The opinion
04/27/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
February 3, 2026 Session
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS THOMPSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Weakley County
No. 2022-CR-82 Jeff Parham, Judge
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No. W2025-00825-CCA-R3-PC
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The Petitioner, Christopher Thomas Thompson, appeals from the Weakley County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to develop a
defense strategy or otherwise investigate possible defenses and that his guilty plea was
involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KYLE A. HIXSON and
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.
Melinda Meador, Martin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Thomas Thompson.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Colin Johnson, District Attorney General; and Kate M. Bynum, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 3, 2022, a Weakley County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
charging the Petitioner and his wife, Jessica Thompson, with various charges relating to
the death of the Petitioner’s niece, Mandy Noe. From the record,1 we glean that on January
21, 2022, while at a camper parked at his address, the Petitioner struck and killed the victim.
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Our recitation of the facts giving rise to these charges is complicated by the absence of a transcript
of the Petitioner’s guilty plea submission hearing from the appellate record.
The Petitioner thereafter rented a tractor, transported it back to his property, dug a grave,
and buried the victim’s body. The Petitioner was arrested on unrelated charges on February
2, 2022, and the victim’s body was exhumed that same day. The Petitioner was
subsequently charged with first degree felony murder, aggravated abuse of a vulnerable
adult, aggravated neglect of a vulnerable adult, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with or
fabricating evidence. The latter four counts of the indictment charged Mrs. Thompson as
a codefendant; Mrs. Thompson was also charged with acting as an accessory after the fact
and with making a false report. On September 13, 2022, the State filed a notice of its intent
to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as to the Petitioner.
The trial court appointed the District Public Defender’s Office to represent the
Petitioner. Through counsel, the Petitioner moved to sever his charges from Mrs.
Thompson’s charges. Although the record does not include an order granting this motion,
the Petitioner’s judgments reflect that it was granted.
On October 23, 2023, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of second degree
murder pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The remainder of his charges were
dismissed by agreement. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration
as a Range I, standard offender at a one hundred percent service rate. Judgments were
entered that same day.
On August 21, 2024, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. Among other grounds, the Petitioner alleged that his conviction was based upon an
unlawfully induced guilty plea and upon a coerced confession. On August 26, 2024, the
post-conviction court entered an order finding that the petition presented a colorable claim
for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel, and instructed counsel to file an amended
petition or notify the post-conviction court that no amendment would be filed within thirty
days. The post-conviction court also ordered that the State file an answer within thirty days
of the Petitioner’s filing an amended petition or notice of no amendment.
On December 11, 2024, the State filed a response in opposition to the petition for
post-conviction relief. On February 12, 2025, the Petitioner, through post-conviction
counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. In his amended petition, the
Petitioner maintained that his guilty plea was involuntary and alleged, among other claims,
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise him about
his case or investigate and prepare a defense strategy. On March 7, 2025, the State filed a
response in opposition to the Petitioner’s amended petition.
The post-conviction court held a hearing on April 8, 2025. Trial counsel testified
that he was the elected District Public Defender and had practiced law for twenty-seven
years. Trial counsel testified that the District Public Defender’s Office was initially
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appointed to represent the Petitioner before he took office and that the Petitioner was
represented by an Assistant District Public Defender (“first counsel”) for approximately
eight months following his arrest in February 2022. First counsel left the District Public
Defender’s Office in October 2022, and trial counsel represented the Petitioner thereafter.
Trial counsel testified that when he began representing the Petitioner, first counsel
informed him that the Petitioner “would accept” a twenty-year plea offer. He averred that
while the State was not yet at “that point” at the outset of his representation, he eventually
negotiated such an offer and presented it to the Petitioner. Trial counsel testified that the
Petitioner rejected this offer and “wanted to go lower than that,” seeking a ten- or fifteen-
year sentence instead. Trial counsel stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate
with the State in accordance with the Petitioner’s wishes.
