The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-2125C
(Filed: April 29, 2026)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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KYLE WEBSTER, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kyle Webster, proceeding pro se, raises various claims arising from a
rejected deposit at his bank. See Compl. (ECF 1). He has applied for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. See App. (ECF 2). The government has moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has not responded. See Mot. (ECF 7); RCFC 12(b)(1). The
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The motion to
dismiss is GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED.
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort
claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see
also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Claims that are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3). “In determining jurisdiction, a court
must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United
States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d
795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less
stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused
from meeting jurisdictional requirements.” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x
917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987));
see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to
a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”).
Here, even taking the facts in the Complaint as true, Plaintiff has not alleged
that he was harmed by any act or omission attributable to the United States. He
claims that he received a check from the United States, but that when he tried to
deposit it into his bank account, the bank rejected his request, closed his account, and
failed to return the check. Even if Plaintiff was injured by the bank’s actions, this
Court cannot hear claims against defendants other than the United States. See
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941).
Nor does Plaintiff request relief this Court has jurisdiction to provide. Most
claims in this Court must be based on a source of law that, if applicable to the facts,
would require the United States to pay money. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,
1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Plaintiff wants to compel the United States to
investigate his bank, but this Court cannot provide that relief. See Garner v. United
States, No. 25-55C, 2025 WL 2417055, at *1–2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing Santini
v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 724, 727 (2024), and Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831 (1985)). Plaintiff also wants the original check reissued, but he does not identify
the source of the check, why he was entitled to the money in the first place, or why
the United States would be obligated to reissue the check after it was lost by a third
party.
CONCLUSION
The application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) is GRANTED.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 7) is GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
Judge
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