Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

TREE DEFENDER, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2520-VMC-NHA

MIKE HURST CITRUS SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court for patent claims

construction. Plaintiff Tree Defender, LLC submitted its

Opening Claim Construction Brief on August 15, 2025. (Doc. #

46). Defendant Mike Hurst Citrus Service, Inc. (“Hurst

Citrus”) filed its Claim Construction Opposition Brief on

September 2, 2025. (Doc. # 47). Tree Defender replied on

September 10, 2025. (Doc. # 48). On October 24, 2025, a claims

construction hearing was held in which both Tree Defender and

Hurst Citrus made arguments to the Court. (Doc. # 49). For

the reasons stated below, the claims are construed as set

forth herein.

I. Background

Tree Defender “designs, manufactures, markets, and sells

protective, breathable individual plant covers (‘IPCs’) that

are placed on young trees for at least their first two years

as they are in a vegetative and growing state.” (Doc. # 32 at

3). According to Tree Defender, the IPCs were developed in

response to a disease commonly referred to as citrus greening

disease, which can devastate citrus crops. (Id. at 4).

Hurst Citrus also produces IPCs and is a direct

competitor of Tree Defender in the IPC market. (Doc. # 36 at

3-4). Tree Defender alleges that the IPCs sold by Hurst Citrus

infringe upon Tree Defender’s patented IPC technology. (Doc.

# 32 at 7-14).

There are two patents at issue in this action, each

possessed by Tree Defender in relation to its IPC: U.S. Patent

Nos. 11,730,092 (“the ‘092 Patent”) and 12,058,965 (“the ‘965

Patent”), both titled “Plant cover with insect resistant bag

for enclosing a plant.” (Doc. ## 46-1, 46-2). The ‘092 and

‘965 Patents were issued on August 22, 2023, and August 13,

2024, respectively. (Id.). Here, there is only one remaining

disputed claim term: “mesh.” See (Doc. # 47 at 6) (indicating

the sole remaining disputed claim term is “mesh”); (Doc. # 48

at 1) (same).

II. Legal Standards

Patent infringement cases involve two distinct phases:

(1) “the proper construction of the asserted claim,” and (2)

“a determination as to whether the accused method or product

infringes the asserted claim as properly construed.”

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted

claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence

of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the

specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.”

Id. at 1582 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52

F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).

“Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of

the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.”

Id.

“First, [a court considers] the words of the claims

themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the

scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary

and customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own

lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their

ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the

term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file

history.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “the ordinary and

customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the

term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in

question at the time of the invention . . ..” Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of claim language as

understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily

apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such

cases involves little more than the application of the widely

accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314.

“[S]econd, it is always necessary to review the

specification to determine whether the inventor has used any

terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”

Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. “The specification acts as

a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the

claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. (citation

omitted). “[T]he specification may reveal a special

definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs

from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases,

the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1316. The specification usually “is dispositive; it is the

single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”

Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.

Third, “a court ‘should also consider the patent’s

prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’” Phillips, 415

F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted). “This history contains the

complete record of all the proceedings before the Patent and

Trademark Office, including any express representations made

by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims.” Vitronics

Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. “[T]he prosecution history can often

inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how

the inventor understood the invention and whether the

inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution,

making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d

at 1582-83). “The purpose of consulting the prosecution

history in construing a claim is to exclude any interpretation

that was disclaimed during prosecution.” Chimie v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic

evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim

term.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. “In such

circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.”

Id. (citations omitted). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all

evidence external to the patent and prosecution history,

including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and

learned treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980).

III. Analysis

Tree Defender’s Hurst Citrus’s

Court’s

Proposed Proposed

Construction

Construction Construction

Mesh material A net-like A net-like

having a mesh size material which material having a

that prevents provides water mesh size which

intrusion by permeability and provides water

insects light permeability and

detrimental to the transmissivity. light

plant while also transmissivity,

allowing for water but prevents

permeability and intrusion by small

light insects such as

transmissivity. psyllids.

Again, this case concerns one disputed term: “mesh.” See

(Doc. # 47 at 6) (indicating the sole remaining disputed claim

term is “mesh”); (Doc. # 48 at 1) (same). The term “mesh”

appears throughout the claims in both the ‘092 and ‘965

Patents. See (Doc. # 46-1 at 16; 46-2 at 16-17).

As shown above, the parties both agree that the

construction of “mesh” in the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents must refer

to a material that provides “water permeability and light

transmissivity.” See (Doc ## 46 at 6; 47 at 6-7). Accordingly,

the sole dispute for the Court to decide is whether the claim

term “mesh” must refer to a material that also prevents

intrusion by insects. Tree Defender seeks a construction of

“mesh” that requires preventing intrusion by insects, whereas

Hurst Citrus seeks a construction of “mesh” without reference

to preventing intrusion by insects. (Id.).

Tree Defender contends that its proposed construction is

“consistent with the specification and with the inventor’s

own statements describing the scope of his invention to the

United States Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’).” (Doc.

# 46 at 6). In opposition, Hurst Citrus contends that its

proposed construction is “easily understood, consistent with

the intrinsic evidence, and follows claim construction

principles,” and that Tree Defender’s construction “asks this

Court to violate fundamental claim construction principles.”

(Doc. # 47 at 6-7).

A. The Claims’ Language

The starting point for claims construction is “the words

of the claims themselves.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Here,

neither Tree Defender nor Hurst Citrus argue that the words

of the claims in the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents provide a

construction of the term “mesh.” See generally (Doc. ## 46,

47, 48). Nor could they, because none of the claims in the

‘092 and ‘965 Patents provide any definition of “mesh.” See

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 16; 46-2 at 16-17). None of the claims in

the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents reference water permeability or

light transmissivity. (Id.). Indeed, none of the claims make

any reference to insects generally, insects specifically

responsible for citrus greening disease, or prevention of

insect intrusion. (Id.).

Because the words of the claims in the ‘092 and ‘965

Patents do not define the term “mesh,” the term is to be given

it ordinary meaning as understood by the person of ordinary

skill in the art. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Here, the person

of ordinary skill in the art would be a citrus farmer using

IPCs to protect plants. “Importantly, the person of ordinary

skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term . . . in

the context of the entire patent, including the

specification.” Id.

B. The Specification

The Court now turns to the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’

specifications to determine how a person of ordinary skill in

the art would understand the claim term “mesh.”

First, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ titles (which are

identical) explicitly reference preventing the intrusion by

insects. See (Doc. # 46-1) (“PLANT COVER WITH INSECT RESISTANT

BAG FOR ENCLOSING A PLANT”) (emphasis added); (Doc. # 46-2)

(same). Second, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ “technical field”

descriptions (which are identical) also explicitly reference

preventing the intrusion by insects. See (Doc. # 46-1 at 14)

(“The present disclosure relates to the field of plant cover

device, and, more particularly, to insect repelling plant

cover devices and related methods.”) (emphasis added); (Doc.

# 46-2 at 14) (same).

Third, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ “background”

descriptions (which are also identical) explicitly discuss

how citrus greening disease is spread by an insect, the Asian

citrus psyllid. (Doc. ## 46-1 at 14, 46-2 at 14). The

“background” descriptions discuss how the Asian citrus

psyllid is “no bigger than the head of a pin.” (Id.). They

further discuss that citrus greening disease has typically

been managed with insecticides, which may be environmentally

harmful. (Id.). In addition, they discuss that citrus

greening disease is sometimes managed by use of “tree covers

that enclose a tree to prevent insect infiltration,” but that

conventional tree covers suffer from drawbacks. (Id.)

(emphasis added).

The Court finds that titles, “technical field”

descriptions, and “background” descriptions in the ‘092 and

‘965 Patents all support that the specifications define the

claim term “mesh” by implication. See Vitronics Corp., 90

F.3d at 1582 (“The specification acts as a dictionary . . .

when it defines terms by implication.”). Specifically, the

aforementioned parts of the specifications impliedly define

“mesh” to include preventing intrusion by insects.

The specifications do not end there. The specifications’

“detailed description” sections also expressly reference

preventing intrusion by insects. (Doc. ## 46-1 at 14-15, 46-

2 at 15-16). Specifically, the “detailed description”

sections both include the following:

The panels 204, 206 may be made at least partially

or completely of a mesh material, which provides

water permeability and light transmissivity, but

prevents intrusion by small insects such as

psyllids. The mesh size may be, for example, 50

mesh or 50 by 25 threads per square inch. Such a

mesh size will be sufficient to prevent intrusion

by psyllids, aphids, white flies, mealy bugs, leaf

miners, thrips, grasshoppers, ants, and orange

dogs. The bag 200 may also protect the enclosed

foliage from frost, hail, and wind damage.

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 15, 46-2 at 15) (emphasis added). Indeed,

the above description purports to expressly define the term

“mesh” as a material “which provides water permeability and

light transmissivity, but prevents intrusion by small insects

such as psyllids.” However, the specifications also each

contain the following disclaimer at the beginning of the

“detailed description” sections:

This disclosure describes example aspects and

embodiments, but not all possible aspects and

embodiments of the plant cover and related methods.

Where a particular feature is disclosed in the

context of a particular aspect or embodiment, that

feature can also be used, to the extent possible,

in combination with and/or in the context of other

aspects and embodiments. The plant cover may be

embodied in many different forms and should not be

construed as limited to only the embodiments

described here.

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 14, 46-2 at 15) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, the specifications also each contain the

following additional disclaimer at the end of the “detailed

description” sections:

The scope of the claims is not limited to the only

the examples described here. The plant cover system

and its components may be embodied in many

different forms.

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 15, 46-2 at 16) (emphasis added).

As discussed below, the Court finds that these explicit

disclaimers negate the purported express definition of “mesh”

in the “detailed description” sections of the specifications.

However, the Court finds that these explicit disclaimers do

not negate the implied definition of “mesh” in the title,

“technical field,” and “background” description sections of

the specifications.

“The specification acts as a dictionary when it

expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines

terms by implication.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.

“[C]laim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings

unless the patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from

the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by

redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the

intrinsic record using words or expressions of manifest

exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of

claim scope.” SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp.,

336 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Teleflex, Inc.

v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

While the Court “must interpret the claims in light of

the specification,” it must “avoid impermissibly importing

limitations from the specification.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l

Trade Com’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). “That balance turns on how the specification

characterizes the claimed invention.” Id. (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court must look “to whether the

specification refers to a limitation only as a part of less

than all possible embodiments or whether the specification

read as a whole suggests that the very character of the

invention requires the limitation be a part of every

embodiment.” Id.

Here, the “detailed description” sections of the ‘092

and ‘965 Patents’ specifications do not use “words or

expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” SunRace,

336 F.3d at 1304. Indeed, the “detailed description” sections

include exactly the opposite: a disclaimer that explicitly

states that the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ claims “should not be

construed as limited to only the embodiments described here”

and are “not limited to the only the examples described here.”

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 14-15, 46-2 at 15-16). Accordingly, the

“detailed description” sections’ description of the claim

term “mesh” as “a mesh material, which provides water

permeability and light transmissivity, but prevents intrusion

by small insects such as psyllids,” is a “part of less than

all possible embodiments.” See Alloc, Inc., 342 F.3d at 1370.

Nevertheless, the title, “technical description,” and

“background” description sections of the specifications all

impliedly define “mesh” to include preventing the intrusion

by insects. Indeed, the specifications characterize the

claimed invention as “insect repelling.” Though the

disclaimers in the “detailed description” sections’ negate

the “example aspects and embodiments” described in those

sections, the specification read as a whole leads to the

conclusion that the claimed inventions must prevent intrusion

by insects. Accordingly, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’

specifications, read as a whole, impliedly narrow the

ordinary definition of the term “mesh,” such that the term

must be read as a material that prevents intrusion by insects.

C. The Prosecution History

Finally, the Court turns to the prosecution history of

the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents. The Court notes that “because the

prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between

the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of

that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the

specification and thus is less useful for claim construction

purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted).

“Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the

meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the

inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor

limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making

the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.

(citations omitted). “[A]ny explanation, elaboration, or

qualification presented by the inventor during patent

examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction

is to ‘capture the scope of the actual invention’ that is

disclosed, described, and patented.” Iridescent Networks,

Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 933 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.

2019). “Disclaimers based on disavowing actions or statements

during prosecution, however, must be both clear and

unmistakable.” Sorensen v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375,

1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

i. Related Patent Applications

“When multiple patents derive from the same initial

application, the prosecution history regarding a claim

limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal

force to subsequently issued patents that contain the same

claim limitation.” Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d

973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “As long as the same claim

limitation is at issue, prosecution disclaimer made on the

same limitation in an ancestor application will attach.”

Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed.

Cir. 2003).

Here, Tree Defender has submitted exhibits of the

prosecution history of a related patent application for U.S.

Patent Application No. 15/359,111 (“the ‘111 Application”).

(Doc. ## 46-3, 46-4). Tree Defender represents, and Hurst

Citrus does not dispute, that “[b]oth the ‘092 and ‘965

Patents are in the continuation chain of U.S. Patent

Application No. 15/359,111, which has the identical

specification.” (Doc. ## 46 at 8, n.3); see generally (Doc.

# 47 at 12-14). Indeed, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents explicitly

disclose the ‘111 Application as a “related application.”

(Doc. ## 46-1 at 1, 46-2 at 1).

However, neither party discusses whether a patent for

the ‘111 Application was actually issued. The Court notes

that Elkay permits consideration of related application

prosecution history of “any patent that has issued.” Elkay

Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d at 980 (emphasis added). However, Omega

permits consideration of prosecution history of patent

applications, but does not make reference to whether a patent

needs to be issued. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1333

(“Our precedent holds . . . that an interpretation asserted

in the prosecution of a parent application can also affect

continuation applications . . . continuation-in-part

applications . . . and even related continuation-in-part

applications arising from the same parent . . ..” (citing

Id.) (other citations omitted)).

Moreover, Hurst Citrus does not argue that if no patent

was issued for the ‘111 Application then this Court is not

permitted to consider the prosecution history of the ‘111

Application. See generally (Doc. # 47 at 12-14). Instead,

Hurst Citrus argues that (1) the prosecution history of the

‘111 Application provides no evidence of a clear disclaimer

that would support Tree Defender’s construction of “mesh,”

and (2) “even if considered,” the ‘111 Application’s

“prosecution history does not support [Tree Defender’s]

proposed construction.” (Doc. # 47 at 12). While the use of

the phrase “even if considered” might imply that Hurst

Citrus’s first argument rejects consideration of the ‘111

Application’s prosecution history, the Court finds that both

of Hurst Citrus’s arguments actually do consider the

prosecution history, but nonetheless reject it as not

supporting Tree Defender’s construction.

Accordingly, the Court will consider the prosecution

history of the ‘111 Application to determine whether and how

it bears on the construction of the claim term “mesh” in the

‘092 and ‘965 Patents.

ii. Prosecution History of the ‘111 Application

During the prosecution of the ‘111 Application, the

USPTO examiner interpreted the claim term “mesh” as “(1) any

knit, woven or knotted fabric of open texture and (2) an

interwoven or intertwined structure.” (Doc. ## 46-3 at 3-4;

46-4 at 5). In its opposition brief (referred to as a “Reply”)

during the patent prosecution before the USPTO, the ‘111

Application’s applicant (“Applicant”) explicitly argued that:

the Specification defines a mesh as provid[ing]

water permeability art, light transmissivity, but

prevent[ing] intrusion by small insects such as

psyllids.

(Doc. # 46-3 at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(alterations in original).

The examiner disagreed with the Applicant’s argument and

concluded that a prior art pertaining to cloth had already

disclosed the ‘111 Application’s claim, reasoning that “cloth

is understood as a material comprising an interlaced

structure i.e., mesh.” (Doc. # 46-4 at 5). Accordingly, the

USPTO examiner rejected the ‘111 Application’s claims as

unpatentable. (Id.).

The Applicant appealed the examiner’s decision to the

UTPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). (Id. at 1).

The PTAB agreed with the Applicant’s argument that “not all

cloth is water permeable, and has light transmissivity,” and

found that the prior art in question “does not appear to have

such properties or characteristics.” (Id. at 6-7).

Accordingly, the PTAB reversed the examiner’s decision of

unpatentability. (Id. at 8).

The Court finds that the PTAB’s decision itself does not

support a construction of the claim term “mesh” to include

preventing intrusion by insects. The PTAB decision makes no

reference to insects at all. Instead, it merely found that

the prior art pertaining to cloth did not negate the

patentability of the mesh at issue because not all cloth is

water permeable and light transmissive. In effect, the PTAB

found that “mesh” must provide water permeability and light

transmissivity, but was silent as to whether it must prevent

insect intrusion.

That said, the Reply filed by the Applicant provides

explicit support for a construction of the claim term “mesh”

to include preventing intrusion by insects. In the Reply, the

Applicant explicitly took the position that the specification

“defines a mesh as ‘provid[ing] water permeability art, light

transmissivity, but prevent[ing] intrusion by small insects

such as psyllids.’” (Doc. # 46-3 at 4) (emphasis added)

(alterations in original).

Hurst Citrus unpersuasively urges that “[m]ere argument

by [Tree Defender’s] attorney in a Reply Brief to the [PTAB]

does not effect a clear disavowal.” (Doc. # 47 at 13). To the

contrary, “explicit statements made by a patent applicant

during prosecution to distinguish a claimed invention over

prior art may serve to narrow the scope of a claim.” Spectrum

Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed.

Cir. 1998). “[W]here the patentee has unequivocally disavowed

a certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of

prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary

meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the

surrender.” Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1324. Here, the

Reply brief filed by the Applicant “unequivocally imparted”

a meaning of “mesh” that includes preventing intrusion by

insects, and thereby “expressly relinquished” any

construction of “mesh” that does not refer to preventing

insects. See Id. at 1323-24.

The Reply’s narrowed definition of “mesh” is not

ambiguous. See Id. at 1324 (discussing that the doctrine of

prosecution disclaimer does not apply where the alleged

disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous). The definition of

“mesh” provided by the Applicant in the Reply unambiguously

requires that “mesh” prevent intrusion by small insects such

as psyllids. This definition is not “amenable to multiple

reasonable interpretations,” Id., as nothing in the Reply

indicates that “mesh” could allow insects to intrude. The

Reply “‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim

term’ [mesh] other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” CCS

Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.

Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, the prosecution history of the ‘111

Application shows that the Applicant expressly narrowed the

ordinary definition of the term “mesh,” such that the term

must be read as a material that prevents intrusion by insects.

That narrowed definition attaches to the ‘092 and ‘965

Patents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1333.

D. Hurst Citrus’s Other Arguments Fail

The Court now addresses the few remaining arguments

raised by Hurst Citrus for its proposition that Tree

Defender’s construction is improper.

Hurst Citrus contends that Tree Defender’s construction

“adds an unexamined claim limitation.” (Doc. # 47 at 14-15).

This argument fails because the narrowed definition of “mesh”

was explicitly provided in the prosecution history of the

‘111 Application before the USPTO. Under the doctrine of

prosecution disclaimer, that narrowed definition attaches to

the ’092 and ‘965 Patents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at

1333.

Hurst Citrus next contends that Tree Defender’s

construction improperly claims “results” rather than an

apparatus. (Doc. # 47 at 15). According to Hurst Citrus,

“[Tree Defender’s] construction essentially asks to convert

a general term (‘mesh’) into a means-plus-function style

limitation (‘means for preventing insect intrusion’) without

invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or using any such claim language.”

(Id.). In reply, Tree Defender argues that its proposed

construction “is solely a limitation on the properties or

characteristics of mesh claimed, and specifying size

limitations for the mesh does not render the term either

functional or results based.” (Doc. # 48 at 6).

“A means-plus-function limitation recites a function to

be performed rather than definite structure or materials for

performing that function.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space

Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The overall means-plus-function analysis is a two-

step process. The first step is to determine

whether a claim limitation is drafted in means-

plus-function format, which requires [the Court] to

construe the limitation to determine whether it

connotes sufficiently definite structure to a

person of ordinary skill in the art. If the

limitation connotes sufficiently definite

structure, it is not drafted in means-plus-function

format, and § 112[(f)] does not apply. If, . . .

the limitation is in means-plus-function format,

[the Court performs] the second step of determining

‘what structure, if any, disclosed in the

specification corresponds to the claimed function.’

Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.

2022) (citations omitted). If the claim term does not use the

term “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that the claim

limitation is not drafted in means-plus-function format. Id.

(citations omitted). “The presumption can be overcome if a

challenger demonstrates that the claim term ‘fails to recite

sufficiently definite structure.’” Id. (citations omitted);

see also Id. at 1366 (indicating the challenger must rebut

the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence). “In

addition, because this inquiry turns on the understanding of

a person of ordinary skill in the art, [courts] often look to

extrinsic evidence when determining whether a disputed

limitation would have connoted structure to a person of

ordinary skill.” Id. at 1366.

Here, the Court finds that Tree Defender’s construction

of “mesh” is not in means-plus-function format. First,

because the term “means” does not appear in the construction

of “mesh,” there is a presumption against means-plus-function

format. Second, a person of ordinary skill in the art (i.e.,

a citrus farmer using IPCs) would understand that “mesh”

connotes a sufficiently definite structure. Indeed, Hurst

Citrus itself argues that “mesh” has an ordinary meaning of

“net-like material,” and cites to dictionary definitions

which indicate that “mesh” is commonly understood to be a

“material like a net.” (Doc. # 47 at 6-7). Accordingly, Hurst

Citrus’s argument fails because Tree Defender’s construction

is not in means-plus-function format. See also Hill-Rom

Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed.

Cir. 2014) (“[D]efining a particular claim term by its

function is not improper and is not sufficient to convert a

claim element containing that term into a ‘means for

performing a specified function’ within the meaning of [§

112].” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, Hurst Citrus essentially argues that Tree

Defender’s proposed construction is a thinly veiled attempt

to avoid invalidation of the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents by certain

prior art references, namely “Morgan (U.S. Pat. No.

6,088,953) and Japanese Utility Model JP 3131895U.” (Doc. #

47 at 15-18). According to Hurst Citrus, these prior art

references both disclose protective mesh covers for plants,

but do not claim an insect-blocking feature. (Id.). Thus,

Hurst Citrus argues, Tree Defender is attempting to limit the

scope of the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents to “sidestep” the prior

art references and to preserve validity ex post facto. (Id.).

Tree Defender does not address this argument in reply.

Indeed, the matter before the Court is the inverse of a

typical claims construction. Typically, a patentee might

attempt to broaden the scope of its patent claims to preclude

later inventions. Here, however, Tree Defender seeks a

narrower scope of the claim term “mesh.” Hurst Citrus argues

that Tree Defender only seeks this result to avoid invalidity

by earlier inventions. The Court finds that the Federal

Circuit’s guidance is instructive:

This court has frequently alluded to the “familiar

axiom that claims should be so construed, if

possible, as to sustain their validity.” Rhine v.

Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999)

(internal quotation marks omitted). At the same

time, however, the court has “admonished against

judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity.”

Id. Accordingly, unless the court concludes, after

applying all the available tools of claim

construction, that the claim is still ambiguous,

the axiom regarding the construction to preserve

the validity of the claim does not apply.

Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed.

Cir. 2004). In other words, where the meaning of a claim term

is clear after applying the tools of claim construction, the

Court should use that definition of the term and should avoid

using another definition, even for the purpose of preserving

validity.

After applying the tools of claim construction, the

Court has concluded that the claim term “mesh” is clearly and

unequivocally defined by the narrowed definition provided in

the prosecution history of the ‘111 Application. Under the

doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, that narrowed definition

attaches to the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents. Thus, by constructing

the term “mesh” in accordance with the prosecution history,

the Court is not “rewriting the claims to preserve validity,”

but rather applying the meaning of the claim term that was

already in place. Hurst Citrus fails to identify any legal

authority that would require the Court to disregard an

unequivocal disavowal in the prosecution history. Thus, Hurst

Citrus’s argument fails.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

The claim language in dispute in this case shall be

construed as set forth in this Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

lith day of February, 2026.

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ#/COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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