Earls-Rozelle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LARETTA EARLS-ROZELLE,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:22-CV-03394

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

ERHARD R. CHORLÉ, JOHN BRAGG,

THOMAS R. JAYNE, and the RAILROAD

RETIREMENT BOARD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Laretta Earls-Rozelle works as a Supervisory Analyst for the Railroad Retire-

ment Board (known by its acronym, the RRB), which is the federal agency that over-

sees retirement benefits for railroad workers. R. 95, DSOF ¶¶ 1, 4.1 In January 2020,

Earls-Rozelle unsuccessfully applied for a promotion. DSOF ¶¶ 16, 43. Earls-Rozelle

sued the RRB, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her race, color,

and gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

R. 48, Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–65.2 She also alleged wage discrimination under the

Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–74. The RRB now moves

for summary judgment, arguing that the record evidence establishes that the claims

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number. Citation page numbers refer to the PDF page numbers for all

exhibits except for depositions, the page numbers at the top of each page for depositions, and

the page numbers at the bottom of each page for briefs. The Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1

Statement of Facts is “DSOF,” and the Plaintiff’s is “PSOF.”

2This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

must fail, even when the record is viewed in Earls-Rozelle’s favor. R. 93, Defs.’ Mot.

For the reasons set forth below, the RRB’s motion is granted.

I. Background

In deciding the RRB’s motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evi-

dence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Except as otherwise noted below,

the recitation of the factual background represents the undisputed facts as present

in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Court also must give the benefit of

reasonable inferences to the non-movant, Earls-Rozelle, as to the summary judgment

motion.

Laretta Earls-Rozelle is an African-American woman who describes herself as

Black and having dark skin. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 62; DSOF ¶ 2; R. 95-5, Exh. 6,

Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 2. In 1987, Earls-Rozelle accepted a position with the RRB

as a claims examiner trainee at the GS-5 level (“GS” stands for General Schedule, the

pay scale that applies to executive-branch employees). DSOF ¶ 1; R. 95-2, Exh. 3,

Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 14:8–21. In 2017, Earls-Rozelle was promoted to her current

position—GS-13 Supervisory Analyst within the Policy and Systems section—from

her previous position, which was also at the GS-13 level. DSOF ¶¶ 1, 5; R. 95-10,

DSOF Exh. 25, Request for Personnel Action at 24. In her 2019 performance review

as a Supervisory Analyst, Earls-Rozelle received a 4 out of 4 on her communication

skills. R. 102-2, PSOF ¶ 30; R. 102-4, Earls-Rozelle’s 2019 Performance Evaluation

at 1.

2

As a Supervisory Analyst, Earls-Rozelle was managed by Nathaniel Coleman,

the Chief of the Compensation and Employer Services Center.3 DSOF ¶ 6; Earls-

Rozelle Dep. at 21:16–22:24. As Chief, Nathaniel Coleman reported to Kimberly

Price, the Director of Policy and Systems. DSOF ¶ 7; R. 95-3, DSOF Exh. 4, Price Dep.

at 11:11–13, 98:4–10. Price in turn reported to Crystal Coleman, the Director of Pro-

grams. DSOF ¶¶ 9, 11; Price Dep. at 98:19–20; R. 95-4, DSOF Exh. 5, Coleman Dep.

at 14:22–23. Price and Coleman are both African-American women. DSOF ¶ 3; R. 95-

6, DSOF Exh. 6, Price EEO Aff. at 3; R. 95-7, DSOF Exh. 8, Coleman EEO Aff. at 3.

Price describes her skin color as “tan,” and Coleman describes her skin color as

“brown.” DSOF ¶¶ 3, 64; Price EEO Aff. at 10; Coleman EEO Aff. at 3.

Job Duties During Chief Vacancy

Nathaniel Coleman retired in December 2019, leaving vacant the position of

Chief of the Compensation and Employer Services Center. DSOF ¶ 7; Earls-Rozelle

EEO Aff. at 3. After Nathaniel Coleman’s departure, Price asked managers, chiefs,

and contractors to include Earls-Rozelle on communications to “prevent a log-jam or

break down in communications of information needed by her and her staff.” DSOF

¶ 8; Price EEO Aff. at 7. Between January 2020 and August 2020, when a new Chief

was selected, Earls-Rozelle was not assigned or appointed as Acting Chief of

3To avoid confusion with another relevant high-level supervisor, Crystal Coleman,

this Opinion will use Nathaniel Coleman’s full name to refer to him.

3

Compensation and Employer Services. DSOF ¶ 51; R. 95-12, DSOF Exh. 31, Supp. to

Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 2; Price Dep. at 99:23–100:21.

Price testified that when Nathaniel Coleman retired, Price, Earls-Rozelle, and

Gregory Frizell, another supervisor, “had to basically step up and do a little bit more

than [they] were ordinarily doing following the absence of Mr. Coleman.” DSOF ¶ 51;

Price Dep. at 101:3–8.4 For example, one of Nathaniel Coleman’s responsibilities as

Chief was to provide quarterly performance evaluations for Earls-Rozelle and Frizell.

DSOF ¶¶ 53–54; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 69:12–24; Earls-Rozelle’s 2019 Performance

Review at 1. When the Chief position was vacant, Price provided those evaluations

for Earls-Rozelle and Frizell. DSOF ¶ 52; Price EEO Aff. at 9, 23–24. Price also signed

off as the reviewer on the appraisals of the staff that Earls-Rozelle and Frizell super-

vised during this time. DSOF ¶ 52; Price Dep. at 91:21–93:12. Earls-Rozelle never

provided a performance review of Frizell when the Chief position was vacant. DSOF

¶ 53; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 70:1–3. And although she testified to supervising Sean

McNeany, another senior compensation and communications specialist, PSOF ¶ 34;

Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 64:22–65:6,5 Earls-Rozelle confirmed that McNeany did not

4In her summary judgment response, Earls-Rozelle provided an “AI generated” defi-

nition of “creditable” as relevant to some of the added responsibilities that she said she shoul-

dered. R. 102, Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 11 n.4. The definition of “creditable” is neither here nor

there in resolving the motion, but it is worth noting the impropriety of relying on an AI-

generated answer with no further explanation or citation.

5The RRB contends that Earls-Rozelle’s citation, to pages 97 and 98 of her deposition,

does not support this factual proposition. R. 106, Defs.’ Reply at 7. But it appears that Earls-

Rozelle cited to pages 97 and 98 of the PDF, which corresponds with pages 64 and 65 of her

deposition where the proposition does appear. The Court endeavors to navigate between

Earls-Rozelle’s inconsistent page citations, but Earls-Rozelle ultimately bears the burden of

4

receive performance appraisals from Nathaniel Coleman before the latter retired,

R. 106-1, Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 34; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 67:24–68:2.

Hiring Process for Chief

On December 20, 2019, the Chief position was posted as a GS-14/GS-15 role

internally and as a GS-15 role externally. DSOF ¶ 16; R. 95-10, DSOF Exh. 22, Inter-

nal Job Posting at 2; R. 95-11, DSOF Exh. 23, First External Job Posting at 8. The

internal role had a closing date of January 7, 2020. Internal Job Posting at 2. The

external role closed on January 17, 2020. First External Job Posting at 8. Both job

postings required “experience” that demonstrates a broad range of extensive

knowledge and expertise of the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and/or Railroad Un-

employment Insurance Act (RUIA).” PSOF ¶ 1; Internal Job Posting at 3; First Ex-

ternal Job Posting at 9; R. 95-7, DSOF Exh. 9, Sanford EEO Aff. at 13. The internal

job posting noted that candidates would be evaluated on factors including “[a]bility

or experience in managing, training, and directing a subordinate staff of employees,”

“[a]bility to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals and groups

within and outside the immediate work area, including rail employers, unions and

other agencies (IRS, SSA, Treasury) in order to coordinate work activities,” and

“[k]nowledge of and experience in agency policies, programs and operations, related

to the unemployment, sickness and railroad retirement programs,” among others.

DSOF ¶ 19; Internal Job Posting at 5–6.

providing “direct citation[s] to easily identifiable support in the record.” Gross v. Town of

Cicero, 619 F.3d 697, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2010).

5

On January 17, 2020, a new external posting replaced the original external

posting, with a closing date of January 24, 2020. DSOF ¶ 20; R. 95-10, DSOF Exh.

24, Second External Job Posting at 16. The new posting did not include the require-

ment of experience with the RRA or the RUIA, and instead included qualifications

such as “[k]nowledge and skill in providing leadership, administrative direction, ex-

ecution, guidance and long-range planning for a bureau or agency,” “[a]bility to plan,

organize, and coordinate work for yourself and others,” “[e]xperience serving as an

expert in the technical and regulatory aspects of an organization’s benefit program

that requires integrating a wide variety of programmatic principles to solve complex

problems,” among others. DSOF ¶ 20; Second External Job Posting at 17. The Chief

position had been reposted externally after Coleman had a “face-to-face conversation”

with LeCherie Sanford, a human resources specialist, in which Coleman and Sanford

mutually agreed to repost the position. PSOF ¶ 8; R. 102-3, Supp. to Sanford EEO

Aff. at 6. Sanford explained that the position was reposted because she “noticed with

the first posting, although [they] had applicants, none would be eligible due to the

specialized experience being too RRB specific.” Supp. to Sanford EEO Aff. at 6; see

also DSOF ¶ 23; Sanford EEO Aff..6

6A senior RRB human resources specialist wrote in an email that “[i]t [was] under-

stood in the federal HR community that [the U.S. Office of Personnel Management] does not

want external announcements to be so agency specific that no one outside the agency would

be eligible; there would be no point in posting a job outside if no one would be eligible.” DSOF

¶ 22; R. 95-11, DSOF Exh. 27 at 13.

6

Earls-Rozelle applied for the Chief position on January 7, 2020. DSOF ¶ 16;

R. 95-11, DSOF Exh. 30, Earls-Rozelle Application Materials at 26. There were ulti-

mately five candidates who were interviewed for the Chief position: Earls-Rozelle,

Lavette Fargo, Jeffrey Archbold, Zina Watkins, and Brenda Yette. DSOF ¶ 24; see

generally Rs. 95-8 to -9, DSOF Exhs. 16–18, Candidate Interview Evaluation Forms.

Other than Archbold, all candidates were African-American women. DSOF ¶ 24;

Price Dep. at 40:21–41:21.

Archbold, who was a Senior Advisor in Criminal Investigations with the U.S.

Department of Labor (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration when he ap-

plied for the Chief position, did not have knowledge or experience with the RRA or

the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. DSOF ¶¶ 41–42, 44; R. 95-9, DSOF Exh.

19, Archbold Selection Justification at 25; see generally R. 95-12, DSOF Exh. 33,

Archbold Resume at 24–32. Coleman had supervised Archbold at the DOL Employee

Benefits Security Administration, where she last worked in 2013. DSOF ¶ 46; Cole-

man EEO Aff. at 6; Coleman Dep. at 33:1–6. She told Archbold about the Chief posi-

tion and encouraged him to apply. DSOF ¶ 46; Coleman Dep. at 32:15–33:2.

Price conducted first-round interviews for the five candidates via telephone in

July 2020. DSOF ¶ 25; Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 3.7 After the first round of

7Carl May, the Chief of the Financial Interchange Division, and Marguerite Dadabo,

assistant general counsel, also attended the first-round interviews and scored the candidates

based on their responses. DSOF ¶ 25; Price Dep. 33:6–35:4; see generally Candidate Interview

Evaluation Forms.

7

interviews were completed, Earls-Rozelle’s average score was lower than the average

scores of Yette, Watkins, and Fargo, but higher than Archbold’s average score. DSOF

¶ 26, Table A; see generally Candidate Interview Evaluation Forms. At this point, the

top external candidate was one of the female candidates. DSOF ¶ 27; Price Dep. at

69:23–70:4. But when Price and Coleman discussed Price’s top external candidate

after the first round of interviews, Coleman expressed concerns about mistakes and

missing information on the candidate’s resume. DSOF ¶ 28; Coleman Dep. at 29:6–

18. Coleman requested that Price schedule a second face-to-face interview with the

candidate, which Coleman would also attend, to resolve the issues. PSOF ¶ 17; Cole-

man EEO Aff. at 4. Price and Coleman ultimately decided to interview all of the five

candidates in person because Price wanted to be clear about her selection. DSOF ¶ 28;

Coleman Dep. at 28:21–29:21, 29:10–21; Price Dep. at 45:16–20. Price prepared the

second-round interview questions without Coleman’s assistance, which differed for

internal and external candidates. DSOF ¶ 28; Price Dep. at 56:21–22; R. 95-9, DSOF

Exh. 20, Second In-Person Interview Questions at 27–31.8 After each interview, Price

and Coleman discussed which candidates had better answers, but Coleman did not

participate in the scoring of the candidates. DSOF ¶ 38; Coleman Dep. at 39:17–41:2.

Following the second round of interviews, Price described Archbold’s second

interview as “decidedly better than his first.” DSOF ¶ 32; Second In-Person Interview

8Price asked internal candidates, “What do you see as the biggest challenge facing [the

Compensation and Employer Service Center] right now?” and external candidates, “If offered

the job, how soon would you be available to start?” DSOF ¶ 34; Second In-Person Interview

Questions at 27–31.

8

Questions at 28. Price noted that Archbold “seemed very knowledgeable and experi-

enced with respect to distance learning,” and said that his response about how he

would handle staff who would likely resent his presence “was more detailed than oth-

ers.” DSOF ¶ 32; Second In-Person Interview Questions at 28. In contrast, Price de-

scribed Earls-Rozelle’s answer to the same question about resentful staff as “lacking

specificity,” and that Earls-Rozelle’s interview demonstrated “[l]imited experience

with distance learning based on RRB’s own limited use.” DSOF ¶ 33; Second In-Per-

son Interview Questions at 27. Price also asked Earls-Rozelle about the “biggest chal-

lenge” facing the Compensation and Employer Services Center, and Earls-Rozelle

discussed the unit’s need for modernization. DSOF ¶ 34; Second In-Person Interview

Questions at 27; Price Dep. at 48:20–49:3. Price and Coleman characterized this re-

sponse as one that “stood out” because they instead saw the biggest challenge of the

unit as everyone being past retirement age. DSOF ¶ 35; Coleman Dep. at 22:23–23:9;

Price Dep. at 48:8–50:3. During her second interview, Earls-Rozelle also asked Price

and Coleman what qualities they were looking for in candidates for the Chief position,

and Coleman responded with, “Zen like Nathaniel Coleman.” DSOF ¶ 30; Coleman

Dep. at 42:20–43:14.

In August 2020, Price notified Earls-Rozelle in a telephone call that she had

not been selected for the Chief position. DSOF ¶ 43; Price EEO Aff. at 5, 21. After the

call, Price sent an email to herself that said that she “informed [Earls-Rozelle] that

while she had a lot of valuable qualities, if [Price] found anything challenging, it was

[Earls-Rozelle’s] verbal and written communication skills and [Earls-Rozelle’s]

9

interactions with her primary stakeholders which are the Board members and their

assistants.” DSOF ¶ 43; Price EEO Aff. at 21. A few days after informing Earls-

Rozelle that she had not been selected, Price announced the selection of Archbold as

Chief of Compensation and Employer Services for Policy and Systems. DSOF ¶ 45;

Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 6.

In October 2020, Earls-Rozelle filed a formal EEO complaint alleging race,

color, sex, and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Equal Pay Act discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). DSOF

¶ 62; R. 95-8, DSOF Exh. 12, Formal EEO Complaint at 2–5. Eventually, she filed

this lawsuit, bringing theories of liability about discrimination on the basis of her

race, color, and sex (but not on the basis of her age). See generally Third Am. Compl.

The RRB now moves for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that Earls-Rozelle

has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact and that a reasonable jury must find

against her. Defs.’ Mot.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum-

mary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378

10

(2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determina-

tions, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704–705 (7th Cir.

2011), and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would

be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judg-

ment has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

III. Analysis

A. Local Rule 56.1

1. Earls-Rozelle’s Objections to the RRB’s Statement

As a threshold matter, the RRB objects to Earls-Rozelle’s response to the RRB’s

Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts on the grounds that her objections were improper

and that she failed to dispute the substance of nearly all the facts set forth by the

RRB. R. 106, Defs.’ Reply at 3. The RRB argues that as a result, its facts should be

admitted. Id.

It is true that there are a multitude of violations of Local Rule 56.1 in Earls-

Rozelle’s response. Local Rule 56.1(d) provides that the parties must submit a state-

ment of material facts and a statement of additional facts “consist[ing] of concise

numbered paragraphs” which “should not contain legal argument.” L.R. 56.1(d)(1),

(4). If a party disputes an asserted fact, then the “party must cite specific evidentiary

material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material

11

controverts the asserted fact. Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not contro-

verted with specific citations to evidentiary material.” L.R. 56(e)(3). A general denial

is insufficient to rebut a movant’s factual allegations. Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D.

581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)

(citing Edward E. Gillen Co. v. City of Lake Forest, 3 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1993))

(“[A] mere disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is inadequate if made with-

out reference to specific supporting material.”). A district court has “discretion to re-

quire strict compliance with its local rules governing summary judgment,” Bordelon

v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000), and “is not required

to ‘wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely dis-

puted fact,’” Lamz, 321 F.3d at 683 (quoting Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 529). Courts in

this district have held that failure to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1

results in the striking of responses and the admittance of factual allegations. See De

v. City of Chicago, 912 F. Supp. 2d 709, 713–14 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Creative Trade Grp.,

Inc. v. Int’l Trade All., Inc., 2009 WL 3713345, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2009).

In Earls-Rozelle’s response to the RRB’s Statement of Facts, there are numer-

ous objections without any supporting citations. See generally R. 102-1, Pl.’s Resp.

DSOF. Earls-Rozelle fully admits to the RRB’s facts in Paragraphs 19, 22, 27, 57, 59,

62, 63, and 72, and partially admits to the facts in Paragraphs 14 and 21. See id.¶¶ 14,

19, 21–22, 27, 57, 59, 62–63, 72. For all other paragraphs, she objects not with cita-

tions but instead by asserting objections like numerosity, irrelevance, and calling for

a legal conclusion. See generally Pl.’s Resp. DSOF.

12

On numerosity, Earls-Rozelle appears to argue that some of the RRB’s sepa-

rately numbered paragraphs contain multiple facts. But Local Rule 56.1 does not nec-

essarily confine each paragraph to just one fact; instead, the Statement should be

comprised of “concise numbered paragraphs.” L.R. 56(d)(1) (emphasis added). It is

true that movants should not cram an excessive number of facts in a single para-

graph. But, at the same time, “a statement of material facts that presents one fact at

a time per paragraph would not be an efficient manner in which to present a state-

ment of material facts and would not be consistent with Local Rule 56.1.” Fishering

v. City of Chicago, 2009 WL 395462, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2009); see also Nettles-

Bey v. Burke, 2015 WL 4638068, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2015) (same). Although as-

serting more than one fact per paragraph may “expose the party to an argument that

Local Rule 56.1 is being abused,” that type of abuse did not occur here. Deffebaugh v.

BNSF Ry. Co., 2015 WL 1230075, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2015). The RRB’s facts are

properly and efficiently organized based on discrete incidents with common, related

factual details. Earls-Rozelle’s objections to the RRB’s Statement on the basis of nu-

merosity are overruled.

On relevancy, it would be inefficient to go one-by-one through Earls-Rozelle’s

relevancy objections given that some of the parties’ disputes are not material to sum-

mary judgment motion. In resolving the summary judgment motion (as detailed be-

low), the Court sets forth only those facts and pieces of evidence that the Court “deems

relevant[,] provided they are supported by the record.” Antech Diagnostics, Inc. v.

13

Downers Grove Animal Hosp. & Bird Clinic, P.C., 2013 WL 773034, at *1 (N.D. Ill.

Feb. 28, 2013).

Finally, Earls-Rozelle objects to Paragraphs 88 and 95 of the Statement as

calling for a legal conclusion. In Paragraph 88, the RRB lists the names of African-

American women who held GS-15 or Senior Executive Service (SES) roles at the RRB

while Price was an RRB employee, and states that Lavette Fargo, the other internal

candidate for the Chief position, was promoted twice after Price left the RRB. DSOF

¶ 88; Price Dep. at 60:10–61:12, 68:14–69:12. In Paragraph 95, the RRB asserts that

GS-14 and GS-15 positions are senior management roles and generally involve su-

pervising other supervisors. DSOF ¶ 95; R. 95-13, DSOF Exh. 36, Coleman Decl. ¶ 5.

Also, in Paragraph 95, the RRB stated that “[i]n Crystal Coleman’s experience, man-

agement and leadership skills are key and more important than subject matter expe-

rience for GS-14 and GS-15 roles.” DSOF ¶ 95; Coleman Decl. ¶ 5. Neither Paragraph

88 nor 95 contain a legal conclusion. Rather, both paragraphs contain factual asser-

tions and describe testimony that has been properly submitted to the record. So Earls-

Rozelle’s objections to those paragraphs are overruled.

Despite Earls-Rozelle’s bevy of objections to most of the Statement, few facts

appear to be materially disputed. Earls-Rozelle purports to dispute Paragraphs 14

and 21. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 14, 21. In Paragraph 14, the RRB states that Coleman

did not decide who should be selected for the Chief position, and that Price made that

decision without being influenced by anyone else. DSOF ¶ 14; Coleman EEO Aff. at

4; Price Dep. at 64:5–9, 65:19–66:1. In her objection to that paragraph, Earls-Rozelle

14

states, “[A]dmit that Price stated that she was not influenced by anyone about who

to hire but deny these facts nonetheless,” and cites to Coleman’s EEO Affidavit and

her deposition transcript generally. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 14. But Earls-Rozelle does not

“cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact” that she disputes, nor

does she “concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.” L.R.

56.1(e)(3) (emphases added). So Paragraph 14 of the Statement is deemed to be ad-

mitted.

In Paragraph 21 of the Statement, the RRB asserts that “Price did not come

up with” either posting for the Chief job, that “Coleman did not review the external

posting and did not talk to human resources to ask them to change the external post-

ing for the Chief role,” and that “Coleman did not authorize a change in the external

posting nor had any involvement in the external job reposting.” DSOF ¶ 21; Price

Dep. at 25:2–13; Coleman Dep. at 47:23–48:12. In her objection to this paragraph,

Earls-Rozelle states, “[A]dmit that Coleman testified that she did not talk to human

resources or have any involvement in the reposting but deny these facts nonetheless,”

and cites the supplement to Sanford’s EEO Affidavit as evidentiary support. Pl.’s

Resp. DSOF ¶ 21; Supp. to Sanford EEO Aff. at 6. Earls-Rozelle appears to be disput-

ing the RRB’s assertion that Coleman did not talk to human resources to ask for the

external posting to be changed, as Sanford communicated to the EEO via email that

the reposting was “mutually agreed upon” in a face-to-face conversation she had with

Coleman. Supp. to Sanford EEO Aff. at 6. But nothing in Sanford’s email to the EEO

demonstrates that Coleman had asked Sanford for the external posting to be

15

changed—only that they both agreed to the reposting. Again, then, Paragraph 21 of

the Statement must be deemed to be admitted.

2. The RRB’s Objections to Earls-Rozelle’s Statement

Next, the Court considers the RRB’s objections to Earls-Rozelle’s Rule

56.1(b)(3)(C) Statement of Additional Facts. In its reply brief, the RRB starts this

argument by objecting to “Paragraphs 31, 32, and 40.” Defs.’ Reply at 6. The RRB

then appears to discuss Paragraphs 30, 31, and 40—not Paragraph 32—but the Court

understands the RRB’s discussion of Paragraphs 30 and 31 to target Paragraphs 31

and 32 of Earls-Rozelle’s Statement. Id. For Paragraph 30 (which the Court under-

stands to be Paragraph 31), the RRB challenges that paragraph because “Earls-

Rozelle relied on her testimony as to something that Archbold supposedly said, which

is hearsay.” Id. Paragraph 30 does not rely on any statement of Archbold, and instead

makes an allegation about Earls-Rozelle’s 2019 performance evaluation, PSOF ¶ 30,

which presumably is a business record and thus admissible under the hearsay excep-

tion, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).Paragraph 31 makes an allegation that Earls-Rozelle was

the expert Archbold deferred to when faced with employer questions about the RRA

or RUIA, PSOF ¶ 31, and is a description of Archbold’s conduct during meetings

based on Earls-Rozelle’s personal knowledge.9

9In Paragraph 31, Earls-Rozelle asserts that she was “generally the expert Archbold

deferred to when an employer had a question concerning the RRA or RUIA.” PSOF ¶ 31;

Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 97:19–98:10. But the cited deposition testimony does not support the

asserted fact. In the cited part of the deposition, Earls-Rozelle very generally asserted that

she trained Archbold around three or four times per month “if we had to have any meetings

with employers concerning the credi[ta]bility of service and compensation.” Earls-Rozelle

Dep. at 97:19–98:2. In the testimony, the most specific description that Earls-Rozelle

16

In Paragraph 32 (which the RRB’s reply brief mislabels as Paragraph “31,”

Defs.’ Reply at 6), Earls-Rozelle asserted that retiring Chief Nathaniel Coleman told

here that if she wanted to do his job, then she would need supervisory experience and

the RRB would bring in another employee to perform Earls-Rozelle’s compensation

and communication duties. PSOF ¶ 32. On that basis, Earls-Rozelle says, she ac-

cepted the Supervisory Analyst position. Id. In response, the RRB argues that “Earls-

Rozelle relied on her own testimony as evidence of something Nathaniel Coleman al-

legedly told her,” which the RRB labels as hearsay. Defs.’ Reply at 6 (emphasis

added). But reliance on a witness’s “own testimony,” id., to introduce a statement is

not what makes a statement hearsay. What makes a statement qualify as hearsay is

that it was made by the declarant outside of trial (or hearing) testimony, Fed. R. Evid.

801(c)(1), and is offered to prove the fact asserted, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Here, if no

hearsay exemption or exception applies, then Nathaniel Coleman’s out-of-court state-

ment could qualify as hearsay—whether introduced via Earls-Rozelle’s trial testi-

mony or Nathaniel Coleman’s own testimony about what he said to Earls-Rozelle.

Arguably, however, the statement would enjoy the hearsay exemption for party ad-

missions. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D). As the Chief of a division, Nathaniel Cole-

man might very well be authorized to inform supervisees what they need to do to earn

provided was not specific at all, referring to teaching Archbold how to “submit a report” or

to “explain what form would be needed.” Id. at 98:4–9. That is a far cry from the asserted

fact that Earls-Rozelle was generally the expert to which Archbold deferred when employers

asked about the RRA or the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.

17

a promotion. Also, the promotion-advice statement arguably qualifies for the hearsay

exception for statements of plan, Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). In any event, this is a sideshow

for two reasons: first, the RRB is correct that the evidence is immaterial even if ad-

missible. R. 106-1, Defs.’ Resp to PSOF ¶ 32 (“The statement is also immaterial.”).

Nathaniel Coleman was not the decision-maker for the promotion that Earls-Rozelle

sought, and his advice adds nothing to Earls-Rozelle’s discrimination claim. Second,

the cited page and lines of Earls-Rozelle’s deposition testimony, PSOF ¶ 32 (citing

Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 67:1–8), does not even relate to a conversation with Nathaniel

Coleman; instead, it covers whether Earls-Rozelle performed a particular perfor-

mance appraisal (she could not remember specifically).

Next, the RRB objects to Paragraph 40, Defs.’ Reply at 6–7, which states that

the RRB historically promotes from within the agency and then lists various individ-

uals who allegedly received promotions in this way, PSOF ¶ 40. In support of that

assertion, Earls-Rozelle cites to her unsworn statement, R. 102-5. But an unsworn

statement, that is, a statement not signed under penalty of perjury, has no eviden-

tiary value. See Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (excluding

unsworn written summaries prepared from unsworn statements because they did not

satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Without supporting evidence, the

Court will not consider the factual assertion in Paragraph 40.

The RRB also objects to Paragraphs 12, 27, 33, 34, and 39 as based on citations

to evidence that do not support the stated propositions. Defs.’ Reply at 7. The Court

agrees in part. As to some paragraphs, the Court has already explained that Earls-

18

Rozelle cites deposition transcripts inconsistently, sometimes to the PDF page num-

bers and sometimes to the deposition page numbers. See supra n.5. In Paragraph 12,

Earls-Rozelle alleges that Coleman was present during the second interview “when

she changed her mind and determined that Archbold had the more complete set of

skills to be successful as the chief.” PSOF ¶ 12. But Earls-Rozelle cites to Price’s dep-

osition transcript—not Coleman’s—for that proposition. Id. (citing Price Dep. 58:15–

59:15). And Price’s cited deposition testimony says nothing about Coleman’s view-

point, and instead describes Price’s view (after the second interview) that Archbold

had the “greater or more complete set of skills to be successful” in the Chief position,

as compared to Earls-Rozelle. Price Dep. at 59:12–15.

In Paragraph 27, Earls-Rozelle states that she was the most senior person in

the unit of the Compensation and Employer Service Center for which the Chief posi-

tion became vacant. PSOF ¶ 27. Again, the evidentiary material support that she

cites—her own deposition transcript—does not support this assertion.10 In Para-

graph 33, Earls-Rozelle asserts that any employee working for a railroad in the

United States “might have knowledge and experience working with the RRA and

RUIA.” PSOF ¶ 33. Like some other citations, another page citation reveals Earls-

Rozelle’s testimony, Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 41:11–18, but the cited fact is immaterial.

10The part of Earls-Rozelle’s deposition transcript cited to support Paragraph 27 dis-

cusses which other individuals Earls-Rozelle supervised in Nathaniel Coleman’s absence and

whether she provided performance appraisals for McNeany while the Chief position was va-

cant. Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 66:3–20. And even on PDF page number 66, the cited passage

does not support the proposition that she was the most senior person, only that her prior role

was very similar to her role of Supervisory Analyst. Id. at 35:14–16.

19

Although Earls-Rozelle suggests that only railroad employees might have knowledge

of the acts, see Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 6–7 & n.3, she also testified that anyone could “read

about the Act,” Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 41:15–18. Finally, in Paragraph 39, Earls-

Rozelle asserts that “[i]ndividuals generally supervise employees with a lower grade

level,” and cites Coleman’s EEO Affidavit as support. But the page Earls-Rozelle cites

provides only an anecdote of one GS-14 employee supervising lower-grade-level em-

ployees, so her statement of the fact that this is “generally” the case is left unsup-

ported. To the extent that this anecdote can be strung together with others, it is not

the Court’s job to find evidence for a party in the record. Johnson v. Advoc. Health &

Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 898 (7th Cir. 2018) (“It [is] … the plaintiff[’s] responsibil-

ity to point us to any evidence that would have supported [an] essential element of

their claim.”). For all those reasons, Paragraphs 12, 27, and 39 of Earls-Rozelle’s Rule

56.1 Statement of Additional Facts are excluded. Paragraph 33 contains immaterial

facts, and the Court has described the material dispute about Paragraph 34.

B. Title VII Discrimination

Turning to the merits, Earls-Rozelle argues that when the RRB hired Archbold

as Chief instead of granting her the promotion, it discriminated against her because

of her gender, race, and color under Title VII. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–65. As detailed

below, even when the record is viewed in Earls-Rozelle’s favor, the RRB has estab-

lished the non-discriminatory motives for its employment decisions, and there is no

genuine dispute: the agency did not act out of discriminatory intent.

20

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an employer “to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-

tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51

F.4th 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Paterakos v.

City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 796 n.1 (7th Cir. 2025). To survive summary judg-

ment, Earls-Rozelle’s discrimination claim must be supported by evidence that would

permit a reasonable factfinder to find that her gender, race, or color motivated the

refusal to promote her to Chief. Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.

2023); Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).

At the summary judgment stage, Earls-Rozelle may present her case in two

ways. Both methods can be deployed; they are not mutually exclusive. First, Earls-

Rozelle can survive summary judgment by “generally present[ing] enough evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find that [the RRB] discriminated against [Earls-

Rozelle] because” of her gender, race, or color. Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th

622, 626 (7th Cir. 2024). If Earls-Rozelle proceeds this way, then she can defeat sum-

mary judgment by offering enough circumstantial evidence that would allow a rea-

sonable jury to find that she was the victim of discrimination; there would be no need

to show a prima facie case. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. In other words, the question simply

would be whether the evidence “permit[s] a reasonable factfinder to conclude that

[her] race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the … adverse

employment action.” Id.

21

Second, Earls-Rozelle may rely on the burden-shifting framework established

in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas, Earls-Rozelle must offer evidence that (1) she belongs

to a protected class; (2) she met the RRB’s legitimate employment expectations; (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees

without her protected characteristics were treated more favorably. Lane v. Stericycle,

Inc., 162 F.4th 866, 874 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Gamble, 106 F.4th at 626). If Earls-

Rozelle does so, then the RRB “must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-

son” for the adverse employment action. Id. (cleaned up).11 If the RRB articulates that

type of reason, then the burden of proof shifts to Earls-Rozelle, and she “must prove

that the [RRB’s] justification was pretext for a decision made on prohibited criteria.”

Id. (cleaned up). Earls-Rozelle must do so by “present[ing] evidence that supports an

inference that the [RRB] was intentionally dishonest when it gave its nondiscrimina-

tory reason.” Id. (cleaned up). As explained next, neither path reveals a genuine issue

of material fact.

1. Direct Method

On the direct method, the Seventh Circuit has “identified three broad types of

circumstantial evidence that will support an inference of intentional discrimination,”

including “ambiguous or suggestive comments or conduct; better treatment of people

11This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, altera-

tions, and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quo-

tations, 18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

22

similarly situated but for the protected characteristic; and dishonest employer justi-

fications for disparate treatment.” Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs., 953 F.3d 923, 929

(7th Cir. 2020) (citing Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.

1994)). As discussed below, even with the benefit of reasonable inferences in her fa-

vor, Earls-Rozelle has not offered enough evidence to refute the RRB’s proffered rea-

sons for hiring Archbold for the Chief position.

First, Earls-Rozelle relies on Price’s statement to an EEO investigator that her

(Price’s) own skin tone was “Tan” and Earls-Rozelle’s skin tone was “Brown.” DSOF

¶ 77; R. 95-2, DSOF Exh. 2, Pl.’s First Resp. to Interrogatories ¶ 4. According to

Earls-Rozelle, this statement meant that Price saw “a real clear distinction between

colors.” DSOF ¶ 79; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 58:19–59:7. But Price provided these state-

ments about her own skin tone and Earls-Rozelle’s skin tone in response to follow-up

questions from the EEO investigator.12 DSOF ¶ 79; Price EEO Aff. at 10. In that cru-

cial context, the statements are not at all suggestive of color discrimination, and do

not support an inference of intentional discrimination.

Earls-Rozelle also relies on Crystal Coleman’s statement during the second in-

terview for the Chief position that the agency was looking for someone “[z]en like

Nathaniel Coleman” as evidence of discrimination. DSOF ¶¶ 30, 76; Coleman Dep. at

42:20–43:14; R. 95-2, DSOF Exh. 1, Pl.’s Supp. Resp. to Interrogatories ¶ 3. But

12The follow-up question from the EEO Investigator was prompted by Price’s initial

statement that she did not understand the questions about Earls-Rozelle’s and her own

“color.” Price EEO Aff. at 3.

23

Coleman was describing how Nathaniel Coleman approached his job when she made

this comment; there is no suggestion that a reference to “zen” meant that Crystal

Coleman intended to hire only a Caucasian or male candidate. DSOF ¶ 30; Coleman

Dep. at 56:18–57:5. Coleman testified that she meant that Nathaniel Coleman “was

always very calm and collected in his approach,” and that “[h]e would think through

any questions or any concerns and be very thorough and logical in his approach to

answering questions.” DSOF ¶ 30; Coleman Dep. at 43:16–21. She also testified that,

of the female candidates for the Chief position, she believed that Lavette Fargo

demonstrated this “zen” quality. DSOF ¶ 30; Coleman Dep. at 45:19–46:4. Though

Earls-Rozelle testified that she interpreted Coleman’s comment that the agency was

looking for someone “[z]en like Nathaniel Coleman” as meaning “[z]en like a man,”

DSOF ¶ 31; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 58:5–16; Formal EEO Compl. at 4, the plain mean-

ing of “zen” simply does not imply the male gender.13 The statement that the RRB

was looking for someone “[z]en like Nathaniel Coleman” to fill the Chief position is

not ambiguous or suggestive conduct supporting an inference of gender discrimina-

tion.

Earls-Rozelle also argues that Coleman tried to conceal her involvement in the

second external posting for the Chief position, which omitted the requirement of

13“Zen” is defined as (1) “a Japanese school of Mahayana Buddhism that teaches self-

discipline, deep meditation, and the attainment of enlightenment by direct intuitive insight

into a self-validating transcendent truth beyond all intellectual conceptions and typically ex-

presses its teachings in paradoxical and nonlogical forms” and (2) “an adherent of Zen.” Web-

ster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2657 (4th ed. 1976).

24

knowledge of the RRA and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ

at 3–4. But Coleman did not review the external posting and did not ask human re-

sources to change the external posting for the Chief position, nor did she authorize a

change in the external posting. DSOF ¶ 21; Coleman Dep. at 47:23–48:17. In re-

sponse, Earls-Rozelle relies on the Supplemental EEO Affidavit of human resources

specialist Le’Cherie Sanford, which says that Sanford and Coleman had a face-to-face

conversation about reposting the external posting. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 3; PSOF ¶ 8;

Supp. to Sanford EEO Aff. at 6. But Coleman never denied that the conversation

happened; instead, she testified that she did not remember speaking with anyone in

human resources and—crucially—convincing them to change the requirements in the

job posting. DSOF ¶ 21; Coleman Dep. at 47:23–48:8. Without any further concrete

factual detail from Sanford (or from some other witness who knows the content of the

Coleman-Sanford conversation), the record evidence does not show that Coleman

tried to hide her involvement in the reposting. So Coleman’s role in the reposting for

external candidates is not evidence of pretext.

Next, Earls-Rozelle argues that the elimination of the RRA- and RUIA-

knowledge qualification from the second external posting was done to help Archbold,

and thus the elimination is evidence of better treatment of a similarly situated per-

son. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 5; Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. But the RRB has produced evidence

to show that the reason for the elimination was to broaden the pool of applicants. In

her EEO Affidavit, Sanford explained that the RRA- and RUIA-knowledge qualifica-

tion for the external posting was removed “so that it would be equal and fair to

25

everyone” because “[n]o one who has not worked in the RRB would have that experi-

ence, so it was taken out and rewritten to be equal and fair to any candidate who

would like to apply.” DSOF ¶ 23; Sanford EEO Aff. at 13. A senior human resources

specialist in the RRB also separately confirmed to the EEO investigator that the Of-

fice of Personnel Management “does not want external announcements to be so

agency specific that no one outside of the agency would be eligible; there would be no

point in posting a job outside if no one would be eligible.” DSOF ¶ 22 (emphasis

added); R. 95-11, DSOF Exh. 27, Chin Email at 13. Earls-Rozelle offers only her own

speculation to rebut this nondiscriminatory reason for the elimination of the qualifi-

cation.

Earls-Rozelle also claims that Coleman tried to hide her involvement in the

interview and selection process. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 7–8. As discussed earlier, nothing

in the record suggests that Coleman tried to hide her involvement in the second round

of interviews. DSOF ¶¶ 28, 30, 38; Coleman EEO Aff. at 4 (describing how she sat in

on the second interviews and provided impressions on the candidates based on a re-

view of the resumes and interview responses); Coleman Dep. at 22:8–12, 27:18–28:4,

29:2–21, 40:5–22 (discussing her involvement in the second-round interviews). And

Earls-Rozelle does not cite any record evidence showing that Coleman actively tried

to hide her involvement in the hiring process for the Chief position.

Moving on, Earls-Rozelle argues that the reasons given by Price and Coleman

for passing over her for the Chief position are dishonest and pretextual. Pl.’s Resp.

MSJ at 5–9. Those reasons are (1) Earls-Rozelle’s limited experience with distance

26

learning based on the RRB’s own limited use; (2) Earls-Rozelle’s lack of experience in

important managerial areas by comparison to Archbold; and (3) Earls-Rozelle’s oral

and written communication skills and interactions with the Board members and their

assistants, which Price found challenging. Id.; DSOF ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Second In-Person

Interview Questions at 27; Price EEO Aff. at 21. The RRB supplied those reasons

with a nondiscriminatory rationale. First, distance learning was important for the

Chief position because there was a push to complete training remotely due to the

COVID-19 pandemic and the high turnover in the railroad industry (leading to a need

for more frequent trainings). DSOF ¶ 37; Price Dep. at 86:14–89:16. Managerial ex-

perience and leadership were also skills that Price evaluated candidates for because

the Chief was a supervisory role. DSOF ¶¶ 20, 42; Price EEO Aff. at 5. Finally, Price

explained that there were instances where Earls-Rozelle provided responses to ques-

tions that showed that she was not “reading the room” in a way that allowed her to

answer questions without embarrassing attendees in a meeting. DSOF ¶ 43; Price

Dep. 76:7–77:16. Although Earls-Rozelle may not personally agree with these justifi-

cations, she does not point to any evidence that demonstrates that the reasons pro-

vided by Price and Coleman for her non-selection were “intentionally dishonest.”

Lane, 162 F.4th at 874 (cleaned up).

Finally, Earls-Rozelle argues that Archbold’s hiring, which broke from office

precedent, and Price’s justification for not promoting Earls-Rozelle because of her

communication skills, are dishonest. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 8–9. As discussed in Part

III.A.2, the assertion that the RRB historically promotes from within is not supported

27

by admissible evidence, so the Court cannot consider this fact. On Price’s justification

for skipping over Earls-Rozelle, Earls-Rozelle argues that Price informed her that she

had not been selected for the role because her oral and written communication skills

were “deficient.” Id. at 9. Earls-Rozelle asserts that Price’s justification is inconsistent

with Earls-Rozelle’s pre-vacancy performance review, which scored her performance

of “[c]ommunication [a]ctivities and [t]echnical [e]xpertise” at 4 out of 4. PSOF ¶ 30;

Earls-Rozelle’s 2019 Performance Evaluation at 1.14 But Price did not describe Earls-

Rozelle’s communication skills as “deficient”—instead, she described them as “chal-

lenging” in the context of Earls-Rozelle’s interactions with “primary stakeholders[,]

which are the Board members and their assistants.” Price EEO Aff. at 21; see also

DSOF ¶ 43; Price Dep. at 76:7–77:16 (describing Earls-Rozelle’s communication skills

in the context of meetings with board members and not generally). Based on the rec-

ord evidence, Price’s justifications for passing over Earls-Rozelle are not pretextual.

For all these reasons, the direct method fails.

2. Indirect Method

To resist summary judgment via a prima facie case, Earls-Rozelle must first

establish a case of prima facie case with evidence that: “she was (1) a member of a

protected class, (2) qualified for the position, (3) rejected for the position, and (4) that

the employer selected someone outside the protected class who was similarly or less

qualified.” Kinney v. St. Mary’s Health, Inc., 76 F.4th 635, 646 (7th Cir. 2023). “If

14According to the Performance Rating Sheet, a 4 is “[o]utstanding.” Earls-Rozelle’s

2019 Performance Evaluation at 1.

28

[Earls-Rozelle] makes out a prima facie case by meeting each of these elements, the

burden shifts to the [RRB] to articulate (not to prove) a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the promotion decision.” Id. And if the RRB meets that burden, then Earls-

Rozelle must offer evidence that the RRB’s explanation for the non-promotion was

pretextual, or “not merely wrong but false.” Id.

Earls-Rozelle meets the first three elements of the prima facie case: she is a

member of a protected class, she was qualified for the position sought, and she was

rejected for the position. The remaining question is whether Earls-Rozelle provided

enough evidence to show that Archbold was similarly or less qualified than her at the

time of his hiring. Put another way, Earls-Rozelle must show (with the benefit of

reasonable inferences) that the comparison of her qualities to Archbold’s qualities is

“so favorable … that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial

judgment that [she] was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.” Millbrook

v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Pro-

tective & Regul. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999)). Although an irrational

decision can qualify as circumstantial evidence of pretext, at bottom courts cannot

“sit in judgment as super-personnel departments” overseeing hiring decisions, even

if the decisions are “mistaken or perplexing or silly.” Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d

1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Kralman v. Ill. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affs., 23 F.3d 150,

156 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Earls-Rozelle’s sole argument for why Archbold was less qualified for the Chief

position is because he had no knowledge or experience with the RRA or Railroad

29

Unemployment Insurance Act. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 5–7. Indeed, the RRB does not con-

test the fact that Archbold had no knowledge or expertise with the RRA or RUIA at

the time of his hiring. Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 2. But courts “do not tell employers

what the requirements for a job must be,” “even if those qualifications change.”

Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). The

fact that the RRB changed its qualifications for external candidates by removing

knowledge of the RRA or RUIA is, generally speaking, a business decision that the

Court should not second guess. See Cardoso v. Robert Bosch Corp., 427 F.3d 429, 435

(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Davis v. Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776,

785 (7th Cir. 2004)) (“[T]he court is not a super-personnel department intervening

whenever an employee feels he is being treated unjustly.” (cleaned up)). Price consid-

ered Archbold’s lack of experience with the RRA and RUIA, but she testified that she

believed that subject-matter experience was “not the most important attribute nor

indicator of success” for a chief-level role. DSOF ¶ 42; Price EEO Aff. at 5. Price

acknowledged Earls-Rozelle’s subject-matter experience with the RRA and RUIA, but

explained that “[Earls-Rozelle’s] experience in important managerial areas by com-

parison, was wanting, even when compared to the other internal candidate.” DSOF

¶ 42; Price EEO Aff. at 5 (emphasis added). And Archbold had been a supervisor since

at least 2011 (giving him around nine years of supervisory experience before the Au-

gust 2020 decision), whereas Earls-Rozelle only became a supervisor in December

2017. DSOF ¶ 1, 44;Request for Personnel Action at 24; Archbold Resume at 24.

Earls-Rozelle has not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of

30

material fact as to whether Archbold was similarly or better qualified for the Chief

position.

Even if Earls-Rozelle had set forth a prima facie case, the RRB has offered

nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Archbold, which Earls-Rozelle failed to show

are pretextual. “Pretext is a ‘lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.’” Sublett

v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Russell v. Acme–

Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995)). To demonstrate pretext, Earls-Rozelle must

offer evidence that (1) the RRB’s “nondiscriminatory reason was dishonest”; and (2)

that the RRB’s “true reason was based on a discriminatory intent.” Fischer v.

Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat.

Res., 499 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 2007)). Contemporaneous with the hiring, the RRB

justified selecting Archbold by pointing to his expertise and experience in employer

payroll-and-taxation reporting and filing requirements, as well as in leadership, tech-

nical direction, achieving an organization’s mission objectives, conducting criminal

investigations, establishing and maintaining relationships with U.S. attorneys,

county prosecutors, employers, and labor unions. DSOF ¶¶ 41–42, 44, 48; see gener-

ally Archbold Selection Justification at 25; Archbold Resume at 24–32. Archbold also

demonstrated more familiarity than Earls-Rozelle with distance learning—an area

of need for the RRB during the COVID-19 pandemic. DSOF ¶¶ 32–33, 37; Price Dep.

at 88:3–89:24, 90:16–24. Price also found Earls-Rozelle’s “experience in important

managerial areas … wanting, even when compared to the other internal candidate.”

DSOF ¶ 42; Price EEO Aff. at 5. Finally, Archbold outperformed Earls-Rozelle in the

31

second-round interview. Compare DSOF ¶ 41, and Archbold Selection Justification

at 25, with DSOF ¶¶ 33–35, and Second In-Person Interview Questions at 27. See,

e.g., Groves v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 51 F.4th 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2022) (ex-

plaining that the plaintiff’s interview “did not go well” was an “entirely proper” sub-

jective determination, “especially given the absence of anything in the record suggest-

ing that considerations of [the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class] influenced”

the hiring decision). Nothing in the evidentiary record suggests that the RRB’s prof-

fered reasons for hiring Archbold were dishonest.

3. Cat’s Paw Theory

To the extent that Earls-Rozelle argues that the RRB is liable under a cat’s

paw theory of liability, the evidentiary record does not support that theory of liability.

The cat’s paw theory of liability applies “when a biased supervisor who lacks deci-

sionmaking power uses the formal decision maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme

to trigger a discriminatory employment action.” Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d

456, 461 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “To survive summary judgment on such a the-

ory, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the biased subordinate actually harbored

discriminatory animus against the victim of the subject employment action, and evi-

dence that the biased subordinate’s scheme was the proximate cause of the adverse

employment action.” Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up) (emphasis added).

Earls-Rozelle’s cat’s paw theory is as follows: Crystal Coleman allegedly hid

her role in causing the external reposting of the Chief position for someone other than

32

the two African-American women who had applied and were deemed eligible as in-

ternal candidates, and then Coleman stepped in to alter the outcome and then denied

doing so. Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 3–4, 7–8. But there is no evidence that Coleman harbored

some kind of discriminatory animus against Earls-Rozelle. As discussed earlier, see

Part III.B.1, the only remark by Coleman that Earls-Rozelle relies on is that Coleman

said “[z]en like Nathaniel Coleman” in describing what attributes Price and Coleman

were looking for in a Chief. Earls-Rozelle fails to connect this statement to race or

color, DSOF ¶ 31; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 58:5–16, and for the reasons discussed ear-

lier, this statement is not evidence of gender discrimination. So this theory of liability

fails, and the RRB is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claims for race,

color, and gender discrimination.

C. Equal Pay Act

In Count Four of the Third Amended Complaint, Earls-Rozelle alleges that the

RRB violated the Equal Pay Act. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–74.15 The Equal Pay Act

15The RRB argues that Earls-Rozelle’s Equal Pay Act claim is partially time-barred.

R. 94, Defs.’ Br. at 28–29. The statute of limitations for claims brought under the Equal Pay

Act is typically two years after the cause of action accrued. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The limitations

period can be extended to three years if the cause of action arises out of a willful violation of

the Equal Pay Act. Id. The RRB asserts that Earls-Rozelle may only recover for Equal Pay

Act violations between June 26, 2020 (two years from June 26, 2022) to August 16, 2020 (the

day before Archbold started in the Chief position). Defs.’ Br. at 28–29. In response, Earls-

Rozelle states that she filed suit on June 28, 2022, and that she continues to be underpaid,

so her Equal Pay Act claim extends from “the present back to June 28, 2020, or perhaps

August 17, 2020.” Pl.’s Resp. MSJ at 12. It appears, then, that both parties agree that the

earliest date Earls-Rozelle can recover Equal Pay Act damages for is June 28, 2020. Although

the RRB refers to June 26, the RRB also recognizes that Earls-Rozelle initiated this suit on

June 28, 2022, so the Court assumes that the two-day discrepancy is merely a typographical

error.

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prohibits employers from paying men and women different rates for the same work

at the same “establishment.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To state a claim for discrimination

under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must offer evidence that “(1) higher wages were

paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort

and responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under similar working condi-

tions.” Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Earls-

Rozelle does have enough evidence to show that higher wages were paid to a male

employee, and the RRB concedes that their jobs were performed under similar work-

ing conditions. R. 94, Defs.’ Br. at 23. The only remaining question is whether her job

required substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibilities as Nathaniel Cole-

man’s job while the Chief position was vacant.

To determine whether the work that a plaintiff performed was similar enough

to a male employee’s, “the crucial inquiry is whether the jobs to be compared have a

common core of tasks; i.e., whether a significant portion of the two jobs is identical.”

Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). To make this deter-

mination, the Equal Pay Act specifies that the elements of skill, effort, and responsi-

bility should be considered separately. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “Each of these ele-

ments must be met individually to establish a prima facie case.” Cullen v. Ind. Univ.

Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14). If a plaintiff

establishes a common core, the inquiry becomes “whether any additional tasks make

the jobs substantially different.” Id. (cleaned up).

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Earls-Rozelle has not presented enough evidence to establish that her job

shared a common core of tasks with the Chief position when that role was vacant.

One of Nathaniel Coleman’s responsibilities as Chief was to provide quarterly and

annual performance reviews for Earls-Rozelle and Frizell, and to review evaluations

made by Earls-Rozelle and Frizell of the employees they supervised. DSOF ¶ 52; Price

Dep. at 91:18–92:10, 92:15–93:12. Earls-Rozelle never prepared a performance review

for Frizell, DSOF ¶ 53; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 70:1–3. And she does not present evi-

dence that she ever reviewed Frizell’s evaluations of employees supervised by Frizell;

instead, it was Price who took over those duties. DSOF ¶ 52; Price Dep. at 92:19–

93:12. Earls-Rozelle also offers no evidence that she oversaw investigations; reviewed

decisions about reconsideration and appeals of the amount of service and compensa-

tion; coordinated review and comment on legislation, regulations, or policy proposals;

or prepared rules and regulations—all of which were duties of the Chief. DSOF ¶¶ 55,

70; R. 95-11, DSOF Exh. 28, Chief of Compensation Position Description at 15–18;

Pl.’s Supp. Resp. to Interrogatories ¶ 13; Pl.’s First Resp. to Interrogatories ¶ 13;

Supp. to Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 2–4.

Even if Earls-Rozelle had established a prima facie case, the burden of produc-

tion would shift to the RRB to prove one of four statutory affirmative defenses: “(i) a

seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quan-

tity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than

sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The RRB relies on the defense that there is “a differential

based on any other factor other than sex.” Id.; Defs.’ Br. at 26–28. According to the

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RRB, Earls-Rozelle continued to be paid at the GS-13 level when the Chief position

was vacant because she was not promoted to the position between January and Au-

gust 2020, whereas Nathaniel Coleman had been paid at the GS-15 level prior be-

cause he had actually received the promotion to the role. DSOF ¶¶ 1, 6–7; Request

for Personnel Action at 24; Earls-Rozelle Dep. at 93:3–8; Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 5

(acknowledging that she was not detailed to the position of Acting Chief). Second, the

RRB states that Earls-Rozelle’s pay was not increased because she never requested

a formal desk audit or higher pay, which could have increased her GS-level. DSOF

¶¶ 74, 90; Supp. to Earls-Rozelle EEO Aff. at 4; R. 95-13, DSOF Exh. 34, Chin Decl.

¶ 4–5. Both of those affirmative defenses relieve the RRB of any Equal Pay Act lia-

bility, and Earls-Rozelle offers nothing to rebut those defenses. The Equal Pay Act

claim cannot survive summary judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The RRB’s motion for summary judgment, R. 93, is granted. The case is dis-

missed with prejudice, and final judgment shall be entered.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: March 23, 2026

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