Meyer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF )

AMERICA, INC. d/b/a AIRLINES FOR )

AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 24-cv-4623

)

v. )

)

KENNETH J. MEYER, in his official ) Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings

capacity as Commissioner of the )

Department of Business Affairs and )

Consumer Protection, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Air Transport Association of America, Inc. d/b/a Airlines for America (the

“Association”) brings this complaint (“Complaint”) against Kenneth J. Meyer in his official

capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection,

alleging that the Chicago Paid Leave and Paid Sick Leave Ordinance, Mun. Code of Chicago

§§6-130-005, et seq., and any rules promulgated thereunder, as applied to the Association’s

member carriers (the “Airlines”), are preempted by (1) the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49

U.S.C. §§41701–26, (“ADA”) and (2) the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§151–88, (“RLA”).

(Dckt. #1). Before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dckt. #30). For the reasons that follow, defendant’s

motion to dismiss is denied.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility requires a plaintiff to “go beyond mere speculation or

conjecture.” Wertymer v. Walmart, Inc., 142 F.4th 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2025). The complaint must

plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A complaint

that satisfies this standard is ‘well-pled’ and may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that

actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable.” Berk v. Choy, 146 S.Ct. 546, 553 (2026)

(cleaned up); Orr v. Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2025) (recognizing that the “notice-

pleading standard is deliberately undemanding.”) (cleaned up). As such, the Federal Rules

require “no more than a statement of the claim” without the pleading of evidence to support it,

Berk, 146 S. Ct. at 553.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “constru[es] the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accept[s] all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true.” Horist v. Sudler & Co., 941 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2019); Esco v. City of

Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024). Moreover, in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

plaintiff is free to “elaborate on his factual allegations so long as the new elaborations are

consistent with the pleadings.” Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 752 n.2

(7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Dismissal is only warranted if “no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Christensen v. Cnty. of

Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007).

II. RELEVANT FACTS

A. The Airlines’ Employment Terms

The Court draws the facts set forth below from plaintiff’s Complaint. (Dckt. #1).

The Association is a nonprofit corporation that advocates on behalf of ten federally

regulated air carriers and three cargo carriers who collectively account for more than 90% of the

annual passenger and cargo traffic on U.S. airlines. (Id. ¶7). The Association represents Airlines

that employ more than 90% of the pilots, flight attendants, ground crew members, and other

employees who operate flights around the country and the world. (Id. ¶¶7, 16, 22). Flight

crew—pilots and flight attendants—are highly mobile workers: they often work out of bases

different from the cities where they live, are permitted to transfer between bases from month to

month, and spend much of their work time in federally regulated airspace. (Id. ¶¶16–18).

Ground crew are less mobile, and typically live near the airport where they work. (Id. ¶22).

They perform services for ticketing, boarding, seating, baggage, towing, de-icing, taxiing,

deplaning, and technical maintenance, among other airport and aircraft needs. (Id. ¶¶24–26).

The employment terms of Airlines’ flight crew and ground crew are detailed in collective

bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) and company policies. (Id. ¶28). With respect to paid time off

in particular, CBAs and company policies reflect the outcome of extensive negotiation and

consideration to maintain a “delicate balance” between the needs of Airline employees to take

paid time off and the needs of Airlines to have sufficient staffing for the round-the-clock

transportation services they provide. (Id. ¶29). Existing policies “are designed to ensure

uniformity, predictability, and fairness” for Airline employees in any given work group

nationwide. (Id. ¶31). They describe detailed procedures for seniority-based schedule bidding,

trip and shift trading, sick time, other time off, and attendance policies. (Id. ¶¶31–48). Airlines

enforce their attendance policies with two “accountability tools”: (1) points systems where

employees accrue points for each occurrence of sick leave or unplanned absence, and where

those points can factor into discipline; and (2) the ability to request doctor’s notes if the

circumstances of an employee’s sick call suggest potential abuse. (Id. ¶¶42–48).

The Association alleges that, although Airlines have “mitigation strategies” in place that

can help provide coverage for employees who call out sick,” (id. ¶84), “[m]ost of the Airlines’

flights operate with the minimum staffing level for pilots and flight attendants,” (id. ¶19), and

existing strategies “cannot and do not insulate the Airlines from the service impacts attributable

to employee absences,” (id. ¶84).

B. The Ordinance

The Chicago Paid Leave and Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), which has

been in effect since July 1, 2024, governs when and how covered employees—defined as any

employee “who works at least 80 hours for an Employer within any 120-day period while

physically present within the geographic boundaries of Chicago”—can earn, use, and carry over

paid leave and paid sick leave. (Id. ¶¶49–73). It imposes requirements for the minimum amount

of leave to which covered employees are entitled, (id. ¶¶57, 59); the reasons for which

employees can use paid leave and paid sick leave, (id. ¶¶58, 60); and the notice and

documentation that an employer can require an employee to provide, (id. ¶¶58, 61, 65).

The Ordinance prohibits the use of an “absence-control policy . . . to count paid time off

as an absence that triggers discipline, discharge, demotion, suspension, or any other adverse

activity.” (Id. ¶66). It also prohibits employers from requiring employees to provide

documentation of how their paid sick leave is used “until an employee is absent for more than

three consecutive workdays.” (Id. ¶65). If an employer does require such documentation, they

face a “rebuttable presumption that it has violated the Ordinance.” (Id. (cleaned up)). The

Ordinance allows CBAs entered into after July 1, 2024 to waive the Ordinance’s leave rules, but

“only if the waiver is set forth explicitly in such agreement in clear and unambiguous terms.”

(Id. ¶67).

The Association alleges that the Ordinance “will lead to more employee absences” and

“cause an increase in late-scheduled or ill-timed use of paid leave.” (Id. ¶¶72–73). An increase

in employee absences and unplanned leave, it further alleges, will “disrupt[] the Airlines’

passenger boarding procedures,” (id. ¶75); “caus[e] or contribut[e] to flight delays and

cancellations,” including “downline delays,” (id. ¶¶75–76); and “impact the operational

reliability of a base, which in turn affects the viability of that base for an Airline,” (id. ¶78).

“The Ordinance will require the Airlines to incur even further costs for [their] mitigation

strategies and/or to implement expensive changes to their business models.” (Id. ¶84).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the Ordinance is preempted by two federal statutes: the Airline

Deregulation Act (“ADA”) and the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). Defendant contends that

plaintiff fails to state a claim under either statute. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds

that plaintiff has properly alleged both ADA and RLA preemption claims, and denies defendant’s

motion to dismiss.

“Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’

command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and

purpose.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990) (cleaned up). The Court “begin[s]

with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that

language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 57.

A. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Is Subject to ADA

Preemption.

The ADA contains an express preemption provision that prohibits state and local

governments from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the

force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C.

§41713(b)(1). A state law “relates to” a price, route, or service if it “[has] a connection with or

reference to airline rates, routes, or services,” even if the effect of a law is “only indirect,” as

long as the effect is not “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 504. U.S. 374, 384, 386 (1992) (cleaned up). Courts have held that “pre-emption occurs at

least where state laws have a ‘significant impact’” on airline rates, routes, and services. See

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motors Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008), quoting Morales, 504

U.S. at 390. To evaluate such impact, courts “conduct an individualized inquiry that ‘engages

with the real and logical effects of the state statute.’” Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045,

1055 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis included).

Defendant argues that the Association has failed to sufficiently allege that the ADA

preempts the Ordinance because: (1) plaintiff’s arguments about the effect of the Ordinance are

speculative; and (2) at most, the Ordinance impacts labor costs, which are too far removed from

“fares, routes, or services” for the Ordinance to be preempted by the ADA. (Dckt. #34 at 14, 10).

The Court disagrees.

To begin, defendant contends that the Ordinance will not actually increase employee

absences because: (1) the chain of causation is “tenuous,” (id. at 15); (2) the Airlines already

have mitigation strategies in place to avoid disruptions, (id.); (3) Airline policies and CBA terms

“largely track or exceed” the Ordinance’s paid leave and paid sick leave provisions, (Dckt. #41 at

4 n.1); and (4) the Ordinance “does not change the terms of CBAs already in place on July 1,

2024,” (id.).

Defendant’s arguments mischaracterize the allegations in the Complaint, which go

beyond mere speculation. In particular, the Association explicitly alleges that the Ordinance

“will lead to more employee absences,” “will . . . cause an increase in late-scheduled or ill-timed

use of paid leave,” and “will . . . cause[e] or contribut[e] to flight delays and cancellations;” and

that existing mitigation strategies are insufficient to accommodate additional absences. (Dckt. #1

¶¶72–73, 75, 84 (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the provisions within the existing CBAs and

company policies that provide generous leave—which the Association alleges were “carefully

negotiated over long periods of time,” (id. ¶4)—do not contradict the fact that the Ordinance

mandates that the Airlines provide greater flexibility on terms that were not reached via

negotiation (such as the reasons that employees can take paid leave and the Airlines’ inability to

enforce their accountability policies). (Dckt. #37 at 13 n.4).

The Court “constru[es] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,” Horist,

941 F.3d at 278, and as the Association correctly points out, the Court considers both the real and

the logical effects of a law when considering ADA preemption, see Costello, 810 F.3d at 1055.

Based on the “delicate balance” of staffing logistics that the Association alleges, (Dckt. #1 ¶29),

it is plausible beyond speculation that a law regulating leave policies will upset that balance—as

early as July 1, 2024 for employers not bound by CBAs, and when “employees enter into a new

CBA” for employers who currently have CBAs with unions, (Dckt. #41 at 4 n.1). Furthermore,

the Association plausibly alleges that the increase in employee absences constitutes a “significant

impact” on airline rates, routes, or services. Contrary to defendant’s framing, the Association

does not allege merely “a possible increase in . . . labor costs” and a “downstream impact on

customer-facing services.” (Dckt. #34 at 15). Instead, it alleges that the Ordinance will disrupt

flight services themselves, including by causing flight delays and cancellations, due to the

difficulty and ripple effect of finding replacement members for a flight or ground crew. (Dckt.

#1 at 72–84).

Finally, the Association persuasively analogizes the Ordinance to the New York and

Massachusetts sick leave laws that other courts have found preempted by the ADA, as well as the

Colorado and Minnesota sick leave laws against which the Association has brought preemption

claims that have survived motions to dismiss. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. New York City Dep’t of

Consumer Affairs, 564 F.Supp.3d 109, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding that a New York sick leave

law went “directly to the availability of flight attendants, and thus on-time flights, a core service

of the airline.”); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Campbell, No. 18-cv-10651-ADB, 2023 WL

3773743, at *12 (D.Mass. 2023) (finding that a Massachusetts sick leave law “caus[ed] an

increase in employees calling out sick” and thus “has a clear and direct impact, which is not

tenuous, remote or peripheral”); see also Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Moss, No. 1:23-cv-

02421-DDD-KAS, 2024 WL 4369137, at *4 (D.Colo. Sept. 30, 2024) (denying a motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the ADA preempted a Colorado sick leave law); Air Transp. Ass’n

of Am., Inc. v. Blissenbach, No. 24-cv-4657 (JWB-ECW), Transcript of Proceedings (D.Minn.

May 14, 2025) (Dckt. #60-1 at 15)1 (denying a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the ADA

preempted a Minnesota sick leave law because “if there isn’t staff, then the plane can’t fly, and

that would certainly seem to go to the heart of what the airline is all about.”).2 As such, the

1 The Association submitted a copy of the Blissenbach order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and

the transcript of the May 14, 2025 hearing on the motion to dismiss as supplemental authority and filed

the order and transcript as Dckt. #60-1 in this case.

2 Defendant’s reliance on other cases where the preemption issue was addressed on summary judgment,

(See Dckt. #34 at 16–17), is misplaced because the plaintiffs in those cases had the burden of presenting

Court finds that the Association has pled facts which support a plausible finding that the

Ordinance will impose a “significant impact” not just on labor costs, but on flights—the core

customer-facing service that the Airlines offer.

In sum: accepting the Association’s factual allegations as true and viewing them in the

light most favorable to the Association as the Court is required to do, the Court finds that the

Association has stated a plausible claim that the ADA preempts the Ordinance.

B. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Is Subject to RLA

Preemption.

Unlike the ADA, the RLA does not contain an express preemption provision. Instead, the

Association argues that the RLA preempts the Ordinance under two theories of implied

preemption: Machinists preemption and “minor dispute” preemption. Defendant argues that

neither theory succeeds. The Court disagrees and, finding that plaintiff has plausibly alleged

Machinists preemption, declines to reach the question of whether plaintiff has plausibly alleged

minor dispute preemption. See Signal Funding, LLC v. Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger

LLP, 136 F.4th 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Where a plaintiff states a plausible claim for relief

under one discernable legal theory, we start and end there.”) (cleaned up).

The Machinists preemption doctrine forbids the regulation of conduct that Congress

intended “be unregulated [and] left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.” Lodge

76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Rel’s Comm’n, 427

evidence (and not merely allegations) to support their claims and the courts had the benefit of a full

factual record. See Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518–19 (7th Cir. 1998) (contrasting the standard for

resolving a motion to dismiss with the standard on summary judgment). And while defendant cites

authority from the Seventh Circuit that laws regulating “labor inputs”—including minimum wage laws,

worker-safety laws, and anti-discrimination laws—are not preempted by the ADA, see S.C. Johnson &

Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012), the Association persuasively

distinguishes the state bribery and racketeering claims that were found not preempted there, as well as the

wrongful discharge claims that were found not preempted in Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870 F.3d 812,

814–15 (8th Cir. 2017), from the sick leave law at issue in the Ordinance, (see Dckt. #37 at 19 n.10).

U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (cleaned up) (Machinists).3 It is based on the idea that “Congress struck a

balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective

bargaining, and labor disputes.” Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140. Nonetheless, federal law does not

preempt a state law that “establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon the

collective-bargaining process.” Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7 (1987). A

minimum labor standard is one that, at a minimum,” affect[s] union and nonunion employees

equally, and neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes that are

the subject of the [National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)].” Metro Life Ins. Co. v.

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755 (1985). Minimum labor standards “have only the most

indirect effect on the right of self-organization established in the Act.” 520 S. Michigan Ave.

Assocs., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1129 (7th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). “[S]tate action that

intrudes on the mechanics of collective bargaining is preempted, but state action that sets the

stage for such bargaining is not.” American Hotel and Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 834

F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 2016). What a state cannot do directly, it also cannot do indirectly,

Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 69 (2008), so even regulations that indirectly

interfere with collective bargaining can be preempted under Machinists.

The Association alleges that the Ordinance is not a “minimum labor standard” for four

reasons: (1) it is not a law of general application; (2) it creates a disincentive to collective

bargaining; (3) it contains a formidable enforcement mechanism; and (4) it interferes with “every

aspect of the Airlines’ sick leave, personal leave, and vacation policies.” (Dckt. #37 at 22–23).

The Association further alleges that the Ordinance affects union and nonunion employees

3 “Where RLA and NRLA provisions ‘are in all material respects identical,’ the Supreme Court has used

RLA cases as a guide to the NLRA and vice versa.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Dist. Ten and Local Lodge

873 v. Allen, 904 F.d 490, 501 n.5 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.

735, 745 (1988).

unequally and discourages the collective bargaining process. (Id. at 23–24). For the reasons

below, the Court finds that plaintiff’s allegations state a plausible claim for preemption under the

RLA.

1. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Is Not a

Law of General Application.

The Association argues that the Ordinance is not a law of general application because it

categorically excludes several groups of employees, including workers in the “construction

industry” (broadly defined to include snow plowing, snow removal, and refuse collection);

federal employees; state employees; “essentially any employee of a railroad”; and any employee

covered by a CBA that explicitly waives the Ordinance’s provisions. (Dckt. ##1 ¶108; 37 at 22).

Defendant disagrees, arguing that the Ordinance “has a broader reach than many laws . . . that

have survived preemption challenges,” (Dckt. #41 at 11). In support of its argument, defendant

contrasts the Ordinance with the Hotel Room Attendant Amendment (“Attendant Amendment”)

at issue in Shannon, which the Seventh Circuit found was preempted by the NLRA in part

because it applied “to only one occupation (room attendants), in one industry (the hotel industry),

in one county (Cook county).” 549 F.3d at 1130. Defendant argues that unlike the “hyper-

specific” and “too narrow” regulation at issue in Shannon, the Ordinance here is more like the

Chicago Fair Workweek Ordinance at issue in Building Owners and Managers Association of

Chicago v. City of Chicago, which the court found was not preempted by the NLRA. (Dckt. #34

at 21); see 513 F.Supp.3d 1017, 1026 (N.D.Ill. 2021) (BOMA).

As an initial matter, defendant’s analogies to these other cases are not persuasive. Either

they were decided on summary judgment and not on a motion to dismiss, where plaintiff must

only state a claim that is “plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, or they concern

distinguishable factual scenarios. (See Dckt. #34 at 22). In particular, neither Shannon nor

BOMA makes it implausible that the Ordinance (unlike the Attendant Amendment) is not a law of

general application, given that the Association has alleged that numerous classes of employees

are exempt from the Ordinance. Moreover, BOMA is distinguishable because unlike the

industries affected in that case, the Airlines belong to an industry uniquely susceptible to

“predictive-scheduling issues.” (Dckt. #37 at 25); cf. BOMA, 513 F.Supp.3d at 1024 (finding

that the law at issue was not a law of general application in part because “BOMA does not allege

or argue that the industries it identifies suffer from late scheduling changes”). Thus, the

Association has plausibly alleged that the Ordinance is not a law of general application.

2. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Creates a

Disincentive to Collective Bargaining.

Next, the Association argues that the Ordinance creates a “disincentive to collective

bargaining” by establishing “terms of employment [through legislation] that would be very

difficult for any union to bargain for.” (Dckt. #37 at 22, 24) (cleaned up). This argument, too, is

plausible. Although defendant correctly points out that “the NLRA is concerned with ensuring

an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms that may emerge from such

bargaining,” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20, the Association emphasizes the “delicate balance” that

the Airlines have struck in their CBAs, (Dckt. #1 ¶29), and like the plaintiffs in Shannon, it has

plausibly alleged that the Ordinance constitutes “more than a mere backdrop” to the Airlines’

negotiations. Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1134. Indeed, the Ordinance allegedly disrupts the Airlines’

negotiations altogether by overriding “long-standing features” of Airlines’ CBAs—namely,

points-based attendance systems and the use of doctors’ notes—that “unions have been unable to

get the Airlines to abandon through the collective bargaining process.” (Dckt. #1 ¶107(a)).

Furthermore, like the Minnesota law at issue in Blissenbach, the Ordinance imposes the same

requirements on all paid leave and paid sick leave that Airlines might provide their employees,

effectively relying on—and interfering with—previously bargained-for terms governing paid

leave. (See Dckt. 60-1 at 38-39 (denying a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the RLA

preempted a Minnesota sick leave law)). In an industry where even small staff shortages have

cascading effects on the services employers provide, (see id.; Dckt. #1 ¶¶72–84), it is plausible

that the features affected by the Ordinance are so substantive as to “discourage the collective-

bargaining processes that are the subject of the [RLA],” Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 755,

“encourag[ing] . . . employers or unions to focus on lobbying at the state capital instead of

negotiating at the bargaining table,” Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1132–33.

3. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Contains a

Formidable Enforcement Mechanism.

The Association goes on to compare enforcement provisions in the Ordinance to parallel

provisions in the Attendant Amendment at issue in Shannon, which the Seventh Circuit found to

be “formidable enforcement mechanism[s],” including: (1) the ability for employees to recover

treble damages plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs, and (2) the creation of a “rebuttable

presumption” that a covered employer has violated the Ordinance if it requires documentation

before receiving notice that an employee has taken paid sick leave for three consecutive days.

(Dckt. #37 at 22). Although defendant argues that the Ordinance’s enforcement measures are

narrower than those at issue in Shannon, and that the Ordinance is therefore still a minimum

labor standard, (Dckt. #41 at 14), the Court finds that the Association has plausibly alleged that

the Ordinance’s enforcement provisions—like those in Shannon and unlike those in BOMA—

“can in no sense be considered ‘minimal.’” (Dckt. #1 ¶107(b)); Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1135).

As an initial matter, the Court is not convinced that the Attendant Amendment was, as

defendant argues, more severe. That law established a rebuttable presumption only where an

employee plausibly alleged retaliation based on a statutory violation, while the Ordinance creates

a rebuttable presumption as soon as an employer requires a doctor’s note before sufficient time

has passed. See Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1135 n.12; (Dckt. #1 ¶65). Moreover, the Association has

plausibly alleged that the Ordinance’s enforcement mechanisms surpass those of a “minimum

labor standard,” especially given the treble damages and burden of proof that the courts in both

Shannon and BOMA recognized as surpassing provisions of a “minimum labor standard.”

Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1135; BOMA, 513 F.Supp.3d at 1025.

4. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Affects the

Structure of the Entirety of the Employment Agreement.

Fourth and finally, the Association adequately alleges that the Ordinance cannot

constitute a minimum labor standard because it affects “the structure of the entirety of the

employment agreement.” Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1137. In particular, the Association argues that

the Ordinance “imposes a pervasive scheme of regulation with respect to numerous aspects of

the working relationship between Airlines and their employees, in derogation” of CBAs. (Dckt.

#1 ¶104(a)). Defendant contends that the Ordinance only establishes minimum labor standards,

and that “the alleged interference is not with the process of collective bargaining.” (Dckt. #41 at

14–15). But as explained above, a law can surpass a “minimum labor standard” by establishing

employment terms that cannot be reached by negotiation, see Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1134;

Blissenbach, No. 24-cv-4657 (JWB-ECW), Order (D.Minn. May 14, 2025), and even indirect

regulations of collective bargaining can be preempted, Brown, 554 U.S. at 69.

The Court finds two aspects of the Complaint are particularly relevant. First, the

Association has alleged that the impact of the Ordinance on “every aspect of the Airlines’ sick

leave, personal leave, and vacation policies” goes beyond the “minimal substantive impact on

contracts” that the Seventh Circuit and its sister circuits have found to constitute a minimum

labor standard. See Shannon, 549 F.3d at 1134, Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Bragdon, 64 F.3d

497, 600 (9th Cir. 1995); Hull v. Dutton, 935 F.2d 1194, 11987 (11th Cir. 1991). Rather than

impacting only paid leave and paid sick leave, the Ordinance (as the allegations of the Complaint

set forth) affects all facets of Airlines’ scheduling practices, and thus their services. (See Dckt.

#60-1 at 38-39).

Second, the Association has plausibly alleged that the Ordinance does not only affect

“employees as individual workers, [but] as members of a collective organization.” Metro. Life,

471 U.S. at 755 (cleaned up); (see Dckt. #1 ¶¶32, 75–83). When one flight attendant calls in sick

on short notice, for example, their unavailability plausibly affects the operation of an entire flight

crew and flight, not to mention every subsequent connecting flight and the flights of any other

employees who need to be rerouted as replacements. Because the Association adequately alleges

the Ordinance’s pervasive effects on (1) “every aspect” of Airlines’ scheduling practices and (2)

the rights of employees as a collective organization, rather than as individuals, the Court finds it

plausible that the Ordinance exceeds a “minimum labor standard.”

5. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance Affects

Union and Nonunion Employees Unequally.

The parties disagree about whether the Ordinance affects union and nonunion employees

unequally, but here, too, the Association’s argument is sufficiently persuasive to survive

defendant’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, it argues that the Ordinance mandates earlier

compliance for some non-union employers and creates the possibility of waiver for union

employees, but not for non-union employees. (Dckt. #37 at 23). Defendant contends that “the

baseline of the Ordinance is that it applies to both groups of employees,” and besides, that “the

focus of the preemption analysis is not whether a law subjects all employees to identical

requirements.” (Dckt. #41 at 15 & n.7). While the Court agrees that the preemption analysis is

broader than the question of equal treatment alone, it finds that the Association has plausibly

alleged that the Ordinance treats union and nonunion employees unequally.

6. The Association Has Plausibly Alleged That the Ordinance’s Opt-Out

Provision Disincentives Collective Bargaining.

Lastly, the Association argues that the Ordinance alters the collective bargaining process

because its opt-out provision “delegat[es] to unions the unfettered authority to determine whether

Airlines must comply with the requirements of the Ordinance.” (Dckt. #1 ¶4). They argue that

the provision is merely “illusory” because unions have historically not waived state or local

regulations in their CBAs, or likely will not. (See Dckt. ##37 at 24). Defendant contends, citing

several cases out of the Ninth Circuit, that states are well within their rights to pass “familiar and

narrowly-drawn opt-out provisions” that accompany minimum labor standard laws. (See Dckt.

#34 at 20–21). The Supreme Court has stated, when considering similar opt-out laws in the

context of the NLRA, that the NLRA “should cast no shadow on the validity of these familiar

and narrowly drawn opt-out provisions.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 & n.6 (1994).

Even so, the Court finds it “plausible,” even if arguably “improbable,” Berk, 146 S. Ct. at 553,

that the Ordinance’s opt-out provision disincentivizes bargaining, at least in the particular context

of the Airlines’ “detail[ed]” CBA negotiations, (Dckt. #1 ¶41), given the “delicate balance” of

logistics at play and unions’ alleged longstanding inability to effectuate different paid leave and

paid sick leave provisions in their CBAs, (id. ¶¶29, 107(a)). (See Dckt. #60-1 at 35, 41

(discussing how a Minnesota leave law “attaches and . . . grafts on to . . . provisions and

responsibilities that were never negotiated” and permitting discovery about how the law at issue

“interacts with, modifies, or contradicts federally governed airline labor relations under the

RLA,” as well as “whether the law was intended to or has in practice affected airline operations

in a matter distinct from other industries”)).

In sum: accepting the Association’s factual allegations as true and viewing them in the

light most favorable to the Alliance, the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that

the RLA preempts the Ordinance.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Dckt.

#30). Defendant is ordered to answer by April 10, 2026. The partial stay on discovery is lifted.

By April 17, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report setting forth a proposed schedule for

the completion of fact and expert discovery and providing an update on the status of their

settlement negotiations.

DATE: March 20, 2026

□□ I. Cummings

United States District Court Judge

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