured [Hadley] to a marina under deception”; “neither asked the police to conduct an

immediate wellness check, nor advised [Perez] to do so”; and “used the police to forcefully take

[Hadley] away for an unlawful examination.” Id. at 7–8 (citing ECF No. [281] at 3, 14). But none

of those factual allegations comes from the Counterclaim. Id. at 8. Fundamentally, the Court

cannot determine from the pleadings alone the validity of Hadley’s truth defense. Id. (citations

omitted).

Moreover, Dr. Bober contends that Hadley’s reliance on dictionary definitions falls flat

because, in the defamation context, “liability does not turn on isolated dictionary meanings but on

context, gist, and the ordinary meaning conveyed to a reasonable reader.” Id. Hadley’s argument

ignores these principles and seeks to put words in a vacuum. Id. Even taking Hadley’s factual

narrative as true, Dr. Bober argues that being taken to a location under false pretenses “does not

equate to criminal kidnapping or abduction, both of which are statutorily defined criminal

offenses.” Id. (citations omitted).

Furthermore, Dr. Bober argues, “the truth or falsity of a statement is quintessentially a

question of fact inappropriate for a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citations omitted). Any attempt by

Hadley to litigate factual disputes at this stage is improper. Id. at 9. Hadley’s attempt to read the

Baker Act statute to prohibit Dr. Bober’s evaluation, Bober contends, constitutes a

misinterpretation. Id. The Act plainly allows a physician who has examined the individual within

the last 48 hours and finds the Baker Act applicable to subject that individual to the Baker Act. Id.

(citations omitted).

Finally, Bober argues that the Court should not consider the Broward County Sheriff’s

Office boy-worn camera footage, as Hadley invites. Id. Specifically, he argues that the footage is

not central to his claims—“which turn on Hadley’s defamatory statements and intent”—and that

he disputes its authenticity. Id. at 10. Here, the footage is not central because it is not necessary to

Dr. Bober’s claims—insofar as Dr. Bober’s claims could prevail without the footage—nor does it

capture anything related to Hadley’s allegedly defamatory statements, which were made more than

a year after the footage was taken. Id.

After a consideration of the arguments and case law, the Court agrees with Dr. Bober. As

a general matter, truth or falsity of allegations are questions of fact not suitable for resolution at

the motion to dismiss stage. Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 707 (11th Cir. 2016)

(“The truth of those statements . . . are questions of empirical fact upon which it would be improper

for this Court to rule when weighing a motion to dismiss.”). Indeed, truthfulness is generally

“asserted as an affirmative defense, and thus is not considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage.”

Utterback v. Morris, No. 24-12947, 2025 WL 1455900, at *6 (11th Cir. May 21, 2025) (citation

omitted).

But a court can consider truthfulness to undermine a defamation claim at the motion to

dismiss stage if the allegedly defamatory statements, read against “the allegations of the . . .

complaint and the attachments thereto, accept[ed] . . . as true, and [viewed] in the light most

favorable to [the plaintiff],” remain “substantially true.” Marshall v. Amerisys, Inc., 943 So. 2d

276, 279–80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Martinez v. Miami Children's Health Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-

22700, 2021 WL 10131975, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2021) (finding that a motion to dismiss a

defamation claim must be denied where “[i]t cannot be shown from the four corners of the

[Counterclaim] that [the speaker’s] statements were true, based on disclosed or well-known facts,

or an accurate representation of the facts.”). Here, the truth or falsity of Hadley’s statements cannot

be determined by the Counterclaim’s allegations alone. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court

is generally limited to considering the facts alleged in the Complaint—or, in this case, the

Counterclaim. Veritas v. Cable News Network, Inc., 121 F.4th 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2024)

(“Because this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we draw all facts from [Plaintiff]’s

complaint. (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009)); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Triumph Hous.

Mgmt., LLC, 855 F. App’x 599, 605 (11th Cir. 2021).

Hadley references factual allegations that are simply not found within the Counterclaim,

including that “Dr. Bober and the ‘mobile crisis unit’ lured [Hadley] to a marina under deception”;

“neither asked the police to conduct an immediate wellness check, nor advised [Perez] to do so”;

and “used the police to forcefully take [Hadley] away for an unlawful examination.” ECF No.

