Cosenza v. Northey CA5

Filed 4/29/26 Cosenza v. Northey CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CORY EDWARDS COSENZA,

F089590

Plaintiff and Respondent,

(Super. Ct. No. 19FL-0587)

v.

KENDRA DAWN NORTHEY, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Mark Skinner,

Judge.

Law Office of John C. Umscheid and John C. Umscheid, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Maroot, Hardcastle & Jolly and Timothy W. Jolly, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and DeSantos, J.

In this family law matter, Kendra Northey and Cory Cosenza litigated the issue of

legal and physical custody of their minor daughter K.C., as well as the issue of whether

K.C. would start kindergarten and attend school in Clovis (Fresno County), where

Northey lived, or in the Hanford-Lemoore area (Kings County), where Cosenza lived.

After a court trial, the family court awarded sole legal and physical custody to Cosenza

and ordered that K.C. attend school in Kings County. The court ordered that K.C. would

spend alternate weekends with Northey. Northey appealed. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

General Background

Cosenza (father) and Northey (mother) met in 2018. K.C. was born in July 2019.

At the time, Cosenza and Northey were living with Cosenza’s mother, Marsha Farrell, in

Hanford. In November 2019, Northey moved out of Farrell’s home and relocated to her

parents’ house in Clovis. Shortly thereafter, sometime in 2020, Northey moved back in

with Farrell and Cosenza. She stayed for a period “[b]etween six and seven months,”

before relocating to her parents’ house again in January 2021.

Since that time, Northey has continued to live with her parents in Clovis. As for

Cosenza, he has moved a few times since 2021, but has remained in the Hanford area.

Cosenza has been in a relationship with April G. (April) since approximately 2021; they

are not married. Cosenza and April live together, along with April’s two young sons.

Cosenza initiated the instant child custody case in the Kings County Superior

Court on October 18, 2019, when he and Northey were living at Farrell’s house in

Hanford after K.C.’s birth. Cosenza explained, at a subsequent hearing, his rationale for

doing so: “[Northey] always threatened to leave and take [K.C.] with her, and so I

wanted to get that taken care of with the orders so that way if she did ever leave I would

have custody of or joint custody of [K.C.]” Cosenza’s initiation of the case led Northey

to move out of Farrell’s house the first time around.

2.

The clerk’s transcript—which is very sparse and basically consists of the register

of actions in the matter1—indicates that the family court issued various custody orders

since the case was initiated. It appears a custody order was filed on February 18, 2020,

specifying joint legal and joint physical custody, with a 2-2-3 time sharing schedule. The

order was subsequently modified after a hearing held on March 29, 2022; the modified

order was filed on July 15, 2022.2

Like the family court’s prior order, the July 15, 2022 order also provided for joint

legal custody and joint physical custody, with equal time shares on a 2-2-3 schedule.

However, the July 15, 2022 order qualified the award of joint legal custody with respect

to the child’s medical care. Specifically, the order awarded Cosenza sole authority to

make the final decision in any dispute concerning K.C.’s medical care.

The family court’s July 15, 2022 order noted there was a high degree of

contentiousness between the parents. The order indicated the court was seriously

concerned about the parties’ ongoing inability to co-parent amicably. In addition, the

order emphasized improper behavior on Northey’s part. Pursuant to the July 15, 2022

order, Northey completed a “co-parenting class,” an “anger management class,” and a

“high conflict class.” Thereafter, on May 10, 2024, the family court restored unqualified

joint legal custody to both parents.

Under the parties’ preexisting 2-2-3 custody schedule, when K.C. was with her

mother, she attended a daycare/preschool facility in Fresno at which her mother worked.

When she was with her father, she attended a different daycare/preschool facility in

Hanford. This arrangement would no longer be feasible as of August 2024, when K.C.

was due to start kindergarten.

1 Aside from the register of actions, the clerk’s transcript only contains the

custody order filed on February 3, 2025, which is the subject of the instant appeal.

2 Neither the February 18, 2020 order, nor the July 15, 2022 order, are in the

record on appeal, but both are reflected on the register of actions.

3.

Given the impending question of where K.C. would enroll in kindergarten—

Fresno County or Kings County—on March 5, 2024, Northey filed a request for order

seeking sole legal custody and sole physical custody of K.C., with visitation for Cosenza

on alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Northey

requested that K.C. be allowed to enroll in kindergarten in Clovis in Fresno County, at an

elementary school in the Clovis Unified School District. As noted, Northey lived at her

parents’ house, which was in the Clovis Unified School District.

The record suggests while Northey’s March 5, 2024 request for order was

pending, K.C. started kindergarten in August 2024 at Akers Elementary School located

on Naval Air Station Lemoore, pursuant to a temporary or interim court order from May

2024.3 The parents maintained the 2-2-3 time sharing arrangement even after K.C.

started school, pending resolution of Northey’s March 5, 2024 request for order.

Pursuant to a prior, longstanding court order, the parents would meet at the Selma

police station to exchange K.C. During Northey’s custodial periods, Northey would

leave home at 6:15 a.m. on school days to drive K.C. to the Selma police station

(approximately a 30-minute drive); the exchange time was 7:00 a.m. Usually, April

(Cosenza’s partner) would meet Northey there to collect K.C. and drive her to school on

the air base in Lemoore, along with April’s own two children.4 At the end of the day,

April, Farrell, or Cosenza would drive K.C. to the Selma police station by 6:00 p.m. (the

evening exchange time); Northey would collect K.C. from there and drive her to

Northey’s home in Clovis. These were long and tiring days for K.C., with a lot of driving

3 The May 2024 order is not itself in the record on appeal; however, it is referred

to in the reporter’s transcript of the underlying trial.

4 April worked at Naval Air Station Lemoore and hence would drive the children

to school on the base.

4.

time.5 The status quo—that is, a 2-2-3 custody schedule—was not tenable in the long

term, at least during the school year.

The family court eventually held a contested hearing or court trial on Northey’s

March 5, 2024 request for order. The trial took place on October 18, 21, 24 and 25, 2024,

and November 15, 2024. Both parties were represented by counsel.

At the trial, Northey testified on her own behalf and called her mother and father

as additional witnesses. As for Cosenza, he testified on his own behalf and called his

mother as an additional witness. Both parties also questioned Edward Coronado, a Kings

County Superior Court child custody recommending counselor, who conducted a child

custody counseling session with the parties on May 23, 2024. Coronado had prepared a

report and recommendation based on his session with the parties; the report was filed

with the court on July 8, 2024. The report was admitted into evidence at trial but is not in

the record on appeal.

Trial Evidence: Testimony of K.C.’s Parents and Family Members

At the time of the underlying trial in this matter, Cosenza worked as a tow truck

driver. His partner, April, worked in some capacity at Naval Air Station Lemoore.

Northey worked at a daycare/preschool facility in Fresno.

Although K.C. had started kindergarten at Akers Elementary, Cosenza and

Northey did not independently have the right to access Naval Air Station Lemoore, and

by extension, Akers Elementary. Rather, they were able to access the base through

April’s sponsorship. Cosenza testified that he had access to the base through April’s

sponsorship and that Northey had “the same base access” through April’s sponsorship.

5 Northey’s father testified that K.C.’s demeanor at the exchanges changed after

she started kindergarten. Specifically, he stated she seemed tired, given “[s]he’s driving

three hours a day back and forth.” He acknowledged, however, that her demeanor may

well be different on the days she stayed with Cosenza in Hanford, which would not entail

such long days for her.

5.

Cosenza further testified that there was no obstacle to him and Northey maintaining their

access to the base. Northey testified she had gone to the school on one occasion to pick

K.C. up for an appointment, without any problem; there had not yet been any occasion

when she needed access but was blocked. Northey also testified she had access to K.C.’s

teachers through an app used by the school.6 In addition, Northey testified that Cosenza

usually informed her through the Talking Parents app when K.C. was picked up from

school. The record indicates that Cosenza and Northey’s base passes needed to be

periodically renewed. Northey’s base pass expired during the trial and was in the process

of being renewed.

Cosenza had long workdays. While he was an involved father to K.C., he also

relied on April’s help in managing many tasks related to caring for K.C., including

transporting her to and from school, taking her to medical appointments, and

communicating with her school. Cosenza also handled such tasks himself, but April

would assist when Cosenza had to work. In addition, Cosenza’s mother helped with

taking care of K.C. during the child’s time in Cosenza’s custody. Similarly, during

Northey’s custodial time with K.C., Northey’s parents would assist her in caring for the

child, as Northey had a fulltime job.7 Northey was also an involved parent.

Northey and Northey’s mother testified to a negative view of Cosenza’s ability to

provide a stable and healthy environment for K.C. As for Cosenza, he was asked whether

he had “any issues with … how [Northey] treats [K.C.] in her care”; he responded “[n]ot

often.”

Northey acknowledged she and Cosenza had a contentious history in terms of

making medical decisions for K.C., including over whether she needed speech therapy,

6 Northey testified: “[K.C.’s] teachers are very nice. I have very good contact

with them. But she has no relationship to any of the naval stuff.”

7 Northey’s father and mother had jobs too; they worked as a water manager and

medical assistant, respectively.

6.

whether she needed allergy medication, and whether to give her Tylenol. Cosenza agreed

that making medical decisions for K.C. was an area of friction. Northey testified that

should Cosenza be awarded sole legal custody she did not believe “[K.C.] would be taken

care of properly” and “would [not] be safe.” Northey testified that K.C.’s immunizations

were not up to date because Cosenza refused to make the necessary appointment.

Cosenza disputed Northey’s characterization and stated K.C.’s immunizations were up to

date and introduced her immunization record into evidence. Northey testified that when

the court had previously given Cosenza sole authority to make the final decision as to

K.C.’s medical care, he did not collaborate with Northey or keep her fully informed.

The respective testimony of Northey and Northey’s mother further reflected they

had a particularly contentious relationship with April. Both Northey and Northey’s

mother testified about several negative interactions with April and about observing April

physically pull K.C. away from Northey or being rigid with K.C. at exchanges. Northey

also accused April of speeding and failing to observe flashing red lights at a railroad

crossing, with K.C. in the car. Northey’s father, who had regularly interacted with April

and Cosenza at exchanges over several years, had a different perspective. He testified he

had no problems with them; he stated: “They act very good with me.”

Northey’s counsel presented court documents (i.e., a criminal complaint and a

minute order) showing that in 2018, April reached a plea deal regarding a violation of

Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b) (misdemeanor child endangerment/abuse),

resulting in a sentence of probation; the family court took judicial notice of the

documents. The documents at issue are not in the record on appeal and the record is

devoid of any factual details regarding the conduct underlying the misdemeanor

conviction. Nor does it appear, based on the court’s description of the documents as

reflected in the record, that they encompassed factual details of the underlying conduct.

Northey testified that she had not brought up April’s misdemeanor conviction to the

7.

court’s attention in any prior proceeding. Cosenza testified, to the contrary, that the issue

was raised in prior court proceedings.

Northey also testified that Cosenza had told her that he and April were married;

however, shortly thereafter she discovered they were not married. She added Cosenza

nonetheless continued subsequently to assert for some time that they were indeed

married. Cosenza’s mother testified that although Cosenza and April were not married,

they had conducted a commitment ceremony.

Cosenza’s mother further testified that shortly after Northey moved out of her

house the first time and relocated to her parents’ house in Clovis, Northey was physically

attacked by her brother (this happened in 2020). Northey texted Cosenza’s mother at the

time to tell her about her brother’s conduct; the text message in question was admitted

into evidence (however, it is not in the record on appeal). This incident was the catalyst

that prompted Northey to move back in with Cosenza and his mother. When Northey

was asked about this incident, she acknowledged she had an altercation with her brother

but noted her brother now “lives in his own house” about “45 minutes to 50 minutes

away.”

Trial Evidence: Testimony of Child Custody Recommending Counselor

Edward Coronado, a child custody recommending counselor (CCRC) at the family

court, testified in this matter. The parties stipulated that Coronado was an expert in the

area of child custody recommending counseling. Coronado conducted a child custody

recommending counseling session with Cosenza and Northey jointly, on May 23, 2024.8

The primary question was where K.C. would attend school. Coronado prepared a written

8 Coronado informed the parties that should they agree to a custody plan, it would

be submitted to the family court for approval; Coronado’s role would be limited to

making a recommendation on points where no agreement was reached. Coronado

clarified that the final decision would be made by the court.

8.

report and custody recommendation that was filed with the court on July 8, 2024, and

subsequently admitted into evidence at trial.

Although Coronado’s report is not in the record on appeal, the record reveals the

parameters of his custody recommendation. Coronado recommended that K.C.’s best

interests would be served by attending school in Kings County and an award of sole legal

and physical custody to Cosenza. Coronado further recommended that K.C. reside with

Northey on the first, third, and when applicable, fifth weekends of every month, from

6:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Coronado testified his “recommendation

was based on what [he] perceived to be the best interest of the child.” Coronado

acknowledged his recommendation was that the child spend more time in Cosenza’s care

than Cosenza had initially asked for (see below).

Coronado testified: “Mother’s request was sole legal and physical custody of the

child [with mother] and for the child to reside with father on alternate weekends from

Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.” Coronado also testified: “[T]he mother

stated she resided in Clovis, California in Fresno County. And reported that the

education and the school would be superior or better than any of the schools in Kings

County. So she was wanting to have her child reside with her primar[ily] so the child

could attend the schools in Clovis Unified School District.”

Coronado also described Cosenza’s request: “[F]ather’s request was to seek sole

legal custody of the child [and share] joint physical custody of the child with the mother.

The child would reside with the mother on the first, second, fourth and fifth weekend of

each month. From Friday at 6:00 [p.m.] until … 7:00 p.m. on Sunday. During the

summer[,] he proposed that the parents would share … alternate weeks with exchanging

the child on Friday at 7:00 p.m.”

Coronado confirmed Cosenza was offering joint physical custody as well as more

time with Northey during the school year and in the summer than Northey was offering

him. As for Cosenza’s request for sole legal custody, Coronado added: “[T]he father

9.

stated that he was seeking sole legal [custody] because he wanted to avoid having the

challenge of having conflict and further disagreement with the mother.” Cosenza had

indicated there had been disagreements as to “the school where the child would attend

and also issues with medical.”

Both parties completed intake forms during the counseling session with Coronado.

The forms showed that Northey did not allege any domestic violence on the part of

Cosenza. Coronado stated that Cosenza indicated on his intake form that he was married.

Cosenza further indicated he wanted K.C. to attend school at Akers Elementary on the

naval air base in Lemoore.

Coronado’s review of the case indicated a history of disagreement and conflict

between the parents. Coronado indicated that during the counseling session, Northey

noted she believed Cosenza did not attend to K.C.’s cleanliness or hygiene. Coronado

further noted that Northey’s tone during the counseling session was “angry and upset.”

He indicated, as reflected in his report, that Northey lost her temper and was unable to

regain control until she had expressed every negative view she had of Cosenza. He

further indicated that Northey continued to demonstrate outright anger and disrespect

towards Cosenza. Coronado acknowledged that Northey’s behavior during the

counseling session was a major factor in his ultimate custody recommendation. He

indicated, as reflected in his report, that the level of hostility demonstrated by Northey

towards Cosenza militated in favor of an award of sole legal custody to Cosenza, based

on the best interests of K.C.

Coronado explained in detail the reasoning underlying his recommendation that

Cosenza be awarded sole legal custody. He stated:

“The recommendation was for sole legal for father … because of the

behavior that was manifested in the session. Mother … started to have a

discussion with father [regarding] the reasons why … he’s [an] unfit father

[given] how the child was received from him to her. Including soiled and

so on. Mother continued to explain and be starting to insult and belittle the

10.

father. I listened hop[ing] she can gather herself … [¶] What I found was

the mother was very upset with the father and she … continued to berate

and belittle him in the session. And uhm, that went on. When reviewing

the case I saw that at one point there was a [temporary] restraining order for

domestic violence … against the mother. Father was struck by the mother.

Then [what] we saw in [the] session she was very upset and angry and

started to belittle the father. Based on her request it appears that the father

was more willing to share than the mother. The father did offer more …

custodial time with the mother in his proposal. He’s also proposing joint

physical custody. So the reasoning behind the recommendation that I made

was that … this parent was the willing party to share.

“And that there was some issue with the mother and her behavior,

although on mother’s behalf she did report that she completed an anger

management class and also a parenting class. After she had finished

speaking to the father I did ask the mother could she recall what was

learned and discussed in the anger management class and she stated [a]

couple [of] things of taking breaths. And then I asked her what she [did in]

the co-parenting class. She made a statement about that. I asked that

because I wanted to see if she was able to use any of the tools that were

brought from the anger management class and the parenting class. And

after what was manifested and then also knowing that in father’s report he

did report that there was domestic violence between the mother and him.

Where as the mother did not report that there was domestic violence and

then in court review we found that there was a temporary restraining order

for a short amount of time against the mother. So based on all this

assessment the recommendation was then made for what we have.”

At another point in his testimony, Coronado reiterated this reasoning, stating: “If

[the mother is] demonstrating hostile behavior [towards the father] in front of a person

she just met for [a custody counseling] session … we don’t know if she is demonstrating

hostile behavior in front of the child when she’s on the phone with the father or

communicating with the father in person. So that’s why the recommendation for sole

legal custody was made. Because of the arguments regarding medical [care] and

education.” Coronado noted that when a parent models improper behavior to a child,

there is a risk the child will begin to mimic it. Coronado also clarified that Cosenza did

not exhibit any hostility towards Northey during the counseling session or exhibit other

improper behavior.

11.

Coronado further testified, as also reflected in his report, that should Northey

remain on the same course, there was a potential that agency-supervised visitation would

be necessitated as to her, in the future. He explained: “Not necessarily now. But in

[time] if whatever this Court orders with regard to custody and visitation[,] if … the

parties were to refile and come back down to CCRC … that would be taken [into]

consideration as a possible recommendation.” He added: “But with this, [we] want the

parties to know that the way they have been handling things cannot continue for the best

interest of this child. This child would be exposed to further verbal abuse between the

parties or the mom to the father and if the mother was able to express herself in [that]

manner … in front of me at the CCRC session what happens at home one can only

imagine.”

Coronado continued: “[A]lthough I’m not there so I cannot say for sure, but if that

happened in the Family Court Services then this is modeled behavior for a child. So

that’s why we don’t want that. We don’t want the agency to have supervised visits with

the mother … this is possible if it continues and doesn’t get better.… What’s in the best

interest for their child.” As to this point, Coronado concluded: “The hope … with this

recommendation is that the parties could reach a point where they can set aside the

acrimony and work together to be coparents. That’s what we want. That’s what the

whole goal is.”

Coronado noted that the intake forms contained a question to the effect, “has

anyone you lived with ever been arrested or convicted, [or] charged with a crime,” which

Cosenza had answered in the affirmative. Cosenza had further indicated that April had

been involved in a criminal matter in Kings County, but it was eventually dropped.

Coronado said he did not further investigate the information provided by Cosenza.

Northey’s counsel then asked Coronado: “[W]ould you say further investigation

[w]ould be needed before [your] recommendation [sh]ould be relied upon?” Coronado

responded: “Not necessarily. Because as I stated the parties have had orders prior. And

12.

I didn’t read [in] any of the prior orders that this was an issue.” Coronado added:

“What’s at issue is the parents not [being] able to get along and the hostility that they

have and the best interest in parenting the child. Now if it’s a concern, that the father’s

partner … did a crime 5 [years ago] or whatever the timeframe, why is the mother still

proposing the father have visitation if there’s such a concern of who he lives with and

how the child’s exposed?” Coronado continued: “Why is it a concern now when even in

[the mother’s] proposal … she’s still proposing the child goes to the father’s house where

this individual lives?” Coronado concluded, “That’s not a concern [for her].”

Family Court’s Post-hearing Custody Order

On February 3, 2025, the family court issued a detailed, written custody order.

The court stated at the top of its order that in reaching its decision, it considered 13

documentary exhibits that were admitted into evidence at trial; none of the exhibits

admitted into evidence at trial are in the record on appeal.

The family court adopted the custody recommendation of CCRC Coronado,

concluding that K.C.’s “best interests are served by attending school in Kings County and

an award of sole legal and physical custody to Father.” Pursuant to the order, K.C. would

“reside with Mother on the 1st, 3rd, and when applicable the 5th Friday of every month

from 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.” The court’s order added a provision to CCRC

Coronado’s recommendation “giving mother the right to authorize emergency medical

care when the minor child is with her.” We next summarize the court’s detailed and

thorough order.

In its post-hearing custody order, the family court began by delineating the prior

custody orders of February 18, 2020, and July 15, 2022. With respect to the February 18,

2020 order, the court noted it was “a joint legal and joint physical order with substantially

equal time spent with each parent,” on “a 223 visitation schedule.” The court stated:

“The order also provides for a ‘No Move Hold’ and defines the primary home [as

Farrell’s home in] Hanford.” The court added: “While the court is unsure what a ‘no

13.

move hold’ is intended to be, the court will find that the child has resided in Kings

County primarily and spent a substantially equal time in Clovis (Fresno County) since

Mother moved to Clovis.”

The family court also took note of the modified custody order of July 15, 2022,

which was necessitated because of ongoing “difficulty in sharing joint legal custody and

managing the child’s medical concerns.” Under the July 15, 2022 order, “sole decision

making authority [was] awarded to father regarding medical decisions.” The court

observed: “In considering the evidence[,] the court is mindful of both the circumstances

that resulted in the July 15th order and the subsequent accomplishments of Mother that

resulted in a restoration of joint legal custody,” pursuant to a May 10, 2024 order.

As for physical custody, the family court pointed out: “The parties have operated

under the 223 plan with amendments until present.” The court observed: “[Essentially,]

[t]he parents have been sharing a substantially equal time share while the child was not of

school age. She is now at the age where she [needed] to be enrolled in school which

triggered the need for a decision in this case.” The court added: “This case is not a

‘move away’ case in the normative sense. The child is already well situated in both

homes. The substantial change in circumstance in this case is the need to set a child

sharing schedule that accommodates the child’s need to attend compulsory education.

The result will be that one parent’s time with the child will be reduced in order to

accommodate the child’s educational needs in the coming years.”

The family court further noted: “The court, in reviewing the file, does not find an

express statement that a permanent order has been issued. It also appears from the file

that there is substantial conflict that has not diminished, and the court has been

continuously involved in administering the custody and visitation plan because the parties

have demonstrated a consistent inability to self-manage their post separation relationship

as well as the co-parenting relationship necessary to share custody.”

14.

The family court observed: “In evaluating the best interest of the child[,] the court

must examine the parties[’] ability to share in parenting responsibilities. This is one of

the aspects of the court’s consideration of the best interests of the child. Family Code

[section] 3020[, subdivision] (b) provides, in part, that ‘it is the public policy of this state

… to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing.’ ”

Next, the family court summarized the evidence presented at trial. First, the court

summarized CCRC Coronado’s testimony as follows:

“Mr. Coronado testified about his observations during the process of

interviewing the parents. He indicated that Mother’s behavior was

concerning. Mother claimed Father was unfit as a parent, demonstrated

that she was very upset and continued to berate and diminish Father. He

described her affect as upset and angry in contrast to Father who did not

demonstrate hostility. When asked if Mother raised her voice

Mr. Coronado indicated she became clearly upset, her tone changed

demonstrating her anger and upset. She lost control of her temper and was

unable to regain control until she ran out of steam. Mr. Coronado further

indicated that if conditions did not improve with Mother that supervision

may be required. He further stated that this manner of handling temper

cannot continue. He further opined that this conduct could impact the

minor if mother does not change. In the report on page 6 of 10,

Mr. Coronado opines, ‘This counselor has taken into consideration the

Mother’s behavior, and if it does not improve, a recommendation of

agency-supervised visits with the child may be considered.’ ”

The family court then addressed the testimony of Northey’s mother, whom the

court designated as the “Maternal Grand Mother” or “MGM.” The court stated:

“The court in hearing [MGM’s] testimony, was concerned that [MGM] and

her daughter are e[n]meshed. Mother lives in the MGM’s home and the

MGM often acts in the role of a primary parent toward the minor child.

MGM and Mother are both hostile to Father and believe he is not capable

of caring for the minor child. They both are hostile to Father[’]s significant

other[,] April [G.] The court heard testimony that clearly indicates that the

minor child is safe and well cared for within the MGM’s home. The court

is confident that if the child were to primarily live with Mother at the

MGM’s home that the child would be appropriately cared for by the adults

in her life. The court’s concern is with the effect of the continued hostility

of Mother and unfortunately the mirrored hostility of the MGM toward

15.

Father. This hostility had the appearance of stigma based on the perception

of lower socio-economic class status of Father and his extended family. [¶]

… The MGM credibly testified that there has been conflict between herself

and April [G.] The hostility is clearly mutual and problematic.”

Thereafter, the family court addressed the testimony of Northey’s father, whom

the court designated as the maternal grandfather or MGF. The court observed:

“[MGF] testified as well. He appeared to be a stable influence on the family. He is

credible. He testified that the minor child treats the MGF’s home [as] ‘home.’ The

minor often was upbeat before exchanges but preferred to stay home [i.e., at MGF’s

home].… [MGF] indicated that he has not had any problems at exchanges. The court

was relieved that his testimony did not include the constant disparagement of Father and

[had] the appearance of the ability to cooperate for the sake of the child. The court was

well pleased with his involvement in the child’s life and encourages the maintenance of

this relationship.”

The family court moved on to summarizing Northey’s testimony. The court

noted:

“Kendra Northey, Mother, testified. Her testimony is best

summarized as a list of complaints against father and his family. She at no

point indicated that she was anything but disappointed with him and his

family. She indicated that she was very upset with [online] postings by

April [G.] (Exhibit 7). This post is seeking funds for the legal battle to

keep the child (her stepdaughter) with her and Father, [and] is in very poor

taste and clearly is a contributor to the hostility between the members of the

family. It was clearly an unwise move and reflects poorly on [April’s]

judgment and maturity. In the court’s opinion the post was not illegal but

creates a problem for the court as it is clear that [April] is directly involved

with the child and this incident reflects adversely on her ability to occupy a

‘quasi-parental’ role in the child’s life with [her own] children.

“[April] is further compromised by her criminal history. The court

takes judicial notice of its own records, files and order [from her criminal

case]. Specifically, the complaint … and [the] minutes [of the plea hearing

and sentencing]. In the criminal matter[,] [April] plead[ed] to a violation of

Penal Code [section] 273a[, subdivision] (b)[.] [April] was ordered to four

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years formal probation with conditions including attending a Child Abusers

Treatment Counseling Program.

“The court has no credible evidence from either party suggesting

that [April] has had further problems with the law or other events reflecting

very poor judgment. Mother believes that [April] is occupying a parental

role with the minor child. This is likely true based on the degree that Father

relies on [April] to participate in family decision making and to secure and

schedule appointments to manage the needs of the family.

“Mother appeared to be insistent on establishing that Father and

[April] are not married. It is likely that her intent was to prove that Father

and [April] are lying. The court does not find the marital status of [April]

and Father useful or critical to evaluating the relationships the child has

with both [April’s] children as well as with [April] herself. The child is

entitled to maintain any safe and healthy relationship she desires within the

context of the family she finds herself. The distinction of whether or not

Father and [April] are married is immaterial if the relationship demonstrates

longevity and permanence. The court has no information that Father is not

in a committed relationship with [April]. The court finds that functionally,

Father’s family is well situated to provide a loving and reasonably safe

environment for all three children in the home. There does not appear to be

any harmful conflict within the household.

[¶] … [¶]

“In reviewing Mother’s testimony it was clearly apparent to the trier

of fact that Mother was evasive, nonresponsive and demonstrated limited or

selective memory. Cross-examination did little to bolster either side on the

testimony adduced but crippled mother’s credibility and demonstrated open

hostility to father and his counsel. The most compelling aspect of the

testimony on cross was the fact that Mother demonstrated in real time her

default mode of dealing with Father. It was hostile and concerning.

“Mother testified [on] cross about an incident that occurred

concerning her brother. There was an incident where Mother had to flee

the home due to violence perpetrated by her brother. The court has

concerns but it appears that this individual is appropriately separated from

the family and the minor child has not been exposed to any danger after the

incident.”

The family court also summarized Cosenza’s testimony. The court stated:

“Father’s testimony established that he is currently employed as a tow truck driver. He

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indicated that he filed the action because Mother had threatened to leave and take the

child. He has a committed relationship with April [G.] and the minor child is a part of the

family and is involved with her ‘stepsiblings.’ April does carry the majority of the

maintenance work load for the family. She is heavily involved in setting appointments

and providing for the daily marshalling of the members of the household[.] His

testimony was not highly probative on the issues above but did establish that he is an

involved parent who cares about his daughter. He is not overly critical of Mother in spite

of the long history of conflict between the two of them.”

The family court next addressed the particulars of the schools proposed by the

parties. The court observed: “Mother has access to the Clovis School District. While

there was little evidence introduced, the Clovis School District has an excellent

reputation in the Central Valley. Father’s proposed school is located on Lemoore Naval

Air Station. As such it is a school located on a secure facility and serves a community of

children of military families. This provides a unique environment that offers its own

advantages. The attendance of the minor child on the base is possible through [April’s]

base employment. Father and Mother will need sponsored access to the base, through

[April], to gain access to the child while on base and the school. Father assured the court

that this is not a problem but it is a step that is needed. In looking at the schools, the

court is satisfied that the child will benefit from an education at either school.”

In addition, the family court noted: “Both parents are employed and have

maintained employment sufficient to provide for the child. Neither parent is avoiding

their respective duty to maintain employment to support the needs of the child.”

Finally, the family court set forth its findings and order. Preliminarily, the court

observed: “In considering this matter the court has considered the court’s orders

contained in the court file, the continuity and stability of the parenting plan, the age of the

child and the willingness of each parent to put the interests of the minor child above the

parents’ individual interests. As indicated herein the court is deeply concerned about the

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level of conflict demonstrated by the Mother and Maternal Grandmother. They … both

demonstrate a strident opposition to Father and any benefit that he might provide to the

Child. Mother in particular has a demonstrated inability to co-parent.” The court added:

“The court has concerns about both households. However, none of the concerns rise to

the level where the minor child is suffering detriment. Both households are sufficient to

meet the minor child’s immediate and long-term needs, and the child is surrounded by

people who love her and seek to protect her.”

The family court continued: “The primary factor after consideration of all the

evidence is the persistent hostility of Mother and the Maternal Grandmother toward

Father and his family. This hostility has been documented in the Court file and was

demonstrated during the CCRC session and then again on the record before the court.

The court shares Mr. Coronado’s concern that, Mother’s behavior, if it does not improve,

may require agency-supervised visits.”

The family court concluded: “Accordingly the court finds that the Minor Child’s

best interests are served by attending school in Kings County and an award of sole legal

and physical custody to Father. The court adopts the recommendation of Mr. Coronado

and adds a provision giving mother the right to authorize emergency medical care when

the minor child is with her.” The court’s order further provided: “The child shall reside

with Mother on the 1st, 3rd, and when applicable the 5th Friday of every month from

6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.”

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Legal Standards

“ ‘ “An application for a modification of an award of custody is addressed to the

sound legal discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be disturbed on appeal

unless the record presents a clear case of an abuse of that discretion.” ’ ” (In re Marriage

of McLoren (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 108, 111–112; see Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26

Cal.4th 249, 255 [custody and visitation orders are subject to the “ ‘deferential abuse of

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discretion test’ ” and must be upheld if “ ‘correct on any basis, regardless of whether such

basis was actually invoked’ ”].) Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion “only if

there is no reasonable basis upon which the trial court could conclude that its decision

advanced the best interests of the child.” (In re Marriage of Melville (2004) 122

Cal.App.4th 601, 610.)

“ ‘The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and

unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a

reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its

discretionary power.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 (Denham);

Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1182.) To establish an abuse of

discretion, the appellant must demonstrate that the court exceeded the bounds of reason.

It is not enough to argue that a different order would also have been within the range of

reason. (Denham, at p. 566.) And it is a “settled rule of appellate review [that] a trial

court’s order/judgment is presumed to be correct, error is never presumed, and the

appealing party must affirmatively demonstrate error on the face of the record.” (People

v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 169, 172.)

In evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion, we also give broad

deference to the trial judge. (Rich v. Thatcher, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) The

trial court’s factual findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (See,

e.g., Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435–436; In re Marriage of Edlund

& Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1473–1474.)

“Under California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation

determinations, the overarching concern is the best interest of the child.” (Montenegro v.

Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255.) “The court has ‘ “the widest discretion to choose a

parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child,” ’ but ‘must look to all the

circumstances bearing on the best interest of the minor child.’ ” (Id. at p. 256; see Fam.

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Code,9 § 3040, subd. (e) [“This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption

for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the

court … the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the

child.”].) “When determining the best interest of the child, relevant factors include the

health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by one parent against the

child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of contact with the parents.”

(Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, at p. 355; see § 3020, subds. (a), (c); see also § 3011 [listing

factors the court shall consider in making a determination of the best interests of the

child].)

We must uphold a court’s custody order if it can be “reasonably concluded that the

order ... advance[s] the ‘best interest’ of the child.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13

Cal.4th 25, 32.) In other words, “ ‘ “[a]n appellate tribunal is not authorized to retry the

issue of custody, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of facts. Only upon a

clear and convincing showing of abuse of discretion will the order of the trial court in

such matters be disturbed on appeal. Where minds may reasonably differ, it is the trial

judge’s discretion and not that of the appellate court which must control.” ’ ” (Catherine

D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931.)

II. Family Court’s Custody Determination Did Not Constitute Abuse of

Discretion

A. Cosenza Requested the Family Court to Adopt Coronado’s

Recommendation

Northey first complains that the family court adopted Coronado’s custody

recommendation in favor of Cosenza even though Cosenza himself “was never seeking

full legal and physical custody of the minor.” Northey is incorrect. Cosenza’s counsel, at

the conclusion of his closing argument, specifically requested the court to adopt

9 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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Coronado’s recommendation that the court award sole legal and physical custody of K.C.

to Cosenza.

Cosenza’s counsel concluded his closing argument as follows: “And at this time

we believe it is in the best interest of [K.C.] to follow [Coronado’s] recommendation and

adopt it.” Northey’s counsel asked for clarification. Cosenza’s counsel repeated: “Well,

in my argument the request is that the recommendation be adopted.” Northey’s counsel

again stated, “I just want to know what you’re asking for.” Cosenza’s counsel reiterated:

“What we’re asking for is in the recommendation. But also what the recommendation

states is in the recommendation, and at this point at the end of this trial we are asking that

the recommendation be adopted.” (Italics added.)

B. The Family Court Properly Considered K.C.’s Best Interests in Making

Its Custody Determination

Northey next argues “the [family] court did not take [K.C.’s] best interests into

consideration” in making its custody determination. (Capitalization omitted.) We

disagree.

The family court’s order is comprehensive and detailed and reflects the court’s

thorough consideration of all the factors that bear on the best interests of K.C. The court

carefully considered multiple documents in the court’s custody file as well as the history

of Northey and Cosenza’s co-parenting relationship reflected therein; the report,

recommendation, and testimony of CCRC Coronado (the parties had stipulated Coronado

was an expert in child custody recommending counseling); the testimony and demeanor

of all trial witnesses, including Northey and Cosenza; the physical altercation between

Northey and her brother; the fact a temporary restraining order had been issued against

Northey in the past on grounds of domestic violence against Cosenza; Cosenza’s

misrepresentation that he and April were married; the contentiousness between Northey

and Northey’s mother on the one hand and April on the other hand; and April’s prior

conviction under Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b), among various other factors.

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It should be noted that the record is silent as to the facts underlying April’s

misdemeanor conviction and no information was presented at trial beyond the fact of the

conviction and sentence. Further, Coronado pointed out that April’s prior conviction did

not appear to be an issue in past custody agreements and orders and that Northey

continued to support weekend visitation with Cosenza at the home he shared with April.

We also note that the documentary exhibits related to April’s prior misdemeanor

conviction are not in the record on appeal.

Finally, the family court was concerned that despite the fact that Northey had been

admonished previously with regard to intemperate conduct and had taken classes to learn

co-parenting skills, she demonstrated such poor conduct at the child custody

recommending counseling session that Coronado raised the possibility that agency-

supervised visitation might be warranted for Northey in the future.

We conclude Northey has not established that the family court’s order was an

abuse of discretion.

C. The Family Court Properly Considered Logistical Issues Related to Akers

Elementary School

Northey further argues the family court abused its discretion in ordering that K.C.

attend school in Kings County, currently Akers Elementary at Naval Air Station

Lemoore. Northey states this placement requires April’s involvement “to provide access

to the school through her employer – a move that seems layered [with] complexity and

potential for complications in the future should [Cosenza and April] separate.”

Cosenza responds: “[Northey’s] concern that [April] might revoke base access …

is based on conjecture about future conflicts, not on a demonstrated problem … and the

mere possibility of a future dispute does not outweigh the trial court’s reasoned judgment

regarding the minor’s educational placement.”

Here, the family court was aware of April’s role in facilitating the parties’ access

to the naval base and, in turn, to Akers Elementary and carefully considered the issue.

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The court noted there were no signs of conflict in Cosenza’s relationship with April.

Moreover, Northey testified there had not been any instance when she needed to go to

Akers Elementary but was unable to access it.

We conclude Northey has not shown the family court abused its discretion in

ordering that K.C. attend school in Kings County.

DISPOSITION

The family court’s February 3, 2025 custody order is affirmed. Each party to bear

his or her own costs on appeal.

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