Casselle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

OMOWALE CASSELLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 25 C 7712

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE )

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, )

BILL JACKSON, JAMI PAINTER, and )

ANNABELLE CLARKE, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

After Plaintiff Omowale Casselle, an African American, lost his position as the director

of the Pritzker Tech Talent Labs of the University of Illinois System’s Discovery Partner’s

Institute (“DPI”), he filed this lawsuit against Defendants the Board of Trustees of the University

of Illinois (the “Board”), Bill Jackson, Jami Painter, and Annabelle Clarke. In his first amended

complaint, he alleges that the Board engaged in race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

He also brings claims for race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against all Defendants

in violation of § 1983. Defendants have moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims, as well as the Title

VII harassment claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because sovereign

immunity bars Casselle’s § 1983 claims and he has not sufficiently alleged his Title VII

harassment claims, the Court dismisses these claims without prejudice.

BACKGROUND1

Casselle, an African American, served as the inaugural director of the Pritzker Tech

Talent Labs within DPI. He began this role in December 2020. DPI is part of the University of

Illinois System (the “System”). It conducts tech workforce development, applied research, and

business in Chicago. The Pritzker Foundation funded the DPI program with a $10 million grant,

with the intent to create opportunities within the technology field for 7,000 participants annually

by 2029 and to draw forty percent of those participants from underrepresented populations.

Jackson served as DPI’s executive director, Painter worked as the director of human resources

for the System, and Clarke worked as a director of administration for the System.

Casselle did not receive any negative evaluations during his employment and instead

received merit pay increases in 2021 and 2022. Beginning in November 2022, he began to

complain about what he perceived as race discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, he sent

several emails complaining about differences in the hiring, promotion, and management of White

and Black people and offering suggestions on how to mitigate the racially hostile environment at

DPI. He also advocated for participants in DPI’s apprenticeship program. For example, Casselle

learned that DPI leadership did not allow apprentices, who generally came from

underrepresented populations, to use DPI’s kitchen or refrigerators on the fourth floor of the

building and instead required apprentices to use facilities on the twentieth floor, allegedly

because apprentices “might steal food.” Doc. 9 ¶ 22. Casselle complained to leadership that

other employees and students could use DPI’s kitchen and break rooms on the fourth floor.

Casselle also learned that Jackson and another employee worried that apprentices would steal

laptops provided by the school and so discussed creating a policy to address the issue, even

1 The Court takes the facts in the background section from the first amended complaint and exhibits

attached thereto and presumes them to be true for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

See Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2013).

though no evidence suggested that apprentices had actually stolen any laptops. Casselle

complained that Jackson’s assumptions and stereotypes implied “underlying criminality.” Id.

¶ 26. On another occasion, after Casselle heard a White employee accuse a Black apprentice of

smoking weed, Casselle asked the White employee why he made the comment, with the White

employee responding that while he had no evidence that the Black apprentice smoked weed, he

seemed “slow and wasn’t learning the material as fast as others.” Id. ¶ 28. During a team

dinner, Jackson asked for recommendations for scaling the DPI program, with one of Casselle’s

co-workers suggesting imposing more rigorous admissions standards. Jennifer Foil, DPI’s

director of workforce development, responded that this would mean accepting less Black people

into the program. Casselle complained that Foil expressed a racist viewpoint.

Casselle complained to Jackson, Painter, and Clarke about these instances of racism,

indicating they should not be tolerated. During one meeting with Jackson and Clarke, Casselle

told them that he “believe[d] DPI is a racially discriminatory environment that treats persons of

color differently.” Id. ¶ 41. Clarke and Painter routinely disciplined Black employees, placing

them on performance improvement plans without cause and applying policies and procedures

differently to Black and non-Black employees. Casselle specifically elaborated that a Black

woman did not receive a promotion because of racial stereotypes, but a White woman and a

White man avoided placements on performance improvement plans despite supervisors

documenting performance issues. Jackson, Painter, and Clarke ignored Casselle’s complaints,

and the System’s leadership did not make any changes or discipline those who made the

discriminatory remarks. Jackson even verbally attacked Casselle, prompting Casselle to take

time off due to emotional distress.

After Casselle complained about the discrimination, Jackson issued Casselle a sixty-day

letter of expectation, even though such letters typically had ninety-day timeframes. The

System’s policy also requires two years of performance reviews before placing an employee on a

performance improvement plan, but Casselle did not have any reviews before receiving the letter

of expectation. When Casselle asked Jackson about the deviation from policy, he stated that he

“wanted to shock the system.” Doc. 9 ¶ 55. Defendants also rescinded invites for meetings that

involved Casselle’s job tasks and excluded him from key personnel decisions related to his

responsibilities.

Casselle’s contract renewal date was August 15, 2023. On July 25, 2023, Casselle

verbally learned that DPI did not plan to reappoint him to his position. He complained about

being treated differently due to his race and having engaged in protected activity, and he also

filed a grievance. On August 7, 2023, Casselle received an email reiterating that DPI would not

reappoint him to his position. Although Casselle initially was told he had six months before his

contract ended, Painter reduced the six-month period to two months after Casselle complained

about discrimination. And immediately thereafter, Jackson told the head of DPI’s IT department

to terminate Casselle’s access to the building and delete his files, even though he had two more

months to work. DPI replaced Casselle with an Indian male who had not engaged in legally

protected activity.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not

its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.

1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in

the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s

favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to

the defendant of the claim’s basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728–29 (7th

Cir. 2014). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

ANALYSIS

I. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants argue that they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from Casselle’s § 1983

claims. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought against a state in federal court. Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Holderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). Sovereign immunity does not apply

where the state consents to suit or federal legislation abrogates the immunity pursuant to a

constitutional grant of authority. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). The Court first

considers whether the Eleventh Amendment bars Casselle’s claims against the Board and then

turns to its effect on his individual capacity claims against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke.

A. Section 1983 Claims against the Board

Casselle does not seriously challenge Defendants’ argument that he cannot pursue his

§ 1983 claims against the Board. Indeed, “[s]tate universities, as well as their governing bodies,

are protected from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Mutter v. Madigan, 17 F. Supp. 3d

752, 757–58 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Kaimowitz v. Bd. of Trs., 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1991)),

aff’d as modified sub nom. Mutter v. Rodriguez, 700 F. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore,

the Court dismisses Casselle’s § 1983 claims (Counts IV, V, and VI) against the Board. The

dismissal is without prejudice, given that Eleventh Amendment immunity goes to the Court’s

jurisdiction. See McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 533–34 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2022).

B. Section 1983 Claims against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke

Next, Defendants argue that despite Casselle indicating that he pursues his claims against

Jackson, Painter, and Clarke in their individual capacities, they are actually official capacity

claims and so also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As the Supreme Court has explained,

individual capacity suits “seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions

he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “Official-

capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 n.55 (1978)). “Whereas in an official capacity suit the plaintiff alleges that the

defendant was party to the execution or implementation of official policy or conduct by a

government because the real party in interest is the entity, an individual capacity suit focuses on

the constitutional torts of an individual official.” Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th

Cir. 1991). Here, Casselle challenges Jackson’s, Painter’s, and Clarke’s individual conduct in

allegedly discriminating and retaliating against him, not just the execution or implementation of

the System’s policies, and so the Court does not find it appropriate to recharacterize Casselle’s

claims against them as official capacity claims.

That does not end the inquiry, however, because Defendants alternatively argue that,

even treated as individual capacity claims, sovereign immunity bars the claims because Casselle

seeks the same damages against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke that he does against the Board.

While the Eleventh Amendment does not typically bar a claim against state officials in their

individual capacities, a plaintiff cannot seek “monetary relief from state employees in their

individual capacities if the suit ‘demonstrably has the identical effect as a suit against the state.’”

Haynes v. Ind. Univ., 902 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d

1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001)). In other words, sovereign immunity bars even individual capacity

suits where “the money will flow from the state treasury to the plaintiffs.” Luder, 253 F.3d at

1024.2

The Seventh Circuit has twice found that sovereign immunity bars claims against state

university officials sued in their individual capacities related to employment matters. See

Haynes, 902 F.3d at 731–32 (sovereign immunity barred § 1981 race discrimination claim

against university administrators); Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2003)

(sovereign immunity barred due process and academic freedom claims brought under § 1983 by

a terminated former professor against university officials). These cases teach that “sovereign

immunity bars a state-employed plaintiff from bringing individual-capacity claims against state-

employed supervisors or coworkers who deprived him of rights, benefits, or opportunities arising

from his employment relationship with the state.” Melgaard v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., No. 24-

CV-561, 2025 WL 3268370, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 24, 2025). Because plaintiffs “seek to

recover the value of their state employment” in such cases, they are “effectively against the

state.” Id.

Casselle’s claims against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke for race discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation arising out of his employment at DPI appear to meet the parameters

set forth in Omosegbon and Haynes for sovereign immunity to apply. But Casselle argues that

2 The fact that the State would pay any damages assessed against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke pursuant to

the State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 350/2, has no relevance to the inquiry and so

the Court does not address it further. See Luder, 253 F.3d at 1023 (“The fact that the state chooses to

indemnify its employees who are sued in federal court is irrelevant, because it is the voluntary choice of

the state, not a cost forced on it by the federal-court suit. . . . Indirect effects are not enough; otherwise the

practical necessity for a state to compensate an employee for bearing liability risks would place

individual-capacity suits under the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.” (citations omitted)).

the Court should find that his claims can proceed because he does not only seek lost wages and

benefits, which flow from his employment contract, but also requests compensatory damages

from Jackson, Painter and Clarke, including recovery for embarrassment, personal humiliation,

loss of reputation, and mental anguish and suffering.

Indeed, some courts have allowed claims to proceed where plaintiffs seek compensatory

and punitive damages from individual state employees. See, e.g., Sizyuk v. Purdue Univ., No.

4:20-CV-75, 2024 WL 68282, at *3–4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2024) (allowing claims where the

plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages from individual state employee, not lost

wages or lost benefits); Calautti v. Shanahan, No. 118CV00119, 2019 WL 3717980, at *6 (S.D.

Ind. Aug. 7, 2019) (allowing complaint to proceed against individual state employees where the

plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages from the individual employees in addition

to lost wages and other financial losses); Reinebold v. Ind. Univ. at S. Bend, No. 3:18-CV-525,

2019 WL 1897288, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2019) (“‘Compensatory damages’ as a concept

includes recovery for embarrassment, personal humiliation, impairment of reputation, mental

anguish and suffering, etc. Even where a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages associated with

an employment contract, courts have declined to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds where

the plaintiff also seeks to recover for these less tangible items.” (citation omitted)). Other courts,

however, have reasoned that the type of relief sought does not matter and that the inquiry should

remain focused on the substance of the plaintiff’s claims. See Smith v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No.

24-CV-5022, 2025 WL 744098, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2025) (“Nor does the Court believe that

the way a plaintiff pleads damages should be decisive as to whether a case is truly against the

state rather than individual defendants. To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to defeat a

sovereign immunity argument just by throwing in an allegation of emotional pain and

suffering.”); Melgaard, 2025 WL 3268370, at *5 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that his case

differed from Omosegbon and Haynes because he did not seek back pay but instead

“compensatory damages for lost income, injury to his personal reputation, mental and emotional

distress, as well as punitive damages”); Upchurch v. Indiana, No. 1:23-CV-01310, 2025 WL

2336851, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2025) (concluding that the plaintiff’s request for

compensatory and punitive damages did not “obscure the fact” that he based his claims against

individual state employees on the denial of employment opportunities he would have received

from the state if not for the alleged discrimination); see also Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F.4th 493, 501

(7th Cir. 2024) (“Even if the sought after compensation would not definitively be paid out of the

state treasury, if the amount the plaintiff seeks ‘should have been paid by the State,’ the suit is

likely one against the state itself.” (citation omitted)). The Court agrees with the latter line of

cases that the focus should be whether a plaintiff’s claims against the individual state employees

“stem[ ] from the plaintiff’s state employment contract, not on whether the plaintiff[ ] s[eeks]

damages other than lost wages and benefits.” Hoffman v. Bd. of Regents, No. 23-CV-853, 2025

WL 1504376, at *5 (W.D. Wis. May 27, 2025).

Here, because Casselle’s claims all arise from his contention that Jackson, Painter, and

Clarke denied him opportunities that he would have received from the System absent racial

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, his individual capacity claims arise from his

employment relationship. As such, sovereign immunity bars Casselle’s claims against Jackson,

Painter, and Clarke in their individual capacities. See Smith, 2025 WL 744098, at *3 (sovereign

immunity barred claims against individual state employees alleging “constitutional violations

premised on [the plaintiff’s] employment relationship with the state”); Hoffman, 2025 WL

1504376, at *5 (finding plaintiff’s hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation

claims against individual state employees barred by sovereign immunity). The Court therefore

dismisses Casselle’s claims against Jackson, Painter, and Clarke (Counts II, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX)

without prejudice.

II. Title VII Harassment Claims

Finally, Defendants argue that Casselle has not pleaded an actionable Title VII racial or

retaliatory harassment claim. “When the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ Title VII is violated.”

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). To state a harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was

subject to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based on his protected characteristic,

(3) the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create

a hostile or abusive working environment, and (4) a basis exists for employer liability. Huri v.

Off. of the Chief Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir. 2015).

Defendants argue that Casselle has not pleaded severe or pervasive harassment.

For purposes of a harassment claim, the “harassment must be sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005). This includes both subjective and objective

components. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. To determine whether a workplace is objectively hostile,

the Court considers “the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.’” Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S.

at 23).

While Casselle may have subjectively found the conduct at DPI so severe as to create a

hostile or abusive working environment, without more specificity, his allegations do not allow

the inference that a reasonable person would find his work environment hostile, nor do they

suggest how the harassment unreasonably interfered with his work performance. See, e.g.,

Boniface v. Westminster Place, No. 18-CV-4596, 2019 WL 479995, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7,

2019) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because her allegations were vague and the complaint

contained “no specific allegations suggesting that any conduct was physically threatening or

verbally abusive or how it interfered with her work performance”); Stone v. Bd. of Trs., 38 F.

Supp. 3d 935, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because “there is no factual

allegation which would plausibly suggest either the severity or pervasiveness of the identified

harassment”). While he does complain that toward the end of his employment, Defendants

excluded him from meetings and personnel decisions, he does not tie this to Defendants’

evaluation of his work performance. And to the extent Casselle alleges that Jackson or others

directed verbal attacks at him when he complained about alleged racial incidents, he does not

include any specifics about the contents of these verbal attacks that would suggest the extent of

their harassing nature or whether tied to a protected characteristic. See Cole v. Bd. of Trs., 838

F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Although a connection between the harassment and the

plaintiff’s protected class need not be explicit, ‘there must be some connection, for not every

perceived unfairness in the workplace may be ascribed to discriminatory motivation merely

because the complaining employee belongs to a racial minority.’” (quoting Zayas v. Rockford

Mem’l Hosp., 740 F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 2014))).

Casselle’s main allegations of harassment involve the alleged harassment of others, not

harassment directed toward him. For example, he claims that apprentices could not use the

kitchen or refrigerators on the fourth floor and instead had to use the twentieth floor, that Jackson

remarked that apprentices would steal laptops, that a Black woman did not receive a promotion,

and that he stood up for a Black man accused of smoking weed. He also complains that Clarke

and Painter routinely disciplined Black employees and did not treat Black and non-Black

employees the same. The fact that Casselle was not the target of this alleged harassment lessens

its impact. See Smith v. Ne. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2004) (“While certainly

relevant to the determination of a hostile work environment claim, when harassment is ‘directed

at someone other than the plaintiff, the impact of [such] second-hand harassment is obviously not

as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff.’” (alteration in original) (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Ultimately, Cassell’s allegations are too thin to suggest severe or pervasive harassment.

See McDaniel v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 13-cv-06500, 2014 WL 4269126, at *7 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 28, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s allegations in the Amended Complaint, while no doubt describing

rude and unpleasant conduct, by themselves do not seem to rise to the level of the hostile and

abusive atmosphere found in the case law.” (collecting cases)); Triplett v. Starbucks Coffee, No.

10 C 5215, 2011 WL 3165576, at *5–7 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2011) (dismissing hostile work

environment claim despite allegations of a racially insensitive comment, racially based

disciplinary actions, and discrimination against African American employees on multiple

occasions). Therefore, without more, Casselle cannot proceed with his harassment claims at this

time, and the Court dismisses these claims without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss [10]. The

Court dismisses Casselle’s § 1983 claims (Counts II, IV, V, VI, VIII, and IX) and his Title VII

harassment claims (Counts III and VII) without prejudice. Casselle’s Title VII race

discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims (Counts I and X) against the Board remain

pending.

Dated: March 19, 2026 ( My

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

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