Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Lee Zeldin

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 21, 2025 Decided May 1, 2026

No. 24-5294

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

AND CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH,

APPELLANTS

v.

LEE M. ZELDIN, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

APPELLEES

INHANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

INTERVENOR

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:24-cv-02194)

Robert M. Sussman argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Paula Dinerstein.

Christopher Anderson, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief

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were Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Robert N. Stander, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and

Robert P. Stockman, Attorney.

Jessica L. Ellsworth argued the cause for intervenor in

support of appellees. With her on the brief were J. Tom Boer,

Susan M. Cook, Marlan Golden, and J. Andrew Mackenzie.

Catherine E. Stetson entered an appearance.

Before: PILLARD and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This case involves an

action under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 15

U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., filed in the District Court by Appellants,

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”)

and Center for Environmental Health (“CEH”), against the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Appellants allege

that EPA has failed in its responsibilities under TSCA to

address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid

(“PFOA”), one of a class of per- and polyfluoroalkyl

substances (“PFAS”), formed during the fluorination of plastic

containers.

Appellants’ complaint focuses on TSCA section 4(f), id.

§ 2603(f), which requires EPA to “initiate applicable action”

within 180 days of receiving information “which indicates to

the [agency] that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude

that a chemical substance or mixture presents a significant risk

of serious or widespread harm to human beings.” Appellants

allege that EPA possessed damning information regarding the

risks of PFOA by March 29, 2023 and that the information was

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sufficient to trigger the agency’s obligation to act under section

4(f). In the alternative, Appellants invoke TSCA section

7(a)(2), id. § 2606(a)(2), to argue that EPA has a

nondiscretionary duty to bring an enforcement action to abate

an imminent hazard posed by PFOA generated by Appellee-

Intervenor Inhance Technologies, LLC (“Inhance”), a

company engaged in the fluorination process.

The District Court dismissed the case for two principal

reasons. First, the court held that EPA had fulfilled any

nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a

request for comment, rendering Appellants’ primary claim

moot. See Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. Regan, 2024 WL

5075828, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024). Second, the court

expressed skepticism that section 7(a)(2) imposes on EPA a

nondiscretionary duty to bring an enforcement action, and,

even if it did, the court found that duty had not been triggered.

Id. at *5-6. The District Court thus concluded that Appellants’

claim “falls outside the terms of . . . TSCA’s citizen-suit

provision.” Id. at *6.

We affirm, but on grounds different from those relied upon

by the District Court. On the record before us, we conclude that

the complaint filed by PEER and CEH must be dismissed

because Appellants have failed to establish that they have

associational standing upon which PEER and CEH rely in

pursuing this action in federal court.

To establish associational standing, an organization must

show “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane

to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted

nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Implicit in the first prong

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of the Hunt test is that the organization “has either members or

any equivalent affiliates.” Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278

F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). As we explain below, PEER and

CEH have failed to make the requisite allegations to establish

their standing.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that “an

association may have standing solely as the representative of

its members.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). This

form of associational standing is always available to a

traditional “voluntary membership organization” that “has

identified members and represents them in good faith.”

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of

Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 201 (2023). Alternatively, an

organization may assert associational standing if it

demonstrates that it “is the functional equivalent of a traditional

membership organization.” Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25.

Appellants have not made either showing.

Appellants are concededly not traditional membership

organizations. And to be the functional equivalent of a

membership organization, a group must be “sufficiently

identified with and subject to the influence of those it seeks to

represent.” Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. DOT, 957 F.3d

1359, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Appellants seek

to represent PEER and CEH’s “[b]oard members, supporters[,]

and staff.” Compl. ¶ 29, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 13. But PEER

and CEH have “given us no insight” into how either

organization relates with these purported supporters. Viasat,

Inc. v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Indeed, there

is nothing in Appellants’ Complaint or in the evidence

presented to the District Court that supports PEER and CEH’s

claims of associational standing.

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Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever adopted

such an expansive conception of associational standing

pursuant to which an employee’s influence over her employing

organization suffices to make her the “functional equivalent”

of a member on whose behalf the organization may assert

associational standing.

Associational standing rests on the assumption that there

is a meaningful alignment of an organization’s interests and the

interests of a constituency that the organization seeks to

protect. Under Hunt, that alignment is demonstrated where the

organization’s purpose is to advance the interests of its

members, those members are the primary beneficiaries of its

activities, and the organization is sufficiently subject to their

influence to ensure it represents their views. See Hunt, 432 U.S.

at 344-45; see also Flyers Rts., 957 F.3d at 1362. This

framework preserves the sanctity of the relationship between

an organization and its members that justifies an organization

suing as the representative of its members.

Appellants’ theory of standing in this case departs from

these settled principles. Neither PEER nor CEH claims that its

purpose is to serve its employees, nor that its employees are the

primary beneficiaries of its work. Nor are the organizations

meaningfully subject to their employees’ influence in the

relevant sense. Any influence PEER and CEH’s employees

wield arises from their roles as employees obligated to carry

out organizational objectives, not as constituents whose

interests the organizations exist to represent. Employees, in this

structure, are the means by which the organizations act, not the

constituency whose interests define those actions. Treating

PEER and CEH’s employees as “members” would collapse the

distinction between representative and represented that Hunt

presupposes.

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We therefore decline to extend associational standing to

encompass PEER and CEH’s employees acting in their

capacity as employees. Accordingly, we dismiss this action for

lack of jurisdiction because Appellants have failed to establish

their standing.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Regulatory Background

Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to protect against

chemical substances that “present an unreasonable risk of

injury to health or the environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).

To achieve that objective, TSCA authorizes EPA to regulate

chemical substances that pose such risks. For example, EPA

may restrict or prohibit such chemicals through rulemaking

under section 6. See id. § 2605. Where risks are more

immediate, TSCA provides an additional complementary

mechanism: under section 7, EPA “may commence a civil

action in an appropriate district court” to address “imminently

hazardous” substances. Id. § 2606(a)(1). Section 7 also directs

EPA to “commence” appropriate action in a district court if

EPA “has not made a rule under [section 6] immediately

effective . . . with respect to an imminently hazardous chemical

substance.” Id. § 2606(a)(2).

Additionally, TSCA contains an action-forcing provision,

section 4(f), which requires EPA, within 180 days of receiving

information indicating that a chemical “presents a significant

risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings,” to either

“initiate applicable action” under relevant TSCA sections “to

prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk” or publish a

finding that the risk is not unreasonable. Id. § 2603(f). In

addition, TSCA section 20 authorizes citizen suits to compel

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EPA’s administrator “to perform any act or duty under this

chapter which is not discretionary.” Id. § 2619(a)(2).

Appellants allege that, by March 29, 2023, EPA possessed

“conclusive data demonstrating that PFOA (i) is carcinogenic

to humans and has no safe level of exposure and (ii) is present

in tens of millions of plastic containers . . . distributed and used

throughout the economy.” Compl. ¶ 113, J.A. 32. They allege

that receipt of such data triggered EPA’s nondiscretionary duty

under TSCA section 4(f) to “initiate applicable action . . . to

prevent or reduce . . . to a sufficient extent” the risks posed by

PFOA formation. Id. ¶ 115, J.A. 32 (citation omitted); see also

id. ¶¶ 113-114, 116, J.A. 32.

Discontent with EPA’s response to these risks, Appellants

and other interested parties petitioned EPA on April 11, 2024,

to initiate rulemaking under TSCA section 6 to prohibit the

manufacture and distribution of PFAS, including PFOA,

generated during container fluorination.

EPA granted the petition on July 10, 2024, stating that “the

agency will promptly commence an appropriate proceeding

under TSCA section 6 associated with the formation of PFOA

[and two other PFAS] during the fluorination of plastic

containers.” J.A. 40 (cleaned up). EPA added that “[a]s part of

that proceeding, [it] intends to request information” regarding

the use of fluorinated containers, available alternatives, and

measures to address the risks posed by these chemicals. Id.

EPA followed through on that commitment on September

30, 2024 by publishing a notice in the Federal Register

requesting public comment on the risks associated with PFAS

formation during fluorination, the prevalence and uses of

fluorinated containers, potential alternatives to fluorination,

and possible regulatory measures.

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B. Procedural History

Appellants filed this citizen suit under TSCA section 20 in

the District Court on July 25, 2024, two weeks after EPA

granted their rulemaking petition and before EPA published the

request for comment. Appellants allege that EPA failed to

perform its nondiscretionary duty under TSCA section 4(f) to

initiate substantive regulatory action within 180 days of

receiving information concerning the risks posed by PFOA. In

their view, neither granting a rulemaking petition nor soliciting

public comment satisfies that obligation. Appellants also allege

that EPA was required under TSCA section 7 to commence a

civil action for injunctive relief against Inhance.

EPA moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

The District Court granted EPA’s motion. See Pub. Emps. for

Env’t Resp. v. Regan, 2024 WL 5075828 (D.D.C. Dec. 11,

2024). Beginning with Appellants’ section 4(f) claim, the court

first assumed, for the purposes of deciding the motion, that

EPA was under a nondiscretionary duty to take applicable

action no later than 180 days after March 29, 2023. However,

the District Court found that EPA had fulfilled that obligation

by publishing the request for comment, which was “explicitly

designed to inform the Agency’s regulation of the relevant

PFAS.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up). Thus, EPA had “kickstart[ed]

the information-gathering process, and . . . successfully

completed the necessary first step of any rulemaking.” Id.

Accordingly, the District Court held that it lacked the power to

award Appellants effective relief on their section 4(f) claim and

that the claim was therefore moot.

Turning to Appellants’ second claim, the District Court

expressed doubt that section 7 imposes a nondiscretionary duty

“given the lack of a deadline that is ‘date-certain’ or ‘readily-

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ascertainable by reference to some other fixed date or event.’”

Id. at *5 (quoting Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 790-

91 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But even assuming that section 7 imposes

a nondiscretionary duty, the court explained that no such duty

had arisen in this case because that duty is triggered only after

EPA proposes a section 6 rule and declines to make the rule

immediately effective. EPA had not proposed such a rule, and,

thus, it was under no mandatory duty to act. Accordingly, the

District Court dismissed Appellants’ section 7 claim,

concluding that it “falls outside the terms of . . . TSCA’s . . .

‘limited waiver of the federal government’s sovereign

immunity.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Physicians Comm. for

Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 441

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Appellants timely petition for this court’s

review.

II. ANALYSIS

“[A] showing of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging’

predicate to any exercise of our jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon

Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)

(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of”

satisfying the court that it has standing to proceed. Lujan, 504

U.S. at 561. At the pleading stage, “[t]he question . . . is

whether plaintiffs have plausibly alleged standing.” In re U.S.

Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 54

(D.C. Cir. 2019). At this posture, “‘we accept the well-pleaded

factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences

from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor,’ but we do not

assume the truth of legal conclusions or accept inferences that

are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id.

(quoting Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).

As noted above, we find that Appellants have failed to

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plausibly allege that either PEER or CEH has standing.

Therefore, we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

A. Associational Standing

Because Appellants are organizations, they can satisfy

“the standing requirements of Article III . . . in two ways.”

Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S. at 199. First, they “can

claim that [they] suffered an injury in [their] own right.” Id.

Second, they can claim “associational standing” as the

representatives of their members. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.

Appellants assert this latter theory of “associational” or

“representative” standing.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[e]ven in the

absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing

solely as the representative of its members.” Warth, 422 U.S.

at 511 (citing Nat’l Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n, Inc. v. United

States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam)). At the same time,

the Court has been equally clear that “[t]he possibility of such

representational standing . . . does not eliminate or attenuate the

constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Id. (citing

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). In Warth, the

Supreme Court enumerated certain requirements for an

association “to invoke the court’s jurisdiction” as the

representative of its members:

The association must allege that its members, or any

one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened

injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort

that would make out a justiciable case had the

members themselves brought suit. So long as this can

be established, and so long as the nature of the claim

and of the relief sought does not make the individual

participation of each injured party indispensable to

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proper resolution of the cause, the association may be

an appropriate representative of its members.

Id. (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court distilled these requirements in Hunt.

There, the Court explained that “an association has standing to

bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the

interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s

purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief

requested requires the participation of individual members in

the lawsuit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.

Both Appellants fail at the threshold. “[I]mplicit in the

three-part test articulated in Hunt” is “[t]he assumption that an

organization litigates on behalf of its members.” Am. Legal

Found. (“ALF”) v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(emphasis added). Accordingly, associational standing is

typically claimed by traditional membership organizations

with “common arrangements such as professional associations,

labor unions, social clubs and the like.” Flyers Rts., 957 F.3d

at 1361. However, as explained in the introduction to this

opinion, an organization may also assert associational standing

if it demonstrates that it “is the functional equivalent of a

traditional membership organization.” Fund Democracy, 278

F.3d at 25 (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342-45). Yet, neither

Appellant has plausibly pled that it “has either members or any

equivalent affiliates.” Id.

“In determining whether [Appellants] have standing, the

court may not consider on appeal supplemental declarations

filed after entry of the judgment appealed.” Swanson Grp. Mfg.

LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “This court

and our sister circuits generally have held that declarations that

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were not part of the record before the district court at the time

of a judgment or order are not part of the record on appeal of

that judgment or order.” Id. (compiling cases). Accordingly, we

cannot consider the standing declarations that Appellants

submitted for the first time on appeal. Having reviewed the

materials that are properly before us, we find that Appellants

have not plausibly established that either PEER or CEH has

standing to represent the interests of PEER and CEH’s “[b]oard

members, supporters[,] and staff.” Compl. ¶ 29, J.A. 13.

Appellants concede that they are “not traditional

membership organizations.” Br. of Appellants 28. Instead, they

claim that PEER and CEH are the functional equivalent of such

organizations based on their relationships with those they seek

to represent, i.e., “their supporters, staff[,] and Boards of

Directors.” Id. But Appellants do not suggest that PEER’s or

CEH’s supporters have the requisite roles, responsibilities, or

influence over the organizations to alone satisfy the strictures

of associational standing. To the extent they gesture toward that

position on reply, the argument comes too late. See Fore River

Residents Against the Compressor Station v. FERC, 77 F.4th

882, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“Arguments raised for the first time

in a reply brief are forfeited.”). Additionally, although

Appellants, in passing, mention each organization’s Board of

Directors as part of their claims to associational standing, they

do not develop the theory sufficiently to preserve it for our

review. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible

argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do

counsel’s work.”).

We are thus left with Appellants’ concededly novel theory

that their employees’ influence derived from their

responsibilities and roles at PEER and CEH suffice to make

them the “functional equivalents” of members on whose behalf

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the organizations may assert associational standing. Even if we

assume that some employees have some degree of influence

based on “their responsibilities and roles in the

organization[s],” Br. of Appellants 28, this is insufficient to

show that Appellants have associational standing.

B. Requirements for a Functional Equivalent of a

Traditional Membership Organization

To assess whether an organization is the functional

equivalent of a traditional membership organization, this court

looks to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Hunt v.

Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.

333 (1977). See, e.g., Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25.

In Hunt, the Court held that a state commission – which was

not a “traditional voluntary membership organization” – had

standing to assert the claims of its constituency of apple

growers and dealers. 432 U.S. at 344. The Court offered three

reasons in support of this conclusion. First, the commission’s

“purpose [was] the protection and promotion of the” state’s

apple growers and dealers. Id. “It thus serve[d] a specialized

segment of the [s]tate’s economic community which [was] the

primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution

of this kind of litigation.” Id. Second, the apple growers and

dealers, in turn, “possess[ed] all of the indicia of membership

in an organization.” Id. “They alone elect[ed] the members of

the [c]ommission; they alone [could] serve on the

[c]ommission; they alone finance[d] its activities.” Id. Thus,

“[i]n a very real sense, . . . the [c]ommission represent[ed] the

[s]tate’s growers and dealers and provide[d] the means by

which they express[ed] their collective views and protect[ed]

their collective interests.” Id. at 345. Third, the interests of the

commission were closely tied to those of its constituency in the

pending litigation. See id.

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This court’s application of Hunt in American Legal

Foundation is instructive. We held that ALF, a “media

watchdog” group, could not assert associational standing on

behalf of members of the public who regularly consume news

broadcasts. ALF, 808 F.2d at 90. The court found that ALF

could not satisfy the first prong of Hunt because it “serve[d] no

discrete, stable group of persons with a definable set of

common interests.” Id. Rather, the court explained, “ALF’s

constituency of supporters is completely open-ended” and

could conceivably include “all who read newspapers, watch

television, or listen to the radio.” Id. Turning to Hunt’s second

prong, ALF failed to satisfy the court that its “‘supporters’

play[ed] any role in selecting ALF’s leadership, guiding ALF’s

activities, or financing those activities.” Id. ALF also failed the

third prong of Hunt because “a definable membership body

whose resources and wishes help steer the organization’s

course” is a prerequisite to ensuring the organization’s fortunes

are tied to those of its constituency. Id.

Following Hunt and American Legal Foundation, this

court has declined claims of associational standing based on an

organization’s “past work with various groups of individual

investors,” Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25, and a magazine’s

relationship with its “readers and subscribers,” see Gettman v.

DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We have also

rejected claims of associational standing where it was

“unclear” whether the organization was “the sort of

organization that would qualify as a ‘membership association’

for purposes of our standing analysis.” Sorenson Commc’ns,

LLC v. FCC, 897 F.3d 214, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted); see also, e.g., Viasat, 47 F.4th at 782 (denying

associational standing where the organization provided “no

basis to determine whether the requisite elements of standing

have been met”).

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Here, too, Appellants fail to satisfy the requirements of

associational standing under Hunt and its progeny.

C. Appellants Fail to Establish that PEER or CEH Is

the Functional Equivalent of a Traditional

Membership Organization

As discussed, Appellants argue that PEER and CEH have

standing to represent the interests of their employees,

supporters, and Boards of Directors “based on their

[employees’] responsibilities and roles in the organization.” Br.

of Appellants 28. However, this court has never held that such

influence suffices to make an employee the “functional

equivalent” of a member on whose behalf the organization may

assert associational standing. For the reasons discussed below,

we decline to do so here.

First, PEER and CEH cannot claim their employees as

“members” under the first prong of Hunt. In Hunt, the state

commission satisfied the inquiry because “its purpose [was] the

protection and promotion of the” state’s apple growers and

dealers, who were, in turn, “the primary beneficiary of its

activities.” 432 U.S. at 344. Here, by contrast, neither PEER

nor CEH claims that its purpose is to advance the interests of

its employees as such, nor that its employees are the primary

beneficiaries of its work. Rather, PEER purports to “speak[] on

behalf of environmental and public health professionals, land

managers, scientists, enforcement officers, and other civil

servants dedicated to upholding environmental laws and

values.” Compl. ¶ 31, J.A. 13-14. Meanwhile, CEH claims to

“work to protect people and the environment from toxic

chemicals by engaging with communities, consumers, workers,

government, and the private sector to demand and support

business practices that are safe for public and environmental

health.” Id. ¶ 26, J.A. 12.

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In neither case are employees the constituency whose

interests define the organization’s mission. Nor could they be.

Employees serve as the means by which an organization acts,

not the constituency it represents. Treating them as “members”

would collapse the distinction between representative (the

organization and its agents) and represented (the members) that

Hunt presupposes.

Without any sort of distinction between representative and

represented, Appellants’ claimed membership also suffers the

defect identified in American Legal Foundation. There, this

court found that the “media watchdog” group’s “constituency

of supporters” was too “open-ended” because it “could,

consistent with [its] ‘institutional commitment,’ purport to

serve all who read newspapers, watch television, or listen to the

radio.” ALF, 808 F.2d at 90. In this case, Appellants have not

identified any distinct group of “supporters” who might reflect

a constituency. And extending PEER and CEH’s already broad

institutional commitments to the “public” to also include their

own employees would render any purported constituency even

more incoherent. In sum, on the record before the court, we

conclude that PEER and CEH do not serve a “discrete, stable

group of persons with a definable set of common interests,” id.,

so as to plausibly support a claim for associational standing.

Second, Appellants cannot rely on their employees’

influence over their employing organizations to satisfy the

second prong of Hunt. Appellants argue that PEER and CEH

satisfy the “indicia of membership” inquiry because they are

“sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence of

those they seek to represent, even though they do not possess

all three indicia of membership considered in Hunt.”

Appellants’ Reply Br. 22 (cleaned up) (quoting Flyers Rts., 957

F.3d at 1362). But the relevant inquiry is not whether

individuals exert some influence over the organization; it is

17

whether the organization is subject to the influence of a

constituency whose interests it exists to represent. See Flyers

Rts., 957 F.3d at 1362. That condition is not met here. Any

influence PEER and CEH’s employees exercise arises from

their roles as employees charged with carrying out

organizational objectives, not from their status as an

independent constituency to whose interests the organizations

are accountable. Influence exercised in service of the

organization’s mission is not the kind of member-driven

control that Hunt contemplates. See 432 U.S. at 344-45

(evaluating whether the commission “represents [its

constituents] and provides the means by which [its

constituents] express their collective views and protect their

collective interests” (emphasis added)). And, as discussed,

Appellants have not “given us . . . insight” into how either

organization relates with its purported supporters. Viasat, 47

F.4th at 781.

Last, as this court observed in American Legal

Foundation, a “definable membership body whose resources

and wishes help steer the organization’s course” is a

prerequisite to establishing a “linkage between [the

organization’s] interest in the outcome of this kind of

litigation and those of its supporters.” 808 F.2d at 90. Here, as

discussed under the first two prongs, Appellants have not

established that either PEER or CEH has a “definable

membership body whose resources and wishes help steer the

organization’s course.” Under these circumstances, it seems

likely that PEER and CEH will “have reasons for instituting a

suit . . . other than to assert rights of” their supporters. Id.

(quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. Allnet Commc’n

Servs., Inc., 806 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Where

such concerns are present, “we cannot conclude, as could

the Hunt Court, that the organization[s] before us [are] the

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functional equivalent[s] of . . . traditional membership

organization[s].” Id.

In American Legal Foundation, our court “counsel[ed]

restraint in straying from the framework of associational

standing crafted in Hunt, even assuming we were at liberty to

do so.” Id. at 91. The same considerations still militate against

an untethered application of Hunt. At the time American Legal

Foundation was decided, the Supreme Court had recently

“reaffirmed the principles [of associational standing]

elaborated in Hunt” in United Automobile Workers v. Brock,

477 U.S. 274 (1986). ALF, 808 F.2d at 91. This court had also

“recently rejected an invitation to relax the requirements for

associational standing articulated in Hunt when doing so

would undermine the ‘theoretical identity’ between

organizations and individuals on which associational standing

is based.” Id. (citing Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr., 806 F.2d

at 1095).

Forty years later, associational standing is so “consistently

applie[d]” and established within our jurisprudence that

challenges to it concern “only the finer points of its operation.”

FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 405 (2024)

(Thomas, J., concurring). At the same time, this court has

consistently adhered to Hunt’s limits. See, e.g., Viasat, 47 F.4th

at 781-82; Sorenson Commc’ns, 897 F.3d at 225; Gettman, 290

F.3d at 435; Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25-26. Here, too,

Appellants fall short of Hunt’s requirements. Thus, permitting

PEER and CEH to proceed would “undermine the ‘theoretical

identity’ between organizations and individuals on which

associational standing is based.” ALF, 808 F.2d at 91.

Although the organizations may be closely aligned with their

employees in an operational sense, they are not identified with

them in the representational sense that Hunt requires.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s

order dismissing the case.

So ordered.