Chox

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

DOMINGO CHOX,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-165-JES-DNF

DAVID HARDIN, in his

official capacity as Warden

of Glades County Detention

Center and TODD M. LYONS, in

his official capacity as

Acting Director, U.S.

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement,

Respondents.

/

ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Domingo Chox’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc.

10). For the reasons below, the Court grants the petition to the

extent set forth in this Order.

I. Background

Chox is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the

United States without inspection in 2008. (Doc. 1 at 3). He was

not apprehended or processed by any immigration authority prior to

the current detention. (Id.) Petitioner is married to a United

States citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved immigrant

visa petition (Form I-30) filed by his spouse. (Id. at 4). On

November 19, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after being stopped by local law

enforcement for a minor traffic violation. He is currently being

held at the Glades Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida. (Id.

at 1). He has no criminal record. (Id.)

Chox is being detained under the mandatory detention

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Doc. 10 at 2). He now argues,

among other things, that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 9).

II. Discussion

The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) applies to Chox. The distinction matters because §

1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal proceedings,

whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the right to a

bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited

removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens

“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to

the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal

“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack

proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their

application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

v. Noem, --- F. Supp. ---, ---, 2025 WL 2192986, at *5 (D.D.C.

2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C),

(a)(7)). And “[a]mong that set, only two categories of

noncitizens are eligible for expedited removal: (1) noncitizens

‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2) noncitizens who ‘ha[ve]

not been admitted or paroled into the United States’ and cannot

affirmatively show that they have been ‘physically present in the

United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior

to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.’ ” Id.

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii)).

Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including

the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention.”)(citing 8 C.F.R. §§

236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country

are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme

Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission

. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,

irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court

has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to

those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of

initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But

once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Chox—already present in the country

1

as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.

Respondents argue that Chox is properly detained under

section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that in Buenrostro-

1

The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory

detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado. 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229

(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s

statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded

that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory

ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no

matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory

construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.

2 In Patel, the case relied upon by the Respondents in their

response, Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this petition and that Petitioner has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those

arguments in Patel and in other recent cases presenting the same

issues. See e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-JES-DNF

(M.D. Fla. December 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida Southside

Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December 15, 2025).

In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its jurisdiction and

determined that exhaustion was excused because it would be futile.

The Court’s reasoning on these issues also applies here.

Mendez v. Bondi, et al., No. 25-20496 (5th Cir. Feb. 6. 2026), the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (to date, the only circuit court to

have addressed the issue) recently concluded that unadmitted

aliens apprehended anywhere in the United States are never eligible

for release on bond, no matter how long they have resided inside

the United States. This is contrary to the overwhelming majority

of district court judges to have considered the issue. This Court

respectfully disagrees with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and notes

that it is not binding precedent in this Court. Thus, the Court

rejects the government’s argument that Chox is subject to expedited

removal and concludes that Respondents’ authority to detain him

stems from section 1226(a). As a noncitizen detained under

section 1226(a), Chox has a right to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Chox

before an immigration judge for a § 1226 bond hearing or release

him within ten days. The Court is aware that the Executive Office

for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is the agency that schedules bond

hearings. In other cases, Respondents have claimed they cannot

direct the EOIR when to conduct a bond hearing. Regardless,

subjecting Chox to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) is

unlawful. If Respondents are unable to ensure that Chox timely

receives the bond hearing to which he is entitled under § 1226(a),

they must release him.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Domingo Chox’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this Order.

2, Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide

Chox with the statutory process required under § 1226, which

includes a bond hearing or release him under reasonable conditions

of supervision.

3. If Respondents release Chox, they shall facilitate his

transportation from the detention facility by notifying his

counsel when and where he may be collected.

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 10, 2026.

J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE