Raycraft

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSE ENRIQUE BLANCO CABRERA, ) CASE NO. 4:26-CV-00085-DAR

)

Petitioner, ) JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

v. )

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, et al. ) JENNIFER DOWDELL

ARMSTRONG

)

)

Respondents. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

)

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Jose Enrique Blanco Cabrera (“Mr. Blanco Cabrera”) filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). In the petition, Mr. Blanco Cabrera, a

citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection, alleges that his due

process rights are being violated because he is being detained at the Northeast Ohio Correctional

Center and has not been granted a bond hearing.

This matter was referred to me on January 16, 2026 under Local Rule 16.2 to prepare a

report and recommendation on Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition. (See ECF non-document entry dated

January 16, 2026). On the same day, Mr. Blanco Cabrera filed an amended petition, naming as

respondents Field Office Acting Director Kevin Raycraft, Secretary of the Department of

Homeland Security Kristi Noem, Attorney General Pamela Bondi, the United States Department

of Homeland Security, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Warden Kenneth Hoover,

and United States Attorney David M. Toepfer (“Respondents”). On February 20, 2026,

(ECF No. 18). Mr. Blanco Cabrera filed his reply on March 6, 2026. (ECF No. 19.) For the reasons

set forth below, I recommend that the Court GRANT Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus and DENY Respondents’ motion to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROND

“For decades, noncitizens already present in the United States at the time of their arrest . .

. have been considered subject to discretionary detention.” Cuyun v. Raycraft, No. 3:25-CV-

02785-JJH, 2026 WL 362791, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2026) (report and recommendation)

(citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum

Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997)).

In July 2025, however, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued an internal

memorandum, entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for

Admission.” See Kaur v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-CV-02679, 2026 WL 709728, at *2 and n.4 (N.D.

Ohio Mar. 13, 2026) (discussing memorandum). Under that memorandum, all individuals who

entered the United States without inspection were deemed “applicants for admission” under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a) and subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(g)(2)(A), regardless

of whether an individual was detained upon entry or had been present in the United States for

years. Id.1

On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued its decision in

Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2005), holding that immigration judges “do[]

not have authority over [a] bond request because aliens who are present in the United States

without admission are applicants for admission as defined under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),

and must be detained for the duration of their removal proceedings.” Id. at 220.

1

Several individuals brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District

of California challenging the policy change. On December 18, 2025, that court issued an order:

granting partial summary judgment to petitioners and holding that Matter of Yajure Hurtado was

no longer controlling; vacating DHS’s policy change; and certifying a Bond Eligible Class

consisting of “All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or

will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon

arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1),

or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody

determination.” Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D.

Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Mr. Blanco Cabrera has attached to his petition purported guidance from the

chief immigration judge stating that Maldonado Bautista “is not a nationwide injunction and does

not purport to stay, vacate, or enjoin Yajure Hurtado,” and instructing immigration judges to

follow Matter of Yajure Hurtado as binding precedent. (ECF No. 7-11).

Mr. Blanco Cabrera alleges that he is a member of the Maldonado Bautista class. He is a

native and citizen of El Salvador. (ECF No. 7-1). Mr. Blanco Cabrera entered the United States

without inspection on or about November 15, 2020. (ECF No. 7-2). At the time, he was 17 years

old. (ECF No. 7-1). Shortly after entering the country, Mr. Blanco Cabrera encountered United

States border patrol agents and was taken into custody. (ECF No. 18-1). He was designated as an

“unaccompanied alien child” (“UAC”) and transferred to the custody of the Secretary of Health

and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”). (ECF No. 7-3). Mr. Blanco

Cabrera was released to the custody of his uncle on or about December 27, 2020. Id.2

On November 17, 2020, Mr. Blanco Cabrera was served with a notice to appear before an

immigration judge for removal proceedings. (ECF No. 7-2). The notice to appear stated that Mr.

2

Blanco Cabrera was an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”

rather than an “arriving alien.” Id. Mr. Blanco Cabrera failed to appear at the hearing and, on April

21, 2021, the immigration judge found that he was subject to removal. (ECF No. 18-3).

On June 13, 2022, Mr. Blanco Cabrera applied for asylum. (ECF No. 7-4). On or around

November 12, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Mr. Blanco Cabrera into

custody. Mr. Blanco Cabrera claims that he was unaware of the prior removal order and that he

inadvertently missed the April 2021 hearing. (ECF No. 7, ¶ 12). Mr. Blanco Cabrera moved to

reopen the proceedings, and the immigration judge granted the motion on November 19, 2025.

(ECF No. 7-5).

Mr. Blanco Cabrera filed a motion for a custody redetermination hearing, requesting that

the immigration court schedule an initial bond redetermination hearing because Mr. Blanco

Cabrera is, he claims, a member of the bond eligible class from Maldonado Bautista. (ECF No.

18-5). On January 22, 2026, the immigration judge denied Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s motion, holding

that it lacked jurisdiction, presumably in light of the Matter of Yajure Hurtado decision. (ECF No.

18-6). Mr. Blanco Cabrera remains in in ICE custody at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center.

On January 14, 2026, Mr. Blanco Cabrera filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. (ECF

No. 1). On January 16, 2026, the Court referred the matter to me to prepare a report and

recommendation on Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition. (ECF No. 5). On the same day, Mr. Blanco

Cabrera filed an amended petition. (ECF No. 7). On February 20, 2026, Respondents filed a

response to Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition and motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 18). On

March 6, 2026, Mr. Blanco Cabrera filed a traverse and response to Respondents’ motion to

dismiss. (ECF No. 19).

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Blanco Cabrera seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to either release

him on bond or grant him a bond hearing. In response, Respondents argue that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition, that he has failed to exhaust his claims, and that

he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and thus not entitled to a bond

hearing.

Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition is far from the first to raise these issues. Rather, in the

months since DHS’ policy change and the Matter of Yajure Hurtado decision, courts throughout

the country have seen an “overwhelming surge” of habeas petitions raising similar arguments.

Millan v. Voorhies, No. 4:25-cv-02779, 2026 WL 248376, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2026) (report

and recommendation) (noting that in the four months since the Matter of Yajure Hurtado decision,

there had been more than 1,000 district court decisions, including more than 200 from district

courts in the Sixth Circuit, addressing similar issues).

Courts have reached differing answers on many of those questions, both nationwide and

within this district. However, a “clear majority” of courts have rejected Respondents’ arguments

and have granted habeas relief to petitioners like Mr. Blanco Cabrera. Lopez v. Noem, No. 3:26

CV 128, 2026 WL 395202, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2026). After careful consideration, I agree

with that clear majority. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant Mr. Blanco Cabrera a writ

of habeas corpus and require Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing.

A. Proper Respondent

Before turning the substance of the parties’ arguments, I must address the identity of the

proper respondent. While Mr. Blanco Cabrera has named a number of individuals and agencies as

respondents, Respondents state in a footnote to their answer that the only proper respondent is

Field Office Director Kevin Raycraft. I agree.

A district court must direct a writ of habeas corpus “to the person having custody of the

person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. In the immigration context, the Sixth Circuit has held that,

although the warden of the facility where the alien is detained “technically has day-to-day control,”

the “INS District Director for the facility where the petitioner is located has power over alien

habeas petitioners.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).

Accordingly. “a detained alien generally must designate his immediate custodian—the District

Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus

petition.” Id.

Relying on Roman, several courts in this district have held that the District Director is the

proper respondent and that other respondents, such as Secretary Noem and Attorney General

Bondi, should be dismissed. See Martinez Hernandez v. Raycraft, No. 3:25-CV-02591-DAR, 2026

WL 698639, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2026) (report and recommendation) (recommending

dismissal of respondents other than ICE District Director); Hu v. Raycraft, No. 4:26-cv-113, 2026

WL 539117, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2026) (report and recommendation) (same). Mr. Blanco

Cabrera has not argued to the contrary. I therefore recommend that the Court dismiss all

respondents other than Field Director Rayfield because they are not proper respondents.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the

district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).

The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained in the United States.” Hamdi

v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). Accordingly, the protections of the writ extend to

noncitizens in immigration matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). However,

Congress has limited federal court jurisdiction over habeas petitions in the immigration context in

several ways. Respondents argue that two of those statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), deprive the Court of jurisdiction over Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition. I will

address each in turn.

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provides that:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory

or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision,

and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause

or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney

General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any

alien under this chapter.

The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the provision is a “zipper clause” that

“covers the universe of deportation claims . . . .” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Rather, the Reno Court held that § 1252(g) “applies only to

three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The

Court further noted that there are “many other decisions or actions that may be part of the

deportation process—such as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected

violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that

is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.” Id. However, it was

“implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand

way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” Id.

In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), a plurality of the Court reaffirmed that

interpretation, noting that American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commission “read the language [of

§ 1252(g)] to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see

also Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020)

(noting that § 1252(g) is “narrow”). The Sixth Circuit has likewise held that, under § 1252(g), a

“district court’s jurisdiction over . . . detention-based claims is independent of its jurisdiction over

removal-based claims.” Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Elgharib

v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that Sixth Circuit precedent supports

jurisdiction where a “petition raise[s] a challenge that d[oes] not require the district court to address

the merits of [the petitioner’s] order of removal”).

Respondents argue that § 1252(g) deprives the Court of jurisdiction because the decision

to “commence” removal proceedings includes the decision to detain an alien pending those

proceedings. As one court in this district has held, however, “[w]hile an immigrant’s detention is

technically related to the attorney general’s decision to commence proceedings, that technical

relation is insufficient to trigger § 1252(g).” Lemus v. Lynch, No. 4:26-cv-203, 2026 WL 496731,

at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026); see also Garcia Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 4:26-cv-0302, 2026

WL 656956, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2026) (rejecting argument that § 1252(g) applies to decision

to detain alien pending removal because “the Supreme Court has declined to read section 1252(g)

as a broad prohibition on any possible claim causally arising from those three actions”); Gu v.

Noem, 3:26-cv-00036, 2026 WL 621356, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2026) (“To hold otherwise

would contradict Supreme Court precedent holding § 1252(g) does not—as Respondents urge—

‘sweep in any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions’”) (quoting

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294) (cleaned up).

Thus, “[m]ost courts in the Sixth Circuit to have addressed the issue agree that challenges

to the government’s failure to provide a detained immigrant with a bond hearing do not fall within

the narrow scope of § 1252(g).” Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *5 (citing cases); see also Lopez,

2026 WL 395202, at *3 (“lower courts have overwhelmingly agreed that Section 1252(g) does not

divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction over habeas challenges to the legality of a noncitizen’s

detention.”); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 3122837, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7,

2025) (“section 1252(g) . . . does not bar the Court’s jurisdiction to consider Petitioners’ claims

concerning their continued detention without a bond hearing”).

To support their contrary interpretation, Respondents cite several out-of-circuit decisions,

most of which predate DHS’s policy change. Most of those decisions are distinguishable. In

Alvarez v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, for example, the petitioner

challenged the underlying decision to detain him, not the failure to provide him a bond hearing.

818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016). The same is true of several district court decisions that

Respondents rely on. See Valencia-Mejia v. United States, No. CV 08–2943 CAS (PJWx), 2008

WL 4286979, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008); Wang v. United States, No. CV 10-0389 SVW

(RCx), 2010 WL 11463156, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) Herrera-Correra v. United States,

No. CV 08-2941 DSF (JCx), 2008 WL 11336833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). The petitioner

in Tazu v. Attorney General likewise challenged the timing of his removal in addition to his

detention. 975 F.3d 292, 296-99 (3d Cir. 2020).

To the extent the authority Respondents rely on is not distinguishable, it is unpersuasive in

light of Reno, Jennings, and the weight of authority in this District and Circuit. I therefore

recommend that the Court hold that § 1252(g) does not divest it of jurisdiction to consider Mr.

Blanco Cabrera’s petition.

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(9)

Respondents also argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9),

which provides that:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of

constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding

brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available

only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in

this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of title

28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any

other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions

of law or fact.

Unlike § 1252(g), § 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause.” Reno, 525 U.S. at

483. “Its purpose is to consolidate ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action in

the court of appeals . . . .” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001).

That does not mean, however, that § 1252(b)(9) is all-encompassing. Rather, Jennings

made clear that § 1252(b)(9) has meaningful limits. There, petitioners argued that they were

entitled to periodic bond hearings while detailed awaiting removal. 583 U.S. at 292. The Jennings

plurality “assume[d] for the sake of argument” that the actions taken to detain aliens without a

bond hearing pending removal constituted “action[s] taken . . . to remove [them] from the United

States.” Id. at 292-93. The plurality also acknowledged that, if removal proceedings had not been

initiated, “the aliens would not be in custody at all.” Id. at 293.

The plurality nonetheless rejected the assertion that such an action “arises from” a removal

proceeding for purposes of § 1252(b)(9), stating that such an expansive interpretation “would lead

to staggering results” and would “make claims of prolonged detention effectively unreviewable.”

Id. at 293. Thus, while the plurality did not need to provide a “comprehensive interpretation” of §

1252(b)(9), it held that § 1252(b)(9) “does not present a jurisdictional bar” where the alien is “not

asking for a review of an order of removal . . . not challenging the decision to detain them in the

first place or to seek removal . . . and . . . not even challenging any part of the process by which

their removability will be determined.” Id. at 294-95.

In light of Jennings, most courts in this district have held that § 1252(b)(9) does not deprive

a district court of jurisdiction to consider a petition alleging that the government must grant aliens

like Mr. Blanco Cabrera a bond hearing. See Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *3 (holding that §

1252(b)(9) “presents no bar” where a petitioner “only challenges the government’s failure to

provide a bond hearing” rather than a removal order, the initial decision to detain him or seek

removal, or the process by which removability will be determined); Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *4

(holding that Jennings “resolves [the] argument” against Respondents’ position because petitioner

was “not challenging the removal proceeding” but rather “his detention and due process rights”);

E.V., 2025 WL 3122837, at *7 (“The question of whether statutory provisions require detention

without bond hearings do[es] not ‘arise from’ actions taken to remove noncitizens.”); Garcia

Rodriguez, 2026 WL 656956, at *4 (“claims of unconstitutional detention do not constitute a

question of law or fact ‘arising from’ an action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien”);

Lopez, 2026 WL 395202, at *3 (holding that Respondents’ “expansive” interpretation was

“unsupported by [§ 1252(b)(9)’s] plain language and contradicts Supreme Court precedent on this

issue”).

In urging a contrary conclusion, Respondents rely on Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion

in Jennings, in which he concluded that “detention is an ‘action taken . . . to remove’ an alien.” Id.

at 318 (Thomas, J., concurring). But the Jennings plurality rejected that interpretation. As the

plurality held, even assuming that detention is an action taken “to remove an alien . . . [t]he

question is not whether detention is an action taken to remove an alien but whether the legal

questions in the case arise from such an action.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295 n.3. There, the questions

presented were “too remote from the actions taken to fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” Id.;

see also Cuyun, 2026 WL 362791, at *5 (stating that the Jennings plurality “expressly rejected”

the concurrence’s interpretation); Kuar v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-CV-02679, 2026 WL 709728, at *6

(N.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2026). Here, Mr. Blanco Cabrera challenges only the failure to grant him a

bond hearing, a legal question that is “too remote” to fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295 n.3.

Respondents also cite Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026), for

the proposition that § 1252(b)(9) deprives the Court of jurisdiction over Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s

petition. As another court in this district has noted, however, “the reason that Section 1252(b)(9)

applied was because Khalil’s specific detention challenge was intertwined with his argument

challenging his removal order.” Gualpa-Lumbi v. Hoover, No. 4:26-cv-0038, 2026 WL 452351,

at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (report and recommendation); see also Lemus, 2026 WL 496731,

at *4 (distinguishing Khalil because petitioner in that case “challenged ‘both his removal and his

detention pending removal proceedings’”) (quoting Khalil, 164 F.4th at 273). Mr. Blanco

Cabrera’s argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing is unrelated to the validity of any

underlying removal order, and Khalil thus does not compel a different result.

Finally, Respondents cite to two decisions from the same judge in this district holding that

§ 1252(b)(9) deprives district courts of jurisdiction to hear claims that aliens are entitled to bond

hearings, Amaya-Velis v. Raycraft, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 100596 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026),

and Munoz Nataren v. Raycraft, No. 4:26cv212, 2026 WL 214368 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2026). In

light of Jennings, however, I respectfully conclude that those decisions are less persuasive than

decisions holding that the question of whether an alien is entitled to a bond hearing does not “arise

from” the removal proceeding and does not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Other courts in

this district have declined to follow Amaya-Velis and Munoz Nataren on the same grounds. See

Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *4 (disagreeing with Amaya-Velis and Munoz Nataren and

concluding those decisions “conflate a challenge to detention itself with a challenge to the lack of

a bond hearing”); Kuar, 2026 WL 709728, at *7 (disagreeing with Amaya-Velis). I recommend

that the Court reject Respondents’ argument that § 1252(b)(9) deprives it of jurisdiction over Mr.

Blanco Cabrera’s petition.

C. Exhaustion

Respondents next argue that the Court should dismiss Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition

because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In particular, Respondents note that, after

the immigration court denied Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s request for custody redetermination, he failed

to appeal that decision to the BIA.

If Congress mandates exhaustion, a court must require a petitioner to exhaust

administrative remedies before bringing suit. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).

“The exhaustion doctrine both allows agencies to ‘apply [their] special expertise in interpreting

relevant statutes’ and promotes judicial efficiency.” Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. 888 Corp., 813 F.2d 760, 764

(6th Cir. 1987)).

Respondents do not contend that any statute applies here that mandates exhaustion. “When

‘Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs’ whether or not

exhaustion should be required.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy,

503 U.S. at 144). “This discretion is referred to as ‘prudential’ exhaustion . . . and such a court-

made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and congressional intent.” Lopez, 2026

WL 395202, at *5 (quoting Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 917 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019)).

Moreover, “[w]hile a court has discretion to fashion exhaustion requirements, there are

some exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594. “For example, exhaustion

may not be required when the administrative remedy ‘does not serve the purposes behind the

exhaustion doctrine[ ],’ if the ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious,’ or

‘where pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.’” Id. (quoting Shawnee Coal

Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083, 1093 (6th Cir. 1981)). “Additionally, ‘[e]xhaustion of administrative

remedies may not be required in cases of non-frivolous constitutional challenges to an agency's

procedures.’” Id. (quoting Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2006)). Finally, a court

may waive exhaustion where a “legal question is fit for resolution and delay means hardship . . .

.” Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000).

“[T]he Sixth Circuit has not yet decided whether courts should impose prudential

exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.”

Ramirez Moreno v. Lynch, Case No. 4:26 CV 275, 2026 WL 496634, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23,

2026). “In evaluating prudential exhaustion in habeas petitions seeking bond hearings, district

courts in this circuit generally consider three factors[.]” Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *4; see also

Cuyun, 2026 WL 362791, at *6 (noting that the three-factor test is drawn from Ninth Circuit

caselaw) (citing Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). Those factors are whether:

(1) the agency has expertise such that agency consideration is necessary to generate a proper record

and reach a decision; (2) relaxation of the exhaustion requirement would encourage petitioners to

deliberately bypass administrative review; and (3) administrative review is likely to enable the

agency to correct mistakes and preclude judicial review. Gu, 2026 WL 496634, at *4.3

Weighing those factors, I conclude that a prudential exhaustion requirement is not

warranted here. First, the question Mr. Blanco Cabrera presents is one of pure statutory

interpretation, and no agency expertise or consideration is necessary to generate a proper record.

See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 387 (2024) (interpreting the meaning of

statutes is a judicial function). In addition, waiving exhaustion would not encourage petitioners to

bypass administrative review, as “[t]he Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held [that] the BIA cannot

review constitutional claims . . . .” Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *6 (citing cases). Finally,

administrative review is unlikely to enable the agency to correct mistakes, as the BIA already held

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado that petitioners like Mr. Blanco Cabrera are not entitled to bond

hearings.

Even if a prudential exhaustion requirement were appropriate, I would conclude that

exhaustion should be waived in the circumstances presented here. In light of Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, there is no reason to believe that the agency intends to reconsider its determination that

Mr. Blanco Cabrera is not entitled to a bond hearing, and exhaustion would therefore be futile. See

Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *6-7; Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *7 (“there is no question that the

3 In Lemus, Chief Judge Lioi held that the three-factor test was “not particularly well suited” to these types of cases,

and instead waived exhaustion on futility and hardship grounds, though Chief Judge Lioi also held that exhaustion

government’s administrative agency has predetermined the disputed issue by having a clearly

stated position that the petitioner is not eligible for the relief sought”) (quotations omitted); Lopez,

2026 WL 395202, at *6 (“This Court cannot think of anything more clearly amounting to a ‘futile

gesture’ than requiring Petitioner to spend time appealing the Immigration Court’s decision to

deny her a bond hearing to the very agency that passed down that unequivocal directive.”).

“There also can be no doubt that the legal question is fit for resolution by th[e] Court now,”

as it turns on a matter of pure statutory interpretation. Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *8. Moreover,

additional delays would impose a hardship on Mr. Blanco Cabrera, who remains detained without

a bond hearing. As another court in this Circuit has noted, “[b]ond appeals before the BIA, on

average, take six months to complete.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 779 (E.D.

Mich. 2025).

In light of those considerations, “the majority of district courts in the Sixth Circuit [] have

concluded that requiring exhaustion would not promote judicial efficiency or protect

administrative authority because it would only delay the resolution of [petitioner’s] legal

questions.” Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *7 (quotations omitted) (citing cases); see also Lopez,

2026 WL 395202, at *5 (joining “several other[s] in this circuit” in concluding that exhaustion

was not required).

Respondents cite to a number of cases from this district dismissing similar petitions for

failure to exhaust. However, “[a] close inspection reveals that all of the decisions in the string were

issued by one of two jurists.” Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *6 n.4. After careful consideration, I

conclude that the decisions declining to impose an exhaustion requirement or excusing exhaustion

are more persuasive. I thus recommend that the Court deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss Mr.

Blanco Cabrera’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

D. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a)

Turning now to the merits of the parties’ arguments, this case comes down to the interplay

between two different statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). §

1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, “in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for

a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” § 1226(a), by contrast, provides that, “[o]n a

warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision

on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). § 1226(a)

further provides that the Attorney General “may release” the alien on bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).

As Respondents concede, under § 1226(a), detention is discretionary. As Mr. Blanco

Cabrera concedes, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), detention is mandatory. The question of which

provision governs here is thus dispositive of Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition. Mr. Blanco Cabrera

argues that § 1226(a) governs because he is not an alien “seeking admission” under §

1225(b)(2)(A) as he has been in the country for years and is not currently “seeking” to enter it.

Respondents, by contrast, argue that all aliens who enter the United States and have not been

admitted are aliens “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that § 1226(b) applies only

to aliens who previously entered the country legally but, for example, overstay their visas or are

later determined to have been improperly admitted.

As always, I start with the text of the relevant statutes, which must be read in context.

United States v. Green, 167 F.4th 832, 851 (6th Cir. 2026). § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that

“applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” shall be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

§ 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who

has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of

arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in

international or United States waters) . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “Admission” and “admitted”

mean “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection

and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). As an alien present in

the United States who has not been lawfully admitted, Mr. Blanco Cabrera is an “applicant for

admission.”

However, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not say that all applicants for admission must be detained.

It says that an applicant for admission who is “seeking admission” must be detained unless the

application is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The

term “seeking admission,” is not defined. “When Congress does not define a term, courts ‘must

give the words their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress

intended them to bear some different import.’” Green, 167 F.4th at 851-52 (quoting Grand

Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. US Att’y W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 967

(6th Cir. 2004)). Dictionaries “often shed light on the ordinary meaning of the term.” Id. at 852.

Merriam-Webster defines the term “seeking” as “to ask for,” “to try to acquire or gain,” or

“to make an attempt.” Merriam-Webster, Seeking, available at https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last accessed Mar. 31, 2026). As a number of courts in this

district have held, the use of the active verb “seeking” implies present action beyond mere presence

in the country. See Gualpa-Lumbi, 2026 WL 452351, at *8 (“Because the word seeking is the

present participle of the verb seek, its use ‘implies some sort of present-tense action’”) (quoting

Curillo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1340, 2025 WL 3235737, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2025));

Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *11 (“the government’s interpretation fails to give effect to

Congress’s choice to use the active term ‘seeking’ in describing those immigrants covered by §

1225(b)(2)”); Lopez, 2026 WL 395202, at *8 (“‘Seeking’ requires something more than just

passively being present in the United States”); Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *8 (“Taken together, the

plain meaning of an ‘alien seeking admission’ is an individual presently asking for, or trying to

presently gain, entry into the United States. That is, an ‘alien seeking admission’ implies the alien

is not already in the United States and is actively seeking to be admitted into the country’s

borders.”).

Respondents do not meaningfully grapple with the statute’s use of the term “seeking

admission” beyond citing to one case from this circuit holding that an “applicant for admission”

is also “seeking admission.” (ECF No. 18, PageID # 243) (citing Gonzalez v. Ladwig, No. 2:26-

CV-02017-MSN-ATC, 2026 WL 413602, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 13, 2026). But “[i]t is a basic

canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[e]very word in the statute is presumed to have meaning’

and that courts should ‘give effect to all the words to avoid an interpretation which would render

words superfluous or redundant.’” In re Village Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 948 (6th Cir. 2022)

(quoting King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 2015); see also TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534

U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon

the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be

superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).

Congress could have drafted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to say that an applicant for admission must

be detained pending removal proceedings. It did not do so. Instead, Congress said that an applicant

for admission who is seeking admission must be detained. Respondents’ interpretation “would

require the Court to ignore the specific text Congress used in the statute.” Gu, 2026 WL 621356,

at *9.; see also Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *10 (“this Court will not presume that Congress

intended its words to be redundant or superfluous”).

In light of § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s plain language, “[t]he vast majority of courts” including

“almost every district court within the Sixth Circuit” have rejected Respondents’ interpretation.

Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *12; see also Lopez, 2026 WL 395202, at *10 (“this Court joins the

clear majority of courts across the country that have refused to read words out of the statute, ignore

superfluous language, downplay Supreme Court dicta, and disregard long-standing principles of

immigration law”); Millan, 2026 WL 248376, at *9 (“Overwhelmingly district courts have

disagreed with the agency’s interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention

scheme”); Kuar, 2026 WL 709728, at *12 (“the Court joins the overwhelming majority of courts

across the country in concluding that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner”).

The structure of the relevant provisions further weighs against Respondents’ interpretation.

In Jennings, the Court described § 1226(a) as a “default rule” that permits detention of certain

“alien[s] present in the country,” including “aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or

who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission.” 583 U.S. at 288. By

contrast, the Court noted that § 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United

States . . . .” Id. at 297. While not a direct holding of the Court and not dispositive, “[t]he Supreme

Court’s analysis in Jennings thus supports [the] reading that § 1225(b)(2) applies to immigrants

seeking to lawfully enter the United States, while § 1226(a) provides a default rule applicable to

immigrants detained in the United States, regardless of whether they were originally admitted.”

Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *11.

Two other considerations further buttress that conclusion. First, § 1225 is entitled

“Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral

for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. “The use of ‘arriving aliens’ strongly corroborates that it applies to

aliens who are in the act of arriving in the United States.” Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *10. By

contrast, § 1226 uses the broader title, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

“Although section headings cannot limit the plain meaning of a statutory text, they supply cues as

to what Congress intended.” Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 380

(2018) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

In addition, subsequent legislative history counsels against interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) as

applying to aliens already present in the United States, regardless of whether those aliens are

actively seeking admission. In 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1,

139 Stat. 3 (2025). The Laken Riley Act added 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), which provides that the

Attorney General “shall take into custody” an alien who is inadmissible under several provisions,

including 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), if the alien is charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or

admits to, certain felonies. § 1182(a)(6)(A), in turn, provides that an alien is inadmissible if the

alien is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or if the alien arrives in the

United States at a time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(6)(A). If aliens who are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled are

already subject to mandatory detention under § 1125(b)(2)(A), it would render that portion of §

1226(c)(1)(E) superfluous. See Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *10-11; Lemus, 2026 WL 496731, at *12;

Cuyun, 2026 WL 362791, at *10 (noting that accepting Respondents’ argument would potentially

render the Laken Riley Act’s amendments adding § 1226(e) “entirely unnecessary”).

To support their argument, Respondents rely on the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). There, the court held, in a split

decision, that “being an ‘applicant for admission’ is not a condition independent from ‘seeking

admission.’” Id. at 502. The court also held that, to the extent that interpretation rendered the term

“seeking admission” redundant, “‘redundancies are common in statutory drafting’” and do not

give a court license to rewrite the statutory text. Id. at 503 (quoting Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222,

239 (2020)).

One judge dissented, concluding that the majority “disregard[ed] the ordinary tools of

statutory interpretation based on speculation” about what would best honor Congress’ goals in

passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Id.

at 516. The dissent also criticized the majority for upending settled understandings of immigration

law. The dissent stated that “[t]he Congress that passed IIRIRA would be surprised to learn it had

also required the detention without bond of two million people” and that “[f]or almost thirty years

there was no sign anyone thought it had done so, and nothing in the congressional record or the

history of the statute’s enforcement suggests that it did.” Id. at 508. The dissent concluded that

“Congress did not secretly require two million noncitizens to be detained without bond, when

nothing like this had ever been done before, and the whole history of American immigration law

suggested it would not be.” Id. at 516.

I note that the Eighth Circuit recently joined the Fifth Circuit in adopting Respondents’

interpretation, again in a split decision. See Avila v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir.

Mar. 25, 2026). The Avila court “agree[d] with the Fifth Circuit that the ordinary meanings of the

phrases ‘applicant for admission’ and ‘seeking admission’ are the same.” Id. at *3. The court also

concluded that “[i]f Congress wanted to make clear that ‘seeking admission’ was an independent

requirement in the statute, it could have easily done so.” Id. at *3. But “[s]ince the structure of the

text does not indicate that this phrase has a standalone meaning, merely using it as a synonym for

something else does not make it surplusage.” Id. at *4.

In response, the dissent faulted the majority for altering settled understandings, stating that

“[a]ll three branches of government understood the IIRIRA to maintain the distinction between

unadmitted noncitizens in the interior and those arriving at the border for detention purposes.” Id.

at *8. The dissent further noted that “[f]ive presidential administrations, including the first Trump

administration, and most immigration judges interpreted § 1225 to apply only to those arriving at

the border,” stating that “[t]his conduct is something courts ought to consider.” Id.

While Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila support Respondents’ position, I, like other courts in

this district, respectfully disagree with their reasoning, which effectively writes the term “seeking

admission” out of the statute. See Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *12 (“as this Court sees it, the . . .

Buenrostro-Mendez decision[] require[s] a linguistic leap the Court cannot make”); Lemus, 2026

WL 496731, at *13 (“Respectfully, this Court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit and other courts

adopting the government’s interpretation”); Martinez Hernandez, 2026 WL 698639, at *14

(holding that Buenrostro-Mendez, as non-controlling precedent, did not change court’s analysis).

I find the dissenting opinions in Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila more persuasive on both statutory

interpretation and historical practice.

It is also worth noting that the Seventh Circuit reached a different conclusion at the

preliminary injunction stage in a case challenging an alleged policy of arresting noncitizens

without a warrant. See Castañon-Nava v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048,

1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (holding that the Government was not likely to succeed on argument that §

1225(b)(2)(A) mandated detention of aliens arrested within country because, among other things,

government’s interpretation “would render § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s use of the phrase ‘seeking

admission’ superfluous, violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction”).

Finally, the parties dispute the impact of the fact that Mr. Blanco Cabrera originally entered

the country as a UAC. Respondents argue that UACs are placed in removal proceedings under 8

U.S.C. § 1229(a) and are both applicants for admission and aliens “seeking admission” under §

1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner, by contrast, argues that he was not subject to mandatory detention when

he first encountered immigration officials as a UAC in 2020, and that the relevant focus should be

on his most recent detention in 2025, after he had already been living in the country for years.

It is not clear to me whether the parties are engaged in any disagreement on this issue that

is material to the issues before the Court, as Respondents also seem to assert that Mr. Blanco

Cabrera is subject to mandatory detention simply because he is an alien present in the United States

without admission, rather than because of any factor unique to his UAC status. See ECF No. 18,

PageID # 245 (“Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien present

without admission), placed into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.”) (emphasis added).

To the extent Respondents are arguing that Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s initial detention as a

UAC somehow renders him subject to mandatory detention, I disagree. As one court confronting

this same issue has stated:

There is no dispute that Petitioner entered the United States when he was 17 years old and

that, upon inspection, he was processed as a UAC and ultimately transferred to ORR

custody as required under the TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b). In other words, when Petitioner

crossed the border and was apprehended, the government did not classify him as an

applicant for admission subject to expedited removal. That Petitioner should now—

approximately four years after entering the country and being released by ORR—be treated

as an “applicant for admission” defies logic.

Salvador v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-07946-MRA-MAA, 2025 WL 2995055, at *7 (C.D. Cal.

Sept. 2, 2025); see also Singh v. Stevens, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 456489, at *2 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 18, 2026) (holding that petitioner who originally entered country as UAC before being

released and re-detained was “not an ‘applicant for admission’ subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(2)”); Madonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D. Minn. 2025) (holding

that petitioner who originally entered as UAC before being released and re-detained was subject

to § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)); Ardon-Quiroz v. Assistant Field Director, No. 25-cv-25290-JB, 2025

WL 3451645, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (same); Ramirez Perez v. Warden, Florida Soft Side

South Detention Ctr., No. 2:26-cv-00108-SPC-NPM, 2026 WL 322872, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6,

2026) (holding, in case involving UAC, that “applying § 1225(b)(2) to noncitizens years after they

were apprehended at the border and released into the county does not comport with the policy

justification for treating noncitizens in the country differently than those seeking entry”).

In sum, I recommend that the Court join the majority of courts in this district, this circuit,

and nationwide, and hold that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to aliens who are passively present

in the United States and are not “seeking admission.” I also recommend the Court hold that Mr.

Blanco Cabrera is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and is, instead,

subject to § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary bond.

E. Due Process

That leaves only Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s claim that his constitutional due process rights are

being violated because Respondents continue to detain him without granting him a bond hearing

even though he is detained under § 1226(a). Respondents have not addressed Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s

due process argument and have thus arguably forfeited the argument. See Gualpa-Lumbi, 2026

WL 452351, at *11 (holding that the government forfeited any opposition to petitioner’s argument

that he had a due process right to a bond hearing because the government offered no argument in

opposition). Even absent forfeiture, however, Mr. Blanco Cabrera has shown that the failure to

provide him with a bond hearing violates his due process rights.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST., amend. V.

“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal

proceedings.” A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (quoting Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670,

673 (2025) (per curiam)).

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court set forth three factors a

court must consider in evaluating procedural due process claims: (1) “the private interest that will

be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”

Id. at 334-35.

All three factors weigh in favor of Mr. Blanco Cabrera. With respect to the first factor,

“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 690. The failure to grant Mr. Blanco Cabrera a bond hearing when he is subject only

to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) thus infringes on a vital private interest.

With respect to the second factor “many district courts have found that an individualized

bond hearing ensures that immigration judges can assess whether noncitizens pose a flight risk or

a danger to the community, thereby mitigating the erroneous deprivation of noncitizens’ liberty

interests.” E.V., 2025 WL 3122837, at *12 (citing cases).

With respect to the final factor, the government certainly has an interest in enforcing

immigration laws. “[T]hat does not, however, translate into an interest in detaining Petitioner[]

without a bond hearing.” E.V., 2025 WL 3122837, at *12. Indeed, “any burdens imposed by

providing due process were mandated by law” and Respondents “cannot claim complying with

the law as stated is overly burdensome.” Gu, 2026 WL 621356, at *14. Accordingly, I recommend

that the Court grant Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order

Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing within 7 days of the Court’s order on this report

and recommendation.4

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For all the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS all

Respondents from this action except for Respondent Raycraft. I further RECOMMEND that the

Court GRANT Martinez Hernandez’s Petition and ORDER Respondent to provide Mr. Blanco

Cabrera with a bond hearing under 8. U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the adoption of

4 Because I conclude that Mr. Blanco Cabrera is entitled to relief on the merits based on my independent review of

this Report and Recommendation. I further recommend that the Court DENY Respondents’

motion to dismiss Mr. Blanco Cabrera’s petition.

Dated: April 2, 2026 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

U.S. Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:

Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and failure to file

timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period shall constitute a

waiver of subsequent review, absent a showing of good cause for such

failure. Such party shall file with the Clerk of Court, and serve on the

Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically

identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to

which objection is made and the basis for such objections. Any party may

respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. The District Judge to whom the case was assigned

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need conduct a new hearing

only in such District Judge’s discretion or where required by law, and may

consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making a

determination on the basis of the record. The District Judge may also receive

further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate

Judge with instructions.

Id. (emphasis added).

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or waiver of

the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report and

recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be

recommendation; a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to object. Howard v.

Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same

argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes judicial

resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates

Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018)

(quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the

interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).