[281] at 3, 14. The Court cannot consider those allegations as belying the facts in the Counterclaim

at this stage of the proceedings. Instead, the Court looks to the allegations in the Counterclaim

itself, which plainly state claims for defamation and defamation per se. Indeed, tellingly, Hadley

does not point to any factual allegations in the Counterclaim that—taken alone or together—fail

to state a claim. Nor could she, because the allegations fairly give rise to an inference of falsity in

Hadley’s statements.

Hadley’s appeal to the dictionary definition of “abducted” and the related meaning of

“kidnapped” is equally unavailing. As Bober correctly points out, the notion that “reasonable

people read words in a vacuum, according to their dictionary definition, is ill-founded. As the law

recognizes, reasonable people read words contextually.” Fortson v. Colangelo, 434 F. Supp. 2d

1369, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 702 (11th Cir. 2002)). Indeed,

by Hadley’s definition, even a perfectly appropriate and perfectly executed Baker Act involuntary

examination would constitute an abduction, since the term is strictly defined as “the action of

taking someone away by force or deception.” ECF No. [281] at 13 (citation omitted). Context

matters, and without further factual development, the Court cannot say that—as a matter of law—

Hadley was truthful in characterizing her involuntary examination as an “abduction” or

“kidnapping.” For all these reasons, Hadley’s truth defense cannot succeed at this stage of the

litigation.

The Court pauses to discuss whether it may consider the body-worn camera footage as well

as whether that footage changes the Court’s analysis. The Court finds, first, that it may not consider

the footage. When resolving a motion to dismiss, a court may properly consider a document not

referred to or attached to the complaint where the document is “(1) central to the plaintiff's claims;

and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.” Johnson, 107 F.4th at 1300.

A document is central to a claim if “the plaintiff would have to offer the document to prove his

case.” Lockwood v. Beasley, 211 F. App’x 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted);

Neurosurgical Consultants of S. Florida, LLC v. United Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 9:22-CV-

81727-KAM, 2023 WL 2487257, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2023). (finding that if a plaintiff’s claim

“could succeed without a document, the document is not central to the claim.” (citing Comer v.

Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., 2016 WL 4702425, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2016))). Documents

relevant to a defendant’s affirmative defenses—rather than the plaintiff's claims—fail to meet this

centrality requirement. See Miranda v. Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1353 (S.D.

Fla. 2015). Here, the footage is not something Dr. Bober would need to offer to prove his case.

That is, he could certainly prove his defamation and defamation per se claims without using the

body-worn camera footage at all, and therefore, it cannot be said to be central. Indeed, the footage

is more relevant to Hadley’s defense insofar as it attempts to establish the truthfulness of her

statements.

But even if the Court were to consider the video footage on the basis that it constitutes

“unedited footage of the events underlying” the defamation claims, Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th

179, 188 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 204 (2025), the Court’s conclusion would remain

unchanged. At the motion to dismiss stage, even considering the video footage, the Court must

“construe all ambiguities in the video footage in favor of the plaintiff.” Baker v. City of Madison,

Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). But “where video is clear and

obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of the

complaint’s account, and [we] view the facts in the light depicted by the video.” Id. at 1277–78.

Here, Hadley alleges that the footage proves a few key facts. First, she alleges that it shows

Dr. Bober planned to subject Hadley to the Baker Act before he met with her in the Marina—

before “even see[ing] her in person.” ECF No. [281] at 6. Second, she alleges that, despite her

requests, Dr. Bober and his team would only allow her treating psychologist to speak to Dr. Bober,

not one of the police officers. Id. at 7. Third, she alleges that the footage shows the she did not

exhibit “signs of psychosis,” nor did she “threaten[] to harm herself or others.” Id. Fourth, she

alleges that the footage proves that “no evaluation took place” insofar as Dr. Bober did not ask her

“a single question about her mental health or how she was feeling.” Id. at 8. Fifth, Hadley alleges

that Dr. Bober’s statement, “No doctor is going to see you for free,” constitutes an admission that

Perez paid him. Id. at 9. Sixth, Hadley contends that Dr. Bober never told her that “she has a right

to conduct a voluntary examination.” Id. Finally, Hadley contends that despite Dr. Bober’s “claims

that he executed a Baker Act Certificate at 5:56 p.m. and subtly suggests that he provided it to the

officers, no such evidence appears on the BWC footage.” Id.

As for Hadley’s assertion that Dr. Bober planned to apply the Baker Act to Hadley before

meeting her, two points merit discussion. For one, the fact that another individual said Dr. Bober

was “going to Baker Act” Hadley does not mean that was Dr. Bober’s subjective intention. Second,

language must be heard in context; the word “is” in that circumstance could well be understood to

be a conditional statement. At the very least, it is not firmly established that Dr. Bober intended to

involuntarily examine Hadley before conducting his own examination.7

As for Hadley’s contention that the officers would not speak to her treating psychologist

but instead directed her to Dr. Bober, this does not undermine Dr. Bober’s claim. For Baker Act

purposes, the Court is aware of no statutory requirement that a treating psychologist be permitted

to speak with police officers as opposed to the physician deciding the appropriateness of

involuntary examination.

Turning to Hadley’s contention that she did not show signs of psychosis or injurious

behavior; those are not matters that can be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Those factual

determinations—which implicate complex medical judgments—require a far more developed

record for proper assessment.

Hadley’s contention that no evaluation took place because Dr. Bober did not ask her how

she was feeling is, again, not suitable for resolution upon a motion to dismiss. The Court cannot at

this point say that the video conclusively establishes that no “evaluation” took place. As Dr. Bober

correctly points out, the Baker Act “does not explicitly define the precise form or duration of an

examination,” ECF No. [306] at 12, and even assuming the footage captures the entirety of Dr.

Bober’s statements, the Court cannot say at this point that Dr. Bober’s actions did not constitute

an evaluation.

As to Hadley’s next point—that Dr. Bober stated “No doctor is going to see you for free”—

it is hardly a conclusive admission by Dr. Bober that Perez paid him. Instead, taking the facts in

7 It also would not matter if Dr. Bober had the intention of involuntarily examining Hadley prior to

his evaluation of her. The statute imposes no requirement that the physician make the decision that the

Baker Act applies at a particular point in time. It merely requires that the physician “execute a certificate

stating that he or she has examined a person within the preceding 48 hours and finds that the person appears

to meet the criteria for involuntary examination and stating the observations upon which that conclusion is

based.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(2)(a)(3).

the light most favorable to Dr. Bober, it appears to be a statement of how voluntary medical

examinations work. Thus, at this point, the Court does not agree with Hadley that this statement is

an admission.

Hadley next contends that Dr. Bober never told her she had a right to a voluntary

examination. But it does not appear that the Baker Act requires this, and Hadley points to nothing

in the Baker Act requiring this. Rather, the Baker Act permits involuntary examination where the

individual refuses voluntary examination or where the individual cannot determine for herself

whether evaluation is necessary. Fla. Stat. § 394.463(2)(a). The Act similarly allows an individual

to be taken into custody by a police officer if “other less restrictive means are not available.” Fla.

Stat. § 394.463(2)(a)(3). Nothing in the Baker Act required Dr. Bober, in evaluating whether

Hadley was a candidate for involuntary examination, to inform Hadley of her right to a voluntary

examination.

Finally, Hadley contends that despite Dr. Bober’s “claims that he executed a Baker Act

Certificate at 5:56 p.m. and subtly suggests that he provided it to the officers, no such evidence

appears on the BWC footage.” ECF No. [281] at 9. That a particular interaction was not captured

on body-worn camera footage does not mean it did not happen. At best, Hadley’s allegation creates

an ambiguity as to whether the interaction occurred, which, at this point, the Court construes in

favor of Dr. Bober.

And even if all the interactions occurred as Hadley describes and Dr. Bober’s evaluation

was inadequate, it still would not necessarily follow that Hadley was “abducted” or “kidnapped.”

The truth of those words cannot be conclusively established at this stage merely by insufficiency

of Dr. Bober’s evaluation. Michel, 816 F.3d at 707 (“[T]he actual truth or falsity of a statement

seems to be quintessentially a question of fact that ought not to be determined on a motion to

dismiss absent some extraordinary factor not present in this case.”).

C. Opinion

Hadley also argues that her statements constituted “pure opinion,” which is not actionable

under Florida’s defamation law. ECF No. [281] at 14 (citations omitted). Specifically, she argues

that her allegations that people connected to her mother were “harassing” or “abusing” her, as well

as her repost of a comment that Dr. Bober “should be in prison,” were her opinions. Id. at 14–15.

The same is true, she says, regarding her statement that Dr. Bober acted unethically, that he was a

disgusting bully and abuser, and that he wanted to drug her to make her drowsy. Id. at 15.

Dr. Bober responds that Hadley’s statements cannot be interpreted as pure opinion. ECF

No. [306] at 18. First, it cannot be known from the “four corners” of the Counterclaim that the

statements were true “based on disclosed or well-known facts[] or an accurate representation of

the facts.” Id. at 19 (citing Martinez, 2021 WL 10131975, at *5). Nor can it be shown from the

Counterclaim “that Hadley’s statements were based on fully disclosed or publicly known facts,”

and as such, the statements cannot be deemed pure opinion at this stage. Id. (citation omitted).

Moreover, whether a statement is pure opinion is “not suitable for disposition” at the motion to

dismiss stage.” Id. at 20.

Bober asserts that Hadley’s opinions cannot be interpreted as pure opinion because they

imply facts that can be proven true false—namely, that Dr. Bober “abused, harassed, and/or

committed criminal acts against her.” Id. (citation omitted). “At best,” they are mixed expressions

of opinion, which are actionable if they imply undisclosed defamatory facts as their basis. Id.

(citation omitted).

The Court agrees with Dr. Bober. Generally, “statements of pure opinion are protected

from defamation actions by the First Amendment.” Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2018). “Under Florida law, a defendant publishes a ‘pure opinion’ when the defendant makes

a comment or opinion based on facts which are set forth in the publication or which are otherwise

known or available to the reader or listener as a member of the public.” Id. Statements of pure

opinion are generally not actionable as defamation because, unlike a statement of fact, a statement

of pure opinion is not readily capable of being proven false. Williamson v. Digital Risk, Inc., No.

18-cv-767, 2018 WL 3870064, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2018). “[A] speaker cannot invoke a

‘pure opinion’ defense, [however,] if the facts underlying the opinion are false or inaccurately

presented.” Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2000).

Mixed expressions of opinion occur “when an opinion or comment [is based] upon facts

regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated in the publication or [are] assumed

to exist by the parties to the communication.” Turner, 879 F.3d at 1262. A mixed expression of

opinion is actionable if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis of the

opinion. See id. at 1263 (quoting Stembridge v. Mintz, 652 So. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995));

Ozyesilpinar v. Reach PLC, 365 So. 3d 453, 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). If a court finds that an

expression of opinion implies a defamatory fact, then it is for a jury to decide whether a defamatory

meaning is attributable to the statement. Johnson v. Clark, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1247 (M.D. Fla.

2007) (citing Stembridge, 652 So. 2d at 446)).

Fundamentally, both pure opinions and mixed expressions of opinion are actionable so

long as the facts underlying them are false or inaccurately represented. Zimmerman v. Buttigieg,

521 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (citing Deeb v. Saati, 778 F. App'x 683, 687–88

(11th Cir. 2019)); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (stating that “even if the

speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or

incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion

of fact”). Whether a challenged statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of law to be decided

by the court. Turner, 879 F.3d at 1262.

At this stage, the Court is unwilling to find that Hadley’s statements constitute protected

opinion. Some of Hadley’s statements are factual, and Bober has adequately alleged that those

facts are untrue. Specifically, allegations that Bober “abducted” or “kidnapped” Hadley, was “paid

money” or “bought” by Perez, called Hadley to apologize and stated that he “messed up,” or

“drug[g]ed [Hadley] up to make [her] drowsy and not be able to talk,” ECF No. [256] ¶ 111, 121,

are not statements of opinion. They are susceptible to being proven false—abduction, kidnapping,

paying or receiving money, calling someone and uttering certain words, or drugging someone for

purposes of preventing them from talking are all discrete actions that did or did not happen. In

reaching the conclusion that those are statements of fact, the Court bears in mind the following

state of the law:

[T]he test to be applied in determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement

constitutes an actionable statement of fact requires that the court examine the

statement in its totality and the context in which it was uttered or published. The

court must consider all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence.

In addition, the court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person

publishing the statement. Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances

surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the statement is

disseminated and the audience to which it is published.

From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Hadley did not merely

provide her characterization of the same set of facts. She alleges a broad conspiracy, divergence

from medical standards and ethics, and, indeed, unlawful conduct. Whether or not those events

occurred are not matters of opinion.

As to Hadley’s remaining allegedly defamatory statements—that she was “abused” and

“harassed,” Dr. Bober “should be in prison,” Dr. Bober is an “abuser” or a “disgusting bully,” and

Dr. Bober acted in an “unethical way”—the Court similarly finds that it cannot dismiss claims

based on those statements on the basis that they are protected opinion. Insofar as Hadley has been

very public with her version of events, those statements largely appear to be statements of pure

opinion—that is, accompanied by factual allegations on which the opinions are based. For

instance, Hadley stated as follows:

Let’s not get distracted with fake evidence. I was ABDUCTED BY THE BSO

POLICE, PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS JAMES FONDO, JESSICA CASSY

AND STEVEN CADDY FROM SIG 9 AND DR. Daniel BOBER!!! Desiree Perez

paid and did this with them. ON THE ROAD with police and MEN I have never

met in my life. This IS NOT AN EVALUATION THAT a “concerned” parent

would orchestrate! I am THE VICTIM NOT YOU. And YOU AND YOUR TEAM

ARE THE ABUSERS.

ECF No. [256] ¶78. From this statement, the context of the evaluation and alleged “abduction” are

evident, so it is clear why Hadley describes Bober and others as being “abusers.” Similarly, the

May 27, 2025, and May 29, 2025 news articles that Hadley reshared explained the Baker Act

involuntary examination, and in resharing them, Hadley reiterated her claims of “abuse” and

claims that “paid” individuals took part in said abuse. Id. ¶ 80. And Defending Your Freedom: The

Demoree Hadley Story reiterated Hadley’s claims about a “conspiracy” and Dr. Bober being

“bought” in the context of saying he acted in an “unethical way” and was a “disgusting bully” and

an “abuser.”

But, at this point, the Court cannot say these statements are protected because Hadley

claims a very different set of factual circumstances than Dr. Bober, and this different set of facts—

capable of being proven or disproven—underlies her opinion. That is, the reason she calls Bober

an “abuser” and his behavior “unethical” is because she describes him as drugging her and being

paid to wrongfully subject her to an involuntary examination. Those characterizations “express[]

or impl[y] an assertion of fact.” Deeb v. Saati, 778 F. App'x 683, 688 (11th Cir. 2019). At this

stage of the proceedings, the Court credits Dr. Bober’s account as true, which means that her

statements, insofar as they express or imply an assertion of fact, are deemed capable of supporting

a claim for defamation.

D. Actual Malice

Finally, Hadley alleges that Dr. Bober has not shown that she acted with actual malice,

which is required in cases involving a public figure. ECF No. [281] at 15. Dr. Bober, she points

out, is the Chief of Psychology at a publicly run hospital and “frequently appears on television,

radio, and social media platforms as an alleged mental health expert,” making him a public figure.

Id. And Dr. Bober “fails to allege sufficient facts that [Hadley] acted with actual malice, i.e. that

she knew her statements were false.” Id. at 17.

Dr. Bober responds that the Counterclaim does not conclusively establish that he is a public

figure. ECF No. [306] at 21. Moreover, whether a plaintiff is a public figure is typically a matter

for summary judgment resolution, not motion to dismiss resolution. Id. (citations omitted). And

Hadley cites no authority and points to no allegation in the Counterclaim that would support a

view that Dr. Bober is a public figure. Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted).

Second, Dr. Bober explains that even if the Court were to consider him a public figure, the

Counterclaim adequately alleges actual malice. Id. at 22. That is, the Counterclaim alleges that

Hadley made the defamatory statements “with actual knowledge of their falsity” or “with reckless

disregard for their truth.” Id. Furthermore, the Counterclaim alleges that Hadley’s statements were

“designed to intentionally and maliciously destroy Dr. Bober’s professional and personal

reputation.” Id.

As a general matter, where the plaintiff in a defamation case is a public figure, in addition

to showing the standard elements of defamation, “he must show that the defendant made the

statements with actual malice, which has been defined as knowing the statements were false at the

time they were made or making the statements with a reckless disregard of the truth.” Mastandrea

v. Snow, 333 So. 3d 326, 327–28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g,

L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). If, instead, the plaintiff is not a public figure,

he need only show that the defendant made the statements negligently. Id. (citing same).

To determine whether a plaintiff is a public figure, the Supreme Court has directed courts

to consider whether the individual falls into one of two categories: (1) those who achieve such

“pervasive fame or notoriety” that they are public figures for all purposes (“all-purpose public

figures”); or (2) those who inject themselves into a particular public controversy and thereby

become public figures only with respect to a limited range of issues (“limited public figures”).

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. To assess whether an individual falls into the latter category, courts

consider two questions: (1) whether plaintiffs “have greater access to the media which gives them

a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally

enjoy;” and (2) whether plaintiffs have “voluntarily placed themselves in a position and acted in a

manner which invited public scrutiny and comment.” Silvester v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 839

F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1988).