Trial counsel testified that he reviewed the Petitioner’s preliminary hearing, visited
the crime scene, and retained two investigators to help him prepare the Petitioner’s defense.
He stated that the investigators reviewed discovery, met with the Petitioner, “developed a
case strategy with the defense team,” and located, interviewed, and took statements from
witnesses. The investigators also prepared a report of their findings.
Trial counsel recalled that the Petitioner requested that he speak with his son and
investigate a “pellet pistol.” Trial counsel testified that he interviewed the Petitioner’s son,
who did not “have a whole lot to say” regarding the Petitioner’s case. However, he noted
that the Petitioner’s son informed him of certain potential marital problems between the
Petitioner and Mrs. Thompson. Trial counsel further recalled that first counsel took
photographs of the “pellet pistol” when he visited the crime scene. Trial counsel averred
that he unsuccessfully attempted to locate the pistol when he began representing the
Petitioner; however, nearly a year had elapsed since the offenses by that time, and the
Petitioner’s home had since been “ransacked.” He testified that he believed the pistol was
relevant because the victim sustained several “pellet gun injuries” to her buttocks and to
the backs of her legs and knees. Trial counsel stated that he and the Petitioner discussed
this evidence. He also recalled that, on the morning after the victim’s murder, the victim’s
father and Mrs. Thompson drove to Georgia to visit one of Mrs. Thompson’s relatives.
Trial counsel described this as “highly coincidental” and recalled discussing it as a potential
defense theory with the Petitioner, noting that the Petitioner “could have run” but instead
remained to bury the victim’s body.
Trial counsel testified that he wrote at least five or six letters to the Petitioner
throughout the course of his representation in which he discussed the evidence in the
Petitioner’s case and discussed its potential strengths and weaknesses if the Petitioner
elected to go to trial. He stated that the Petitioner confessed during an interview with
officers from the Weakley County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO). He averred that he did not
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file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statements because he did not believe one would
be meritorious. He also opined that there was “ample other evidence” which he believed
would have incriminated the Petitioner at trial.
Trial counsel stated that the State agreed to extend the Petitioner’s plea deadline to
October 23, 2023, and that the State informed him it would not be extended further. Trial
counsel stated that he met with the Petitioner several times prior to the plea deadline and
that the Petitioner continuously refused the State’s twenty-year plea offer, maintaining he
“want[ed] lower than [twenty] years.” Trial counsel again unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate with the State for a new plea offer. On October 23, 2023, the Petitioner was
scheduled to appear in court for a status hearing, and trial counsel met with him beforehand.
Trial counsel stated that Jeffery Washburn, an Assistant District Public Defender,
accompanied him at this meeting as a witness. Trial counsel recalled that the Petitioner
again rejected the State’s twenty-year plea offer. However, after several minutes of silence,
the Petitioner reinitiated conversation and informed trial counsel he would accept the
State’s plea offer. Trial counsel and the Petitioner discussed the plea offer, and the
Petitioner subsequently pled guilty.
Trial counsel denied that he pressured or coerced the Petitioner into pleading guilty
and stated that the Petitioner did not appear confused about the consequences of his
pleading guilty. He also averred that he was prepared to go to trial if the Petitioner decided
against pleading guilty, although he noted that the Petitioner’s trial “would have been set
months after” the plea deadline. He recalled that he had a trial notebook “made up” and
that he had reviewed discovery and discussed it with the Petitioner.
On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed that he wrote the Petitioner a letter on
October 12, 2023, in which he discussed the Petitioner’s “options before [his] plea
deadline.” He also agreed that the letter discussed the strengths of the State’s evidence,
explained why the Petitioner “d[id] not have a good case,” and did not discuss any
“potential defense.” Trial counsel testified that the Defendant did not “have much of a
defense”; however, he noted that the Petitioner informed him he had broken up a fight
between the victim and Mrs. Thompson shortly before the victim’s death.
