Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MARIA D. G., Case No. 5:25-cv-01189-KES

12 Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

13 v.

AND ORDER

14 FRANK BISIGNANO,

15 Commissioner of Social Security,

16 Defendant.

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18 I.

19 INTRODUCTION

20 On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff Maria D. G. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint for

21 review of the denial of her widow’s Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under

22 Title II of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. 1.) On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a

23 Plaintiff’s Brief in accordance with Rule 6 of the Supplemental Rules for Social

24 Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (“PB” at Dkt. 12.) After a stay caused

25 by the lapse of appropriations to fund the federal government (Dkt. 16, 18), on

26 December 3, 2025, Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

27 (“Commissioner”), filed a responding Commissioner’s Brief under Rule 7. (“CB”

28 at Dkt. 19.) Plaintiff declined to file a Reply. For the reasons stated below, the

1 Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is AFFIRMED.

2 II.

3 BACKGROUND

4 In April 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for widow’s DIB, alleging a

5 disability onset date of July 7, 2020. Administrative Record (“AR”) 274.

6 On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified at an

7 in-person hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the assistance

8 of a Spanish interpreter. AR 38-63. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. AR

9 58.

10 On May 9, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 17-37. The

11 ALJ found that Plaintiff potentially qualified for widow’s DIB as of January 14,

12 2022, the date her wage-earner spouse died. AR 23-25. The ALJ determined that

13 Plaintiff suffered from one severe medically determinable impairment (“MDI”):

14 breast cancer. AR 25. The ALJ did not find that Plaintiff’s other MDIs, including

15 long COVID-19, temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”) disorder, and depression, were

16 severe, but she nevertheless considered any functional limitations caused by these

17 MDIs when assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). AR 26.

18 Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with

19 some additional limitations on postural activities and overhead reaching. AR 27-28.

20 Based on these RFC findings, the VE’s testimony, and other evidence, the

21 ALJ determined that Plaintiff could work as a (1) marking clerk (Dictionary of

22 Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 209.587-034); (2) cleaner (DOT 323.687-014); and

23 (3) solderer (DOT 813.684-022). AR 31-32. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was

24 not disabled. AR 32.

25 III.

26 ISSUES PRESENTED

27 This appeal raises the sole issue of whether the ALJ erred by failing to give

28 clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting

1 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (PB at 2, 7-14.) Plaintiff asks the Court to apply

2 the credit-as-true doctrine and remand for an award of benefits. (PB at 14-15.)

3 IV.

4 DISCUSSION

5 A. Relevant Law.

6 The ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s subjective

7 symptom testimony. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007).

8 “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective

9 medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected

10 to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036. If so, the ALJ may

11 not reject a claimant’s testimony “simply because there is no showing that the

12 impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged.” Smolen v.

13 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).

14 Second, if the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may discredit the

15 claimant’s subjective symptom testimony only by making specific findings that

16 support the conclusion. Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010);

17 Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014). Unless an ALJ finds that a

18 claimant is malingering or has failed to provide objective medical evidence in

19 support of his or her testimony, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons

20 for rejecting a claimant’s subjective testimony about the severity of experienced

21 symptoms. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). While

22 an ALJ’s findings must be properly supported and sufficiently specific to assure a

23 reviewing court that the ALJ did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective

24 statements, an ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation” of disability. Fair

25 v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).

26 The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony

27 must be supported by substantial evidence. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674

28 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “Substantial” means “more than a mere scintilla”

1 but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

2 support a conclusion.” Id.; Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting

3 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Where evidence is

4 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that

5 must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

6 B. Relevant Administrative Proceedings.

7 The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s April 2024 testimony. AR 28. Plaintiff

8 testified “that she had stage II breast cancer and underwent a bilateral mastectomy”

9 in March 2021. AR 28; see AR 47, 566-68. She also “underwent chemotherapy

10 treatment ending in January 2021.” AR 28; see AR 48-49. Plaintiff testified that

11 she continued to have functional limitations in 2024 from her cancer treatment.

12 Her chemotherapy affected her by causing pain in her feet, such that she could no

13 longer “walk properly because of the pain.” AR 28; see AR 48.

14 Plaintiff testified, “After the mastectomy surgery, she still experiences pain

15 under her arms which causes difficulty to lift them.” AR 28; see also AR 49 (“I

16 cannot lift up my hands because it’s very painful.”). She also testified that “the

17 cancer has caused her ongoing fatigue, even in remission.” AR 28; see AR 50. As

18 a result, she could only “be on her feet up to 5 to 10 minutes before having difficulty,

19 pain in her feet, dizziness, and ankle pain.” AR 28; see AR 53. She also testified

20 that “lifting her arms is hard, [which affects activities] such as lifting things, doing

21 laundry, cooking, and performing household chores.” AR 28; see AR 55. It was “a

22 challenge” to dress herself because she had difficulty stretching her arms to put on a

23 shirt. AR 28; see AR 56 (testifying that she “cannot lift up [her] hands”). She

24 could not wash her own hair. AR 28; see AR 56.

25 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s MDIs “could reasonably be expected to cause

26 the alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence

27 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical

28 evidence and other evidence in the record ....” AR 29. As reasons, the ALJ found

1 that (1) the extent of Plaintiff’s claimed limitations was not supported by the

2 objective medical evidence, and (2) Plaintiff engaged in inconsistent symptom

3 reporting. AR 29-30.

4 C. Analysis of Claimed Error.

5 Plaintiff argues, “Beyond a discussion of the objective medical evidence, it

6 does not appear that the ALJ actually offered any rationale to reject [Plaintiff’s]

7 testimony ....” (PB at 10.) But the ALJ’s decision sufficiently identifies the two

8 above-stated reasons. ALJs need not label their reasons in any particular way or

9 include them in any particular section of the decision. See Danny Lee F. v. Saul,

10 No. 2:19-cv-09099-KES, 2020 WL 4368097, at *10 n.9, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

11 135544, at *29 n.9 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (“ALJs, however, need not organize

12 their decisions in any particular way so long as the reviewing Court can understand

13 their reasoning.”); Glenn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:16-cv-04268-PHX-

14 DGC, 2017 WL 4349394, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161949, at *7 (D. Ariz.

15 Oct. 2, 2017) (“Although the ALJ’s opinion could have been organized more clearly

16 to highlight its specific reasons, they are identified in the decision ....”).

17 Plaintiff next cites law for the premise that lack of support from objective

18 medical evidence cannot be the only reason for rejecting subjective symptom

19 testimony. (PB at 10.) While this is true, a lack of objective support is different

20 from inconsistent symptom reporting. For example, if a claimant has back pain, an

21 ALJ might cite imaging studies showing only mild degenerative changes to support

22 finding a lack of objective support. The same ALJ, however, might cite appointments

23 at which the claimant denied back pain to support a finding of inconsistent symptom

24 reporting. Inconsistent symptom reporting occurs when claimants tell the Social

25 Security Administration that their functional limitations are more serious than

26 those they describe to their treating doctors. Inconsistent symptom reporting can

27 be a clear and convincing reason to discount a claimant’s testimony. See Social

28 Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, at

1 *16 (explaining that the claimant’s symptom information provided to treating

2 sources “may be compared with [their] other statements in the case record”);

3 Medina v. Saul, 840 F. App’x 71, 73 (9th Cir. 2020) (inconsistent symptom

4 reporting as a clear and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony);

5 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly considering

6 claimant’s “prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms” in evaluating

7 their testimony).

8 Here, the ALJ cited numerous medical records in which Plaintiff did not

9 report to her treating doctors any fatigue, pain limiting her ability to walk, pain

10 limiting her ability to raise her arms, or other disabling symptoms, as follows:

11 By August 2021, [Plaintiff] reported that she was feeling well with

12 minor complaints. She indicated her appetite and sleep were normal

13 and she was exercising 2 days per week. The doctor noted a normal

14 physical examination as well as a normal mental status examination

15 (Exhibit 10F, pp. 17-19 [AR 1252-54]). In the following month, the

16 evidence does include treatment notes where [Plaintiff] complained

17 of left axillary [arm pit] discomfort. Nevertheless, the physical

18 examination was normal (Exhibit 3F, pp. 212-217 [AR 704-09]). In

19 January and February 2022, the record shows [Plaintiff] reported that

20 the left chest wall tenderness was improving, and physical examination

21 findings were unremarkable (Exhibit 3F, pp. 322-324 [AR 814-16];

22 4F, pp. 37-38 [AR 872-73]). [Plaintiff] stated she was doing very

23 well overall with good appetite, good energy level, and staying busy

24 with activities throughout the day with no problems. [Plaintiff] also

25 denied any pain, discomfort, burning sensation, or any other problems

26 in her treated breast (Exhibit 4F, pp. 39-41 [AR 874-76]).

27 AR 29. “Other records through 2022 and 2023 show [Plaintiff] sought treatment

28 for other symptoms not entirely related to [her] treatment for breast cancer, including

1 bilateral heel tenderness, ankle pain and right ear pain (Exhibit 8F, pp. 30-31; 16F,

2 pp. 55-56).” AR 29; see AR 1153-54, 1419-20. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s

3 cancer treatment was successful “and by February 2022, [she] complained of only

4 residual left chest tenderness ....” AR 30.

5 The ALJ provided another specific example of inconsistent symptom

6 reporting: “[Plaintiff’s] statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting

7 effects of her symptoms are inconsistent with the record as a whole. For example,

8 [she] testified that the cancer has caused her ongoing fatigue and she needs to take

9 a break after washing dishes for 15 to 30 minutes at a time. However, recent

10 treatment records from 2023 and 2024 note [that Plaintiff] was doing well overall

11 and she was busy during the day performing activities without problems (Exhibit

12 4F, pp. 37-38).” AR 30; see AR 872-73. In the cited records, on February 15,

13 2022, when questioned by Carolyn Barnes, M.D., about her progress after radiation

14 treatment, Plaintiff “denie[d] chest pain, weight loss or cough. She has left axilla

15 [armpit] tightness intermittently but no other complaints.” AR 872. She rated her

16 pain at zero and her fatigue at zero. AR 872. She did not complain about difficulty

17 raising her arms to do basic tasks like washing her hair or getting dressed. Instead,

18 she had a normal range of motion. AR 873.

19 In August 2022, another doctor recorded Plaintiff’s subjective reports of her

20 symptoms, as follows:

21 Patient states that she is doing very well overall. She has good

22 appetite and good energy level and is busy with her day-to-day

23 activities without any problems. Patient denies any pain, discomfort,

24 burning sensation, itching or any other problems in the treated breast.

25 … Patient states that she does not have any difficulty, pain or

26 discomfort with use of ipsilateral arm and has full range of motion.

27 Patient also denies any bony or muscular discomfort in any other part

28 of the body as well. Overall patient is doing well with no complaints

1 or problems at this time.

2 | AR 874 (cited by ALJ at AR 30).

3 Thus, the ALJ identified a clear and well-supported inconsistency between

4 | Plaintiff's 2024 testimony that her cancer treatment still caused so much residual

5 || fatigue that she could not wash dishes for more than 15 or 30 minutes without

6 | taking a break (AR 56-57) and her statements to treating doctors in 2022 that she

7 | had good energy levels and could do her daily activities without any problems

8 | (AR 874). While Plaintiff testified that her 2021 chemotherapy caused residual

9 | pain that prevented her from being on her feet more than five or ten minutes in

10 | 2024 (AR 48, 53), the ALJ cited these 2022 records wherein Plaintiff denied pain

11 | and denied difficulty with normal daily activities, such as walking. AR 30; see

12 | AR 872, 874. While Plaintiff testified that she had so much difficulty lifting her

13 | arms that she could not wash her own hair (AR 56), again the ALJ cited these 2022

14 || records wherein Plaintiff reported a full range of motion, no difficulty with daily

15 | activities, and only intermittent armpit tightness (AR 874).

16 In sum, the ALJ’s finding of inconsistent symptom reporting is supported by

17 | substantial evidence, and it provides a clear and convincing reason for discounting

18 | Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony.

19 V.

20 CONCLUSION

21 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment shall be entered

22 | AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.

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55 | DATED: January 22, 2026 Mand 6. Sestt?

KAREN E. SCOTT

26 United States Magistrate Judge

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