Courts consider whether the plaintiff is a limited public figure with respect to the particular

public controversy at issue. See id. This requires the Court to “(1) isolate the public controversy,

(2) examine the plaintiffs’ involvement in the controversy, and (3) determine whether ‘the alleged

defamation was germane to the plaintiffs’ participation in the controversy.’” Id. (quoting

Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

And whether an individual is a public figure “is a question of law to be determined by the

court[.]” Turner, 879 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Mile Marker, Inc., 811 So. 2d at 845). That is, the

Court need not simply accept Dr. Bober’s contention that he is not a public figure. Jacoby v. Cable

News Network, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2021), aff’d, No. 21-12030, 2021 WL

5858569 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021). Courts can and do resolve issues of whether an individual is a

public figure at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1272 (11th

Cir. 2018).

As to the interviews which Hadley attaches to the motion to dismiss, the Court is guided

by the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Turner:

In determining Coach Turner’s public figure status, we take judicial notice of the

existence of videos produced or articles written about Coach Turner that were filed

by the Defendants. We do not, however, consider them for the truth of the matters

they assert. U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 815 n.4 (11th Cir.

2015) (explaining that courts may take judicial notice of documents such as

newspaper articles for a limited purpose, but not for determining the truth of those

statements).

Turner, 879 F.3d at 1272. Here, too, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the videos

cited by Hadley for the limited purpose of assessing whether Dr. Bober is a “prominent person.”

Id.

Here, even considering the existence of those seven videos, the Court finds that Dr. Bober

does not appear to be public figure. First, Dr. Bober certainly does not have such “pervasive fame

or notoriety” as to make him an all-purpose public figure. A handful of television appearances on

a range of mental health-related topics does not transform a physician into a public figure.

Moreover, Dr. Bober does not appear to be a limited public figure. First, it is not clear that

Dr. Bober possesses “greater access to the media” than normal individuals enjoy such that he is

better able to counteract a false narrative. Silvester, 839 F.2d at 1494 (11th Cir. 1988). There is

nothing in the Counterclaim or the existence of the seven interviews—all apparently unrelated to

any decision by Dr. Bober to involuntarily examine Hadley under the Baker Act—that suggests

some significant media access or presence by Dr. Bober. Similarly, Dr. Bober did not “voluntarily”

place himself in a position or act in a manner “which invited public scrutiny and comment.” Id.

Dr. Bober’s actions, based on the allegations in the Counterclaim, were those of a private physician

taken with respect to a private individual. Id. At this stage and taking the facts in the light most

favorable to Dr. Bober, there is nothing to indicate that Dr. Bober took actions which invited public

scrutiny and comment.

Of course, the ultimate resolution of whether an individual is a public figure depends on a

fact-intensive analysis that the Court cannot conclusively undertake at this early stage of the

proceedings and in the absence of discovery. But the Court can say that it does not have sufficient

factual allegations—even considering the existence of the seven interviews that Hadley attaches—

to assign any degree of public figure status to Dr. Bober.

Moreover, even were the Court to find that Dr. Bober were a public figure, he plainly

alleges actual malice throughout the Counterclaim. “To plead actual malice, [a plaintiff] must

allege facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the false statement was made with

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Michel, 816

F.3d at 702. Here, Dr. Bober did precisely that. He alleges that Hadley made her defamatory

statements “with actual knowledge of their falsity” or “with reckless disregard for their truth.”

ECF No. [256] ¶ 7. He has alleged Hadley’s statements to be “knowingly false.” Id. ¶ 10. Bober

alleges Hadley’s knowledge of the falsity of her statements around a dozen more times in the

Counterclaim. Id. ¶¶ 105, 111, 114, 116, 119, 121, 124, 126, 129. Thus, even if the Court were to

Case No. 25-cv-22162-BLOOM/Louis

determine that Bober is a public figure, he still would have properly alleged actual malice as

required.

For all these reasons, the Court will not dismiss Dr. Bober’s claims on the basis of a failure

to plead actual malice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

1. Hadley’s Motion to Dismiss Daniel Bober’s Counterclaim Complaint, ECF No. [281],

is DENIED.

2. Hadley shall file an Answer to the Counterclaim no later than April 27, 2026.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on / 14, 2026.

BETHBLOOM i ists

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

34