In the Int. of: J.W., Appeal of: J.W.

J-S08029-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

: OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: J.W., MINOR :

:

:

:

:

: No. 2363 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Adjudication of Delinquency July 8, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0000415-2025

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 28, 2026

J.W., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order adjudicating him

delinquent and in need of treatment and supervision. J.W. argues the court

erred when it denied his suppression motion. He further contends that he was

adjudicated delinquent for carrying a firearm without a license although there

was insufficient evidence that he did not, or could not, have a license. After

careful review, we affirm.

On May 3, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition alleging

J.W. committed the delinquent act of possessing a concealed firearm without

a license, and thereby charged him with firearms not to be carried without a

license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), possession of a firearm by a minor, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.1(a), and carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6108. An adjudicatory hearing was continued multiple times due

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to outstanding discovery. On June 6, 2025, J.W. filed a motion to suppress

the physical evidence against him, arguing he was arrested without probable

cause and stopped and frisked without reasonable suspicion.

On June 9, 2025, an adjudicatory hearing was held. At the beginning of

the hearing, the court heard argument on the motion to suppress.

The Commonwealth called its sole witness, Officer Timothy Dollarton, to

testify. Officer Dollarton testified that he had been a police officer for 13 years

and that on May 3, 2025, at approximately 12:45 p.m., he was on duty in the

area of 7400 Buist Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See N.T., 6/9/25, at

6-7. When asked to describe the area, Officer Dollarton explained that he has

responded to robberies and car jackings in that area, which involved firearms

in the commission of those crimes. See id. at 8.

Officer Dollarton explained that, on the date in question, he was the

passenger in the police car, while his partner was driving. See id. at 9. While

they were driving east on 7400 Buist Avenue, they observed J.W. walking

westbound on the sidewalk, with his left arm tucked tight to his midsection.

See id. As they continued driving east, Officer Dollarton turned around to look

through the windows of the car. See id. 10. Officer Dollarton observed that

J.W. kept turning around and looking in the direction of the police car, while

he continued walking westbound. See id.

J.W. then walked into the middle of the street and continued to turn

around to look in the direction of the police See id. Officer Dollarton’s partner

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started to make a U-turn. See id. As the police car made a U-turn to head

westbound, Officer Dollarton saw J.W. run westbound and turn northbound at

the next corner. See id. at 11. The police car did not have its lights or sirens

activated. See id. When his partner made the same right turn, Officer

Dollarton saw J.W. on the sidewalk “walking at that point.” Id. at 12. See id.

at 31. Officer Dollarton’s partner started talking to J.W. through the window

while both officers were still seated in the police car. See id. at 12-13. At that

point, Officer Dollarton went to exit the vehicle, and J.W. took off running

westbound. See id. at 13. Officer Dollarton testified that just prior to exiting

the vehicle, he thought J.W. was trying to conceal a firearm. See id.

When J.W. began to run, Officer Dollarton engaged in a foot pursuit

heading westbound into a grass field. See id. at 14. J.W. did not comply with

Officer Dollarton’s numerous verbal commands to stop. See id. J.W. continued

to run into the grass field and collapsed on the ground. See id. Officer

Dollarton detained J.W. and held J.W.’s arms up until his partner arrived. See

id.

Officer Dollarton testified that as he chased J.W., he observed that

J.W.’s left arm stayed tucked tight up against his body, while his right arm

was moving freely. See id. Accordingly, Officer Dollarton believed J.W. was in

possession of a firearm. See id.

Officer Dollarton explained what happened when he got to the grass

field and detained J.W. as follows:

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I held both his arms. I was able to get both of his arms and held

them till my partner arrived and we were able to cuff him. While

attempting to cuff him he laid on top of his left arm like under—

he was on his, I guess, chest at this point. And he’s lying on top

of his left arm. So I had to struggle to get his arm out from

underneath him. And when I was getting his arm to get behind his

back, at some point, I don’t know if he was cuffed yet or in the

process of being cuffed, I felt a firearm in his left like jacket or

hoodie sleeve. I forgot if it was a jacket or hoodie he was wearing.

Id. at 15. Officer Dollarton stated that he immediately recognized the object

to be a firearm as soon as he touched it. See id. Finally, Officer Dollarton

testified that he observed J.W. to have a “youthful appearance,” explaining

that “his eyes and facial features just looked young, his build.” Id. at 15-16.

On cross-examination, defense counsel played video from both Officer

Dollarton’s and his partner’s body worn cameras (“BWC”), as Officer Dollarton

stated his BWC fell off at some point during the interaction. See id. at 18.

After watching the videos, Officer Dollarton initially explained that he

was putting J.W. in cuffs because he felt a firearm in his sleeve, after running

from the officers. See id. at 23 (“So I’m detaining him as there is a weapon

in his sleeve.”). Officer Dollarton was emphatic that he felt the firearm before

J.W. was cuffed. See id.

Upon further questioning regarding what was seen on the BWCs, Officer

Dollarton conceded: (1) at the time he was cuffing J.W., he did not know how

old J.W. was or if he had a license to carry, (2) both he and his partner were

in full uniform, had their tasers out at different times, and were using profanity

during the interaction, (3) when first seen, J.W. was walking down the

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sidewalk in broad daylight, and was not reaching for anything or going in his

waistband, (4) that his partner first checked J.W.’s waistband and, when he

did not find anything, his partner can be heard asking J.W. “where’d you toss

it,” and (5) at no point did Officer Dollarton see J.W. toss anything or see any

bulge or anything gun related. See id. at 23-26. Officer Dollarton explained

that he suspected J.W. had a firearm because of “[h]is arm close to his body

in a high crime area with unprovoked flight from police.” Id. at 26.

Finally, Officer Dollarton’s witness statement, given on the date of the

incident, was admitted into evidence. See id. at 34. As part of the statement,

Officer Dollarton described the circumstances of the encounter as follows:

At that point, I held [J.W.]’s arm until my partner [] arrived. While

attempting to place [J.W.] into handcuffs, [J.W.] would not put his

left hand behind his back. When I was able to pull his left arm

behind his back, I immediately felt a firearm in his left hoodie

sleeve. Myself and my partner was able to handcuff [J.W.] and

[my partner] received the firearm from [J.W.]’s left sleeve.

Exhibit D3 at 1.

Following argument from both sides, the court denied the motion to

suppress. The court immediately proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing,

incorporating all non-hearsay evidence from the suppression hearing. See id.

at 46. The Commonwealth presented no additional witnesses, and offered a

report indicating the recovered firearm was operable as it’s only additional

evidence. See id. The defense also rested with no additional witnesses.

After hearing closing argument from both sides, the court found that the

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden for Section 6110.1, possession of a

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firearm by a minor,1 because the elements of the crime indicate a specific age

requirement, and no evidence of J.W.’s age was presented. However, the court

found the Commonwealth met its burden for the remaining offenses, Section

6106(a)(1), firearms not to be carried without a license, and Section 6108,

carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia.2

Following the hearing, the court entered an order finding J.W. guilty of

Sections 6106(a)(1) and 6108, but deferring a disposition as to adjudication

of delinquency. The court scheduled a disposition hearing for July 8. 2025.

On July 8, 2025, following the disposition hearing, the court entered an

order adjudicating J.W. delinquent and finding him in need of treatment,

supervision and/or rehabilitation.

On July 18, 2025, J.W. filed a motion to reconsider adjudication of

delinquency, arguing there was no evidence of non-licensure to substantiate

the Section 6106(a)(1) conviction, and that the charge of Section 6108 should

be vacated and dismissed as unconstitutional. On August 15, 2025, following

a brief hearing, the court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.

J.W. raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in denying J.W.’s motion to suppress

where the police detained and subsequently arrested J.W. without

reasonable suspicion or probable cause?

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.1(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108.

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2. Was the evidence insufficient to establish that J.W. violated 18

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106 where the Commonwealth presented no

evidence of non-licensure or that [J.W.] was ineligible to possess

a firearm due to his age?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 2-3.

In his first issue, J.W. argues the court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. We begin with our well-established standard of review:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on the

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions

of law of the trial court are subject to plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. Also, it is within the

suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations, brackets, quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).

J.W. argues he was seized the moment Officer Dollarton exited the

police car. J.W. claims this created an investigative detention, and the police

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did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot in order to

support his seizure at that moment.3 See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-12.

Both “[t]he Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit unreasonable

searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 896

(Pa. 2024) (citation omitted). “It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment

governs seizures of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station

house and prosecution for crime; whenever a police officer accosts an

individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.”

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 333 A.3d 710, 717 (Pa. Super. 2025) (internal

quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis, and citation omitted).

We begin with a discussion of the three types of police-citizen

interactions:

The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between

police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an

investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [](1968); and (3) a custodial detention.

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3 We note that while J.W.’s statement of the question involved indicates he is

challenging both the lack of reasonable suspicion to support his detention as

well as the lack of probable cause to support his arrest, the argument section

devoted to this issue solely addresses his contention that here was a lack of

reasonable suspicion to support his detention. Accordingly, we limit our

analysis to that specific claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also B.S.G. v.

D.M.C., 255 A.3d 528, 535 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that “[w]here an

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion

capable of review, that claim is waived”).

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A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction

between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry

by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that

it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond, and therefore

need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.

In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official

compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has

elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of

unlawful activity.

Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and

conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to

be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.

This level of interaction requires that the police have probable

cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is

committing a crime.

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (some citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).

A mere encounter can

escalate[] to an investigatory stop if a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not free to leave. When that happens,

for the stop to be proper the police must have reasonable

suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal

activity is afoot. … [A] proper reasonable suspicion analysis

considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop

and affords due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences

drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience. The

totality of circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal

conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police

officer. Per se rules are incompatible with a totality-of-the-

circumstances inquiry.

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016, 1028 (Pa. 2025) (citations,

brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

We have further elaborated:

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No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United

States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which

courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate the

interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred to

as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine whether,

taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the

encounter, the police would have communicated to a reasonable

person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police and go about

his business. …

In applying this “free to leave” test, the focus is whether the

suspect has in some way been restrained by physical force or show

of coercive authority.

In considering whether a seizure has occurred, or whether a

reasonable person would feel free to leave, courts may examine

the following nonexclusive list of factors: The number of officers

present during the interaction; whether the officer informs the

citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; the officer’s

demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the

interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and the

questions asked. Although no single factor controls our analysis,

both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have

held that the approach of a police officer followed by questioning

does not constitute a seizure. The circumstances must present

some level of coercion, beyond the officer’s mere employment

status, that conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible

consequences from refusal.

Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations,

brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we must first determine when J.W. was seized,

i.e., when the encounter turned from a mere encounter to an investigative

detention. Then we can evaluate what information the officer possessed at

that time and if that information qualifies as reasonable suspicion.

J.W. argues he was seized when Officer Dollarton exited the police car

while his partner continued verbally engaging with him as he attempted to

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walk away. See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12. The Commonwealth does not

dispute an investigatory detention occurred, but does not identify exactly

when it maintains the encounter turned into an investigative detention. See

Appellee’s Brief, at 6. Similarly, the trial court does not explicitly state when

the encounter turned into an investigative detention. However, it appears the

trial court believed it was after the foot pursuit. See Trial Court Opinion,

12/10/25, at 27 (listing multiple factors which enabled the officers to

formulate reasonable suspicion including running from the officers on “two”

occasions).

It is clear from viewing both BWCs that, after the officers followed J.W.

for some time, and then started to verbally engage with him, J.W. clearly

attempted to walk away from the officers; however, they did not allow him to

do so. Instead, Officer Dollarton’s partner continued to verbally engage with

J.W. and followed him closely in the patrol car. While his partner drove the car

and spoke to J.W., Officer Dollarton began opening his door, then closed it as

the car continued driving alongside J.W. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dollarton

successfully exited the car and immediately ran after J.W. Officer Dollarton

also had his taser out during this foot pursuit; he could be heard shouting at

J.W. that he was going to tase him if he did not stop. Even after J.W. was

detained, Officer Dollarton’s partner was seen pointing his taser directly at

J.W., and told J.W. he would tase him if he did not allow them to put the cuffs

on him.

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As J.W. was not given an option to leave if he wanted to, we find J.W.

was subject to an investigative detention at least at the moment Officer

Dollarton got out of the car. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 226 A.3d 1090,

1095 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[W]ith respect to the show of authority needed for

a detention, the circumstances must present some level of coercion, beyond

the officer’s mere employment, that conveys a demand for compliance or

threat of tangible consequences from refusal.”) (citation omitted).

The next step is to determine whether the officers had reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity at that time.

Here, the court found that Officer Dollarton established a firm foundation

for his reasonable suspicion to detain J.W., reasoning as follows:

As a police officer of thirteen years, with hundreds of arrests made

over the course of his career, [Officer Dollarton] established he

had the requisite experience to identify suspicious activities or

scenarios. Officer Dollarton testified to the behavior of [J.W.] upon

seeing his police vehicle: [J.W.], despite heading in the opposite

direction of the vehicle, continued to look back at the vehicle

as he clutched his left arm tightly against his body. Officer

Dollarton did not know for certain at the time why [J.W.] was

behaving this way, but it caused the officer to keep his eyes on

[J.W.] as they drove past him. What Officer Dollarton

observed of [J.W.]—constantly looking back to check on

the vehicle, even from the middle of the street, and running

from the officers on two occasions—combined with his

experience as a police officer and knowledge of the high

crime area in which this interaction occurred, enabled him

to formulate reasonable suspicion that criminal activity

was afoot.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/25, at 26-27 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

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After a review of the record, it is clear that the officers suspected J.W.

of carrying a concealed weapon. However, mere possession of a firearm,

without more, does not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937 (Pa. 2019). Under certain

circumstances, possession of a firearm can be suspicious and “[a] police officer

is entitled to view individuals’ conduct in light of the probabilities that criminal

activity may be afoot, and indisputably may draw certain common sense

conclusions about human behavior.” Id. at 938 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Our analysis of the question at bar is guided by fundamental

Fourth Amendment principles. We find no justification for the

notion that a police officer may infer criminal activity merely from

an individual’s possession of a concealed firearm in public. … [I]t

is not a criminal offense for a license holder[] to carry a concealed

firearm in public. Although the carrying of a concealed firearm is

unlawful for a person statutorily prohibited from firearm

ownership or for a person not licensed to do so, see 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]

§§ 6105-06, there is no way to ascertain an individual’s

licensing status, or status as a prohibited person, merely

by his outward appearance. As a matter of law and common

sense, a police officer observing an unknown individual can no

more identify whether that individual has a license in his wallet

than discern whether he is a criminal. Unless a police officer has

prior knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to carry

a concealed firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting

reasonable suspicion that a firearm is being used or intended to

be used in a criminal manner, there simply is no justification for

the conclusion that the mere possession of a firearm, where it

lawfully may be carried, is alone suggestive of criminal activity.

Id. at 936-37 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).

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The firearms offenses charged all include the element that the

perpetrator is unlicensed to carry a weapon, whether it be concealed or not. 4

Officer Dollarton conceded that, during the interaction, he did not know how

old J.W. was or if he had a license to carry. While Officer Dollarton testified

that he observed J.W. to have a “youthful appearance,” 5 id. at 15-16, he did

not in any way tie this to the age of licensure. On its own, having a “youthful

appearance” is not indicative of any particular age. See id. at 937. Someone

who is 17 years old, 28 years old, or even 32 years old, could all be described

as having a “youthful appearance.”

Accordingly, this information on its own was not sufficient to support a

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

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4 In its opinion, the trial court states that J.W. “was carrying an operable

concealed firearm on the streets of Philadelphia, which is prohibited, licensed

or unlicensed.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/25, at 32. However, 18 Pa.C.S.A.

6108 provides that persons in Philadelphia are allowed to carry a concealed

firearm if they have a license to carry a firearm.

5 In supporting its argument that the evidence was sufficient to prove Section

6106(a)(1), the Commonwealth concedes that it did not offer any direct

evidence to establish J.W.’s non-licensure. However, the Commonwealth

argues that circumstantial evidence existed to justify the court’s action of

adjudicating J.W. delinquent of the offense, because the very presence of J.W.

in juvenile court was evidence that he was a minor at the time of the offense,

and statutory law establishes that a minor is ineligible to obtain a license to

carry a firearm. See Appellee’s Brief, at 12.

While that may be relevant in support of the court’s decision to adjudicate

J.W. delinquent, as discussed further below, that after-the-fact circumstantial

evidence is not relevant to whether or not reasonable suspicion existed at the

time of the detention. The officers simply cannot support a detention with

information learned after the fact.

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However, the totality of the information the officers had before the

encounter turned into an investigative detention included: the area being

known for shootings, i.e., high crime; J.W. continuously looking back at the

police car nervously and running; J.W.’s odd behavior of holding his left arm

tight to his body; and the officers’ belief that this action was indicative of

concealing a firearm.

Notably, our Supreme Court recently decided Commonwealth v.

Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016 (Pa. 2025). There the Court considered “the quantum

of evidence necessary to prove an area is high in crime, such that a

suppression court may properly consider that fact among the totality of the

circumstances when assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed at the

time of a stop.” Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1021. The Court noted:

[In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the United

States Supreme Court] explained that officers are not required to

ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining

whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant

further investigation. [The Court] therefore held the fact that the

stop occurred in a high crime area was a relevant contextual

consideration in assessing reasonable suspicion[.]

At first blush, this principle seems unremarkable. If a proper

reasonable suspicion analysis considers the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the stop, then, logically, this might

include the location of the stop in some cases. After all, we have

recognized that prudent police officers on patrol pay close

attention to every detail of their surroundings and take their

knowledge of the area into account when considering a stop. Thus,

for example, an officer observing a hand-to-hand transaction on

a street corner will naturally be more suspicious if he knows the

corner is a hotspot for heroin sales than if the corner has no

meaningful history of drug trafficking. It would be simply illogical

to expect officers to ignore those details, or to conclude that an

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officer’s experience regarding them is not a relevant factor

informing reasonable suspicion.

Id. at 1030-31 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

The Court then considered Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa.

2021), where the defendant was stopped in his vehicle for a minor traffic

infraction, and explained that “[u]nder those circumstances, the fact that the

area where the stop occurred was generally high in crime would have added

nothing probative to the legal determination of whether the police had

probable cause to search the vehicle.” Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1031. Clearly, then,

the type of interaction helps the courts determine whether the area being high

crime is relevant under the totality of the circumstances.

The Lewis Court held that whether an area is high crime is relevant in

assessing reasonable suspicion, but an officer may not simply intone “high

crime area.” Id. “The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving a high-

crime area is, in fact, high in crime, and the suppression court is free to

discredit the Commonwealth’s evidence when appropriate.” Id. at 1035

(citations omitted). The Court provided a nonexclusive list of factors to assist

in determining if an area is high crime: “the geographic scope of the high-

crime area; the nexus between the type of crime the area is known for and

the type of crime suspected on the day of the stop; the officer’s level of

familiarity with the area; the recency of the officer’s information; empirical

data known to the officer; and the assignment of specialized police units

targeting high-crime areas.” Id. at 1036 (citation omitted).

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Here, the suppression hearing was held before Lewis was decided, but

some of the factors were touched upon at the hearing. Upon questioning as

to what he defined as the “high crime area,” Officer Dollarton explained the

area as “Elmood to Buist is where the gas station is that we’ve experienced

car jackings. And then we’ve had—I’m trying, I don’t know the exact dates.

But we’ve experienced some shootings and homicides on the east side.” See

N.T., 6/9/25, at 27-28. Officer Dollarton clarified that he has not personally

investigated the car jackings but has provided patrol by responding to calls

for shootings and homicides in that area. See id. at 28-29. Officer Dollarton

could not provide any specific dates about any recent calls or reports made,

but stated they were “earlier in this year, from like February to April.” Id. at

29. When asked to specify whether the car jackings he received patrol alerts

for were during the daytime or at nighttime, Officer Dollarton stated he could

not recall but said he has “responded to crimes any—all times of day in that

area,” and that gun related crimes “varies … all day”. Id. at 30. We find the

above information was sufficient for the trial court to qualify the area as a high

crime area. Therefore, the area being high crime was a relevant consideration

in determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion.

As explained above:

[A] proper reasonable suspicion analysis considers the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the stop and affords due weight to

the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of

the officer’s experience. The totality of circumstances test does

not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that

clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of

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innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further

investigation by the police officer.

Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1029 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

The information the officers had before the encounter turned to an

investigative detention (the area being known for shootings, i.e., high crime;

J.W. continuously looking back at the police car nervously and running; J.W.’s

odd behavior of holding his left arm tight to his body; and the officers’ belief

that this action was indicative of concealing a firearm), constituted sufficient

reasonable suspicion to subject J.W. to a pat down or frisk for weapons. See

Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 775 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)

(reversing a trial court’s order granting suppression because the defendant

turned his body to conceal a bulge in his jacket pocket in a high crime area

creating reasonable suspicion). Therefore, the trial court was correct in

holding that there was reasonable suspicion to support his detention.

In his second and final issue, J.W. argues the court erred in finding him

guilty of Section 6106(a)(1) when the Commonwealth failed to provide

sufficient evidence that J.W. was not licensed to own a firearm. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 16.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most

favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all

reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact

to find that each element of the crimes charged is established

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may meet this

burden of proving every element of the crime by utilizing only

circumstantial evidence.

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The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubt raised

as to the accused's guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder, so

long as the evidence presented is not utterly incapable of

supporting the necessary inferences. This Court does not

independently assess credibility or otherwise assign weight to

evidence on appeal.

Commonwealth v. Riley, 302 A.3d 112, 115 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

To sustain a conviction of carrying a firearm without a license, the

Commonwealth had to prove that J.W. “carried a firearm concealed on or

about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,

without a valid and lawfully issued license.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). In

other words, “[t]he Commonwealth must prove each of the factors listed in

the definition: (a) that the weapon was a firearm ...; (b) that the firearm was

unlicensed ...; and (c) that where the firearm was concealed on or about the

person, it must be outside his home or place of business.” Commonwealth

v. Lopez, 565 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. 1989).

Here, J.W. does not dispute that elements (a) and (c) were proven in

this case. However, there is no testimony or other evidence of record that

directly established that J.W. was unlicensed to carry a concealed firearm.

It is undisputed the Commonwealth did not offer any direct evidence to

establish J.W.’s non-licensure. However, the Commonwealth argues that

circumstantial evidence existed to justify the court’s adjudicating J.W.

delinquent of the offense, because the very presence of J.W. in juvenile court

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was evidence that he was a minor at the time of the offense, and statutory

law establishes that a minor is ineligible to obtain a license to carry a firearm.

See Appellee’s Brief, at 12.

Licenses to carry concealed firearms in Pennsylvania are only available

to “[a]n individual who is 21 years of age or older....” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6109(b).

Consequently, “[a] person under the age of twenty-one years is absolutely

disqualified from obtaining a license under Section 6109....” In re R.B.G.,

932 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis in original).

“The juvenile court has jurisdiction over children charged with

delinquent acts.” In Interest of Ryan, 419 A.2d 1224, 1225 (Pa. Super.

1980). The Juvenile Act defines “[c]hild” as an individual under the age of 18

years, or an individual under the age of 21 who was adjudicated delinquent,

or committed a delinquent act, before reaching the age of 18 years. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

Accordingly, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, J.W.

must have been under the age of 18 at the time he was arrested. Additionally,

J.W.’s status as a defendant in juvenile court implies, without qualification,

that J.W. is under the age of 21.

Therefore, it is an absolute impossibility that J.W. could have possessed

a valid license to carry a concealed firearm. Accordingly, we agree with the

Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence of record to establish that

J.W. was not licensed to carry a concealed firearm when he was arrested in

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this case because, by the very nature of J.W.’s status as a defendant in

juvenile court, he was ineligible to possess a license to carry a concealed

firearm under Section 6109.

As we find both issues raised are without merit, we affirm the

dispositional order.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/28/2026

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