The October 12, 2023 letter was admitted as an exhibit through trial counsel’s
testimony. In the letter, trial counsel discussed the Petitioner’s statements to the
investigating officers, noting that the Petitioner informed the officers that he had pushed
the victim backward and caused the victim to hit her head. The Petitioner also informed
the officers that the victim’s body was “on the property” and would not be “hard to find.”
Trial counsel also discussed Mrs. Thompson’s statement to the investigating officers. He
noted that while Mrs. Thompson initially stated the Petitioner had “beat” the victim, she
later stated that the Petitioner pushed the victim and caused her to fall and hit her head.
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Trial counsel also discussed a conference call he had with a retained investigator and a
medical examiner. He stated that the Petitioner had seen photographs of the victim’s body
taken after her body was exhumed, which depicted her injuries. He noted that the victim’s
injuries showed that she suffered “multiple blows administered with great force” and that
she had been “beaten to death.” Trial counsel contrasted this with the Petitioner’s statement
that he pushed the victim. Trial counsel also noted that the victim suffered six “pellet gun
injuries” to her thighs and lower back. He averred that there was “no way to determine
which person did this damage to her body.”
In his letter, trial counsel requested additional information regarding any of the
Petitioner’s prior convictions. He stated that if the Petitioner was convicted of first degree
murder following a jury trial, he faced a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He
noted that if the Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and had no prior felony
convictions, he could receive a sentence between fifteen and twenty-five years’
incarceration without the possibility of parole. He informed the Petitioner that if the
Petitioner had one prior qualifying felony conviction, he could receive a sentence of up to
twenty-five years’ incarceration, and if the Petitioner had two or more prior qualifying
felony convictions, he could receive a sentence between twenty-five and forty years’
incarceration. Trial counsel similarly advised the Petitioner of his sentencing exposure if
he was convicted as charged of aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult, noting that if the
Petitioner had a sufficient number of prior qualifying felony convictions, he could receive
a sentence of up to thirty years’ incarceration. Trial counsel also noted that the trial court
could align the Petitioner’s convictions consecutively.
Trial counsel concluded his October 12, 2023 letter by reiterating that the State’s
twenty-year plea offer would not be lowered. He wrote that the Petitioner had “a right to
a trial by jury” and that the “choice” was his to make. He also reminded the Petitioner that
the deadline to accept the State’s twenty-year plea offer was October 23, 2023, and that the
trial court would only accept a blind plea thereafter.
Trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner on October 16, 2023, and that
he took notes during this meeting. Relying upon his notes, trial counsel recalled that the
Petitioner confirmed that he had received and read trial counsel’s October 12, 2023 letter.
The Petitioner again rejected the State’s twenty-year plea offer, stating “[I]f I do [twenty]
years, I’[ll] be dead in two weeks. I’ll never survive it. It doesn’t matter if I get life without
parole or the death penalty.” The Petitioner further informed trial counsel that he believed
that an investigating officer had mischaracterized his statement to the police during that
officer’s testimony at the Petitioner’s preliminary hearing. The Petitioner requested that
trial counsel provide him with photographs of the pellet gun and of the fuse box, which
first counsel took during first counsel’s visit to the crime scene. The Petitioner asserted
that he believed these photographs would prove the investigators had neglected to test
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certain evidence and that the fuse box had been moved from its initial position. Trial
counsel responded that he had previously provided these photographs to the Petitioner and
that he would send them again, along with the pattern jury instructions for charges of first
degree murder and felony murder. Trial counsel testified that on October 19, 2023, he
spoke with the prosecutor, who informed him the State would withdraw its twenty-year
plea offer if the Petitioner “continue[d] to reject it.”
Trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner twice on October 20, 2023.
During the first meeting, the Petitioner stated he would agree to a fifteen-year plea offer
and again rejected the State’s twenty-year plea offer. He rejected the idea of entering a
blind plea. After the first meeting, trial counsel again spoke with the prosecutor and
attempted to negotiate a fifteen-year plea offer. The prosecutor refused and stated that he
would like to schedule a status hearing on October 23, 2023, the same day as the
Petitioner’s plea deadline, so he could ensure the Petitioner “understood the ramifications
of this passing plea deadline.” During the second meeting, trial counsel again discussed
the State’s twenty-year plea offer with the Petitioner and reviewed photographs of the
victim with the Petitioner. Trial counsel recalled that the photographs depicted certain of
the victim’s injuries, which the Petitioner opined “could have been from where she was
buried.” The Petitioner denied killing the victim, but he admitted that he buried her. The
Petitioner again rejected the State’s twenty-year plea offer and maintained that he wanted
to go to trial. Trial counsel recalled that their meeting concluded with a discussion of the
clothing the Petitioner might wear at trial.
Trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner on October 23, 2023, prior to
the Petitioner’s status hearing. He stated that he again discussed the State’s twenty-year
plea offer with the Petitioner during this meeting and that Mr. Washburn sat in on the
meeting as a witness. Trial counsel recalled that during the meeting, first counsel “came
by” and showed the Petitioner several photographs on his cell phone, which the Petitioner
stated he had previously seen. Trial counsel again discussed the State’s twenty-year plea
offer with the Petitioner, and the Petitioner again rejected it, maintaining that he was
innocent.
Trial counsel testified that he sat next to the Petitioner and “didn’t say a word for a
while” after the Petitioner’s final rejection of the State’s twenty-year plea offer. He
recalled that the Petitioner then began “re-exploring the idea of a plea.” After a discussion,
the Petitioner stated he would accept the State’s twenty-year plea offer.
Trial counsel estimated that ten minutes elapsed between the Petitioner’s acceptance
of the State’s twenty-year plea offer and his pleading guilty. He stated that he stood beside
the Petitioner while the Petitioner pled guilty and that he did not question the Petitioner
during the guilty plea submission hearing regarding the Petitioner's decision. He stated
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that the trial court asked its “standard questions” during the guilty plea submission hearing.
Trial counsel agreed that the trial court was not informed that the Petitioner had previously
maintained his innocence.
On redirect examination, trial counsel testified that he discussed the strengths and
weaknesses of the Petitioner’s potential defenses with the Petitioner multiple times before
the Petitioner pled guilty. He averred that he “practically never” questioned a defendant
during a guilty plea submission hearing. He also testified that he had no concerns that the
Petitioner’s plea was involuntary because the terms of the negotiated plea agreement
reflected “what [the Petitioner] wanted to do back when [trial counsel] first took the case.”
First counsel testified that he represented the Petitioner while he worked as an
Assistant District Public Defender. He recalled that he was assigned the Petitioner’s case
shortly after the Petitioner informed investigating officers that the victim’s body was
located on his property. First counsel testified that he was asked to serve as an
“intermediary” between the Petitioner and law enforcement when the investigating officers
were unable to locate the victim’s body on the Petitioner’s property. First counsel did not
recall whether the Petitioner confessed to killing the victim. He noted that the Petitioner
informed him that the victim and Mrs. Thompson had argued shortly before the victim’s
murder, but he was unsure whether the Petitioner also provided this information to the
investigating officers.
First counsel testified that he visited the crime scene along with the investigating
officers and photographed a blood spatter on a wall and a metal box. First counsel denied
seeing any blood on the metal box and averred that he did not request that the box be tested.
First counsel later interviewed witnesses, including the victim’s father, employees from
First Choice Rentals, where he stated the Petitioner rented the tractor he used to bury the
victim’s body, and Mrs. Thompson’s relative, whom she and the victim’s father visited the
day after the victim’s murder.
First counsel stated he left the District Public Defender’s Office in October 2022
and joined the District Attorney General’s Office. He testified that while he was in court
on October 23, 2023, trial counsel approached him and asked if he still had the photographs
he had taken of the crime scene. First counsel stated that he did, and he agreed to allow
the Petitioner to review the photographs. He stated that he did not discuss the Petitioner’s
case with him during this interaction.
Jeffery Washburn testified that he worked as a part-time Assistant District Public
Defender. Mr. Washburn stated that while he was in court on October 23, 2023, trial
counsel approached him and asked if he would “walk down to the end of the hall with him
and the client that he was representing.” Mr. Washburn agreed. Mr. Washburn recalled
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observing a conversation in which trial counsel informed the Petitioner that the State would
withdraw its twenty-year plea offer that day if the Petitioner refused it and asked the
Petitioner to consider the offer. Mr. Washburn described the Petitioner as initially
uninterested in the State’s twenty-year plea offer; he did not recall the Petitioner’s
disposition towards the offer after he was informed it would be withdrawn that day. Mr.
Washburn testified that he had no prior or subsequent involvement in the Petitioner’s case.
The Petitioner testified that although he did not want to “take the plea deal to begin
with,” he pled guilty on October 23, 2023. He averred that trial counsel told him he
“need[ed] to take this plea deal” and “forc[ed] it” upon him. He did not recall that the
State’s twenty-year plea offer would have been withdrawn if he had not accepted it that
day, but he stated that this would not have influenced his decision, maintaining that he was
prepared to go to trial. He testified that he was innocent and stated that he had never told
anyone he was guilty of murdering the victim.
He recalled that he asked the District Public Defender’s Office to examine the pellet
gun and test it for fingerprints because he believed “that could have been a big issue.” He
also stated that he had never seen any reports analyzing the victim’s blood spatter, the fuse
box, or any “supposed weapon.” He averred that trial counsel did not show him any
statements from the witnesses in his case.
The Petitioner testified that he received only one letter from trial counsel, which he
described as a “brief statement” regarding his next court date. He recalled meeting with
trial counsel on October 16, 2023, and informing him that he did not want to accept the
State’s twenty-year plea offer. He stated that first counsel had known he did not want to
plead guilty. He testified that he once stated, “If you’re going to force me to take a plea
deal, they can at least give me [fifteen] years with a less [sic] percentage.” He described
this statement as sarcastic.
On cross-examination, the Petitioner did not recall whether he testified he was
satisfied with trial counsel’s performance during his guilty plea submission hearing;
however, he asserted that he did not inform the trial court he was dissatisfied with trial
counsel’s performance because he was at “a point of just giving up.” The Petitioner agreed
that trial counsel’s duty was to advise him of the potential strengths and weaknesses in his
case. He averred that trial counsel “pushed” him to accept the State’s twenty-year plea
deal throughout the course of his representation. Although he testified that trial counsel
did not investigate certain issues he requested, or review evidence with him, he conceded
that trial counsel showed him photographs of the crime scene and provided him with two
copies of discovery materials. However, he maintained that the discovery materials he was
provided were incomplete. On redirect examination, the Petitioner testified that trial
counsel did not discuss or suggest any trial strategies or defenses with him.
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Following this proof and the parties’ arguments, the post-conviction court took the
matter under advisement. On May 6, 2025, the post-conviction court entered an order
denying post-conviction relief, finding the Petitioner had failed to establish either that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary. This
timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
and that his guilty plea was involuntary. The State responds that the post-conviction court
properly denied relief. We agree with the State.
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Petitioner first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
trial counsel’s failure to develop a defense strategy or otherwise investigate possible
defenses. He asserts that trial counsel merely conducted a “superficial investigation” and
failed to develop any strategy for the Defendant’s trial. He contends that despite trial
counsel’s testimony that the Defendant did not “have much of a defense,” there were at
least two “obvious” potential defenses which trial counsel deficiently failed to explore.
The State responds that the Petitioner has failed to establish any deficiency.
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides relief only when a petitioner’s
“conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right
guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. In a post-conviction proceeding, a petitioner has the burden
of proving his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Tenn. S. Ct. R. 28, §
8(D)(1). “Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt
about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hicks v. State, 983
S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d
896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)). The standard of review on appeal dictates that the post-
conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence
preponderates against them, Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015) (citations
omitted), while its application of the law to those factual findings and the conclusions
drawn therefrom are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness, Holland v.
State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tenn. 2020) (citations omitted).
Both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee provide
the criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend.
VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
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Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9 (“That in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused hath the right to be heard by himself and his counsel”); see
Davidson v. State, 453 S.W.3d 386, 392-93 (Tenn. 2014). To succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction petitioner must prove, and the record
must affirmatively establish, both that counsel performed deficiently and that this deficient
performance adversely impacted the petitioner’s defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 693 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). “A court need
not address both prongs if the petitioner fails to demonstrate either one of them.” Davidson,
453 S.W.3d at 393. Each element of the Strickland analysis of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact that this court reviews de novo. Phillips
v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tenn. 2022) (citing Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 294
(Tenn. 2009)); Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457.
Deficient performance is that which, in consideration of “all the circumstances” and
the prevailing professional norms at the time of counsel’s representation, falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688). We defer to counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions, even if such decisions
were unsuccessful or harmful to the defense, so long as they were “informed ones based
upon adequate preparation.” Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2016) (citing
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)). In other words, so long as counsel’s
decisions are made after adequate preparation, this court “will not grant the petitioner the
benefit of hindsight, second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy, or provide relief on the
basis of a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision made during the course of the
proceedings.” Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 172-73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). Thus, a
petitioner who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel must, through clear and convincing
evidence, overcome the strong presumption “that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation
omitted).
The post-conviction petitioner must also prove that counsel’s deficient performance
affected the outcome of his or her trial; that is, there must be “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is that which is “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Id. Accordingly, “a petitioner must establish that
‘counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree that it deprived him of a fair trial
and called into question the reliability of the outcome.’” Mobley v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70,
81 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869 (Tenn. 2008)). When a
petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel in a case which resulted in a guilty plea,
as here, the petitioner “must show a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s
deficient performance, ‘he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.’” Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
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Thus, the focus of the prejudice requirement in a guilty-pled case is whether the deficiency
in performance “affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to establish either the
deficient performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. In its order
denying post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court relied upon trial counsel’s
testimony that he met with the Petitioner approximately ten times, hired a private
investigator to review discovery and interview witnesses, discussed discovery with the
Petitioner, and explained the medical examiner’s findings to the Petitioner. The record
does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings of fact. Trial counsel
testified that he reviewed first counsel’s work on the Petitioner’s case when he began
representing him. Although trial counsel did not believe there were strong defenses in the
Petitioner’s case, he nevertheless interviewed the Petitioner’s son and investigated the
pellet gun upon the Petitioner’s request. Trial counsel also testified that he had prepared a
notebook and was ready to go to trial, despite the fact that the Petitioner’s trial “would have
been set months after” the plea deadline. Therefore, we agree with the post-conviction
court’s findings that the Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance regarding trial
counsel’s investigation and trial preparation.
The Petitioner further claims that trial counsel performed deficiently because he
failed to identify and investigate two “obvious” potential defense theories—namely,
arguing that the proof was sufficient to convict the Petitioner of manslaughter rather than
first degree murder and attempting to shift the blame for the victim’s death onto other
individuals also present during the murder. Instead, the Petitioner characterizes trial
counsel’s strategy as simply attempting to convince the Petitioner to accept the State’s
twenty-year plea offer. These claims are unavailing for three reasons.
Firstly, and as noted above, we begin our analysis with the presumption that trial
counsel’s actions are the product of sound trial strategy, a presumption which a post-
conviction petitioner bears the burden of rebutting by clear and convincing evidence.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 458. Importantly, we do not provide
petitioners with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight by second-guessing decisions made
after adequate preparation. Berry, 366 S.W.3d at 172-73. The Petitioner did not ask trial
counsel during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing whether he had considered these
“obvious” potential defense strategies. Although the Petitioner contends that he did not
need to ask such questions because trial counsel testified he did not believe the Petitioner
had “much of a defense,” it is entirely plausible that trial counsel considered these strategies
and rejected them following his investigation. Without any testimony to this effect, and in
consideration of the high burden of proof upon post-conviction petitioners to establish
deficient performance, we decline to speculate as to whether trial counsel truly “failed” to
investigate these potential defense strategies or how he would have testified if asked about
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them. Moreover, contrary to the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel neglected to develop
any defense theory, trial counsel testified that he discussed the victim’s father and Mrs.
Thompson’s driving to Georgia to visit one of Mrs. Thompson’s relatives the morning after
the victim’s murder while the Petitioner remained at home to bury the victim’s body as a
potential defense theory with the Petitioner.
Secondly, a review of trial counsel’s October 12, 2023 letter belies the Petitioner’s
claims. In his letter, trial counsel reviewed the Petitioner’s statement to the police, noting
that he informed the investigating officers that the victim’s body was “on the property” and
would not be “hard to find”; contrasted the Petitioner’s statement with Mrs. Thompson’s
initial statement to the police; and summarized his discussion with a retained investigator
and a medical examiner. In the latter summary, trial counsel detailed the victim’s injuries
and opined that there was “no way to determine which person did this damage to her body.”
In short, trial counsel advised the Petitioner regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the
Petitioner’s case, as was his duty.
Additionally, although the Petitioner characterizes the letter’s tone as “hostile” and
exaggerative of the Petitioner’s potential sentences, trial counsel’s advice was accurate.
Trial counsel advised the Petitioner he could receive a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole if convicted of first degree murder as charged, as the State filed a
notice of its intent to seek such a sentence on September 13, 2022. Trial counsel also
accurately advised the Petitioner that he could receive sentences between fifteen and forty
years’ incarceration if convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder,
depending upon the number of his prior qualifying felony convictions. Second degree
murder is a Class A felony for which a trial court may impose a sentence between fifteen
and twenty-five years’ incarceration for Range I, standard offenders, and between twenty-
five and forty years’ incarceration for Range II, multiple offenders. Tenn. Code Ann. §§
39-13-210(c)(1); 40-35-112(a)(1), (b)(1).2 Trial counsel similarly advised the Petitioner
regarding his charge of aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult, counseling that the
Petitioner could receive a sentence of up to thirty years’ incarceration if convicted.
Aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult, as charged in this case, is a Class B felony for
which a trial court may impose a sentence of up to thirty years’ incarceration for Range III
offenders. Id. §§ 39-15-511(c); 40-35-112(c)(2). The record supports the post-conviction
court’s conclusion that trial counsel did not perform deficiently.
Finally, and crucially, the Petitioner has failed to establish or allege that, but for any
of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he would not have accepted the State’s twenty-year
plea offer and not pled guilty, so he has not established that he was prejudiced by trial
2
Trial counsel did not advise the Petitioner of his potential sentencing exposure for this charge if
he was convicted and classified as a Range III offender.
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counsel’s actions. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at 221. The Petitioner is
not entitled to relief.
B. INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA
The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred by concluding his
guilty plea was voluntary. He asserts that he maintained his innocence up until the moment
he pled guilty and that the trial court should have been informed of his sudden “change of
heart.” He also contends that trial counsel “forc[ed]” him to enter a guilty plea and,
accordingly, that his guilty plea was the product of coercion. The State responds that the
Petitioner has waived appellate review of this claim by failing to include a copy of the
transcript of his guilty plea submission hearing in the appellate record.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that a guilty plea
be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 n.5 (1969); Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010). “A guilty plea is
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered if it represents ‘a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Davis v. State, No.
M2024-01238-CCA-R3-PC, 2025 WL 2453101, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2025)
(quoting Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tenn. 2003)), no perm. app. filed. A trial
court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining if a plea has been
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897,
905 (Tenn. 1993). A “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings” is
created by a defendant’s declarations in open court because such declarations “carry a
strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); Davis, 2025
WL 2453101, at *11.
As the State notes, the Petitioner failed to include a transcript of his guilty plea
submission hearing in the appellate record. On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
compiling, preparing, and submitting a record adequate for review, such as is “necessary
to convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those
issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). This burden includes the
obligation to submit a transcript of any proceeding that is the subject of the appellant’s
assignment of error or, if no transcript is available, a statement of the evidence. Tenn. R.
App. P. 24(b), (c); see also State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993). “In the
absence of an adequate record on appeal, this court must presume that the trial court’s
rulings were supported by sufficient evidence.” State v. Brown, 373 S.W.3d 565, 571
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In his reply brief, the Petitioner asserts that a review of his guilty plea submission
hearing transcript is unnecessary to adjudicate the merits of his claim because his argument
is rooted in counsel’s ineffective assistance rather than a claim of any deficiency in the trial
court’s plea colloquy. To be sure, a petitioner may seek post-conviction relief on the basis
of an involuntarily entered guilty plea either as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
or as a standalone argument of constitutional deficiency. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
103 (“Relief under [the Post-Conviction Procedure Act] shall be granted when the
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right
guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”);
see also Mendoza v. State, No. M2001-01855-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 1610824, at *14
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2003) (“Independent of, and as an alternative to, the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner may successfully attack his
conviction when his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Sept. 2, 2003). The considerations are subtly different for the two claims. A petitioner
asserting his or her guilty plea was involuntarily entered as a result of the ineffective
assistance of counsel must show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance regarding the
entry of the plea, the petitioner would not have pled guilty and would have instead insisted
upon going to trial. Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Tenn. 2011) (citing Hill, 474
U.S. at 59). In the context of a standalone constitutional claim, a petitioner must establish,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, that his or her guilty plea was not the product
of “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action” available to
the petitioner. Jaco, 120 S.W.3d at 831. However, in either case, the appellant’s burden
of preparing an adequate record remains the same, and in the absence of an adequate record,
we must presume the lower court ruled correctly. Brown, 373 S.W.3d at 571.
Here, a review of the guilty plea submission hearing transcript is a necessary
prerequisite to our ability to conduct a meaningful appellate review of the Petitioner’s
claim. As noted above, a defendant’s statements during a guilty plea submission hearing
pose formidable barriers in subsequent collateral attack proceedings. Blackledge, 431 U.S.
at 74; Davis, 2025 WL 2453101, at *11. The Petitioner’s claims are based, in part, upon
trial counsel’s perceived inadequacies during the plea colloquy; he asserts that trial counsel
should have questioned the Petitioner regarding his change of heart but failed to do so.
Additionally, as the post-conviction court noted in its order denying relief, it “took the
Petitioner’s guilty plea and found upon questioning that the plea was voluntarily,
knowingly, and freely given.” The questions asked, and the Petitioner’s responses thereto,
are, accordingly, necessary to our review of the Petitioner’s claims that his plea was
involuntary, and the transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing is directly relevant to
our review of the Petitioner’s claim. In its absence, we must presume the post-conviction
court ruled correctly. See Fifer v. State, No. W2024-01377-CCA-R3-PC, 2025 WL
1753576, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2025) (concluding that meaningful appellate
review of the petitioner’s claims regarding her guilty plea based upon counsel’s alleged
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ineffective assistance and the plea’s constitutional validity was impossible because of the
omission of a transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Nov. 20, 2025).
From the limited record we do have, trial counsel testified that he did not pressure
or coerce the Petitioner into pleading guilty and that he did not believe the Petitioner’s plea
was involuntary because the terms of the negotiated plea agreement reflected “what [the
Petitioner] wanted to do back when [trial counsel] took the case.” The post-conviction
court implicitly accredited this testimony over the Petitioner’s contrary testimony in its
order denying post-conviction relief, and nothing in the appellate record preponderates
against that determination. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Following our review of the record and based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.
s/ Steven W. Sword
STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE
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