Kena

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JANET KENA, *

*

Plaintiff, *

* Civ. No. MJM-25-173

v. *

*

HOWARD COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, *

et al., *

*

Defendants. *

*

* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Janet Kena, on behalf of her minor son, A.A., (“Plaintiff”) filed an Amended Complaint

against Howard County Public Schools, Howard County Public Schools Board, Albert Holley,

Anthony Goode, Will Robinson, Kevin Blake (collectively, “Defendants”). Howard County Public

Schools moved to dismiss, arguing that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued, see ECF 12,

and Plaintiff filed an Opposition on June 6. See ECF 13. The individual defendants and Howard

County Public Schools Board also filed a motion to dismiss. See ECF 21. Plaintiff opposed the

motion, and the defendants filed a Reply on August 25. See ECF 22 and 23. No hearing is necessary

to resolve the motions. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For reasons stated below, the motions shall

be granted, and the Amended Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Janet Kena (“Plaintiff”) is the mother of A.A., who was a junior at Hammond

High School during the 2023–24 school year. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 16. Hammond High School is

a public high school in Howard County, Maryland. Id. ¶ 4.

1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See ECF 10.

On January 18, 2024, A.A. was attending a varsity basketball team practice in the gym of

Hammond when he suffered a cardiac arrest. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant Albert Holley was the head coach

of the basketball team, and defendants Anthony Goode, Will Robinson, and Kevin Blake were

assistant coaches. Id. ¶¶ 7–10. The Amended Complaint alleges that Holley, Goode, Robinson,

and Blake were all present at the January 18, 2024, practice and “failed to immediately take action

to provide medical assistance to A.A.” Id. ¶ 18. A.A. laid unresponsive on the floor for

approximately 15 minutes without medical intervention. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. There was an automated

external defibrillator (“AED”) located directly outside the basketball gym. Id. ¶ 22. Defendants

“were trained in administering emergency aid such as the AED in cases of medical emergency,”

but at no point was the AED used. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. A school administrator called 911, id. ¶ 20, and

paramedics responded to the scene.

Over the next ten months, A.A. spent periods of time in various intensive care units at

Johns Hopkins Hospital and Mt. Washington Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 32–32. The Amended Complaint

alleges that, due to the cardiac arrest and Defendants’ “failure to provide immediate medical aid,

A.A. is now in a persistent vegetative state.” Id. ¶ 35.2 A.A. is a quadriplegic, unable to speak, and

requires a feeding tube for sustenance and requires “around-the-clock care.” Id. ¶¶ 36–38, 43.

Ultimately, Plaintiff was terminated from her employment after exhausting her Family Medical

Leave Act benefits and forced to move to an apartment accessible for A.A. Id. ¶ 44.

The Amended Complaint asserts claims against Defendants in three counts: (1) violation

of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all Defendants; (2) municipal liability, against

Howard County Public Schools (“HCPS”); and (3) gross negligence, against all Defendants. ECF

2 Plaintiff does not blame defendants for inducing the heart attack. See ECF 22 at 8 (“Through no

fault of the Defendants, A.A. suffered a heart attack while at practice on January 18, 2024. It was in the

subsequent minutes after A.A. collapsed from a heart attack where the liability lies.”).

10. HCPS and the remaining defendants each filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party can seek dismissal for failure “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir.

2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must plead enough factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added).

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take the factual allegations in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. King v. Rubenstein,

825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). At the same time, “a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019)

(citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A court decides whether [the pleading]

standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth

of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to

reasonably infer” the defendant’s liability for the alleged wrong and the plaintiff’s entitlement to

the remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against HCPS

In its motion to dismiss, HCPS argues that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued,

and, therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against it must be dismissed. ECF 12. “When a party named in a

suit is not an entity that can legally be sued, the Court may dismiss the claims against that entity

with prejudice, as any future claims against that entity would be futile.” Jabari-Kitwala v.

Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs., Civ. No. GLS-22-0060, 2024 WL 4007948, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 30,

2024) (citing Miller v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs., Civ. No. TJS-19-3067, 2020 WL 2097686,

at *1 (D. Md. May 1, 2020)). Plaintiff does not dispute the contention that HCPS is not capable of

being sued and that the Board of Education of Howard County (“BOE”) is the proper party to this

litigation. See ECF 13 at 5. Accordingly, HCPS’s motion to dismiss shall be granted, and

Petitioner’s claims against HCPS shall be dismissed.

B. Due Process Claims

The First Count of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim against all Defendants under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of A.A.’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment by failing to render medical aid in the moments after he collapsed.

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who, under

the color of state law, causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution.” Thus, to sustain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1)

he suffered a deprivation of federal rights; and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 45 n.3 (1988);

Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against

deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without the due process of the law.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). However, the Supreme Court has

“spurned any approach to the Fourteenth Amendment that would make it ‘a font of tort law to be

superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.’” Waybright v.

Frederick Cnty., 528 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701

(1976)). See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998) (“[T]he due process

guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone

cloaked with state authority causes harm.”); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .

does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.”); Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (“Our Constitution . . . does not purport to supplant

traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend

living together in society.”). Thus, to bring a viable substantive due process challenge, a plaintiff

must typically show that a “defendant’s behavior was ‘so egregious, so outrageous, that it may

fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Washington v. Hous. Auth. of the City of

Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Dean ex rel. Harkness v. McKinney, 976

F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2020)). “Th[is] requirement ensures that alleged violations of substantive

due process do not improperly infringe on state tort law.” Callahan v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 18 F.4th 142, 149 n.5 (4th Cir. 2021).

Whether a government actor’s conduct “shocks the conscience” turns on its degree of

culpability. Waybright, 528 F.3d at 205. “Conduct intended to injure . . . in some way unjustifiable

by any government interest” is most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level and is on one

end of the culpability spectrum. Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849). At the other end of the

“culpability spectrum” lies “negligently inflicted harm,” which is “categorically beneath the

threshold of constitutional due process.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848–49); see also Daniels,

474 U.S. at 328 (“We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent

act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”) (emphasis in

original). There is also an “intermediate level of culpability”—deliberate indifference—which, if

proven, “can . . . also establish a due process violation,” Dean, 976 F.3d at 415 (citing Lewis, 523

U.S. at 848–49), though cases involving this intermediate level of culpability “may have

constitutional implications . . . only in special circumstances,” Waybright, 528 F.3d at 205 (citing

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).3

Plaintiff’s claim against the individual defendants is based on their failure to render medical

aid in the moments after A.A. collapsed, specifically, to utilize the AED machine while waiting

for paramedics to arrive. See ECF 22 at 8, 14–15. Plaintiff argues that the individual defendants

“violated A.A.’s right to bodily integrity by failing to take adequate precautions which amounted

to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights as a student.” Id. at 14. Exhibits attached to

Plaintiff’s response in opposition include a Maryland Public Secondary Schools Athletic

Association (“MPSSAA”) regulation that requires all MPSSAA member schools to employ

coaches who “[p]ossess a MPSSAA/MSDE Coach Certification.” ECF 22-1. The second exhibit

is a “suggested outline” of courses on “care and prevention of athletic injuries” for coaches to

attend, which was formulated by the MPSSAA Medical Advisory Board and approved on

3 For example, in circumstances where the government is required “to take care of those who have

already been deprived of their liberty,” such as “pretrial detainees,” “persons in mental institutions,”

“convicted felons,” and “persons under arrest,” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 127 (1992), the

government’s deliberate indifference to the care of such persons in its custody “can shock the conscience

for purposes of finding a substantive due process violation,” Slaughter v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore, 682 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2012). See also Dean, 976 F.3d at 415 (deliberate indifference

standard sensibly applies only when actual deliberation is practical, such as when a law enforcement officer

can make “unhurried judgments with time to deliberate, such as in the case of a non-emergency”). Courts

evaluating due process claims grounded in this middle range of the culpability spectrum “should proceed

with ‘self-restraint’ and ‘utmost care’ and make ‘an exact analysis’ of the circumstances presented ‘before

any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking.’” Waybright, 528 F.3d at 205 (quoting Collins,

503 U.S. at 125, and Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850).

December 11, 2024. ECF 22-2. The outline contains “CPR/AED Certification” and “Sudden

Cardiac Arrest” components. Id.

Defendants raise several arguments in support of dismissal. First, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs’ claims against Holley, Goode, Robinson and Blake fail because they are not considered

“persons” under § 1983. ECF 21 at 4 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)

and Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Second, Defendants

argue that “the Due Process Clause works only as a negative prohibition on state action,” Pinder

v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1995), so Plaintiff’s claim, which is premised on

Defendants failure to provide aid, should be dismissed. ECF 21 at 6. Next, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff failed to allege that they acted “affirmatively or with deliberateness to deprive A.A. of

any rights protected under § 1983.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Waybright, 528 F.3d at 206, and Pope v.

Trotwood-Madison City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). Finally,

in a footnote, Defendants suggest they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF 21 at 8 n.3.

This case is undeniably heartbreaking. However, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint does not state a plausible substantive due process claim.4

To begin, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest Defendants “intended to injure”

A.A. Waybright, 528 F.3d at 205. The allegation here is that A.A. “was unresponsive on the floor

for approximately 15 minutes without emergency medical intervention.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff does not suggest, nor can any reasonable inference be made, that by failing to use the

4 The individual defendants are incorrect in their argument that they are not “persons” subject to

suit under § 1983. Plaintiff sued these defendants in both their “individual and official capacities.” Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 7–10 (emphasis added). “While state officials sued in their official capacities are not ‘persons’

under § 1983…, state officials sued in their individual capacities are ‘persons’ within the meaning of the

statute and are not absolutely immune from suit[.]” Doe by Watson v. Russell Cnty. Sch. Bd., 292 F. Supp.

3d 690, 712 (W.D. Va. 2018) (internal citation omitted).

AED, Defendants intended for A.A. to suffer the tragic consequences of his medical condition.

And to the extent any Defendant acted negligently, that claim is “not a constitutional one[.]”5

Waybright, 528 F.3d at 206. Plaintiff therefore must establish this case is one of the “special

circumstances” in which deliberate indifference can “shock the conscience to such an extent that

a federal action lies.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that this case should be analyzed under a deliberate indifference standard

because “a special relationship exists between a school district and its students[.]” ECF 22 at 16

(quoting Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 888 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D. Md. 2012)

(analyzing whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled a duty to support their common-law negligence

claim)). The “special relationship doctrine” is an exception to the general rule that the Due Process

Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services.

Callahan, 18 F.4th at 147 n.4. Where a special relationship exists, the state may acquire an

affirmative duty to act on an individual’s behalf, “and its failures to act are measured on a

deliberate indifference standard.” Waybright, 528 F.3d at 207.

In Waybright, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the municipal

defendants on the plaintiffs’ due process claim based upon a fire department recruit’s accidental

death following an intensive physical training session. 528 F.3d at 208. As relevant here, the Fourth

Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that Waybright was in a “special relationship” with his

supervisor such that the government had “a duty to act on [Waybright’s] behalf and its failures to

act [were] measured on a deliberate indifference standard[.]” Id. at 207. The court recognized that

“a ‘special relationship’ is all but synonymous with a custodial relationship.” Id. (citing DeShaney,

489 U.S. at 199–200). “The idea of a custodial relationship is a circumscribed one, grounded in

5 Plaintiff does not assert a common law claim for simple negligence in her Complaint.

the rationale DeShaney gives for it: ‘[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so

restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time

fails to provide for his basic human needs... it transgresses the substantive limits on state action . .

. .’” Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). Therefore, for a relationship to be considered

custodial for due process purposes, there must be some sort of confinement, such as incarceration

or institutionalization. Id. (citing Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175). The special relationship doctrine did

not apply in Waybright because the decedent was free to walk away from the training session and

the job. Id.

Courts in the Fourth Circuit have specifically held that a special relationship is not

automatically triggered by a school-student relationship. See Stevenson ex rel. Stevenson v. Martin

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App’x 25, 30 (4th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases from other circuits); Jackson

v. Sch. Bd. for City of Richmond, Virginia, No. 3:24CV528 (RCY), 2025 WL 2025363, at *6 (E.D.

Va. July 18, 2025) (concluding that attendance in public school does not create the type of custodial

relationship required under Fourth Circuit precedent). Unlike the instant case, the Stevenson and

Jackson cases each asserted due process violations based on public school officials’ failure to

protect students from harm directly inflicted by the actions of a third party. But, as noted supra,

under DeShaney, Pinder, and Waybright, “a ‘special relationship’ is all but synonymous with a

custodial relationship.” Waybright, 528 F.3d at 207 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200, and

Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175); see also Callahan, 18 F.4th at 147 n.4 (“The ‘special relationship’

exception arises only in a custodial context[.]”).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that A.A. was in “a custodial relationship” with Defendants

or, otherwise, that Defendants “restrain[ed] [A.A.’s] liberty” such that they “render[ed] him unable

to care for himself[]” before he experienced the medical emergency. Waybright, 528 F.3d at 207.

A.A.’s inability to care for himself once he went into cardiac arrest and collapsed in the gym did

not, as a matter of law, suddenly create a “special relationship” with Defendants such that their

unintentional failure to render medical care amounted to a substantive due process violation. Under

the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, Defendants’ conduct was not “so egregious, so

outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Dean, 976 F.3d at

413 (citation omitted). Therefore, the first count of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

C. Municipal Liability Claim Against BOE

The second count of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim for municipal liability against

HCPS, which the Court will construe as a claim against BOE.6 In support of her claim for Monell

liability against BOE, Plaintiff argues that the BOE failed to provide adequate training to its

athletic coaching staff on the emergency medical needs of students, including the use of the

mounted AED machines within Hammond High School, which amounts to deliberate indifference.

See ECF 22 at 25.

Section 1983 does not make local governmental bodies “liable under respondeat superior

principles for all constitutional violations of their employees simply because of the employment

relationship.” Est. of Green v. City of Annapolis, 696 F. Supp. 3d 130, 164 (D. Md. 2023) (quoting

Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987)). A municipality may be liable for a

deprivation of federal rights under § 1983 “[o]nly in cases where [it] causes the deprivation

‘through an official policy or custom’ . . . .” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978) (“[In § 1983], Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant

6 As explained in Part III.A, supra, HCPS is not an entity capable of being sued. Here, in addition

to HCPS, Plaintiff names “Howard County Public Schools Board” as a defendant, which the Court

construes as a reference to BOE.

to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”). “[A] viable §

1983 Monell claim consists of two components: (1) the municipality had an unconstitutional policy

or custom; and (2) the unconstitutional policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's

constitutional rights.” Green v. Obsu, Civ. No. ELH-19-2068, 2020 WL 758141, at *10 (D. Md.

Feb. 13, 2020) (citations omitted).

Importantly, however, “[c]ourts in this District have repeatedly and consistently explained

that Maryland county boards of education do not qualify as ‘persons’ within the meaning of the

statute and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983.” Brown v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

Civ. No. GJH-18-2723, 2019 WL 3944983, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2019) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) for the proposition that

the Fourth Circuit has determined that school boards are “persons” under § 1983 is misplaced. As

Defendants correctly point out, Paxman concerned school boards in Virginia, see 612 F.2d at

853—not Maryland—and the court “operated under the assumption that Virginia school boards

were local governing bodies rather than state entities[,]” Wood v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty.,

Civ. No. GJH-16-00239, 2016 WL 8669913, at *5 n.5 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2016) (noting the

distinction is “significant” because “the treatment of county boards of education is a state-specific

issue”). In contrast, “Maryland law, through statute and judicial opinion, treats the county school

boards as agents of the state.” Lewis v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cnty., 262 F. Supp. 2d 608, 614 (D.

Md. 2003). “[A]s state agencies, school boards are not considered ‘persons’ under § 1983[,]”

Schiffbauer v. Schmidt, 95 F. Supp. 3d 846, 852 (D. Md. 2015) (citing Mayo v. Bd. of Educ. of

Prince George’s Cnty., 797 F. Supp. 2d 685, 689 (D. Md. 2011)), and “are entitled to sovereign

immunity[,]” Lewis, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 614. See also Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (holding that “neither a

State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”). Therefore,

BOE cannot be sued under § 1983 on a Monell theory of liability, and the second count of the

Amended Complaint fails to state a viable § 1983 claim and must be dismissed. See, e.g., J.G. by

& through Gusman v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. PWG-16-1008, 2017 WL 930130,

at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2017) (dismissing Monell claim against Prince George’s County Board of

Education because “Maryland’s county school boards are not local government units[,]” but rather

“instrumentalities of the State”).

Even if the BOE was a “person” that could be liable under § 1983, Plaintiff’s claim would

still fail. “[T]here can be no municipal liability in the absence of an underlying constitutional

violation.” Chae Bros., LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, Civ. No. GLR-17-1657, 2018

WL 1583468, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2018) (quoting Jones v. Mullins Police Dep’t, 355 F. App’x

742, 747 (4th Cir. 2009)). Where a plaintiff, as here, fails to adequately allege an individual

violated their constitutional rights, “there is no basis for Monell liability.” Wilson v. Town of Mount

Jackson, Civ. No. 5:21-CV-00055, 2022 WL 819531, at *15 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2022).

For each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Monell claim in the second count of her

Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

D. Gross Negligence Claims

The third count of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim of gross negligence against all

Defendants under state law. A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction of claims for

which it lacks original jurisdiction if those claims “are so related to claims in the action within [its]

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But

§ 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a claim” when it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because the

Court has dismissed all federal claims asserted in the Amended Complaint over which it has

original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims and shall dismiss the third count of the Amended Complaint without prejudice.

See Owen-Williams v. Higgs, Civ. No. DKC 18-0439, 2019 WL 448810, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 5,

2019) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing § 1983 claims);

Mills v. Hassan, Civ. No. GLR-18-562, 2019 WL 4750338, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2019) (same).

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is by the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF 12 & 21) are

GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Motion to

Dismiss the initial Complaint (ECF 4) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff SHALL FILE any motion for

leave to file an amended pleading no later than April 20, 2026.

3/30/26 /S/

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge