Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

WILIAN ALEXANDER VASQUEZ LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-147-JES-NPM

WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY DETENTION

CENTER, et al.,

Respondents.

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OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Wilian Alexander Vasquez

Lopez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and the

government’s response (Doc. 3). For the reasons below, the Court

grants the petition to the extent set forth in this Order.

I. Background

Vasquez Lopezis a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered

the United States without inspection on March 28, 2017. (Doc. 1

at 2). He was not apprehended or processed by any immigration

authority prior to the current detention. (Id.) Petitioner is

the father of a United States citizen. (Id. at 3). On November

21, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE). He is currently being held at the

Glades Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida. (Id. at 1). He

has no criminal record. (Id. at 4).

Vasquez Lopez is being detained under the mandatory detention

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Doc. 3 at 2). He now argues,

among other things, that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 6).

II. Discussion

The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) applies to Vasquez Lopez. The distinction matters because

§ 1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal proceedings,

whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the right to a

bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited

removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens

“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to

the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal

“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack

proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their

application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

v. Noem, --- F. Supp. ---, ---, 2025 WL 2192986, at *5 (D.D.C.

2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C),

(a)(7)). And “[a]mong that set, only two categories of noncitizens

are eligible for expedited removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in

the United States,’ and (2) noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been

admitted or paroled into the United States’ and cannot

affirmatively show that they have been ‘physically present in the

United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior

to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.’ ” Id.

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii)).

Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including

the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§

236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country

are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme

Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission

. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,

irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court

has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to

those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of

initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But

once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Vasquez Lopez—already present in

the country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1

Respondents argue that Vasquez Lopez is properly detained

under section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that in

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al., No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330

(5th Cir. Feb. 6. 2026), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—to

date, the only circuit court to have addressed the issue—recently

concluded that unadmitted aliens apprehended anywhere in the

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory

detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado. 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229

(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s

statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded

that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory

ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no

matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory

construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.

2 In Patel, the case relied upon by the Respondents in their

response, Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this petition and that Petitioner has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those

arguments in Patel and in other recent cases presenting the same

issues. See e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-JES-DNF (M.D.

Fla. December 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida Southside

Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December 15, 2025).

In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its jurisdiction and

determined that exhaustion was excused because it would be futile.

The Court’s reasoning on these issues also applies here.

United States are never eligible for release on bond, no matter

how long they have resided inside the United States. This is

contrary to the overwhelming majority of district court judges to

have considered the issue. This Court respectfully disagrees with

the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and notes that it is not binding

precedent in this Court. Thus, the Court rejects the government’s

argument that Vasquez Lopez is subject to expedited removal and

concludes that Respondents’ authority to detain him stems from

section 1226(a). As a noncitizen detained under section 1226(a),

Vasquez Lopez has a right to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Vasquez

Lopez before an immigration judge for a § 1226 bond hearing or

release him within ten days. The Court is aware that the Executive

Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is the agency that schedules

bond hearings. In other cases, Respondents have claimed they

cannot direct the EOIR when to conduct a bond hearing. Regardless,

subjecting Vasquez Lopez to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)

is unlawful. If Respondents are unable to ensure that Vasquez

Lopez timely receives the bond hearing to which he is entitled

under § 1226(a), they must release him.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Wilian Alezander Vasquez Lopez’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this

Order.

2, Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide

Vasquez Lopez with the statutory process required under § 1226,

which includes a bond hearing or release him under reasonable

conditions of supervision.

3. If Respondents release Vasquez Lopez, they shall

facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by

notifying his counsel when and where he may be collected.

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 10, 2026.

ade E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE