Scott v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

______________________________________

)

NAVARRA S. SCOTT, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 26-455

)

v. ) Filed: April 27, 2026

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

______________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Navarra S. Scott, proceeding pro se, alleges that she has suffered various wrongs

throughout her life on account of misclassification of her race, ethnicity, and culture. Plaintiff also

alleges that she has been persecuted by the U.S. Constitution and takes issue with certain aspects

of U.S. foreign policy. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)

is currently pending before the Court. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s IFP Application and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action without paying the requisite filing fee. See

Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. On the same day, Plaintiff filed an IFP Application, asking the Court to

permit her to proceed without paying the filing fee. See ECF No. 2. In her Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that she “ha[s] been consistently misclassified of [her] race[,] ethnicity[,] and culture from

birth.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff states that her “race is mankind and ethnicity is Hebrew and []

culture is the law of the Torah.” Id. She appears to argue that “the school system and [her] parents”

required her to honor the U.S. Constitution rather than her “true identity and purpose.” Id. She

also alleges that, in 1948, Congress fraudulently formed an agreement with Israel to supply

military and foreign aid to Egypt and Jordan “to keep the peace with Israel.” Id. She demands

judgment in the amount of $45 million—$1 million for each year she has been alive—against the

United States for financial reparations as well as “the land that was promised by God Almighty.”

Id. at 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. IFP Applications

A court may waive the filing fees and allow a plaintiff to proceed IFP if he or she is “unable

to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Whether to allow a plaintiff

to proceed IFP is left to the discretion of the court, based on information submitted by the plaintiff.

Thompson v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 21, 24 (2011). Being “unable to pay such fees,” as

contemplated by § 1915(a)(1), “means that paying [the filing] fees would constitute a serious

hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment would render plaintiff destitute.” Fiebelkorn v.

United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007) (recognizing that the burden of demonstrating an inability

to pay is not a heavy one).

B. Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for Frivolousness or Failure to State a Claim

A court “shall dismiss” the case of a plaintiff proceeding IFP “at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, No.

25-932, 2025 WL 1589283, at *2 (Fed. Cl. June 5, 2025) (dismissing the plaintiff’s case as

frivolous and for failing to state a claim); Alvar v. United States, No. 25-1131, 2025 WL 1951847,

at *2 n.4 (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2025) (“The frivolity of [p]laintiff’s baseless claim . . . could also

provide a separate ground for dismissal.”). A complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable

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basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To avoid dismissal

for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Pupols v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 413 F.

App’x 232, 234 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677–78).

C. Tucker Act Jurisdiction

“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Marcum LLP v. United

States, 753 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Before the Court can reach the merits of a plaintiff’s

claim, it must first assure itself of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Tucker Act vests this Court with jurisdiction

over any suit against the United States for money damages “founded either upon the Constitution,

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or

implied contract with the United States . . . in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

“The Tucker Act, however, does not create ‘substantive rights[,]’” nor does it grant jurisdiction

for “every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation.” Me. Cmty. Health

Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 322 (2020) (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 556

U.S. 287, 290 (2009) and then quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983)).

Instead, to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, “a plaintiff must identify a separate source of

substantive law that creates the right to money damages” from the United States. Fisher v. United

States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he court must address jurisdictional issues, even

sua sponte, . . . whether raised by a party or not.” St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 916

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F.3d 987, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2019). If the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss

the action in accordance with Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal

Claims (“RCFC”).

Although filings by pro se litigants are liberally construed, pro se plaintiffs maintain the

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Curry v.

United States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). “[T]he leniency afforded to pro se litigants with respect

to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application is Granted.

Plaintiff’s IFP Application meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In her IFP

Application, Plaintiff states that she is currently unemployed and is paying her expenses using

“survivor benefits.” ECF No. 2 at 1–2. Although Plaintiff does not explain what she means by

“survivor benefits,” nor how much she receives in such benefits, the Court presumes that she is

referring to a category of Social Security benefits. See Social Security Administration, Survivor

Benefits, https://www.ssa.gov/survivor (last visited Apr. 15, 2026) (“Survivor benefits provide

monthly payments to eligible family members of people who worked and paid Social Security

taxes before they died.”). Plaintiff also states that she does not own any property and that she is

“in debt.” ECF No. 2 at 2. The Court finds that requiring Plaintiff to pay the filing fee would

present considerable hardship. See Fiebelkorn, 77 Fed. Cl. at 62. The Court therefore grants

Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP.

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B. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Dismissed.

Consistent with its duties under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and RCFC 12(h)(3), the Court has

reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and determined that it must be dismissed. Plaintiff does not assert

a claim within this Court’s jurisdiction, and, alternatively, her Complaint is frivolous.

As to jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint first because it identifies

no applicable money-mandating provision of law on which Plaintiff may base her claims, and

second because the claims stated in the Complaint do not appear to be against the United States.

The Tucker Act limits the jurisdiction of the Court to hear only a specific subset of legal actions:

(1) claims for money damages against the United States that are founded upon a provision of law

that mandates compensation by the Government for the “damages sustained,” Mitchell, 463 U.S.

at 216–17; (2) claims founded upon contracts with the United States that are “either express or

implied in fact,” not “in law,” Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996); and (3)

actions to recover “illegal exactions of money by the United States,” Roth v. United States, 378

F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

In the jurisdiction section of her Complaint, Plaintiff does not state the specific basis for

her claim, instead only generally describing the Court’s jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1 at 1 (“The

United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over a wide range of claims against the

government including, but not limited to, contract disputes, bid protests, takings claims, tax refund

suits, patent and copyright matters, Indian claims, civilian and military pay cases, and vaccine

cases.”). Plaintiff does not, however, identify how her specific claim might fall into one of the

aforementioned categories of the Court’s jurisdiction. Plaintiff goes on to cite 42 U.S.C. § 1996,

the “American Indian Religious Freedom Act,” as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Id. She also

cites Worcester v. Georgia for the proposition that “Indian nations are distinct, independent

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political communities retaining their original natural rights, affirming tribal sovereignty against

state encroachment.” 31 U.S. 515 (1832). Finally, she cites Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393

(1857), without further explanation. None of these sources of law are money-mandating.

The “American Indian Religious Freedom Act” is a Joint Resolution establishing a federal

policy of “protect[ing] and preserv[ing] for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to

believe, express, and exercise the[ir] traditional religions . . . including but not limited to access to

sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and

traditional rites.” Pub. L. No. 95–341, § 1, 92 Stat. 469, 469 (1978). As the United States Supreme

Court has stated, “[n]owhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of

action or any judicially enforceable individual rights,” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective

Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988), let alone a right that mandates compensation from the

Government for damages sustained. Thus, this resolution cannot serve as the basis for this Court’s

jurisdiction.

The other sources of law on which Plaintiff relies as bases for jurisdiction similarly fail

because they do not provide a substantive basis for money damages. In Worcester, the Supreme

Court found that the state’s arrest of a white missionary for preaching to the Cherokee on tribal

lands without a license was unlawful because the state of Georgia had no lawful right to govern

the territory of a separate sovereign. See 31 U.S. at 595. Worcester has since been abrogated.

See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (“Long ago the

Court departed from [the] view that the laws of [a State] can have no force within reservation

boundaries.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“Our

cases make clear that the Indians’ right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not

exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation.”). Plaintiff fails to explain how Worcester

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supports her assertion of Tucker Act jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Worcester cannot sustain her

proposition that “Indian nations . . . retain[] their original natural rights, affirming tribal

sovereignty against state encroachment,” ECF No. 1 at 1, because Worcester has been abrogated.

See Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 643 (2022) (“[T]he Worcester-era understanding

of Indian country as separate from the State was abandoned later in the 1800s. After that change,

Indian country in each State became part of that State’s territory.”). More importantly here, even

if Worcester remained good law, it did not establish any money-mandating provision upon which

this Court’s jurisdiction could be based.

Plaintiff’s reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott similarly fails to provide

a money-mandating provision of law because the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

Amendments superseded and effectively nullified that case. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 609 F.

Supp. 1491, 1495 (D. Colo. 1985) (“The Dred Scott opinion was, of course, reversed by the

adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution after the

Civil War.”), aff’d, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990). Even if Dred Scott’s holding had not been

nullified, it fails to provide a jurisdictional basis for Plaintiff’s claims because its holding did not

purport to establish any money-mandating source of law.

Thus, none of the sources of law on which Plaintiff relies—the American Indian Religious

Freedom Act, Worcester, or Dred Scott—support her assertion that this Court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over her claims. Because Plaintiff cites no applicable money-mandating source of law

on which she may base her claims, the Court must dismiss her Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (explaining that the Tucker Act does not “create[] substantive

rights” but rather “operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources

of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)”).

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Moreover, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against parties other than the

United States. Many of her allegations do not appear to be targeted at the United States

specifically. See ECF No. 1 at 2 (stating that she “ha[s] been consistently misclassified of [her]

race[,] ethnicity[,] and culture from birth,” but not specifying who or what misclassified her); id.

(stating that the school system and her parents converted her to honor the U.S. Constitution); id.

(expressing frustration with her “disobedient parents”). This Court’s jurisdiction does not extend

beyond claims against the Federal Government. Curie v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 791, 808–09

(2022) (“It is well established that [the Court of Federal Claims] lacks jurisdiction to hear claims

against state, local officials, or private individuals or entities, who are not federal employees.”)

(collecting cases); see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . .”). Thus,

Plaintiff’s claims involving her parents cannot be the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Edelmann

v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 380 (2007) (dismissing claims against private parties for lack of

jurisdiction). And Plaintiff’s claims involving “the school system” also fail to serve as a viable

basis for the Court’s jurisdiction because such claims are presumably against a state or local

governmental entity, rather than the United States. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S.

483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local

governments.”); Treviño v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining the

Court lacks jurisdiction over “states, localities, state and local government officials, [or] state

courts”). To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed as alleging federal government

action within “the school system,” she does not identify any actions taken by federal employees

or the federal government as the basis of her claims. See Burga v. United States, No. 25-490, 2025

WL 2840728, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 7, 2025) (“For the United States to be the proper defendant of

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the claim, the federal government’s actions must be the cause of the alleged harm.” (citing

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216–17)), appeal dismissed, No. 2026-1242, 2026 WL 636788 (Fed. Cir.

Mar. 6, 2026).

Alternatively, even if the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the

Court would dismiss the Complaint as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 325 (explaining that “a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”). Plaintiff alleges

that her “race[,] ethnicity[,] and culture” have “been consistently misclassified . . . from [her]

birth.” ECF No. 1 at 2. But Plaintiff’s allegations lack any plausible factual or legal basis. See,

e.g., id. (stating that she has “been persecuted and outcasted by many people” but not specifying

who these people are); id. (“[T]he U.S. Constition [sic] is a [sic] attempt murder on my life.”); id.

(the “agreement Congress created with the Imposters of Israel . . . is fraud and a mockery to God

Almighty”). Although Plaintiff asserts that “[her] constitutional and civil rights mandated in the

Torah were violated by the USA and state constitution and disobedient parents that did not enforce

the Law of God Almighty,” id., she does not explain how her rights were violated or even specify

what cause of action she brings. Even if she did, the Court would not have jurisdiction over claims

to enforce her civil rights. See Ouattara Hema v. United States, 607 F. App’x 989, 990 (Fed. Cir.

2015) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to entertain general civil rights claims

that are not based upon an appropriate money-mandating provision.”).

Plaintiff’s demand for a $45 million judgment also lacks any arguable basis in fact or law.

She requests “$1 million for every year [she] was born and suffered under man made law,” but the

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$1 million figure appears to be entirely arbitrary. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. 1 See Maat El v. United States,

No. 24-1563, 2024 WL 4851311, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 21, 2024) (holding that “obviously fictional

[damages] number further underscores the Complaint’s frivolousness”); Thomas v. United States,

No. 11-572C, 2012 WL 514712, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 16, 2012) (finding plaintiff’s factual

allegations “plainly frivolous” where they involved, among other things, “nonsensical damages”);

Akinro v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 650, 658 (2010) (finding that demand for trillions of dollars

“rise[s] to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). Because none of Plaintiff’s

allegations meet the bar of plausibility, the Court alternatively dismisses her Complaint as

frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Alvar, 2025 WL 1951847, at *2 n.4.

Finally, the Court finds that transfer to district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 is not

appropriate. Pursuant to § 1631, the Court of Federal Claims must transfer civil claims that are

beyond its jurisdiction to a court in which the action could have been brought provided that transfer

is “in the interest of justice.” Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 306, 314 (2012) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1631). Transfer is in the interest of justice when a litigant’s claims “appear to the Court

to be ‘nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Galloway Farms,

Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous,

so transfer is not warranted.

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Plaintiff also requests that the Court provide “the land that was promised by God

Almighty.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Even if Plaintiff had a plausible claim, the Court would not have

jurisdiction to grant injunctive or other equitable relief in the circumstances alleged. The Tucker

Act authorizes the Court to grant some forms of equitable relief in cases where such relief is “an

incident of and collateral to” a judgment in a matter within the Court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1491(a)(2). Thus, the Court may only grant equitable relief when it is “‘tied and subordinate to’ a

money judgment.” James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Austin v. United

States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, 723 (1975)).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from

this decision would not be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The Clerk is directed

to enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2026 /s/ Kathryn C. Davis

KATHRYN C. DAVIS

Judge

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