The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1620-23
SAID A. SAID,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________
Argued January 21, 2026 – Decided May 4, 2026
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the New Jersey Division of State
Police.
Philip Nettl argued the cause for appellant (Benedict
Altman & Nettl, LLC, attorneys; Philip Nettl, on the
brief).
Leo R. Boerstoel argued the cause for respondent
(Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General,
attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Handel T. Destinvil, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Said A. Said appeals a December 18, 2023, final agency
decision of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) denying his application to renew
a bounty hunter license. The denial was based on charges that Said violated
provisions of the Bounty Hunter Licensing Act (BHLA), N.J.S.A. 45:19-30 to -
42. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the denial and
the NJSP Superintendent issued a final agency decision adopting the ALJ's
findings. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles,
we affirm.
I.
We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the
record.
On February 20, 2018, NJSP Detective James Clay of the Private
Detective Unit received a complaint that several unlicensed bounty hunters were
operating out of the Jersey City/Newark area. According to Detective Clay's
investigation report, the complainant stated that John Virtuet contacted him
seeking assistance with a "bail skip" 1 for Stanley Edwards and another fugitive
because Virtuet did not have a bounty hunter license. The complainant also
stated that Virtuet was conducting bounty hunter work with Said and Roberto
1
This is a reference to a fugitive.
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2
Rivera. Detective Clay's report indicated that, as of February 20, Said was
licensed and associated with AAA Bail Bonds, but Rivera and Virtuet did not
have a bounty hunter license in the State of New Jersey. Clay conducted a
criminal history search on Edwards and confirmed that he had been arrested and
processed at the Bergen County jail on February 4, 2018.
Detective Clay discovered that Said apprehended Edwards on February 4
and turned him over to authorities. Detective Clay conducted interviews with
Said, Rivera, Dayshawn Rodriguez, and Patricia Edwards, Stanley Edwards'
mother.
Rivera told Clay that he first became aware of Edwards when someone
from Apple Bail Bonds sent him a photograph of Edwards and a copy of
Edwards' bail-forfeiture notice. Rivera then contacted Said "to work the case"
as a bounty hunter. Rivera stated that Said solicited his help to capture Edwards
and confirmed Said was acting as a bounty hunter in that case. Rivera also stated
that Virtuet, a licensed bail bondsman—not a licensed bounty hunter—and
Donald Conner, also not a licensed bounty hunter to his knowledge, were "acting
in a bounty hunter capacity along with Said."
According to Rivera, the four began surveilling Patricia Edwards' home
on the day of the capture, February 4, 2018. They observed a man believed to
A-1620-23
3
be Edwards come out of a vehicle and enter the home. They decided to wait to
confirm it was Edwards. After half an hour, they "hit the house" with Virtuet
and Conner entering, Said at the front of the house, and Rivera at the back of the
house. Rivera stated that eventually, Virtuet and Conner found Edwards and
arrested him. Afterwards, Said and Rivera entered the home.
Edwards was placed in Rivera's car, and Rivera drove Edwards to Said's
office for processing. Said, Viruet, and Conner later transported Edwards to the
Bergen County Jail. Said paid Rivera $300 in cash for his role in Edwards'
apprehension.
Patrcia Edwards confirmed in her interview with Clay that Rivera was one
of the persons who came to her home that day.
During his phone interview with Clay, Said stated that Rivera and Virtuet
"don't work for [him]." Said acknowledged that Virtuet and Rivera were not
licensed bounty hunters in this State. He also told Clay that Rivera was a
licensed bondsman and Virtuet owns a bail bonds company.
On July 19, 2018, Said was charged with knowingly employing a person
who has been convicted of a crime in the first to fourth degree, offenses relating
to controlled dangerous substances, or offenses where employment of the person
is contrary to public interest, N.J.S.A. 45:19-36(b); and employing a person
A-1620-23
4
without performing a requisite criminal history records background check or
while knowing of a disqualifying crime or offense, N.J.S.A. 45:19-36(c). The
Passaic County Prosecutor's Office downgraded the charges to false
imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3, and remanded the matter to Paterson municipal
court.2
The record shows that Said held a New Jersey bounty hunter license from
April 1, 2014, which was set to expire on May 15, 2018. In April 2018, prior to
the expiration date, Said applied to renew his bounty hunter license.
On August 21, 2018, Lieutenant Robert Cowden of the NJSP Detective
Unit notified Said in a letter that the NJSP would not renew his bounty hunter
license because of Said's alleged violations of the BHLA. The letter referred to
N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.7(a), which permits the NJSP to deny a renewal request if,
among other things: (1) the applicant had violated the BHLA; (2) the applicant
had failed to comply with the applicable New Jersey regulations pertaining to
bounty hunting; (3) the applicant had "demonstrated bad moral character,
incompetence, or untrustworthiness"; or (4) if good cause exists, based on the
interests of public safety.
2
On April 10, 2019, after his renewal was denied, all of the criminal charges
against Said were dismissed.
A-1620-23
5
The letter noted that police arrested Said on July 19, 2018, and the charges
related to Said's failure to conduct criminal background checks when hiring
bounty hunters. The letter explained that his license was not renewed "based on
the listed violations" and advised him of his right to request a hearing to
challenge the non-renewal decision.
Said appealed the denial whereupon the matter was referred to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case.
On April 26, 2023, the ALJ conducted an administrative hearing. The
judge heard testimony from Clay, Rivera, and Said.
Rivera testified that he considered Said his "boss" and explained that his
position was "like investigating cases, locating fugitives." He stated that he
never had a bounty hunter license. Rivera confirmed his involvement in
Edwards' apprehension, which he became aware of when Said called him about
it and the two met in person. He testified regarding his involvement in Edwards'
arrest and noted he only got paid if he arrested the fugitive.
Clay testified regarding his recorded interviews and other reports prepared
by the NJSP detectives, which were submitted into evidence. Clay also testified
to his investigation results:
A-1620-23
6
Q. Okay. Based on your investigation were any of
those other individuals [besides Said] legally allowed
to be involved with arresting [Edwards] on that date?
A. No, they were not.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, [Viruet] did not qualify for a bounty hunters
license nor would he qualify to do work as a bounty
hunter because he had a criminal history. [Rivera] did
not have a bounty hunter license and [Conner] did not
have a bounty hunter license. Conner was an
investigator for a [Private Investigations] company
owned by Matt Sulman (phonetic) identified as Xforce
Investigation, so . . . none of the parties involved
besides [Said] were licensed bounty hunters.
Clay then explained what Rivera told him about his involvement in
Edwards' arrest, stating:
[H]e gave specifics as to how they came to arrest
[Edwards]. They set up on his block doing surveillance
in separate cars. They observed an individual matching
[Edwards'] description going into the residence owned
by his mother, Patricia Edwards. They waited for a
period of time after he went into the residence before
hitting the house and effecting the arrest.
In the initial decision, dated September 20, 2023, the ALJ framed the
central issue in the case as "whether [Said] employed unlicensed bounty hunters
to perform bounty hunter work for him, and if so, does this justify the denial of
the renewal of his [bounty hunter] license." After summarizing the testimony,
A-1620-23
7
the ALJ found Clay "sincere and credible," but found that Said and Rivera were
"not as credible and not consistent with the facts, the other reports, and the
timeline in this matter." The ALJ found that "the individual or individuals used
by [Said] to assist in the arrest of [Edwards] were conducting work as bounty
hunters" and that "in exchange for the offer for a fee from [Said], Rivera, an
unlicensed [bounty hunter], conducted an investigation, performed surveillance
and was present during the arrest of [Edwards] on February 4, 2018."
The ALJ made the following additional factual findings:
1. [Said] was a licensed bounty hunter.
2. [Said] was involved in the capture of [Edwards] on
February 4, 2018.
3. [Said] paid [Rivera], an unlicensed [bounty hunter,]
for intelligence which was obtained through
surveillance and other investigation in connection with
the apprehension of [Edwards].
4. [Said] paid [Rivera] a cash fee for his assistance in
connection with the arrest following the completion of
the arrest and surrender of him to the authorities.
The ALJ concluded that Said had unlawfully engaged Rivera, who was
not licensed to perform bounty hunter work. The ALJ noted that "[a] lthough
Rivera may not have been an 'employee' in a traditional employer-employee
relationship, the language of the statue defines a [bounty hunter] as anyone
A-1620-23
8
engaged for a 'fee, hire or reward.'" See N.J.S.A. 45:19-29. Moreover, the ALJ
reasoned that "[t]he statute defines [bounty hunter] work as anyone who
'engages in or assists in the apprehension, arrest, detention, confinement,
surrender or securing of any such person; or keeps any such person under
surveillance.'" See ibid.
The ALJ also explained:
The testimony from the petitioner, as well as the
evidence and testimony from other witnesses,
demonstrates that Rivera was paid for intelligence that
led to the arrest of [Edwards]. The work he conducted
included investigation [and] surveillance, and there is
no dispute that he was present for the arrest of
[Edwards]. The crux of [Said]'s argument is that he was
paying people for confidential information, and this
does not constitute employment, nor were these
individuals conducting [bounty hunter] work.
However, due to the nature of this type of work, and the
need [for] strict regulation of quasi-law enforcement
work, the statue is very clear what constitutes [bounty
hunter] work. The work of confidential informants falls
squarely within the definition of [bounty hunter] work,
and due to the nature of this type of work, licensing is
required to engage in this type of work. Moreover, due
to the nature of this type of work, individuals with
criminal convictions are not permitted to engage in this
work.
Based on those findings, the ALJ affirmed the denial, concluding that the
"decision of the [NJSP] to deny the renewal of the bounty hunter license on the
A-1620-23
9
grounds of retention of unlicensed individuals to perform bounty hunter work
which demonstrated bad moral character was proper."
The NJSP Superintendent adopted the ALJ's findings and concluded that
Said's actions violated N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.7(a)(4), (5), (7), and (8). The final
decision concluded that the record "clearly support[ed]" the finding that Said
had employed unlicensed persons to perform bounty hunter work and found that
the ALJ had properly evaluated the documentary evidence and witness
testimony. The Superintendent explained that Said had engaged and paid Rivera
to do work that qualified as "bounty hunter" services under N.J.S.A. 45:19-29,
which justified the ALJ's conclusion that he had exhibited "bad moral conduct."
Furthermore, the final decision noted that the nonrenewal was justified
because: N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.7(a)(4) permits nonrenewal if an applicant "is
alleged to have violated one of the provisions of . . . the [BHLA];" N.J.A.C.
13:55B-2.7(a)(5) permits nonrenewal if an applicant has "failed to comply with
any of the rules in this chapter;" N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.7(a)(8) authorizes
nonrenewal when "good cause exists . . . in the interest of public safety;" and
the facts justified nonrenewal on those bases.
This appeal followed. Said raises the following contentions for our
consideration:
A-1620-23
10
POINT I
The Superintendent's decision to deny [Said]'s Bounty
Hunter License was arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable, because the credible evidence did not
establish any indication of a violation of the statutes
regulating bounty hunters during the apprehension of
Stanley Edwards, and the Superintendent failed to
consider [Said]'s exemplary record as a Bounty Hunter
over the course of his career as it affected his "moral
character."
A. Because [NJSP] expressly based the non-renewal
on [Said]'s arrest, which then resulted in a
dismissal, the Superintendent's decision to deny
[Said]'s license based upon a $300 payment to
Roberto Rivera instead was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable.
B. The undisputed facts do not support findings of
wrongdoing by [Said], as Roberto Rivera was not
an "employee"
C. [NJSP]'s finding of [Said]'s "moral character" did
not account for contrary information in the
record.
II.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal. The scope of our review is narrow. "'Judicial review of an
administrative agency action is limited' because respect is due to the 'expertise
and superior knowledge' of an agency in its specialized field." Francois v. Bd.
of Trs. of Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 347 (App. Div. 2010)
A-1620-23
11
(quoting Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223
(2009)). "An appellate court affords a 'strong presumption of reasonableness' to
an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities."
Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting City of Newark v. Nat. Res.
Council, Dep't of Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)). To that end, a "reviewing
court 'should not reverse'" an administrative agency's decision "unless it is
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record as a whole." Ibid. (quoting Prado v. State, 186
N.J. 413, 427 (2006)). The party challenging the administrative action bears the
burden of making that showing. Ibid.
To determine if an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, an appellate court must ascertain:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Ibid. (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194
(2011)).]
A-1620-23
12
When undertaking that analytical process, "[t]he choice of accepting or
rejecting testimony of witnesses rests with the administrative agency, and where
such choice is reasonably made, it is conclusive on appeal." Oceanside Charter
Sch. v. Dep't of Educ., 418 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting
Application of Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1976)).
Deference is "especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial
and involves questions of credibility." Matter of J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117
(1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 (1989)). It is
not our place to second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the agency
and, therefore, we do not "engage in an independent assessment of the evidence
as if [we] were the court of first instance." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471
(1999).
"[A]lthough the scope of review of an agency's decision is circumscribed,
an appellate court's review of an agency decision is 'not simply a pro forma
exercise in which [the court] rubber stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably
supported by the evidence.'" Mejia v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 446 N.J. Super. 369,
376-77 (App. Div. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting In re Taylor, 158 N.J.
644, 657 (1999)); accord Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93
(App. Div. 2018). Furthermore, "we are not bound by an agency's construction
A-1620-23
13
of a statute just as we are not bound by its other, strictly legal determinations."
Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 200 N.J. 413, 420 (2009).
Turning to substantive legal principles, the law provides that a person
seeking to conduct the business of bounty hunting in this State must be licensed
by the Superintendent of NJSP. N.J.S.A. 45:19-30. Pursuant to N.J.A.C.
13:55B-2.7(a), the Superintendent has the authority to deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a bounty hunter license for certain reasons, including:
4. The person holding a bounty hunter license,
applying for a license, or applying for renewal of a
license, is alleged to have violated one of the provisions
of N.J.S.A. 45:19-28 [to -42], the [BHLA];
5. The person holding a bounty hunter license,
applying for a license, or applying for renewal of a
license, has failed to comply with any of the rules in
this chapter;
....
7. The person holding a bounty hunter license,
applying for a license, or applying for renewal of a
license, has demonstrated bad moral character,
incompetence, or untrustworthiness; or
8. The Superintendent determines that good cause
exists to deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse, renewal of a
bounty hunter license in the interest of public safety.
A-1620-23
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III.
We first address defendant's contention that the final agency decision is
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As noted, Said makes three principle
arguments for reversal: (1) "the agency's decision did not follow the law, as it
did not follow the original reasons expressed in the notice of denial, violating
[Said]'s right to [d]ue [p]rocess;" (2) "the evidence did not support the agencies
findings, as confidential informants are not 'employees' of a bounty hunter
within the meaning of the statute, and [NJSP]'s own credible witness,
[Detective] Clay, acknowledged that sometimes street intelligence is necessary
to bounty hunting work;" and (3) "the agency clearly erred by not
acknowledging [Said]'s decades of honorable performance of his responsibilities
as a bounty hunter and bail bondsman, including bringing approximately 10,000
fugitives to justice, in determining whether his 'moral character' was impugned
by a single incident of paying [Rivera] to stay out of his way." We address these
arguments in turn.
A.
We are unpersuaded by Said's argument that his due process rights were
violated. Said contends that NJSP was "bound by the reasons given in their
denial letter, lest [Said] will be denied [d]ue [p]rocess guaranteed by N.J.A.C.
A-1620-23
15
13:15B-6.3." Ibid. He further argues the denial should have been vacated when
the charges were dismissed.
We note that Said cites no published precedent to support his contention
that NJSP is bound by the initial letter. Further, the record belies the notion that
he was not provided adequate notice of the several grounds for the non -renewal
decision, depriving him of notice and opportunity to respond at the OAL
hearing.
On August 21, 2018, NJSP served Said with notice of nonrenewal
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:55B-6.3(a). The letter refers to his July 2018 arrest for
"knowingly hiring unlicensed individuals who had criminal convictions which
would preclude them from employment." Clearly then, Said was aware that part
of the allegations raised by NJSP were based on the fact that he allegedly
employed individuals who were unlicensed.
Further, Said does not identify any point in time at which he did not
comprehend the several different reasons for denial that might indicate a lack of
notice in violation of due process principles. Said's counsel never objected to
NJSP's opening statement and so far as the record shows never objected to the
proceedings based on lack of notice. Opening statements made by Said's
counsel, moreover, show he understood the reasons for the denial and the fact -
A-1620-23
16
sensitive issues pertaining to those reasons. For example, counsel referred to
"[t]he allegations that [Said] has a history of employing unlicensed bondsmen
that's going to come from [Rivera]."
Moreover, the ALJ after opening statements confirmed the issues to be
litigated at the hearing, stating:
[The ALJ]: Okay. Just so I understand the basic
argument is that these individuals who were there were
not there at the direction of [Said], they were not
employees of [Said], he didn't request that they, you
know, show up at this house . . . . and they were
involved . . . in bringing in the skips. But is that the
basic allegation? I'm going to hear proof that were
these people there because [Said] asked him to be there,
were they helping [Said], were they employees of
[Said], or did they just happen to be there. Is that the
issue?
[Said's Counsel]: It depends on the person we're talking
about, Your Honor. [Rivera] who is going to be one of
[NJSP's counsel's] witnesses, he was there on his own.
[Conner] who is a licensed private investigator he
brought my client information about where to find
[Edwards].
[(Emphasis added).]
In sum, there is no indication in the record that Said was not given the
reasons for denial before the hearing. His due process arguments are thus
unavailing.
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B.
We next address Said's contentions with respect to whether he violated the
BHLA by employing an unlicensed person. N.J.A.C. 13:55B-4.1(a) provides:
Under the [BHLA], licensed bounty hunters may
employ as many persons as the licensee may deem
necessary to assist the licensee in the licensee's work
and in the conduct of the licensee's business, provided
that:
1. A person employed to perform any of the
functions, activities or services of a bounty hunter as
defined in N.J.A.C. 13:55B-1.3, is also licensed as a
bounty hunter in accordance with N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.
Here, the ALJ stated that, "[a]lthough Rivera may not have been an
'employee' in a traditional employer-employee relationship, the language of the
statue defines a [bounty hunter] as anyone engaged for a 'fee, hire or reward.'"
The judge also made the following relevant factual finding, which the
Superintendent accepted: "[Said] paid [Rivera] a cash fee for his assistance in
connection with the arrest following the completion of the arrest and surrender
of him to the authorities."
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The administrative code does not define the term "employed." Said, in
arguing Rivera cannot "reasonably" be Said's "employee[]," 3 suggests the test
this court should utilize is the "ABC" test of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19, which is used
in the wage claim context. NJSP, citing Grillo v. State, 469 N.J. Super. 267,
274 (App. Div. 2021), proposes using the ordinary meaning of the word as is
done with any other statute/administrative code. The Superintendent did not
expound on the definition of "employed" in his final decision.
We agree with the ALJ and Superintendent's construction of the term
"employed" as used in the context of the BHLA. In doing so, we reiterate that
we review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Verry v. Franklin Fire
Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294 (2017). "[A] rule of an administrative agency is
subject to the same canons of construction as a statute." A.B. v. Div. of Med.
Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div. 2009)
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re N.J.A.C.
14A:20-1.1, 216 N.J. Super. 297, 306 (App. Div. 1987)). A reviewing court's
primary "objective [in] statutory interpretation is to discern and effectuate the
intent of the Legislature." Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581,
3
We note that in his appeal brief, Said acknowledges that "[t]he only person
who could be construed as an employee was [Conner]." According to Clay's
investigation, Conner was not a licensed bounty hunter.
A-1620-23
19
592 (2012). "Absent a clear indication from the Legislature that it intended
statutory language to have a special limiting definition, we must presume that
the language used carries its ordinary and well-understood meaning." State v.
Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 262 (2014); see also Paff v. Galloway Twp., 229 N.J.
340, 353 (2017). "[L]egislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be
found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless." State v. Regis, 208 N.J.
439, 449 (2011) (quoting Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602,
613 (1999)). Furthermore, only when statutory language is ambiguous, or "leads
to more than one plausible interpretation," may the court "turn to extrinsic
evidence, 'including legislative history, committee reports, and
contemporaneous construction.'" DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93,
(2005) (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "employ" as: "1. To make use of. 2. To
hire. 3. To use as an agent or substitute in transacting business. 4. To
commission and entrust with the performance of certain acts or functions or with
the management of one's affairs." (12th ed. 2024). Applying this ordinary
meaning, we agree with the reasoning undergirding the final agency decision.
Notably, the testimony supports the conclusion that Said paid Rivera $300 in
connection with the capture of Edwards, and that Rivera conducted surveillance
A-1620-23
20
with Said, planned the apprehension with Said, and generally worked with him
the day of the capture as well, including driving Edwards to Said's office. NJSP
also accepted the credibility findings of the ALJ, who was presented with
Detective Clay's interviews and investigation report summaries. We give
deference to the ALJ and agency's credibility findings, and note that although
Rivera testified differently, the ALJ did not find him to be as credible as
Detective Clay. Evidence from the investigation report also supports the finding
that the fee was paid in exchange for capturing Edwards, not merely bringing
the case to Said initially.
Furthermore, accepting that Said thus "employed" Rivera, Rivera's
conduct in Edwards' apprehension constitutes bounty hunter activities within the
meaning of the BHLA. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 45:19-29(a) provides:
"Bounty hunter" means and includes any bail runner,
bail recovery agent, bail enforcement agent, fugitive
recovery agent or any other person who, for fee, hire
or reward: makes any investigation or investigations
as to the location or whereabouts of any person who
has violated the provisions of N.J.S.[]2C:29-7 or has
failed to appear in any court of law in this State or any
other state, when so required by law, or has failed to
answer any charge, subpoena or court ordered inquiry,
when so required by law; engages in or assists in the
apprehension, arrest, detention, confinement,
surrender or securing of any such person; or keeps any
such person under surveillance.
A-1620-23
21
[(Emphasis added).]
It is undisputed, moreover, that Rivera did not hold a bounty hunter's
license. Thus, applying the same facts that credibly established that Rivera had
been employed by Said, the Superintendent and ALJ properly found that Said's
employing Rivera for bounty hunter work was in violation of the administrative
code. On this ground, in light of the clear terms in the law and accepting the
ALJ's and agency's credibility findings, we conclude the Superintendent
properly denied Said's bounty hunter license renewal application.
IV.
Said also challenges the Superintendent's finding that Said demonstrated
bad moral character under N.J.A.C. 13:55-2.7(a)(7) by unlawfully engaging
Rivera to perform unlicensed bounty hunter services. Said argues that this
conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence and neither the ALJ nor
agency took into account his twenty-five-year career as a bounty hunter and bail
bondsman. He also argues that he did not hurt anyone in this matter.
N.J.S.C. 13:55B-2.7(a)(7) provides a basis for denial of renewal when the
applicant has "demonstrated bad moral character, incompetence, or
untrustworthiness." The NJSP's administrative regulations do not provide a
specific statutory definition for "bad moral character, incompetence, or
A-1620-23
22
untrustworthiness." NJSP urges us to follow the reasoning of In re Berardi, 23
N.J. 485, 493 (1957), which involved analogous statutory provisions of the
Private Detective Act of 1939, N.J.S.A. 45:19-8 to -27. In Berardi, our Supreme
Court instructed that the Superintendent may properly exercise their judgment
through "the testing of the known facts against the ordinary and generally
accepted meaning of the words 'good character, competency, and integrity.'" 23
N.J. at 493.
Because we affirm the agency's finding that Said violated the BHLA by
employing unlicensed individuals to engage in bounty hunter activities—an
independently sufficient basis upon which to deny renewal of Said's license—
we need not address whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious for the
Superintendent to also find the same violation of the statute is alone sufficient
to find that Said demonstrated "bad moral character, incompetence, or
untrustworthiness." The fact remains that violation of the BHLA provides the
basis for the denial of the renewal under N.J.A.C. 13:55B-2.7(a)(4) and we see
no need to use the same facts to establish bad moral character under N.J.A.C.
13:55B-2.7(a)(7).
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments raised by Said lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. See R.
2:11–3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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