Harrington v. Lancaster

Case: 25-20360 Document: 48-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/04/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 25-20360

FILED

May 4, 2026

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Tyler Harrington, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

James Lancaster; Nathaniel Cano; Jared Lindsay,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:24-CV-366

______________________________

Before Jones, Stewart, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

This Fourth Amendment case began with a neighbor’s mistake. The

neighbor called 911 to report a possible home invasion but gave officers the

wrong address. Acting on that information, officers entered the wrong home

to conduct a protective sweep, expecting to find either a vacant house or an

intruder. Instead, they found Tyler Harrington and his wife asleep in bed.

The officers then wondered aloud whether they had the right address. But

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 25-20360

instead of confirming where they were, they stepped back to the front door,

knocked, and re-entered moments later. During that second entry, they

awoke the underwear-clad couple, ordered them at gunpoint to put their

hands up and “stay right there,” and questioned them.

* * *

The district court erred in dismissing Harrington’s unlawful entry,

search, and seizure claims arising from the officers’ second entry. On the

facts alleged, apparent consent justified the officers’ initial entry and

sweep—but not their return moments later. A warrantless entry may be valid

when officers reasonably, though mistakenly, rely on consent to enter a

home. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990). The question is

whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over

the premises[.]” Id. at 188 (cleaned up).

The facts available at the time of the first entry support that

conclusion. The officers knew that two 911 calls had reported a possible home

invasion, that dispatch had identified Harrington’s address as the home in

question, and that dispatch had confirmed the owner’s consent to clear what

the officers believed was that house. Given those facts, a reasonable officer

could conclude—though mistakenly—that he had consent to enter.

But the facts looked very different by the time the officers entered

again. Just before the second entry, they opened a bedroom door and found

the Harringtons asleep in bed. Officer Lindsay whispered, “There’s

somebody asleep on the bed. Did they give us the right address?” Officer

Cano answered, “I don’t know.” At that point, the officers knew the house

was not vacant, as they had expected, but occupied by a sleeping couple

instead. And they knew enough to question whether they were in the right

place. Yet rather than confirm the address before going further, they exited,

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No. 25-20360

re-entered, and seized Harrington and his wife. Indeed, they did not confirm

the address with dispatch until after they had re-entered the home, awakened

the Harringtons, and questioned them at gunpoint. Apparent consent

therefore did not justify the officers’ second warrantless entry, search, and

seizure. 1

Qualified immunity does not change that conclusion. We have held

that qualified immunity does not “provide a safe harbor for police to remain

in a residence after they are aware that they have entered the wrong residence

by mistake.” Simmons v. City of Paris, 378 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2004). Once

the officers found the Harringtons asleep in bed and questioned whether they

had the correct address, they had to “immediately terminate their search.”

Id. at 477. They did not. Qualified immunity therefore does not shield the

officers from Harrington’s unlawful-entry, search, and seizure claims arising

from the second entry.

Harrington’s excessive-force claim is different. That claim rests on

the allegation that the officers “woke him up by screaming at him and holding

him at gunpoint while he wore only underwear.” But “pointing a gun can be

reasonable given the circumstances” even when the plaintiff poses no

immediate danger to the officers. See Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453,

468 (5th Cir. 2022). In Crane, we rejected an excessive-force claim where an

officer pointed a gun and shouted orders at car passengers who were not

suspects. Id. We have likewise held that “the momentary fear experienced by

the plaintiff when a police officer pointed a gun at him [does] not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation.” Id. (cleaned up).

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1

We do not address Defendants’ exigent-circumstances argument because they

failed to raise it below. See Est. of Duncan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 890 F.3d 192, 202

(5th Cir. 2018) (“This court will not consider arguments first raised on appeal . . . .”

(footnote omitted)).

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No. 25-20360

A right is clearly established only if “every reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted). Harrington

alleges no force beyond the officers’ shouting commands and brandishing

firearms responding to a late-night home-invasion call. On these allegations,

we cannot say that every reasonable officer would have understood that

conduct to violate clearly established law.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the excessive-force claim

and the unlawful-entry, search, and seizure claims arising from the initial

entry; REVERSE the dismissal of the unlawful-entry, search, and seizure

claims arising from the second entry; and REMAND for further

proceedings.

4