Sayar v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-1993C

(Filed: April 27, 2026)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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NAZIR A. SAYAR, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Nazir A. Sayar, proceeding pro se, alleged unauthorized use or

manufacture of a patented invention by the United States. See Am. Compl. (ECF 11);

28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). After the government moved to dismiss, see Mot. to Dismiss (ECF

15), Plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint removing the patent

claims and substituting claims for breach of contract, breach of bailment, breach of

the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and just compensation under the Fifth

Amendment. See Opp. & Mot. to Amend (ECF 18); Corr. 2d. Am. Compl. (ECF 24-1).

The United States has opposed, arguing that the amendment would be futile. See

Opp. to Mot. to Amend (ECF 19). Because Plaintiff wishes to withdraw his patent

claims, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Because the claims in the proposed

second amended complaint are untimely, the motion for leave to amend is DENIED.

The case is DISMISSED.

This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on

the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort

claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see

also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal

Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). This Court lacks jurisdiction over claims

outside the statute of limitations — six years, unless a statute provides otherwise.

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2501. The burden is on Plaintiff to establish jurisdiction. Ibrahim v. United States,

112 Fed. Cl. 333, 336 (2013). Claims that are outside the Court’s jurisdiction must be

dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).

“In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts

asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir.

2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a

pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared

by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements.”

Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted)

(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74

Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972))

(explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their]

pleadings”).

The claims in Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint are based on the

government’s failure to return his property after the expiration of contracts in 2012

and 2013. See Corr. 2d. Am. Compl. at 2–4, 5–6. Plaintiff admits that he demanded

return of the property several times in 2012 and 2013, see id. at 4, indicating that he

was aware that the government was retaining his property and believed that he had

a right to have it returned. His claims therefore accrued no later than 2013. Patton

v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 768, 774 (2005) (breach of contract); Hoffmann v. United

States, 17 F. App’x 980, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (breach of bailment); Eden Isle Marina,

Inc. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 372, 488 (2013) (breach of duty of good faith and

fair dealing); Nix v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 260, 266 (2024) (taking). Because he

did not file his complaint until 2025 — twelve years later — his claims are untimely.

Plaintiff argues that his claims did not in fact accrue until later. Accrual of

claims can be suspended when the claim is concealed by the United States or

somehow “inherently unknowable.” E.g., Nix, 174 Fed. Cl. at 266 (quoting Young v.

United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). But Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain

his property after 2012 show that he was aware of his claim all along. Plaintiff’s

allegations in support of delayed claim accrual — i.e., that the United States had sole

access to the property and failed to keep its promises to return — underscore his

knowledge and do not delay accrual. Corr. 2d. Am. Compl. at 4–5.

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CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 15) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to amend (ECF 18) is DENIED. The case is DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge

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