Doe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

*

JANE DOE, *

*

Plaintiff, *

* Civ. No. MJM-25-861

v. *

*

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY *

APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, *

*

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendant Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics

Laboratory’s (“Defendant” or “APL”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF 11; plaintiff Jane Doe’s (“Doe” or

“Plaintiff”) Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously, ECF 2; and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint, ECF 18. No hearing is necessary to resolve these motions. See Loc. R. 105.6

(D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously is

granted, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is

granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jane Doe initiated this lawsuit on March 14, 2025, asserting claims against her

former employer, defendant Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, for violations

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title I of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as well as state common law claims she later voluntarily dismissed. See

ECF 1 (Verified Complaint (“Compl.”)); ECF 16 (Notice of Voluntary Dismissal). The next day,

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Seal Name and Proceed Pseudonymously, ECF 2, to which Defendant

filed a response in opposition, ECF 10, and Plaintiff filed a reply in support, ECF 14.

On April 14, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the Verified Complaint. ECF 11. Plaintiff

filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF 17, and a motion to amend her

Complaint, ECF 18. Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss, ECF 19, and a

response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to amend her Complaint. ECF 20.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Doe was an employee of APL from 2016 until January 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5. During the

COVID-19 pandemic, APL required their employees to get the initial dose of the COVID-19

vaccination by October 15, 2021. Id. ¶ 6. APL offered exemptions to the vaccination requirement,

including for medical or religious reasons. Id. ¶ 7.

Doe discussed completing a religious exemption form with her supervisor, who told her,

“Just make sure you are doing so ethically.” Id. ¶ 8. Following her supervisor’s comment, Doe

called APL’s Ethics Department to discuss filing an internal ethics complaint. Id. ¶ 9. The Ethics

Department discouraged Doe from filing the complaint. Id.

On September 30, 2021, Doe submitted a Religious Accommodations Request. Id. ¶ 10.

She “noted in her submission her unwillingness to share her private medical and religious

information with a large group of people.” Id. Doe was informed by the Accommodations

Coordinator that APL was receiving a high number of exemption requests, so the office’s

processing timeline was delayed. Id. ¶ 12.

On December 28, 2021, Doe began to experience symptoms of COVID-19 and tested

positive for the virus the next day. Id. ¶ 12. She shortly thereafter filed a short-term disability claim

with Defendant. Id.

On January 4, 2022, the same day that Defendant acknowledged Doe’s disability claim,

Doe was notified via email that her religious accommodation request had been denied. Id. ¶ 15.

Doe responded to the email, attempting to “clarify factual errors” and to demonstrate “her

willingness to pay for her own COVID-19 testing [and] to wear a mask when needed onsite[.]” Id.

¶ 16–17. She also asked why she could not work remotely and requested saliva testing because it

was less invasive than the nasal swab testing. Id. ¶ 17.

On January 6, 2022, Defendant told Doe that she “may not return to work until she was

cleared by Defendant’s Medical Office as a result of her COVID diagnosis” and attributed the

denial of Doe’s religious exemption request to “leadership expectation,” even though Defendant

told Doe that her position would be under a Flexible Work Arrangement. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant

declined Doe’s proposals to work remotely, wear a mask in the office, or any other

accommodation. Id. ¶ 19.

On January 7, 2022, Doe filed an ethics complaint against Defendant “for their

discriminatory treatment against her and the continuous pressure she faced to comply with the

COVID-19 vaccination policy.” Id. ¶ 20. The Accommodations Coordinator informed Doe that

her religious exemption denial is final, and no other accommodation would be possible. Id. ¶ 21.

On January 10, 2022, Dr. Meegan Chestnut of Columbia Medical Practice sent a letter and

medical exemption request to Defendant, informing them that “Doe should not receive a COVID-

19 vaccination for at least three months after her COVID-19 diagnosis.” Id. ¶ 22. “This document,

and the others submitted by Dr. Chestnut, stood as Doe’s medical exemption request.” Id.

On January 11, 2022, Doe told the Accommodations Coordinator “her concerns of

religious discrimination and sought clarification as to why her exemption request was denied,

despite other similarly situated individuals having theirs accepted.” Id. ¶ 23.

On January 18, 2022, at 10:00 AM, Doe’s request for a medical exemption was denied. Id.

¶ 24. According to Doe, “[s]imilarly situated individuals employed by Defendant who were denied

medical or religious exemptions were provided thorough consideration and formal

documentation.” Id. Defendant granted “multiple other religious and medical exemption

accommodation requests of other religions and of Christianity from the COVID-19 vaccination

mandate.” Id. ¶ 26.

Later the same day, at 3:00 PM, Defendant fired Doe via Zoom. Id. ¶ 25. After Doe’s

termination, Defendant spoke with Doe’s doctor without Doe’s consent. Id. ¶ 27. On January 20,

2022, “Defendant sent internal email communications about Doe’s medical information, again

without Doe’s consent[.]” Id. ¶ 28.

An employee of Defendant, Daniel Anna, sent an email to Doe’s former coworkers with

approved accommodations requests. Id. ¶ 29. The email detailed saliva testing for COVID-19 as

part of their on-site accommodations. Id.

Defendant contacted Doe on multiple occasions about the ethics complaint that she filed.

Id. ¶ 30. Doe notified Defendant’s ethics investigator that Defendant’s medical advisor had

“spoken with Doe’s primary care physician, Dr. Chestnut, without Doe’s consent . . . .” Id. On

February 28, 2022, Doe’s ethics complaint was officially terminated. Id.

Doe filed an official complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) on April 21, 2022, id., and filed the instant lawsuit on March 14, 2025, id. ¶ 31.1

1 Doe states that she filed a charge with the EEOC on April 21, 2022. See ECF 1 at 7. She does not

state when she received a Right-to-Sue Letter, so it is unclear whether this matter was filed within the

requisite 90-day period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (complainant has 90 days to file suit in federal or

state court after being notified of the right to sue).

III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY

Plaintiff requests leave to proceed with this litigation under a pseudonym, with her actual

identity maintained by the Court under seal. ECF 2 at 4. She contends that her top-secret security

clearance prevents her from disclosing information about her and her colleagues’ identities, roles,

connections, and security clearances, and that such disclosure would pose “a real and present risk

of retaliatory or other harm, from both foreign and domestic actors.” ECF 14 at 1. Plaintiff also

argues that her claims involve private medical information, there is a risk of “retaliatory harm” in

her field of work, and Defendant will not be prejudiced if she were permitted to proceed

pseudonymously. ECF 2 at 1–3. Defendant opposes the request, arguing that Plaintiff’s

justifications are insufficient to overcome the presumption of public access to judicial proceedings

and records. See generally ECF 10. Plaintiff’s motion is denied because her contentions here do

not present exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify proceeding by pseudonym.

“To preserve the public’s interest in judicial proceedings, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure contain a presumption that an action should be prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest.” Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., Civ. No. SAG-23-1572, 2023 WL 3949737, at

*2 (D. Md. June 12, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), 17(a)). This presumption is rooted in the

common law and the First Amendment. See Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. Buchanan, 417 F.3d

424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005). The public presumptive right of access to a party’s name may be

overcome by “exceptional circumstances,” such as when the party presents “compelling concerns

relating to personal privacy or confidentiality . . . .” Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 273 (4th

Cir. 2014).

The Fourth Circuit has explained that district courts “ha[ve] an independent obligation to

ensure that extraordinary circumstances support such a request by balancing the party’s stated

interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any prejudice that anonymity

would pose to the opposing party.” Id. at 274. To achieve this balance, courts in this Circuit

consider the following list of non-exhaustive factors:

(1) [w]hether the justification asserted by the requesting party is

merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any

litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly

personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory

physical or mental harm to the requesting party or even more

critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose

privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action

is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, (5) the risk

of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against

it to proceed anonymously.

James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (enumeration added). It is a “rare dispensation”

that a court finds it appropriate for a plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d

at 273 (quoting James, 6 F.3d at 238). See also James, 6 F.3d at 238 (“The decision whether to

permit parties to proceed anonymously at trial is … committed in the first instance to trial court

discretion.”).

The first James factor, which considers whether the litigation is of a “sensitive and highly

personal nature,” 6 F.3d at 238, weighs in favor of disclosure. Courts generally consider medical

conditions to meet this sensitivity threshold when coupled with extremely stigmatizing factors,

such as sexual assault allegations or mental health issues. See Doe v. Chesapeake Med. Sols., LLC,

Civ. No. SAG-19-2670, 2020 WL 13612472, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2020) (finding that because

the case “uniquely implicate[d]” both plaintiff’s medical conditions and allegations of sexual

exploitation due to those medical conditions, proceeding pseudonymously was warranted); Univ.

of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 2023 WL 3949737, at *3 (noting that plaintiff’s medical conditions and

mental health both being at the center of the allegations weighed in favor of anonymity).

Here, Plaintiff asserts a concern that “private, medically protected information” will

become available to the public. ECF No. 2, ¶ 10. But the only medical information implicated in

this case is Plaintiff’s COVID-19 diagnosis and her request for a medical exemption from the

COVID-19 vaccine. As Defendant notes, more than forty million people have contracted COVID-

19 since the pandemic started six years ago. See ECF 10 at 5. In a world where COVID-19 has

become commonplace, this diagnosis and related exemption request fall far short of the

stigmatizing or unusual medical circumstances courts typically require to justify proceeding under

a pseudonym.

Plaintiff’s argument that her security clearance justifies proceeding under a pseudonym is

also insufficient. In support, Plaintiff attests that her clearance prevents her from discussing,

among other things, the “specific details of work, or particularly sensitive data relating thereto;”

“names of projects or missions [] worked on;” “specific locations associated with [the] clearance;”

and “conduct that, if known, creates vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation or duress by a

foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group[.]” ECF 14 at 2. Plaintiff fails, however, to

connect any of the foregoing to this litigation, nor does she offer sufficient details that would allow

this Court to conclude that denying her motion would expose her and colleagues to harm from

“from both foreign and domestic actors.” ECF 14 at 1. While the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s

security clearance, the only information she seeks to shield at this time is her name, and “cases

challenging revocations of, denials of, or investigations regarding security clearances are

frequently litigated under the plaintiffs’ real names.” Doe v. Benoit, No. 119CV01253, 2019 WL

13079193, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2019) (citing cases). If any sensitive or confidential information

turns up in the course of discovery or motions practice, it can be protected from disclosure by an

appropriate protective order and/or sealing order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Loc. R. 105.11.

The second James factor calls for considering whether any harm would result from publicly

identifying the party. See 6 F.3d at 238. Courts “consistently have rejected anonymity requests to

prevent speculative and unsubstantiated claims of harm.” Public Citizen, 749 F.3d at 274. See also

Doe v. Corp. Sec. Sols., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 3d 609, 614 (E.D.N.C. 2024) (citing cases) (“[N]aked

speculation of future harm does not justify pseudonymous litigation.”). Pseudonymity is generally

warranted where there is a concrete risk of physical or severe mental harm, rather than potential

economic or professional consequences. Compare Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 2023 WL

3949737, at *3 (finding pseudonymity appropriate where disclosure risked exacerbating mental

health stigma and harm), and Doe v. Austin, No. 22-3474, 2024 WL 864197, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb.

29, 2024) (permitting pseudonymity where the plaintiff’s role as a U.S. intelligence officer could

reasonably expose to “the attention of hostile foreign actors” and could expose her family to

“immediate danger of retaliation, capture, ransom, abduction, or death”), with S. Methodist Univ.

Ass’n of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting

argument that plaintiff lawyers’ identities “[would] leave them vulnerable to retaliation from their

current employers, prospective future employers and an organized bar that does ‘not like lawyers

who sue lawyers[]” because plaintiffs “face[d] no greater threat of retaliation than the typical

plaintiff alleging Title VII violations[]”); Candidate No. 452207 v. CFA Inst., 42 F. Supp. 3d 804,

809 (E.D. Va. 2012) (finding professional and reputational risks to plaintiff insufficient to justify

pseudonymity); Free Market Compensation v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313

(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding plaintiff’s wishes to proceed under a pseudonym due to fear of both

professional embarrassment and economic loss “insufficient” to justify doing so). Plaintiff’s

speculative concern about professional fallout and personal distress does not rise to the level of a

reasonably expected claim of harm. This factor, too, weighs against her motion.

The third James factor considers the plaintiff’s age. In practice, courts generally deem this

factor relevant in cases implicating a minor’s privacy interests. See, e.g., Smith v. Towson Univ.,

Civ. No. 22-2998, 2022 WL 18142844, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2022). Here, Plaintiff is not a

minor.

The next factor asks whether the action is against a governmental or private party. “Courts

are more likely to grant a plaintiff permission to anonymously bring suit against a governmental

entity than a private entity because ‘an action against a private party can result in damage to the

defendant’s reputation as well as economic harm’ in ways that do not raise similar concerns in

civil actions against the government.” Candidate No. 452207, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 810 (citation

omitted). See also Smith, 2022 WL 18142844, at *2 (quoting Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 41

(W.D. Va. 2016)) (“Unlike actions against private parties, ‘[a]ctions against the government do no

harm to its reputation[.]’”). Thus, when a private party is sued and publicly accused of wrongdoing,

basic fairness may—but does not always—call for disclosure of the accusers’ identities, depending

on the circumstances. See S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students, 599 F.2d at 713 (“Basic

fairness dictates that those among the defendants’ accusers who wish to participate in this suit as

individual party plaintiffs must do so under their real names.”); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.

Trump, Civ. No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 818255, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2017) (“[T]he mere filing

of a lawsuit against a private party may cause the defendant reputational and economic harm, such

that fairness requires the identification of the plaintiffs[.]”); but see Doe v. Sidar, 93 F.4th 241,

248 (4th Cir. 2024) (reaffirming James’s requirement of a “particularized assessment of the

equities”). Furthermore, “[u]se of pseudonyms is more likely to be appropriate in cases challenging

government activity because there is both ‘arguably a public interest in a vindication of . . . rights’

and a risk of stigmatization of the plaintiff, who often represents a minority interest. Int’l Refugee

Assistance Project, 2017 WL 818255, at *3 (quoting EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108,

111 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).

Here, Plaintiff details APL’s origins and argues that APL “perform[s] governmental

functions as a University Affiliated Research Center . . . .” ECF 14 at 6. But APL is a private

institution, and it can suffer reputational harm—and, as a result, economic harm—in ways that a

federal, state, or local government cannot.2 Moreover, Plaintiff is not challenging APL’s

performance of any government function or activity, and APL has engaged in similar litigation

with a named plaintiff before this Court. See Scherck v. The Johns Hopkins University Applied

Physics Laboratory, LLC, No. 23-1605, 2023 WL 6311469 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2023). The fourth

James factor weighs against Plaintiff’s motion.

Relatedly, the final James factor directs this Court to consider whether there is a “risk of

unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.” 6

F.3d at 238. As noted above, a civil action against a private institution like APL can expose it to

risk of reputational and economic harms. See, e.g., S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students,

599 F.2d at 713; Candidate No. 452207, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 810. Here, there would be some risk of

unfairness in permitting Plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym with her allegations that APL engaged

in various forms of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct while leaving APL exposed to potential

reputational and economic damage that those allegations may cause.

2 The Court notes some support for the proposition that the third James factor should weigh against

plaintiff anonymity even in suits brought against actual governmental entities, like public universities, that,

due to their commercial activity, can suffer reputational and economic harms in ways similar to private

entities. See Doe v. N. Carolina Cent. Univ., No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL 1939248, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Apr.

15, 1999) (finding where “[p]laintiff has made serious allegations against NCCU and [supervisor] that do

impinge upon their reputations[,] . . . the fact that NCCU is a state university is insufficient to justify

allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously”); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he

fact that Doe is suing the Postal Service does not weigh in favor of granting Doe’s request for anonymity.”).

But this sort of asymmetry in anonymity is not the only consideration called for by James’s

risk-of-unfairness factor. See Doe v. Mast, 745 F. Supp. 3d 399, 413 (W.D. Va. 2024) (quoting

Sidar, 93 F.4th at 248) (“[T]he Fourth Circuit has admonished courts that the fairness factor does

not ‘always counsel[] against letting a plaintiff in a civil action use a pseudonym at trial unless the

defendant is also using one.’”). A court should also consider whether allowing the plaintiff to

proceed anonymously would “hinder[] the [defendant’s] ability to mount a defense—as it might

in a case in which the defendant[] do[es] not know the plaintiff[’s] identit[y].” Id. (citing cases).

See also Smith, 2022 WL 18142844, at *3 (finding no unfairness to defendant where plaintiff has

filed his true name under seal and “defendant is fully aware of [p]laintiff’s identity[]”); Corp. Sec.

Sols., 751 F. Supp. 3d at 615 (finding, on consideration of the fifth James factor, that “permitting

Doe to proceed pseudonymously would not hinder [defendant’s] ability to fully and fairly litigate

this case”). The parties dispute whether APL is prejudiced by Plaintiff’s anonymity. Here, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant “already knows [her] identity[,]” ECF 14 at 2, but according to Defendant,

“Plaintiff has not disclosed her true identity, under seal or otherwise[,]” ECF 10 at 8. Defendant is

correct that Plaintiff has not yet filed her true name under seal, but she requests leave to do just

that, see ECF 2, and the Court presumes that APL, as Plaintiff’s former employer, can determine

Plaintiff’s identity based on the allegations in her Complaint, see ECF 1. Therefore, the Court does

not find that APL will be prejudiced in its ability to defend against Plaintiff’s claims if Plaintiff

were allowed to proceed pseudonymously.

Because the relevant risk-of-unfairness considerations in this case cut both ways, the Court

finds the fifth James factor to be neutral.

In sum, the majority of the James factors weigh against allowing Plaintiff to proceed in

this litigation by pseudonym. She has not presented such extraordinary circumstances to override

the strong presumption of public access to judicial proceedings and the identities of the parties

thereto. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

IV. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

APL moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Doe’s Complaint

for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. For the reasons explained below, the motion is

granted, and Doe’s initial Complaint is dismissed.

A. Standard of Review

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek dismissal

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” To survive the challenge, the non-

moving party must have pleaded facts demonstrating “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). A plausible claim is more than merely conceivable or speculative. See Holloway v.

Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022). The allegations must show there is “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,

961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the allegations as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765, 777

(4th Cir. 2022). But the Court does not accept “legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” U.S. ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177,

189 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451,

455 (4th Cir. 2013)). Merely reciting a claim’s elements “and supporting them by conclusory

statements does not meet the required standard.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d

230, 234 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 212

(4th Cir. 2019)). The Court “does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or

the applicability of defenses.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v.

Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)).

B. Count I: Religious Discrimination

Count I asserts a claim of discrimination on the basis of religion under Title VII. Title VII

makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion . . . .” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a). At trial in an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the burden of

proving her claims either through “direct or indirect” evidence of discriminatory animus under

“ordinary principles of proof[,]”3 Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997), or follow the burden-shifting framework

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 793 (1973). See Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 416 (4th Cir. 2021). Under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See

Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318–20 (4th Cir. 2005). The precise

formulation of the required prima facie showing will vary in “differing factual situations.”

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a

presumption of illegal discrimination arises, and the burden of production shifts to the employer

to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC,

650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011).

3 “Direct evidence is ‘evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged

discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.’” Bandy v. City of

Salem, 59 F. 4th 705, 711 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir.

1999) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003)).

Notably, the “prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary standard,

not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). A plaintiff is not

strictly required to allege facts sufficient to establish all elements of a prima facie case of

employment discrimination to avoid dismissal under Rule (12)(b)(6). Parker v. Child.’s Nat’l Med.

Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 WL 5840949, at *9 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021). She must,

however, “allege[ ] facts that plausibly state a violation of Title VII ‘above a speculative level,’”

Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals,

626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30 (2012)). Put differently, the plaintiff generally

must allege facts to support a reasonable inference that the employer took adverse action against

the plaintiff “under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Tex.

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see also Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190;

McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015).

Courts have recognized two theories of liability for religious discrimination in

employment: (1) disparate treatment; and (2) failure to accommodate. Menk v. MITRE Corp., 713

F. Supp. 3d 113, 144–45 (D. Md. 2024) (citing Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d

1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff argues that her Complaint states a claim under either theory.

See ECF 17 at 7. Defendant disagrees. For reasons explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff

fails to state a plausible discrimination claim under either theory.

1. Disparate Treatment

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment theory fails for insufficient pleading because she fails to set

forth circumstances to support any reasonable inference that she was fired based on her religion.

“Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats certain people less favorably than

others on the basis of a protected classification[,]” Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207

(4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 n.7 (4th Cir. 1994)), like religion. To

establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in employment, a plaintiff must show: “(1)

membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory work performance; (3) adverse employment

action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”

Id. (citing Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190). As noted supra, “[a]t the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff

need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination[,]” Parker, 2021 WL 5840949, at *9, but

the facts alleged in the complaint must support a reasonable inference that the employer took an

adverse action motivated by unlawful discrimination, see Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190; McCleary-

Evans, 780 F.3d at 585.

In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a disparate treatment claim

because she fails to allege that she was treated differently based on her religious beliefs. See ECF

11-1 at 14. Defendant contends that, in fact, “Plaintiff admits the opposite: that members of all

faiths were granted religious accommodations associated with the Policy.” Id. Further, Defendant

argues, Plaintiff fails to allege that she met APL’s “legitimate expectations.” Id. at 15–16.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s argument is “contradictory and self-defeating” because

Plaintiff is “a Catholic woman of deep faith,” which was known to Defendant, and “was fired,

while others similarly situated were treated differently. That is a prima facie pleading of disparate

treatment by Plaintiff.” ECF 17 at 10.

Plaintiff’s argument is ipse dixit. Plaintiff does not allege any direct evidence that she was

fired “because of” her religion; nor does she allege facts to support a reasonable inference that she

was fired “because of” her religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Complaint offers no facts to

suggest that any decisionmaker within APL had a discriminatory animus toward Plaintiff’s religion

and no “circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Burdine, 450

U.S. at 253. The facts alleged in the Complaint do not support an inference that, in firing Plaintiff,

Defendant targeted her based on her religious beliefs or treated her differently than other similarly

situated employees of other religious faiths. Plaintiff alleges that APL was aware of her “strongly

held religious beliefs,” Compl. ¶ 36, and granted employees of other religious backgrounds,

including Christianity, accommodations while denying her request, id. ¶ 26. But the Complaint

leaves unclear whether the employees of other religious backgrounds who received

accommodations were similarly situated to Plaintiff such that one can reasonably infer without

speculating that denying Plaintiff’s such an accommodation was “because of” her religion. The

denial of religious accommodation, by itself, is not sufficient to allege Title VII discrimination

based on disparate treatment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim fails.

2. Failure to Accommodate

Plaintiff also asserts her religious discrimination claim based on a failure-to-accommodate

theory. But her initial Complaint does not include enough facts to permit an assessment of what

Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are and how they conflict with APL’s policy. Thus, her failure-to-

accommodate theory fails.

To state a prima facie claim for failure to accumulate religious beliefs, an employee must

allege that “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment

requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was disciplined

for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers

& Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019 (internal

quotation marks omitted)).4

4 If a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the employer to show “either (1) that it provided

the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for his or her religious observances or (2) that such

While Plaintiff’s Complaint generally asserts that she had bona fide religious beliefs that

conflicted with APL’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, “it alleges no facts to allow this Court to assess

what Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are and how they conflict.” Friend v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP,

Civ. No. SAG-22-03308, 2023 WL 3390820, at *3 (D. Md. May 11, 2023). See also Menk, 713 F.

Supp. 3d at 149 (quoting Ellison v. Inova Health Care Servs., 692 F. Supp. 3d 548, 559 (E.D. Va.

2023)) (“[T]o withstand a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs are obliged to set forth ‘sufficient

allegations regarding their subjective personal beliefs, how those beliefs are related to their faith,

and how those beliefs form the basis of their objection to the COVID-19 vaccination.’”).5 In her

opposition brief, Plaintiff argues, without citation to any fact in her Complaint, that her objection

to receiving the vaccine “was predicated on her belief in Jesus Christ, understanding of The Holy

Bible, and the sanctity of her body as God’s Temple.” ECF 17 at 8 (no citation); see also id. at 9

(noting, without citation, her objection to “injecting vaccines derived from or tested with aborted

fetal cells and other foreign substances into her body, which is the Temple of the Holy Spirit”).

But a plaintiff’s statements in opposition to a motion to dismiss cannot cure deficiencies in her

pleading. See Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1068 (D. Md. 1991) (citation

omitted) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to

a motion to dismiss.”); Noshafagh v. Leggett, Civ. No. DKC 11-3038, 2013 WL 93345, at *6 (D.

accommodation was not provided because it would have caused undue hardship[.]” Firestone Fibers &

Textiles, 515 F.3d at 312.

5 Plaintiff argues in a footnote that this proposition is an error this Court should correct. ECF 17 at

9 n.3. I disagree. It is well established that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to “‘state[] a plausible

claim for relief’ that ‘permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct’” and “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). And the pleading standard of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8(a) is prescribed to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Without allegations of what religious beliefs a

plaintiff held that conflicted with the employer’s policy or requirements, the plaintiff’s claim for

accommodation would be entirely speculative and would not provide adequate notice of the factual grounds

for her failure-to-accommodate claim.

Md. Jan. 7, 2013), aff’d, 538 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v.

Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 399, 436 (D. Md. 2006)). To be certain, courts in this

Circuit must “give great weight” to a plaintiff’s assertion that their objection to an employer policy

is based on their religious faith. Finn v. Humane Soc’y of the United States, 160 F.4th 92, 98 (4th

Cir. 2025) (citing Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 471 (4th Cir. 2025)). And

plaintiff is not required to explain “how any particular tenet or principle of her religion prohibited

vaccination.” Id. at 99 (quoting Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2024)).

But the law requires that a plaintiff’s “refusal to be vaccinated derives from an aspect of her

religious practices or beliefs.” Id. Simply stating that one has a religion that prevents vaccine

compliance does not suffice to state a religious discrimination claim. The plaintiff “must plausibly

connect her refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine to her religious beliefs[,]” Id. (emphasis

added) (internal quotations omitted and cleaned up), and she must do so in her Complaint.

In sum, the initial Complaint fails to state a plausible Title VII religious discrimination

claim. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed.

C. Count II: Hostile Work Environment

Count II asserts a claim of hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff

alleges that APL created a hostile work environment by its insistence that she comply with its

COVID-19 vaccine policy and denial of her accommodation request. Her claim fails.

“A hostile [work] environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Boyer-Liberto v.

Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (cleaned up). A claim of

religion-based hostile work environment under Title VII requires a plaintiff to show: “(1)

unwelcome conduct; (2) based on the plaintiff’s [religion]; (3) which is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive work

environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.” Id. (citing Okoli v. City of Baltimore,

684 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011)); see also Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir.

2019).

In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is flawed because it does not

allege that Defendant’s conduct was objectively hostile or interfered with Plaintiff’s work

performance, provides no support for the allegation that Plaintiff endured a “persistent threat” of

termination, and does not connect any purported hostile treatment to her religious beliefs. See ECF

11-1 at 17–18.

Plaintiff argues that “persistent and specific communication from Defendant to get the

COVID-19 vaccination, knowing that getting the COVID-19 vaccination was against her religious

belief[,]” constituted unwelcome harassment and created an abusive atmosphere. ECF 17 at 10.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable employee similarly situated to Plaintiff would

believe they were subjected to a hostile work environment because this case is comparable to “eras

when religious discrimination and ‘cleansing’ has raised its evil, ugly head in other nations and

even our own[.]” Id. at 12.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for a hostile work environment. It includes

allegations that Plaintiff and her employer communicated back-and-forth regarding APL’s vaccine

requirement and Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Although establishing unwelcome conduct “is

not a high hurdle,” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 328 (4th Cir. 2018), the law requires

employers and employes to engage in an interactive process when an accommodation is requested.

The Fourth Circuit and other courts have emphasized “the importance of ‘bilateral cooperation’

between an employer and employee in their search for a reasonable accommodation.” Firestone

Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 316 (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60,

69 (1986)); see also Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.

2000) (holding that the “statutory and regulatory framework” requiring reasonable

accommodations for employee’s religious practices obligates employer and employee to engage

in an “interactive process” in seeking reasonable accommodations). Without more an employer’s

participation in this required interactive process is not actionable harassment. And Plaintiff does

not allege that APL’s contacts with Plaintiff were so “severe or pervasive to alter” her work

conditions or “to create an abusive work environment[.]” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Tawwaab v. Virginia Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D. Md.

2010), is misplaced. The plaintiff in Tawwaab alleged that he was subjected to at least ten incidents

of harassment that included racial slurs, insults, and threats. See 729 F. Supp. 2d at 766, 777–79.

Defendant here is correct that it is “unfathomable that any reasonable individual would find that

ordinary communications regarding Plaintiff’s accommodation request would rise to the level of

a racist slur or comment like those in Tawwaab.” ECF 19 at 8.

Moreover, as explained in Part IV.B supra, the Complaint does not include any facts to

support an inference that any alleged unwelcome conduct Plaintiff endured was based on her

membership in a protected class, i.e., her religion. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with APL’s denial of

her accommodation request alone does not rise to the level of a religiously hostile work

environment.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Count II must be dismissed.

D. Count III: Retaliation

Count III asserts a claim of Title VII retaliation. Title VII forbids employers from

retaliating against an employee for reporting workplace discrimination. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-

E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To state a prima facie claim

of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that she engaged in a protected activity, (2) that her

employer took an adverse action against her, and (3) that there was a causal link between the two

events.” Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F. 4th 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s retaliation clam falters at the third element.

Plaintiff argues that APL took the adverse action of terminating her employment not for

noncompliance with APL’s vaccination policy but instead because she submitted an

accommodation request associated with the policy, which, she contends, was a protected activity.

ECF 17 at 12. An employee engages in Title VII protected activity when she “oppose[s] an

unlawful employment practice or participate[s] in a charge or other proceeding under Title VII.”

Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Protected

activity under the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision includes “complaints

of discrimination based upon ‘race, color, religion, sex or national origin.’” Landino v. Sapp, 520

F. App’x 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balazs, 32 F.3d at 159). While the Fourth Circuit has

endorsed an “expansive view of what constitutes oppositional conduct[,]” DeMasters v. Carilion

Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 417 (4th Cir. 2015), “[g]eneral complaints of unfair treatment are not

protected activity[,]” Bowman v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Commissioners, 173 F. Supp. 3d 242,

248 (D. Md. 2016). Protected activity by an employee under § 2000e–3(a)’s opposition clause

must oppose either employment actions that are “actually unlawful under Title VII” or those that

the employee “reasonably believes to be unlawful.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282 (citation

omitted).

The Complaint does not contain any facts to suggest that Plaintiff’s initial request for

religious accommodation on September 30, 2021, was a Title VII protected activity. According to

the Complaint, APL communicated its “‘mandatory’ COVID-19 vaccination requirement” to its

employees on September 14, 2021, which required each employee “to receive an initial dose of

the COVID-19 vaccine by October 15, 2021.” Compl. ¶ 6. There is no indication in the Complaint

that Plaintiff’s September 30 accommodation request voiced objection or opposition to APL’s

vaccination requirement as a discriminatory employment practice. Plaintiff simply sought

compliance with the policy by undertaking the prescribed process for seeking an exemption before

the prescribed vaccination deadline. “[M]erely requesting a religious accommodation is not the

same as opposing the allegedly unlawful denial of a religious accommodation.” Menk, 713 F.

Supp. 3d at 153 (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d

1098, 1102–03 (8th Cir. 2018)). Plaintiff had a number of communications with APL about her

accommodation request in October and November 2022. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12. But the Complaint

does not allege that Plaintiff opposed or complained about the vaccination policy at any point

during these contacts. APL communicated its denial of Plaintiff’s accommodation request on

January 4, 2022. Id. ¶ 15.

It was not until Plaintiff “officially filed an ethics complaint against Defendant for their

discriminatory treatment against her” several days after the email denying the religious

accommodation that the Complaint provides any indication of a protected activity by Plaintiff. Id.

¶ 20. By that point, however, the parties had already contemplated Plaintiff’s termination for

failure to comply with the vaccination requirement. The Complaint alleges that on January 7, 2022,

Plaintiff “followed up” to request “any accommodation that would allow her to retain her

employment with Defendant without receiving the COVID-19 vaccination.” Id. Without facts to

suggest that APL terminated Plaintiff on January 18, 2022, because her ethics complaint alleged

discriminatory treatment, a causal connection between APL’s adverse action and Plaintiff’s

activity is not plausible. Any such causal link is called into doubt by the fact that the the parties

contemplated Plaintiff’s termination before she even submitted her discrimination complaint,6 and

the only apparent reason for termination at that time was Plaintiff’s non-compliance with APL’s

vaccine policy.

Courts have had no trouble dismissing employment retaliation claims, where a plaintiff is

terminated for noncompliance with an employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy, and the policy

was announced prior to the alleged protected activity. See, e.g., Schneider v. Cnty. of Fairfax, No.

22-871, 2023 WL 2333305 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-1303, 2023 WL 5524752 (4th

Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) (“Because the COVID-19 policy was in place before any conduct plaintiff

alleges to be protected activity occurred and because the policy clearly stated that dismissal could

be a consequence for non-compliance, it is implausible to suggest that [plaintiff’s] termination was

a result of any of his protected activity rather than a result of his decision not to comply with the

policy.”); Jorgenson v. Conduent Transp. Sols., Inc., Civ. No. SAG-22-01648, 2023 WL 1472022,

at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-1198, 2023 WL 4105705 (4th Cir. June 21, 2023) (“Even

if he had been able to demonstrate a good faith belief [his conduct was protected], though, Plaintiff

cannot establish a retaliation claim because the mandatory attestation policy was put in place

before he expressed opposition or refused to comply with it.”); Speaks v. Health Sys. Mgmt., Inc.,

6 Further, in her opposition brief, Plaintiff claims that APL “attempt[ed] to terminate Plaintiff while

on short-term disability,” before Plaintiff made an ethics complaint alleging discrimination for the first

time. ECF 17 at 13.

No. 522CV00077KDBDCK, 2022 WL 3448649, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2022) (finding “it is

not reasonable to infer that there was a causal connection between [plaintiff’s] criticism of

[defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination] policy and her termination” where plaintiff was terminated

under the policy and it “enacted before [plaintiff] spoke up in opposition to the vaccination

requirement”).7 Likewise, here, APL enacted a policy that made vaccination for COVID-19

“mandatory” for all employees months before Plaintiff ever complained of discrimination and

months before she was terminated. These facts do not support a reasonable inference of any causal

link between Plaintiff’s protected activity and her termination. Her retaliation claim in Count III

of the Complaint, therefore, fails and must be dismissed.

E. Counts IV & V: ADA Violations

Counts IV and V assert claims under Title I of the ADA for failure to accommodate and

disability discrimination, respectively.

In Count IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was temporarily unable to get the

vaccine because she had contracted COVID-19 and, on that basis, her doctor recommended she

abstain from getting the vaccine for three months. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 76. Plaintiff contends that

Defendant was required to provide “a reasonable accommodation to her medical disability

exemption request from the COVID-19 vaccine mandate.” Id. ¶ 77. In Count V, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant considered her “mere presence as an unvaccinated individual, regardless of testing,

masking, or any other accommodation, posed an unmitigable risk” and considered her

7 I recognize that the foregoing cases involved claims of retaliation under the ADA, not Title VII.

This distinction is immaterial, however, because the same standards are typically applied to retaliation

claims asserted under either statute. See Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)

(“Because the ADA echoes and expressly refers to Title VII, and because the two statutes have the same

purpose—the prohibition of illegal discrimination in employment—courts have routinely used Title VII

precedent in ADA cases.”); Parker v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 WL

5840949, at *23 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (citing Laird v. Fairfax Cnty., 978 F.3d 887, 893 n.5 (4th Cir. 2020)

(“Courts typically apply the standards for Title VII retaliation claims to ADA retaliation claims.”).

“unvaccinated status to be a physiological condition related to her immune and respiratory system

that impaired major life activities, such as interacting with others and working.” Id. ¶ 87.

According to Plaintiff, “Defendant therefore perceived [Plaintiff] as having a bona fide medical

disability and discriminated against her by failing to explain why her unvaccinated status disability

could not be accommodated, even though similarly situated persons had received accommodations

from the COVD-19 vaccination requirement.” Id. ¶ 89. Finally, in Count IX, Plaintiff alleges that

APL retaliated against her or interfered with her rights, in violation of 29 CFR § 1630.12 et seq.,

by “failing to provide reasonable accommodation related to her bona fide disabilities as it pertained

to Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement, failing to address the hostile work

environment made known to Defendant through the ethics complaint process, obtaining medical

information from [Plaintiff] under false pretenses, and terminating [Plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 116.

The ADA makes it unlawful for employers to “discriminate against a qualified individual

on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To establish a claim for disability discrimination

under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is a ‘qualified

individual’ for the employment in question, and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took

other adverse employment action) because of her disability.’” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the

Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. Stowe–Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373,

377 (4th Cir. 2000)). Like violations of Title VII, “[d]isability discrimination may be proven

through direct and indirect evidence or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework.” Id.

“In order to state a claim cognizable under the ADA, [Doe] must demonstrate she has a

disability.” Cox v. Civista Med. Ctr., 16 F. App’x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2001). The ADA defines

“disability” as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). A “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111. Ultimately, “[t]he determination of whether a person is

disabled is an individualized inquiry, particular to the facts of each case.” EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,

237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

Because the Complaint fails to allege facts to support Plaintiff’s claim that she had a

disability under the ADA’s definition, her ADA claims must be dismissed.

First, Plaintiff does not allege that her COVID-19 infection in late December 2021 was so

severe that it limited her ability to engage in major life activities. Major life activities include

“[c]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,

standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,

thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). The

only limitation alleged in the Complaint associated with Plaintiff’s COVID-19 diagnosis is, based

on her physician’s opinion at the time, that Plaintiff was temporarily unable to receive a vaccine.

A doctor’s advice not to receive a vaccine for a period of three months does not amount to a severe

limitation on a major life activity such that it qualifies as a disability under the ADA.

Second, Plaintiff’s claim that APL “regarded her” as having a disability is unavailing. For

a plaintiff to plead they were “regarded as having a disability” within the meaning of the statute,

he or she “must plausibly allege ‘that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under

this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the

impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.’” Jorgenson, 2023 WL 1472022, at

*4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A), and citing Miller v. Maryland Dep’t of Nat. Res., 813 F.

App’x 869, 876 (4th Cir. 2020)). Any claim that Plaintiff was subjected to a prohibited

employment action “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment” would not

be plausible under the facts contained in the Complaint. The only reason for Plaintiff’s termination

supported by the facts alleged in the Complaint is her refusal of vaccination for COVID-19. The

only factual basis for Plaintiff’s bare allegation that APL “considered [Plaintiff’s] unvaccinated

status to be a physiological condition . . . that impaired major life activities, such as interacting

with others and working[,]” is APL’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to return to work until she was

medically cleared. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 87. But Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that her bout

with COVID-19 was anything more than “transitory and minor,” and “a plaintiff cannot ultimately

succeed on a regarded as claim if the impairment is ‘transitory and minor.’” Miller, 813 F. App’x

at 876 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). Such impairments are expressly excluded from the

ambit of a “regarded as” disability under the statutory definition. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).

Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has determined that, for purposes of the ADA, “an employer’s

inquiry into an employee’s vaccination status isn’t a disability-related inquiry.” Finn, 160 F.4th at

99 (citing Jorgenson., 2023 WL 1472022, at *5). Although Plaintiff concedes that courts have

concluded that unvaccinated status may not be considered a prima facie disability, she argues that

“if unvaccinated individuals or individuals whom are unvaccinated and recovered from COVID-

19 are treated as if they were still infectious even though no longer infectious and prevented them

from returning to work, then the employer has regarded the employee as having a disability[.]”

ECF 17 at 18–19. But as several courts have explained, “vaccination status stems from a personal

choice, not from a physical or mental impairment.” Foshee v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, Civ. No.

SAG-23-00894, 2023 WL 6845425, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2023) (citing Speaks, 2022 WL

3448649, at *5), and Johnson v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Grp., Inc., No. 22-CV-02936, 2023 WL

2163774, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-466, 2024 WL 3289475 (2d Cir. July 3,

2024)). See also Finn, 160 F.4th at 100 (“[Plaintiffs] allege that [Defendant] regarded them as

disabled because they were unvaccinated and then fired them for that reason. But, once again,

being unvaccinated isn’t a physical or mental impairment. It therefore can’t support a ‘regarded

as’ claim.”). And mandating that a plaintiff employee “to follow a COVID-19 policy applicable to

all employees does not support the inference that [the employer] classified [her] as disabled under

the ADA.” Foshee, 2023 WL 6845425, at *6.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Counts IV and V fail to state plausible violations of Title

I of the ADA and must be dismissed.8

F. Count IX: ADA Interference

In Count IX of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of the ADA’s implementing

regulations. Although Count IX is styled as “Retaliation and Interference” under 29 C.F.R. §

1630.12,9 Plaintiff failed to respond in her opposition to Defendant’s arguments as to why her

retaliation claim fails. Plaintiff therefore is deemed to have abandoned that claim. See Sewell v.

Strayer Univ., Civ. No. DKC 12-2927, 2013 WL 6858867, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2013) (citing

Ferdinand–Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777, 783 (D. Md. 2010)).10

8 To the extent Plaintiff claims her “COVID-19 immunity as an unvaccinated person” was not

accommodated, ECF 17 at 21, that claim is not stated in the Complaint and, to the contrary, it conflicts with

the allegation in the Complaint that “Defendant considered [Plaintiff’s] unvaccinated status to be a

physiological condition related to her immune and respiratory system that impaired major life activities,

Compl. ¶ 87. An immunity from a virus is not a disability under the ADA.

9 The cited regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12, is part of the ADA’s implementing regulations.

10 Regardless, Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim would still be deficient for the same reasons that

her Title VII retaliation claim is deficient. See Parker, 2021 WL 5840949, at *23 (citing Laird, 978 F.3d at

Moreover, Plaintiff does not appear to allege any retaliatory conduct by Defendant in support of

Count IX.

With respect to the interference claim, Plaintiff’s argument in her opposition varies from

the allegations in her Complaint. In her opposition, Plaintiff contends that she engaged in protected

activity by seeking an accommodation and filing an ethics complaint. ECF 17 at 23. She further

states in her opposition that APL interfered with her ability to redress its violation of the ADA and

intimidated her from pursuing a charge of discrimination when it discussed her private medical

information with her doctor. Id. But in the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege unlawful

interference based on contacts between APL and Plaintiff’s medical provider. See Compl. ¶¶ 114–

16. In any event, Plaintiff’s new arguments miss the mark.

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12(b), “[i]t is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, harass or

interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or because that individual aided or

encouraged any other individual in the exercise of, any right granted or protected by [the ADA’s

implementing regulations].” To plead a claim of ADA interference, a plaintiff must set forth

sufficient facts to demonstrate that:

(1) she engaged in activity statutorily protected by the ADA; (2) she

was engaged in, or aided or encouraged others in, the exercise or

enjoyment of ADA protected rights; (3) the defendants coerced,

threatened, intimidated, or interfered on account of her protected

activity; and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to

discriminate.

Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, Virginia, No. 1:19CV00032, 2020 WL 2553614, at *7 (W.D. Va. May

20, 2020), aff’d, 90 F.4th 158 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872

893 n.5 (“Courts typically apply the standards for Title VII retaliation claims to ADA retaliation claims.”));

see also Jones v. HCA, 16 F. Supp. 3d 622, 635 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“The elements of an ADA retaliation claim

mirror the elements of Title VII retaliation claim.”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly

allege that she was protesting the application of APL’s vaccine mandate to those with disabilities.

F.3d 545, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2017)); see also Patel v. Credence Mgmt. Sols., No.

120CV00427RDAJFA, 2021 WL 1439675, at *10 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Patel

v. Credence Mgmt. Sols. LLC, No. 21-2324, 2023 WL 5348340 (4th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) (citations

omitted).

The Complaint does not include any facts to suggest that APL’s communications with

Plaintiff’s doctor about her request for an accommodation to the vaccine requirement interfered

with her ability to seek ADA redress or her exercise of her rights under the ADA, or that APL at

any point was motivated by an intent to discriminate against her based on ADA protected activity.

Moreover, as noted supra, the Fourth Circuit has held that “an employer’s inquiry into an

employee’s vaccination status isn’t a disability-related inquiry.” Finn, 160 F.4th at 99.

In sum, Count IX is dismissed because it fails to state any plausible claim for relief.

V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Following APL’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file an

amended complaint. See ECF 18. Plaintiff’s proposed amendment adds a small set of allegations

in support of her Title VII claim in Count I of religious discrimination based on failure to

accommodate and her ADA interference claim, now re-numbered Count VI, following removal of

the state-law claims she voluntarily dismissed. See ECF 18-1 & 18-2. Because the proposed

amended complaint, with its additional allegations, is not clearly insufficient to state a plausible

Title VII discrimination claim in Count I, and the proposed amendment is not prejudicial nor

presented in bad faith, Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted as to Count I. However, the ADA

interference claim in the proposed amended complaint fares no better than that in the initial

Complaint. Because the proposed amendment is futile as to the interference claim, the motion to

amend is denied as to that count.

Amendment of pleadings is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15. Rule

15(a)(2) provides that a court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Based on this rule, the Fourth Circuit has endorsed a liberal approach to granting motions

for leave to amend. The court has “interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that leave to amend a pleading

should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has

been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.” Laber

v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Leave

to amend should be denied as futile “when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or

frivolous on its face.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations

omitted).

Here, Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to include modest additions pertaining to

religious discrimination under Title VII (Count I) and interference under the ADA’s implementing

regulations (Count VI). With respect to Count I, Plaintiff adds the following to her Complaint:

Doe’s religious faith is a sincere Catholic Christian and her reasons

for her faith and practice needing the exemption were stated and

declared to Defendant, in part, as follows:

I am a devout Catholic Christian with the sincerely held belief that

receiving the COVID19 vaccine would be completely against my

faith, morals, and conscience. The main belief that necessitates my

accommodation is the belief that all lives are sacred gifts and it is

immoral, evil, and wrong to end a life. The 5th commandment states

that it would be a moral sin to kill. I firmly believe that every human

life begins at the time of conception and must be respected and

safeguarded. Furthermore, God created us in his image and loves us

so much that he sacrificed his only son for us to be forgiven of our

sins and as a result, we are called to follow the Lord’s word and act

through his image. “If anyone destroys God's temple, God will

destroy him. For God's temple is holy, and you are that temple” (1

Corinthians 3:17).

Doe’s complete religious exemption declaration is attached hereto

as Exhibit One.

See ECF 18-2 at 3 (red-lined proposed amended complaint).

Notably, Doe’s completed religious exemption declaration is not attached as an exhibit to

the proposed amended complaint, but it is attached to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion

to dismiss. See ECF 17-1. In the Declaration, Plaintiff explains that:

The science associated with the COVID-19 vaccinations as well as

the COVID-19 vaccination program both directly conflict with my

religious beliefs stated above (see response to question #2) as they

were produced from the cells of electively aborted human babies.

Early in the development of mRNA vaccine technology (e.g., Pfizer

and Moderna), fetal cells were used for “proof of concept” (to

demonstrate how a cell could take up mRNA and produce the

SARS-CoV2 spike protein) or the characterize the SARS-CoV-2

spike protein. The non-replicating viral vector vaccine produced by

Johnson & Johnson required the use of fetal cell cultures,

specifically PER.C6, in order to produce and manufacture the

vaccine.

The COVID-19 vaccines would alter my God given body in a way

that to me equals a violation of the first commandment because the

mRNA development attacks the natural design of cell immunity by

trying to supplant it. I would then be placing the worship of science

above Gods creation. I strongly believe that consuming the vaccine,

a prohibited “unclean food” would cause harm to my conscience

because to me, the COVID-19 vaccines are unclean. I believe that

there is also insufficient data to confirm that the vaccine will not

cause my body excessive harm.

See id. at 3.

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s proposed additions as futile, relying on Finn v. Humane

Soc’y of U.S., Civ. No. 23-2107, 2024 WL 1765702, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2024), for the

proposition that there is a distinction between a religious opposition to abortion and an opposition

to vaccines that were potentially developed using a fetal cell line. See ECF 20 at 11. The problem

for Defendant is that the district court’s decision in Finn was overturned by the Fourth Circuit. See

Finn v. Humane Soc’y of the U.S., 160 F.4th 92 (4th Cir. 2025). One of the plaintiffs in Finn

objected to COVID-19 vaccination because aborted fetal cell lines were used to produce the

vaccine. Id. at 98. The plaintiffs based their objections to vaccination on the “Christian upbringing”

and conviction that taking the vaccine would “betray … conscience and faith,” citing Catholic

teachings. Id. at 96–97. The employer denied the plaintiffs’ requests for exemption and fired them.

Id. at 97. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to state a plausible

religious discrimination claim at the pleading stage, as the plaintiffs pleaded sincere religious

beliefs that conflicted with their employer’s vaccine mandate. Id. at 98–99.

For the same reasons, here, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint is not clearly

insufficient to state a claim in Count I for religion-based discrimination under Title VII. Thus,

leave is granted to proceed with Count I of the proposed amended complaint.

Next, with respect to claim Count IX, Plaintiff adds the following:

Defendant engaged in a pattern and practice of coercion,

intimidation, interference and contact with her medical doctor in

order to cause her to cease exercising her medical ADA rights and

to be intimidated from pursuing her ethics complaint about

Defendant’s denial of the same.

Defendant spoke with Plaintiff’s personal doctor for the purpose of

discussing Plaintiff’s private medical information, interfering with

her ability to seek redress for their violation of the ADA and

intimidating her from pursuing her charges of discrimination.

See ECF 18-2 at 20.

Defendant argues that leave to amend should be denied because Plaintiff still fails to plead

that APL was motivated by an intent to discriminate and that APL coerced, threatened, intimidated

or interfered with her request for accommodation because she engaged in a protected activity. See

ECF 20 at 9. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff’s proposed additional allegations are conclusory statements that do not address

the pleading deficiencies in Count IX identified in Part IV.F supra. Specifically, Plaintiff does not

allege facts to support her conclusion that APL engaged in the alleged pattern and practice, nor

does she state any facts to suggest that APL had discriminatory motivations. See Kelly, 2020 WL

2553614, at *7 (interference claim requires that “the defendants were motivated by an intent to

discriminate”). It is unclear how Plaintiff’s ethics complaint relates to the alleged interference. See

id. (interference claim requires that “the defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered

on account of her protected activity”). Plaintiff filed her ethics complaint on January 7, 2022, while

seeking a religious accommodation, which occurred before her doctor sent in the alleged medical

accommodation request on January 10. And it is similarly unclear how APL speaking to Plaintiff’s

doctor about her request for accommodation interfered with her ability to seek redress of APL’s

alleged ADA violation or impeded her ability to pursue charges of discrimination. In the end, these

proposed additions are the type of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” that cannot survive a

motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009). Therefore, the Court finds them to be

futile. The proposed amendment of Count IX is denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously (ECF 2) is

denied; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 11) is granted; and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

Amend (ECF 18) is granted as to Count I but denied as to Count IX. Plaintiff shall re-file a version

of her Amended Complaint that includes her name and excludes the counts subject to dismissal

and/or found to be futile (Counts II through VI).11

A separate Order will follow.

3/30/26 /S/

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge

11 The proposed Amended Complaint does not modify or augment the allegations offered in support

of Counts II through V, so these counts are subject to dismissal and futile for the reasons explained in Parts

IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E supra and are therefore futile.