“[T]he preference for warrants is most appropri- ately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.” (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S. Ct. at 591)
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he preference for warrants is most appropri- ately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.” (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S. Ct. at 591)
- “A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants . . . is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- “[P]rosecutors have absolute immunity for all activities that are inti- mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explain- ing that a false arrest claim “cover[s] the time of detention up until the issuance of process or arraignment, but not more” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-13645 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 1 of 15
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-13645
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BLAIR CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DAVID BELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-00444-WFJ-SPF
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Blair Clark sued a police detective for allegedly misleading
prosecutors into charging him with grand theft. The District Court
dismissed Clark’s complaint, finding that the detective had “at least
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
arguable probable cause” to suspect Clark had committed the
crime. Because Clark failed to state a plausible claim for relief, we
affirm.
I.
On February 21, 2025, Clark sued Detective David Bell of
the City of Lakeland, Florida Police Department for one count of
malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. According to Clark,
Detective Bell filed a probable cause affidavit with the State Attor-
ney’s Office that contained false, misleading, and incomplete infor-
mation. Clark alleges the following facts in his complaint.
In early 2022, Alicia Storer reported the theft of certain in-
dustrial equipment, which she had been keeping on Clark’s prop-
erty. The equipment included several forklifts, a “goose neck”
trailer, a fiberglass utility bed, and a skid steer. The complaint fails
to mention why Storer was keeping her equipment on Clark’s
property, whether Clark agreed to watch over the equipment, or
how long it was supposed to remain there. In any event, Storer told
Detective Bell that her equipment was now missing, and that it was
worth approximately $36,000.
Detective Bell came to learn that Storer’s equipment was
physically removed from Clark’s property by a man named Allan
Kitto. Detective Bell interviewed Kitto, who explained that he was
hired by Clark to remove the equipment, that he originally quoted
Clark $18,000 for the removal, and that he agreed to accept receipt
of some of the items in lieu of payment. Kitto then described the
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 3
equipment as “junk” and “not worth more than $3,000.” As to why
Kitto would have agreed to take $3,000 worth of “junk” in lieu of
his $18,000 quote, the complaint leaves us without answer.1
Kitto also said that Storer told Clark the equipment be-
longed to someone else. The complaint does not suggest why
Storer would mislead Clark as to who owned the equipment or
why the equipment’s ownership would impact Clark’s ability to
dispose of it. But, apparently, Detective Bell went back to Storer,
who confirmed that she had lied to Clark about someone else own-
ing the equipment, and that it was in fact hers.
When Clark learned of the investigation, he told Detective
Bell how to reach his attorney, Nick Troiano. On April 18, 2022,
Troiano and Detective Bell spoke on the phone. Troiano said that
Clark would give a statement but only with Troiano present. In the
ensuing weeks, Troiano tried to schedule that meeting, but Detec-
tive Bell never followed up.
On June 13, 2022, Detective Bell filed a probable cause affi-
davit with the State Attorney’s Office.2 There, Detective Bell wrote
1 This omission is relevant because one of Clark’s key allegations is that De-
tective Bell failed to credit Kitto’s $3,000 valuation over Storer’s $36,000 valu-
ation.
2 The probable cause affidavit was attached to a copy of Bell’s motion to dis-
miss. Because the existence of the affidavit and its content are not in dispute,
the District Court properly considered the affidavit in its analysis. See Maxcess,
Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] docu-
ment outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered [on a
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
that “through his investigation,” he became aware of the following
facts:
• Clark had agreed to keep Storer’s equipment on his property
while Storer was in the process of moving her business.
• In October 2021, Storer offered to retrieve her items. Clark
informed Storer that his “loader” was broken and that he
would let her know when it was fixed.
• In November 2021, Clark hired Kitto to remove the equip-
ment and directed him to bring it to a local auction house.
• When Storer learned that her equipment was missing, she
confronted Clark, who verbally admitted that he sold the
items “to pay bills.”
• Storer texted Clark about his earlier admission, and Clark re-
sponded: “Oh no I did i [sic] say that whoops I said that I sold
your stuff silly me . . .”
• The equipment was worth over $30,000.
• Clark refused to give an interview.
Detective Bell concluded by stating: “Based on the totality
of this investigation, the allegation, some of the equipment being
recovered, the text messages, the phone call history, [and] the state-
motion to dismiss] if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in
terms of its authenticity.”).
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 5
ments by the victim and Kitto[,] . . . I determined that there is suf-
ficient probable cause to complete an affidavit for Grant Theft.” A
copy of Clark’s text message exchange with Storer was appended
to Detective Bell’s affidavit.
On August 3, 2022, Assistant State Attorney Joseph McCar-
thy filed a Direct Information for Grand Theft and Dealing in Sto-
len Property. On August 4, 2022, Clark was arrested, and on August
5, 2022, he posted bond. On March 13, 2024, the State Attorney’s
Office dismissed the charges.
Clark brought the instant action on February 21, 2025. His
complaint alleges that Detective Bell’s affidavit contained several
material misrepresentations and omissions. Specifically, he alleges
that the affidavit: (1) incorrectly stated that Clark refused to give an
interview; (2) incorrectly stated that the property was worth over
$30,000; and (3) failed to mention that Storer misrepresented the
equipment’s ownership. Clark also claims that Detective Bell failed
to conduct a reasonable investigation into who owned the equip-
ment, the value of the equipment, and the full communications be-
tween Clark and Storer.
The District Court dismissed Clark’s complaint for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), rea-
soning that “any misstatements or omissions that [Detective Bell]
may have made were not sufficiently material to violate the Fourth
Amendment.” The Court also held that Detective Bell was entitled
to qualified immunity. Clark appeals.
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Moore v. Cecil, 109 F.4th 1352,
1365 (11th Cir. 2024). We accept all factual allegations in the com-
plaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Id. However, we disregard legal assertions disguised as
factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
show a “plausible claim for relief,” as opposed to one that is merely
“conceivable.” Id. at 679–80, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51; Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937 at 1940.
III.
A. Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution
As a common law tort, malicious prosecution occurs when
a person “[1] initiates or procures proceedings [2] without probable
cause . . . [3] primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an
offender to justice, and [4] the proceedings have terminated in fa-
vor of the accused.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (A.L.I.
1977). It responds to the concern that “a malicious prosecution, like
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 7
a defamatory statement, can cause unjustified torment and an-
guish.” 3 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283, 114 S. Ct. 807, 818
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In our Circuit, to demonstrate a claim for § 1983 malicious
prosecution, a “plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in addition
to the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.”
Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
This means that the plaintiff must demonstrate, on top of the four
common law elements, “[1] that the legal process justifying his sei-
zure . . . was constitutionally infirm and [2] that his seizure would
not otherwise be justified without legal process.” Williams v.
Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1165 (11th Cir. 2020). 4 Because we hold that
3 We note that claims of malicious prosecution cannot be brought against
prosecutors because a “public prosecutor acting in his official capacity is abso-
lutely privileged to initiate, institute, or continue criminal proceedings.” Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 656; Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837 (11th Cir.
2010) (“[P]rosecutors have absolute immunity for all activities that are inti-
mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
4 As we have explained, however, the analysis can often be simplified:
In practice . . . a malicious-prosecution claim’s common-law
elements meld with the Fourth Amendment’s textual compo-
nents because a “significant overlap” exists between them. For
instance, “[i]f a plaintiff establishes that a defendant violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures pursuant
to legal process, he has also established that the defendant in-
stituted criminal process against him with malice and without
probable cause.”
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
Clark’s complaint fails to allege a constitutional infirmity, we do
not touch upon the common law elements.
1. “Legal Process” Justifying a Seizure
Whether the legal process justifying an individual’s seizure
is constitutional necessarily turns on substantive Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. But before we get there, we need to clarify what we
mean by “legal process.” While this Court has not provided an ex-
haustive list of legal processes that may give rise to a claim of ma-
licious prosecution, we have recognized that warrants, arraign-
ments, indictments, probable cause hearings, and probation revo-
cations all fall in that category. Id. at 1158; Gervin v. Florence, 139
F.4th 1236, 1251 (11th Cir. 2025). Relevant here, we have also found
that a prosecutor’s filing of a Direct Information constitutes a legal
process for purposes of malicious prosecution. Whiting, 85 F.3d at
585 n.7.
Our focus on legal process has been largely aimed at sepa-
rating malicious prosecution from the related § 1983 tort of false
arrest, which contemplates an arrest without legal process. Wil-
liams, 965 F.3d at 1162; Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1113 (11th Cir.
2023); Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120, 1133 (11th Cir. 2024). False
arrest occurs when an individual is arrested without a warrant and
without probable cause. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2009). A false arrest ends with the introduction of legal process.
Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Luke v. Gulley,
975 F.3d 1140, 1143–44 (11th Cir. 2020)).
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 9
For example, a timely Gerstein 5 hearing concludes the tort of false
arrest, and, if the judicial officer finds probable cause, the tort of
malicious prosecution takes over. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1167; Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 (1994) (explain-
ing that a false arrest claim “cover[s] the time of detention up until
the issuance of process or arraignment, but not more” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
2. Where to Look for Probable Cause
The distinction between arrests pursuant to “legal process”
and warrantless arrests matters not only for how we establish the
timing of a cognizable claim under each respective tort (i.e., false
arrest vs. malicious prosecution) but also for how we conduct our
constitutional analysis and where we look for probable cause. We
analyze false arrest claims as we would analyze any other warrant-
less arrest, asking whether the arresting officer had probable cause
to suspect the detainee had committed a crime. Case, 555 F.3d at
1327; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1964). Any-
thing the officer was able to observe is relevant to our analysis, re-
gardless of whether it ends up in a charging document. If the officer
had probable cause to believe that an individual “ha[d] committed
5 In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to ex-
tended restraint of liberty following arrest.” 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 854,
863 (1975).
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
even a very minor criminal offense,” the arrest was justified. Atwa-
ter v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557
(2001); see Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002).
By contrast, “the lawfulness of seizures pursuant to legal
process,” as in malicious prosecution, “turns on the validity of the le-
gal process itself.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162 (emphasis added). For
example, when an arrest warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate,
a plaintiff must show that the legal process—the granting of the
arrest warrant—is itself invalid. And we must treat that judicial de-
termination of probable cause with “great deference.” Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 591 (1969); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983) (“A grudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants . . . is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment[.]” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 3416 (1984) (“[T]he preference for warrants is most appropri-
ately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s
determination.” (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S. Ct. at 591)).
Unlike with warrantless arrests, the “universe of information” we
use to decide the validity of a warrant-based arrest is limited to the
information actually presented to the judicial officer. Butler, 85
F.4th at 1113; Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564, 91 S. Ct. at 1035.
We have summarized it like this: “warrantless arrests con-
cern whether the facts known to the arresting officer establish
probable cause, while seizures pursuant to legal process concern
whether the judicial officer who approved the seizure had sufficient
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 11
information to find probable cause.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162–63
(11th Cir. 2020).
B. Clark’s Complaint is Deficient
Having explained that malicious prosecution requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the legal process justifying his seizure
was invalid, we would normally turn to evaluating the plaintiff’s
legal process. The problem? Clark’s complaint never tells us what
legal process triggered (or extended) his detention. Here is all we
know:
1. On June 13, 2022, Detective Bell filed his affidavit with
the State Attorney’s Office.
2. On August 3, 2022, Assistant State Attorney Joseph
McCarthy filed a Direct Information charging Clark with
grand theft.
3. On August 4, 2022, Clark was arrested.
4. On August 5, 2022, Clark was released on bond.
That’s it. The complaint never explains whether an arrest
warrant was issued, who the arresting officer was, whether McCar-
thy conducted his own investigation before bringing charges,
whether Clark received a probable cause determination by a mag-
istrate, or whether Clark was subject to any conditions on release.
It appears as though Clark seeks to have us to evaluate Detective
Bell’s probable cause affidavit, which was sent to the State Attor-
ney’s Office two months before charges were filed, as the sole in-
stigating force behind his detention.
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
This makes Clark’s complaint deficient for at least two rea-
sons, among others. First, it leaves us without the ability to deter-
mine, even under a “plausibility” standard, see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 at 1940, whether Clark’s legal process was con-
stitutionally infirm. Second, we cannot properly evaluate the
causal connection between the affidavit and Clark’s seizure pursu-
ant to legal process.
1. Clark Does Not Properly Challenge Any Legal Process
To plead a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim for relief,
Clark needed to identify a legal process that was invalid or consti-
tutionally infirm. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162, 1165. Clark’s com-
plaint, however, describes only one “process” with any detail: De-
tective Bell’s filing of an affidavit with the State Attorney’s Office.
That affidavit, which the complaint does not allege to have been
presented to any magistrate, neither comprised nor began any legal
process, as such term is understood by this Court. See id. at 1158.
To be sure, Clark’s complaint also mentions that Assistant
State Attorney McCarthy initiated charges against Clark by way of
Direct Information, and that Clark was arrested the following day.6
6 We note that, in Florida, one type of arrest warrant is automatically issued
by the clerk of court when a prosecutor files a Direct Information. Fla. Stat.
§ 932.48 (“Upon the filing of an information, the clerk of the circuit court shall
. . . without leave or order of the court first being had and obtained, issue a
capias for the arrest of the person charged.” (emphasis added)). This arrest
warrant, or “capias,” is a ministerial act which may not be subject to our ordi-
nary deferential review for an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
after a probable cause determination. Our caselaw does not appear to address
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 13
And this Court has explained that “[a]n arrest following the issu-
ance of an information is an arrest as part of a prosecution.” Whit-
ing, 85 F.3d at 585 n.7. But, aside from one conclusory statement
that “[t]here was no probable cause for the original proceeding,”
Clark makes no plausible allegation that would allow us to infer the
charging document was infirm or that it was brought without
probable cause. In fact, we are told absolutely nothing about the
Direct Information except for the date on which it was filed.
The Florida Constitution requires prosecutors to file charg-
ing documents under oath. Fla. Const. art. I, § 15. Further, the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure require prosecutors, when filing a
Direct Information, to certify “his or her good faith in instituting
the prosecution . . . and that he or she has received testimony under
oath from the material witness or witnesses for the offense.” Fla.
R. Crim P. 3.140(g). Because Clark was arrested or “seized” only
after the Direct Information was filed, and because Assistant State
Attorney McCarthy was obligated to verify Detective Bell’s infor-
mation through some investigation of his own, Clark needed to
show more than a faulty detective’s affidavit to prove his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.
how to review Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims where a
plaintiff’s seizure was triggered by a Direct Information or ministerial capias
rather than a formal, magistrate-issued arrest warrant. But, because we do not
know for sure that this process is what led to Clark’s arrest, that is a question
for another day.
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-13645
2. Clark Does Not Properly Allege Causation
Causation provides an another reason that Clark’s com-
plaint is deficient. Section 1983, under which Clark brings his claim,
creates a private right of action against anyone who, under color of
law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). “The language
italicized above ‘plainly requires proof of an affirmative causal con-
nection’ between the actions taken by the defendant ‘and the con-
stitutional deprivation.’” Harris, 102 F.4th at 1138 (Tjoflat, J., con-
curring) (quoting Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir.
1982)).
In the context of an arrest warrant filed by a defendant-of-
ficer, our Court has explained that the causal connection is fairly
simple to identify. Because the Fourth Amendment violation is fo-
cused on an individual’s seizure rather than his entire prosecution,
the causation inquiry typically “turns on whether [an] officer[] in-
tentionally provided materially false statements to support the ar-
rest warrant.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1167. If so, the individual’s en-
suing arrest is the “natural consequence[]” of the officer’s actions.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the causal story is more complicated. Detective Bell
did not apply for an arrest warrant. Again, he only filed his affidavit
with the State Attorney’s Office. It was not until two months later
that prosecutors filed charges and Clark was arrested. We have
held in similar contexts that “intervening acts of [a] prosecutor,
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25-13645 Opinion of the Court 15
grand jury, judge and jury . . . each break the chain of causation
unless [a] plaintiff can show that these intervening acts were the
result of deception or undue pressure” by a defending officer. Barts
v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989). While it is possible
that a probable cause affidavit could deceive a prosecutor, or that
an officer could exert undue influence on the decision to bring
charges, Clark’s complaint contains no plausible allegation to that
effect.
IV.
Because Clark’s complaint is insufficient, we agree with the
District Court that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.