Kang

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

CHRISTINA KANG,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 6:25-cv-528-DNF

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Christina Kang seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claim for

a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and for supplemental security

income benefits. The Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings (“Tr.”

followed by the appropriate page number), and the parties filed legal memoranda

setting forth their positions. Plaintiff also filed a reply brief. As explained below, the

decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED under § 205(g) of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural

History, and the ALJ’s Decision

A. Social Security Eligibility

The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The impairment must be

severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial

gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505–404.1511, 416.905–416.911.

B. Standard of Review

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a

scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderated against the

Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by

substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th

Cir. 2004). In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or

substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole,

taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision.

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Sullivan,

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Unlike findings of fact, the Commissioner’s

conclusions of law are not presumed valid and are reviewed under a de novo

standard. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.

1994); Maldonado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-14331, 2021 WL 2838362, at *2

(11th Cir. July 8, 2021); Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. “The [Commissioner’s] failure

to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning

for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates

reversal.” Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066.

The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ must

determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments from which the

claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s

severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the ALJ finds the

claimant’s severe impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment,

then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

(e)–(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f).

If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine

at step five whether the claimant’s RFC permits her to perform other work that exists

in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). At the fifth step, there are two ways in which the ALJ may

establish whether the claimant is capable of performing other work available in the

national economy. The first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines, and

the second is by the use of a vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004); Atha v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App’x 931, 933

(11th Cir. 2015).

The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Atha, 616 F. App’x

at 933. If the claimant meets this burden, then the burden temporarily shifts to the

Commissioner to establish the fifth step. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the Commissioner presents evidence of other work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able

to perform, only then does the burden shift back to the claimant to prove she is unable

to perform these jobs. Atha, 616 F. App’x at 993.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on

July 23, 2021, and for supplemental security income on July 29, 2021, alleging

disability beginning on May 1, 2020. (Tr. 160-61, 358-67, 373-79). The applications

were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 160-61, 185-86). Plaintiff

requested a hearing, and on July 11, 2024, a hearing was held before Administrative

Law Judge Janet Majon (“ALJ”). (Tr. 90-121). On September 4, 2024, the ALJ

entered a decision finding Plaintiff not under a disability from May 1, 2020, through

the date of the decision. (Tr. 16-32).

Plaintiff requested review of the decision, but the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request on January 30, 2025. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff began this action by

Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on March 25, 2025, and the case is ripe for review. The

parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings. (Doc. 1).

D. Summary of ALJ’s Decision

In this matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of

the Social Security Act through March 31, 2025. (Tr. 18). At step one of the

sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful

activity during the third and fourth quarters of 2022 and the first quarter of 2024.

(Tr. 18-19). The ALJ also found that there was a continuous 12-month period during

which Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity and her remaining

findings addressed this period. (Tr. 19). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

the following severe impairments: “disorder of the skeletal spine; osteoarthrosis,

migraine, carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), peripheral neuropathy, irritable bowel

syndrome (IBS), and disorder of the ligament, muscle and fascia.” (Tr. 19). At step

three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). (Tr. 23).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following

RFC:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R.

§§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can lift and carry

20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand,

and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasional

climbing but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

occasional bending, stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling;

frequent fingering bilaterally; and avoid concentrated

exposures to hazards (i.e. heights and machinery), vibrations,

and extreme heat and extreme cold.

(Tr. 23).

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past

relevant work as a dental assistant, supervisor cashier, and manager retail store. (Tr.

30). The ALJ found that this work did not require the performance of work-related

activities precluded by the RFC. (Tr. 30). Alternatively, the ALJ proceeded to step

five and found that considering Plaintiff’s age (50 on the alleged disability onset

date), education (at least high school), work experience, and RFC, there were jobs

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform. (Tr. 30-31). Specifically, the vocational expert testified that a person with

Plaintiff’s limitations could perform such occupations as:

(1) Office Helper, DOT1 239.567-010, light, SVP 2

(2) Routing Clerk, DOT 222.687-022, light, SVP 2

(3) Photocopy Machine Operator, DOT 207.685-014, light, SVP 2

(Tr. 31). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from May

1, 2020, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 31).

II. Analysis

On appeal, Plaintiff challenges whether the ALJ erred by failing to discuss

Plaintiff’s documented fibromyalgia at any of step of the sequential analysis.

Plaintiff also challenges whether the ALJ erred by failing to account for the total

limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments by not properly evaluating her self-

described limitations. (Doc. 16, p. 4). Basically, Plaintiff raises two arguments. First

the ALJ erred in failing to consider Plaintiff’s documented fibromyalgia and second,

1 DOT refers to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective statements. The Court addresses

each argument in turn.

A. Fibromyalgia

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to mention Plaintiff’s diagnosis

of fibromyalgia in the decision. (Doc. 16, p. 13). It is undisputed that the ALJ did

not mention fibromyalgia in the decision. The question is whether this failure

amounts to error by the ALJ. It does not.

At step two, an ALJ considers the severity of a claimant’s impairments. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of

impairments is not severe “if it does not significantly limit [a claimant’s] physical or

mental ability to do basic work activities” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a). In

other words, a severe impairment is an impairment or combination thereof that

significantly limits a claimant’s abilities to perform basic work activities. See SSR

85-28, 1985 WL 56856, *4 n.1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1522(a), 416.920(c),

416.922(a).

The severity of an impairment “must be measured in terms of its effect upon

ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards

of bodily perfection or normality.” McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th

Cir. 1986). The impairment must also last or be expected to last for a continuous

period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1509,

416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.909. The claimant bears the burden at step two of proving that

she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. O’Bier v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 338 F. App’x 796, 798 (11th Cir. 2009).

This inquiry “acts as a filter in that the finding of any severe impairment ... is

enough to satisfy the requirement of step two and allow the ALJ to proceed to step

three.” Ball v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 714 F. App’x 991, 993 (11th Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted). “Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step

two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe.” Heatly v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010). If any impairment or combination

of impairments qualifies as “severe,” step two is satisfied and the claim advances to

step three. Gray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 550 F. App’x 850, 852 (11th Cir. 2013)

(citing Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987)). “[B]eyond the second

step, the ALJ must consider the entirety of the claimant’s limitations, regardless of

whether they are individually disabling.” Griffin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.

App’x 837, 841-842 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff spends a great deal of time discussing the legal standard to consider

fibromyalgia. (Doc. 16, p. 5-6, 12-14). Plaintiff does not, however, cite evidence in

the record that supports her argument that the ALJ erred in failing to discuss

fibromyalgia. Plaintiff claims that her fibromyalgia impairment is documented, but

fails to show where it is documented in the medical or other records. For this reason

alone, remand is not warranted on this issue.

To be thorough, the Commissioner cites the record to show that two of

Plaintiff’s medical providers included fibromyalgia in a list of Plaintiff’s diagnoses.

(Doc. 20, p. 6 (citing Tr. 736, 1398, 1422, 1431, 1435, 1439, 1443, 1453, 1530)).

While these medical records contain a diagnosis, they contain little discussion of

what symptoms are associated with this diagnosis. Plaintiff also failed to cite any

portions of the medical or other records that demonstrate her diagnosis of

fibromyalgia had an effect on her ability to work. See Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F.

App’x 684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005) (“However, a diagnosis or a mere showing of ‘a

deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality’ is

insufficient; instead, the claimant must show the effect of the impairment on her

ability to work.”) (citation omitted). In other words, these medical records only show

a diagnosis and fail to meet the criteria for finding fibromyalgia is a medically

determinable impairment.2 For these reasons substantial evidence supports the

2 SSR 12-2p contains two sets of criteria for an ALJ to evaluate whether fibromyalgia can be found

to be a medically determinable impairment. The first set of criteria requires that a plaintiff

demonstrate: (1) “[a] history of widespread pain—that is, pain in all quadrants of the body;” . . .

that has persisted (or that persisted) for at least 3 months. The pain may fluctuate in intensity and

may not always be present;”(2) [a]t least 11 positive tender points on physical examination;” and

(3) “[e]vidence that other disorders that could cause the symptoms or signs were excluded.” SSR

12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, *2-3. Under the second set of criteria, a plaintiff must show: (1) “A

history of widespread pain;” (2) “[r]epeated manifestations of six or more FM symptoms, signs,

or co-occurring conditions, especially manifestations of fatigue, cognitive or memory problems

(“fibro fog”), waking unrefreshed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome;” and

ALJ’s findings at step two and at the later steps of the sequential evaluation, and

remand is not warranted.

B. Subjective Statements

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s statements

concerning her limitations in her ability to sit, stand, or walk. (Doc. 16, p. 9). Plaintiff

reported that she had debilitating pain throughout her body – her pain woke her up

at night, she had difficulty lifting her arms and legs, and difficulty doing chores, such

as mopping, doing dishes, and doing laundry. (Doc. 16, p. 8-9). Plaintiff testified

that she had neuropathy in her legs, constant back and neck pain, itching, burning,

numbness, and tingling, and spends most of her day lying down. (Doc. 16, p. 9).

Generally, a claimant may establish that she is disabled through her own

testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Ross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 794

F. App’x 858, 867 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210

(11th Cir. 2005)). In such a case, a claimant must establish: “(1) evidence of an

underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that

confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the

objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be

(3) “[e]vidence that other disorders that could cause these repeated manifestations of symptoms,

signs, or co-occurring conditions were excluded.” SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *3.

reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Id. (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at

1210).

When evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ should consider: (1) the

claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the

claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the

type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication to alleviate pain or

other symptoms; (5) treatment other than medication for relief of pain or other

symptoms; (6) any measures a claimant uses to relieve pain or other symptoms; and

(7) other factors concerning a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due

to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Ross v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 858, 867 (11th Cir. 2019).

The ALJ should consider these factors along with all the evidence of record.

Ross, 794 F. App’x 867. If the ALJ discredits this testimony, then the ALJ “‘must

clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for’ doing so.” Id. (quoting Dyer, 395

F.3d at 1210). The ALJ may consider the consistency of the claimant’s statements

along with the rest of the record to reach this determination. Id. Such findings “‘are

the province of the ALJ,’ and we will ‘not disturb a clearly articulated credibility

finding supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014)). A decision will be affirmed as long as the

decision is not a “broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court]

to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.”

Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted).

In the decision, the ALJ thoroughly summarized Plaintiff’s statements and

testimony. (Tr. 24). The ALJ noted:

Disability is alleged due to back problems, carpal tunnel

syndrome, migraines, severe neuropathy in the legs, all of

which causes chronic low back pain, numbness and tingling

sensation, itchiness, burning, and sharp pain, and difficulty

with grasping, lifting, sitting, walking and standing. Estimated

her capacity for walking was less than a ¼ block, sitting for up

to 10 minutes, standing for 5-10 minutes. She is constantly

changing positions due to pain in the legs. She can lift less than

5 pounds. She has difficulty with holding onto items. She

cannot write. . . . Most comfortable position is lying down with

a heating pad for some relief.

(Tr. 24).

After this summary, the ALJ generally found:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned

finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this

decision.

(Tr. 24).

The ALJ further found that there was no objective evidence to support that

Plaintiff’s impairments were of such a severity as to preclude performing work-

related activities. (Tr. 24). The ALJ then thoroughly summarized the medical

records. (Tr. 24-28). The ALJ recounted when Plaintiff complained of neck and low

back pain, and when her gait and muscle strength were normal. (Tr. 25). The ALJ

noted that some records showed a restricted range of motion along the cervical spine

secondary to pain. (Tr. 25). The ALJ also summarized MRI results, including disc

disease, hemangioma, facet disease, and degenerative disc disease of the spine, and

tenderness in other areas. (Tr. 25-27). The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s pain

management for pain in the neck, lower back, shoulders, and wrists. (Tr. 26). She

also discussed Plaintiff’s visits to the emergency room for tenderness of the lower

back and decreased sensation in the lower extremities, as well as Plaintiff’s normal

range of motion, no muscle weakness, and normal gait. (Tr. 26). The ALJ

summarized more recent medical records from 2023 and 2024, showing Plaintiff

sought treatment for chronic pain in the neck, lower back, ankles, and feet. (Tr. 26-

27). The ALJ considered the x-ray results and examination results. (Tr. 26). She also

discussed medical records relating to Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome and

migraines. (Tr. 27-28).

After considering both Plaintiff’s statements and the medical records, the ALJ

found:

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, they are

inconsistent because the medical evidence fails to substantiate

the asserted limitations or document a level of functional

restriction incompatible with sustained work activity.

Although the evidence documents the claimant suffers from

disorder of the skeletal spine; osteoarthrosis, migraine, carpal

tunnel syndrome (CTS), peripheral neuropathy, irritable bowel

syndrome (IBS), and disorder of the ligament, muscle and

fascia, it fails to support a finding that these conditions have

functionally restricted the claimant to a level incompatible with

sustained work activity within the limitations of the assessed

residual functional capacity.

Due to the effects of claimant's physical impairments, the

undersigned conclude the claimant can do light work with the

additional limitations described in the residual functional

capacity above. Subjective complaints of functional limitations

are disproportionate to the medical evidence and are not fully

consistent considering both medical and other evidence of

record. (20 C.F.R. [§§] 404.1529, 416.929).

(Tr. 28).

The ALJ explained that treatment notes showed Plaintiff was not

dysfunctional. (Tr. 29). She found the records reflected that generally Plaintiff

walked with a normal gait, had normal muscle strength, had no motor or sensory

deficits, retained normal range of motion in extremities, did not require additional

back or neck surgery, and even though more recent records showed an antalgic gait,

no assistive devices were required for support or ambulation. (Tr. 29). Also,

injections were helpful in controlling her pain and her migraines were well

controlled. (Tr. 29). The ALJ concluded:

Physical examinations do not reflect a disabling level of

limitation due to the claimant’s physical impairments. Medical

evidence does not suggest greater exertional or nonexertional

limitations. Although the claimant alleged disabling physical

impairments, she remained functional and acknowledged the

ability to perform a robust range of routine activities of daily

living independently. Claimant remained capable of

performing significant work-related activities and showed a

physical capacity for activities consistent with a range of light

work.

(Tr. 29).

Finally, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the

evidence that shows an ability to work and handle a “wide range of activities of daily

living.” (Tr. 29). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to work during the relevant

period at both substantial and non-substantial gainful levels despite her physical

impairments. (Tr. 29). Earlier in the decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff could pay

bills, count change, use a checkbook, handle a savings account, shop for groceries,

go to doctor’s appointments, buy pet supplies, and buy household items. (Tr. 21).

She also drives a car and was working at a mall at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 21).

In thoroughly summarizing the medical and other evidence of record, the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s daily activities, the location duration frequency and intensity

of her pain, aggravating factors, her medications, and other treatments to relieve the

pain. The ALJ clearly articulated reasons why she found Plaintiff’s subjective

statements of her limitations not entirely consistent with the medical and other

evidence of record, and the Court cannot disturb this finding.

In essence, Plaintiff invites the Court to reweigh the evidence, which it cannot

do. A court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771

F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). “The ALJ need not refer to every piece of evidence

in his decision, so long as a reviewing court can conclude that the ALJ considered

the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.” /d. Even if the evidence preponderates

against the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s decision. Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5

F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). The ALJ thoroughly considered the record as a

whole and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision in evaluating Plaintiff's

subjective statements.

HI. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standard. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The

Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, terminate

all deadlines, and close the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 10, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties