The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-1881C
(Filed: April 28, 2026)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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SCOTT GENE YAHNE, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Scott Gene Yahne, proceeding pro se, raises various claims against
the United States and other parties. See Compl. (ECF 1). The government has moved
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Mot. (ECF 15);
RCFC 12(b)(1), (6). Plaintiff’s response includes a motion to strike the motion to
dismiss, which the government has opposed. See Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss & Mot. to
Strike (ECF 16); Reply & Resp. (ECF 19). Plaintiff has also moved for summary
judgment. See Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF 18). The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The
motion to strike is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The
case is DISMISSED.
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort
claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see
also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Claims that are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3). “In determining jurisdiction, a court
must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United
States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d
795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less
stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused
from meeting jurisdictional requirements.” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x
917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987));
see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to
a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”).
Here, many of Plaintiff’s claims appear to be against parties other than the
United States, including various California state officials. Compl. at 3–4. Even if
Plaintiff was injured by state officers or agencies, this Court cannot hear claims
against defendants other than the United States, see United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 588 (1941), or claims for violation of state law, see Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Some of Plaintiff’s claims against the United States are tort claims. Compl. at
5. But this Court has no jurisdiction over cases that sound in tort. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1).
Some of Plaintiff’s claims allege federal contracts or bonds, or that Plaintiff
was an agent of the United States. Those kinds of claims are at least within this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. But Plaintiff must also satisfy the relevant
pleading standard, which requires Plaintiff to “plead[ ] facts upon which a valid claim
can rest.” El Bey v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 777, 780 (2021) (quoting Stroughter v.
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 755, 760 (2009)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–
78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts suggesting that he was a federal contractor, that he was an agent
of the federal government, or that the United States owes him money on a bond. His
Complaint includes a large volume of exhibits, but none appears to be a federal
contract or bond. They mainly appear, rather, to be documents generated by Plaintiff
himself or by other private parties. He has therefore failed to plead facts sufficient to
support his claim.
In some cases, litigants who fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted are entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaints. But here, Plaintiff
appears to have tried to substantiate his claims against the United States. Nothing
in his pleadings suggests that an opportunity to amend his pleadings would bring a
valid claim to light. Instead the documents Plaintiff has attached suggest that his
claims resemble “sovereign citizen” theories, which are mistaken as a matter of law.
An opportunity to amend would therefore be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
183 (1962); Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Chapman
v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 216, 219 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 15) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to
strike (ECF 16) and motion for summary judgment (ECF 18) are DENIED. The case
is DISMISSED.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
Judge
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