Maryland Attorney General Opinion 110OAG82

82 [110 Op. Att’y

EXPUNGEMENT

LICENSING RECORDS – WHETHER EXPUNGEMENT OF THE

RECORDS OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AFFECTS

PROFESSIONAL LICENSING DISCIPLINE THAT RELIED ON

THE CONVICTION – WHETHER THE RELATED LICENSING

RECORDS MUST BE EXPUNGED

October 6, 2025

Stephen Conti

Chair, State Board of Massage Therapy Examiners

Winnie D. Moore

Chair, State Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists

Lawrence Franklin

Chair, State Board of Barbers

On behalf of your respective boards, you requested an official

opinion of the Attorney General on how expungement of a criminal

conviction affects earlier professional license discipline that relied

on the conviction. Various professional licensing boards, including

yours, can suspend or revoke a license, or otherwise discipline the

licensee, if the licensee is convicted of specific types of crimes.

Meanwhile, Maryland courts can expunge certain criminal

convictions, usually a specified number of years after completion

of the sentence, including some convictions that might be the basis

of disciplinary action by professional boards. When a conviction

is expunged, certain records of the conviction must either be

destroyed or removed from public access. Would-be employers,

schools, and licensing agencies also may not ask applicants about

expunged convictions.

You asked what happens if a licensee is subject to discipline

based on a criminal conviction (the fact of conviction itself rather

than the conduct underlying the conviction) but the conviction is

later expunged. Specifically, you asked whether “regulatory

boards have any duty to rescind, vacate, or otherwise remove from

public view any disciplinary orders based solely on a crime or

crimes expunged after the issuance of those board orders.”

Gen. 82] 83

In our opinion, expungement of a conviction does not require

a licensing board to rescind or vacate disciplinary action that relied

on the conviction. The expungement statute provides for records

of an expunged conviction to be sealed and prohibits asking about

expunged convictions in certain contexts. But nothing in the statute

suggests that expungement retroactively voids or invalidates the

original criminal conviction itself. And if the conviction remains

in existence, the basis for the licensing board’s order remains in

existence as well.

That said, some specific categories of documents in the record

of a license discipline proceeding arising from a criminal

conviction may be eligible for expungement. Although the

standard expungement order found in the Maryland Rules mentions

only police and court records and does not reach licensing agency

records at all, the text of the expungement statute leaves open the

possibility of expungement of “other records” beyond police and

court records when requested in the expungement petition. Even

then, though, the “other records” in a licensing file eligible for

expungement are likely only those records that originated as police

or court records but have come into the hands of the licensing

agency. Thus, for example, a copy of an indictment in the files of

a licensing board could be expunged, but the administrative order

of a licensing board revoking a license could not be. We recognize,

however, that these conclusions are not free from doubt, so the

General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the scope and

effects of expungement in Maryland.

I

Background

A. Expungement as a Remedy for Collateral Consequences of

Criminal Conviction

A criminal record is a heavy burden. Once someone

convicted of a crime completes their sentence, they have, as it is

commonly said, paid their debt to society. But “collateral

consequences” of the conviction can linger long after the sentence

ends. “Collateral consequences are the penalties, disabilities, or

disadvantages imposed upon a person as a result of a criminal

conviction” as distinguished from the “direct consequences

imposed as part of the court’s judgment at sentencing.” Collateral

Consequences Workgroup, Final Report 1 (Dec. 1, 2016)

(“Collateral Consequences Report”).

84 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of these consequences stem from laws that explicitly

impose the consequence. For example, a criminal conviction can

render someone legally ineligible for certain public housing,

welfare, and healthcare benefits. See, e.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Note,

Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an

Extraordinary Harm, 25 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 169, 173-

74 (2017). Or, as discussed further below, a criminal conviction

can trigger the denial or revocation of a professional license. Infra

Part I.C. In Maryland, a criminal conviction can affect, among

other things, one’s right to serve on a jury, capacity to serve as

personal representative of an estate, or ability to adopt a child. See

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc (“CJP”) § 8-103(b)(4); Md. Rules

6-122, 9-103(b)(1)(N). The American Bar Association identifies

166 permanent legal consequences that Maryland law may impose

for any conviction, and 324 consequences for a felony conviction.

Am. Bar Ass’n, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of

Conviction, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ (last

visited Sept. 29, 2025) (select “Maryland” for “Jurisdiction,” “Any

misdemeanor” or “Any felony” for “Offense type,” and

“Indefinite” for “Duration”).

But the stigma of a criminal record can weigh even more

heavily than these formal disabilities. See, e.g., Maryland

Equitable Justice Collaborative, Breaking the 71%: A Path Toward

Racial Equity in the Criminal Legal System 54 (2024) (“MEJC

Report”); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88

Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104-05 (2013). Would-be employers,

landlords, and others can easily look up criminal records from both

official sources and private background check services. See Logan,

supra, at 1107-08; Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law:

A Comprehensive Approach, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 403, 411-12 (2015);

Collateral Consequences Report at 10, 12. That easy access

subjects people with criminal records to discrimination in almost

every facet of life. See, e.g., MEJC Report at 54; Logan, supra, at

1107-09; Yee, supra, at 170-71. “These compounded barriers not

only undermine an individual’s ability to rebuild their life but also

perpetuate cycles of recidivism, which places strain on families,

communities, and the criminal legal system itself.” MEJC Report

at 54. The scope of the problem is vast. By some estimates, one

third of the U.S. adult population has a record of arrest and/or

conviction. Yee, supra, at 171. And the burden falls

disproportionately on communities that are exposed at higher rates

to the criminal justice system. See MEJC Report at 7, 54.

Expungement aims to address this problem. Almost every

state allows expungement of criminal records in at least some

Gen. 82] 85

circumstances. See Restoration of Rights Proj., 50-State

Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief (last

updated July 2024) (“50-State Comparison”), https://ccresourcece

nter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-

expungement-sealing-and-set-aside-2-2/. Expungement typically

shields the official records of a conviction from public access and

also limits access by government and law enforcement agencies.

See Yee, supra, at 182-83; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for

Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and

Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 362 (2016).

Typically, too, the beneficiary of expungement (the “expungee”)

may deny the existence of the conviction if asked, for example, on

a job or college application. See Yee, supra, at 182-83. Other

details that vary from state to state include what convictions are

eligible, the procedures required to obtain expungement, and

whether expungement has any further effects, such as eliminating

collateral consequences imposed by law. See 50-State

Comparison.

Expungement does not erase all collateral consequences of a

conviction, however. First, expunged records often are not

destroyed, but may be retained for certain law-enforcement

purposes. E.g., Kessler, supra, at 433. Thus, some commentators

have argued that “sealing” is a more accurate term than

“expungement.” Id. Second, the scope of expungement, meaning

what public records are expunged or sealed and what collateral

consequences are removed, depends on the statute. Legislatures

crafting expungement remedies must strike a balance among the

reduction of collateral consequences, protection of the public, and

preservation of records for law-enforcement and other purposes.

See, e.g., Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 115-16 (1966);

E.A. v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm’n, 208 N.J. Super. 65, 68

(1986); D.A. v. State, 58 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ind. 2016). This means

some collateral consequences usually remain even after

expungement. Finally, non-governmental records are often

unaffected by expungement. This includes government records

harvested into private databases. See Murray, supra, at 377-78.

Data brokers often fail to update their records to reflect the

expungement of a conviction. Id.

B. Maryland’s Expungement Law

Maryland’s expungement statute is codified at Title 10,

Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Procedure Article (the “Expungement

Law”), with implementing court rules found in Title 4, Chapter 500

of the Maryland Rules. The Expungement Law focuses on

86 [110 Op. Att’y

expungement of “police records” and “court records.” Under the

law, “expunge” means “to remove information from public

inspection in accordance with [the Expungement Law].” Md. Code

Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 10-101(e). And “expungement,” as to

a court record or a police record, means:

[R]emoval from public inspection:

(1) by obliteration;

(2) by removal to a separate secure area to

which persons who do not have a legitimate

reason for access are denied access; or

(3) if access to a court record or police record

can be obtained only by reference to another

court record or police record, by the

expungement of it or the part of it that

provides access.

Id. (f); see also Md. Rule 4-502(e).

As noted, the scheme focuses on the expungement of court

records and police records, both of which are defined terms.

“[C]ourt record,” as relevant here, means “an official record of a

court that the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps

about . . . a criminal proceeding,” and includes “an index, docket

entry, charging document, pleading, memorandum, transcription of

proceedings, electronic recording, order, and judgment.” CP

§ 10-101(d); see also Md. Rule 4-502(d). And “police record”

means, in relevant part, “an official record that a law enforcement

unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository maintains about

the arrest and detention of, or further proceeding against, a person

for . . . a criminal charge [or] a suspected violation of a criminal

law.” CP § 10-101(i); see also Md. Rule 4-502(h).

Although the Expungement Law provides for expungement

of records of a variety of cases not resulting in conviction, such as

arrests without charges, cases terminated by dismissal or nolle

prosequi, and acquittals, CP §§ 10-103, 10-103.1, 10-104,

10-105(a), we will focus here on expungement of records of

convictions, as these are most relevant to your question. Records

of a conviction can be expunged in the following circumstances:

• When a person was convicted of only one

criminal act, not a crime of violence, and

received a full and unconditional pardon from

the Governor. CP § 10-105(a)(8).

Gen. 82] 87

• When a person was convicted of certain minor

public-order offenses, including public

urination and loitering. Id. (a)(9).

• When a person was convicted of a crime, but

the underlying act is no longer a crime. Id.

(a)(11).

• When a person was convicted of simple

cannabis possession. Id. (a)(12).

• When a conviction was vacated on the ground

that the defendant was a victim of human

trafficking. Id. (a)(13); CP § 8-302.

• When a person was convicted of one of a

lengthy list of specified misdemeanors. CP

§ 10-110(a)(1).

• When a person was convicted of one of a

shorter list of specified felonies, id. (a)(2),

specifically: Theft under § 7-104 of the

Criminal Law Article; possession with intent

to distribute a controlled dangerous substance

under § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article; or

burglary (except first degree burglary with

intent to commit a crime of violence) under

§§ 6-202(a), 6-203, or 6-204 of the Criminal

Law Article.

Expungement is available regardless of whether the

conviction resulted from a guilty verdict at trial or a guilty plea,

because the term “convicted” encompasses both scenarios. See

Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 642-43 (1985). Also, if a guilty plea

to an offense not enumerated above leads to probation before

judgment, the record is eligible for expungement, assuming

successful completion of probation. See CP § 10-105(a)(3), (c)(2),

(e)(4).1

1

The Expungement Law does not expressly address cases where a

defendant pleaded nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere subjects

the defendant to sentencing but does not result in “conviction” in the

strict sense. E.g., Hinton v. State, 257 Md. App. 562, 582 & n.6 (2023).

However, we doubt the General Assembly intended that a guilty verdict

or guilty plea would be eligible for expungement, whereas a nolo plea to

the same charge would not. Thus, we think that, for purposes of the

88 [110 Op. Att’y

An individual with a qualifying conviction becomes entitled

to expungement after a specified waiting period. The waiting

period usually begins upon completion of the sentence. See CP

§§ 10-105(c), 10-110(c). Once eligible, the individual must file a

petition in the last court to have jurisdiction over the case. See CP

§§ 10-105(b), 10-110(b); see also Md. Rule 4-504(a). Specifically,

an eligible person “may file a petition listing relevant facts for

expungement of a police record, court record, or other record

maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” CP

§§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a).

Unless the State’s Attorney or a law enforcement agency

objects, the court “shall pass an order requiring the expungement

of all police records and court records about the charge.” CP

§§ 10-105(d)(2), 10-110(e)(3); see also Md. Rule 4-507(b). If

there is an objection, the court must hold a hearing, and if it finds

the petitioner entitled to expungement, “shall order the

expungement of all police records and court records about the

charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2); see also Md. Rule

4-508. Before granting expungement, the court must consider the

petitioner’s success at probation, parole, and mandatory

supervision, and whether any court-ordered restitution has been

paid. CP §§ 10-105(e)(5), 10-110(f)(2)(iii)-(iv). Under CP

§ 10-110, which allows expungement of a broader array of

misdemeanors and felonies, the court must also determine that the

petitioner is not a risk to public safety and that expungement would

be in the interest of justice. CP § 10-110(f)(2)(iii), (v). “[E]very

custodian of the police records and court records that are subject to

[an] order of expungement” must certify compliance within sixty

days. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h); see also Md. Rule 4-510.

Some police records and court records are expressly exempt

from expungement. Court records exempt from expungement

include “the published opinion of a court,” “a cash receipt or

disbursement record that is necessary for audit purposes,” and “a

transcript of court proceedings made by a court reporter in a

multiple defendant case.” CP § 10-102(c)(2)-(4). Police records

exempt from expungement include “an investigatory file” and “a

record of the work product of a law enforcement unit that is used

solely for police investigation.” CP § 10-102(c)(5)-(6).

Expungement Law, the term “convicted” likely includes a nolo plea, as

is true in some other contexts. See, e.g., Md. Rule 5-609(d); Curry v.

Department of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 102 Md. App. 620, 625

(1994); see also Curry, 102 Md. App. at 627 n.3 (noting that the meaning

of the word “conviction” depends on context).

Gen. 82] 89

But with these limited exceptions, records subject to

expungement must either be destroyed or removed to a limited-

access secured area. CP § 10-101(f); see also Md. Rule 4-512. “A

person may not open or review an expunged record or disclose to

another person any information from that record without a court

order[.]” CP § 10-108(a). Also, an employer or educational

institution may not require an applicant for a job or for admission

to disclose information about expunged convictions. CP

§ 10-109(a)(1)(i), (a)(3)(i). Nor may a State or local government

agency require an applicant for a license, permit, registration, or

government service to disclose information about convictions for

which records have been expunged, or deny an application on the

basis of the person’s refusal to disclose an expunged conviction.

CP § 10-109(a)(1)(ii), (a)(3)(ii). Violation of any of these

restrictions on the use of expunged information is a misdemeanor.

CP §§ 10-108(d)(1), 10-109(b)(1).2

The General Assembly first enacted general expungement

legislation in 1975. 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 260. It did so apparently

in response to the then-Court of Appeals’ decision in Doe v.

Commander, Wheaton Police Dep’t, 273 Md. 262 (1974),

suggesting the possibility of an inherent judicial authority to

expunge in the absence of statutory authority, see Mora v. State,

123 Md. App. 699, 710 (1998), aff’d, 355 Md. 639 (1999). Since

1975, the Legislature has gradually broadened the availability of

the remedy. In particular, it has expanded what dispositions and

what crimes are eligible for expungement. For example, under the

original statute, records of convictions could not be expunged. In

1982, the General Assembly allowed expungement of records of

pardoned convictions. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. In 2008, it

extended expungement to convictions of certain minor public-order

offenses. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 616. And in 2016, under the Justice

Reinvestment Act, it extended expungement to a much longer list

of misdemeanor convictions, with a 2018 amendment adding

certain felony convictions. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515; 2018 Md.

Laws, ch. 143. More recently, the Legislature has focused on

expungement of cannabis-related charges, including automatic

expungement in certain circumstances. See CP § 10-105.1; e.g.,

2021 Md. Laws, ch. 680.

2

A separate statute allows for the “shielding” of certain convictions.

CP § 10-301(f). To “shield” a conviction means to render related court

and police records “inaccessible by members of the public.” Id. (e).

However, access to shielded records is much broader than access to

expunged records. See id. § 10-302. As relevant here, shielded records

are accessible to professional licensing agencies. See id. (b)(2).

90 [110 Op. Att’y

C. Professional License Discipline as a Collateral Consequence

Many occupations and professions in Maryland require

licenses, from physicians to cosmetologists to maritime pilots. Md.

Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) § 14-301; Md. Code Ann., Bus.

Occ. & Prof. (“BO&P”) §§ 5-301, 11-401. And for many of these

occupations and professions, the licensing authority may suspend

or revoke a license for certain criminal convictions.

Relevant here, the Health Occupations Article gives various

health professions boards the authority to suspend or revoke a

license if the licensee is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo

contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.3 For

some professionals, like physicians, license revocation is

mandatory upon conviction of (or plea to) a crime of moral

turpitude. HO § 14-404(b).4 Where revocation is not mandatory,

the licensee typically has a right to a hearing on whether the

conviction justifies the proposed discipline. See Oltman v.

Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162 Md. App. 457, 489 (2005);

see also Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-226(c). “Each health

3

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. (“HO”) §§ 1A-309(7)

(acupuncturists), 9-3A-12(b)(4) (assisted living managers), 2-314(4)

(audiologists, hearing aid dispensers, and speech-language pathologists),

17-6A-19(3) (behavior analysts), 8-6D-10(a)(4) (certified midwives),

3-313(5) (chiropractors), 4-315(c)(13) (dental hygienists), 4-315(a)(4)

(dentists), 5-311(6) (dietician-nutritionists), 8-6C-20(a)(4) (direct-entry

midwives), 8-6B-18(a)(6) (electrologists), 21-312(b)(5) (environmental

health specialists), 6-308(a)(4) (massage therapists), 7-316(a)(4)

(morticians), 7-604(4) (mortuary transport service providers),

2-4A-14(3) (music therapists), 8-316(a)(4) (nurses), 8-6A-10(a)(4)

(nursing assistants), 9-314(b)(4) (nursing home administrators),

10-315(6) (occupational therapists), 11-313(3) (optometrists),

12-313(b)(22) (pharmacists), 12-6B-09(22) (pharmacy technicians),

13-316(6) (physical therapists), 16-311(a)(3) (podiatrists), 17-509(10)

(professional counselors), 18-313(3) (psychologists), 12-6D-11(15)

(registered pharmacy interns), 20-313(b)(4) (residential childcare

program professionals), 19-311(7) (social workers).

4

We need not comprehensively define “moral turpitude” here, but

courts have called the concept “rather broad” in the professional

licensing context. See Oltman v. Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 162

Md. App. 457, 483 (2005). The term can include crimes involving a

serious breach of professional standards and casting doubt on public

confidence in the profession, see Burke v. Maryland Bd. of Physicians,

250 Md. App. 334, 350, 353 (2021) (physician who wrote multiple

prescriptions for non-patients), but can also include crimes not directly

related to professional practice, see Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314 (1937)

(indecent exposure with underage victims).

Gen. 82] 91

occupations board shall post on the board’s Web site each final,

public order for a disciplinary sanction issued to a licensee or

certificate holder.” HO § 1-607.

Meanwhile, the Business Occupations and Professions

Article usually provides for license discipline upon conviction of a

felony or a misdemeanor directly related to the licensee’s fitness to

practice.5 There are some minor variations.6 Under most of these

provisions, the board must consider the specific circumstances of

the crime and its relationship to the licensed activities. See, e.g.,

BO&P § 2-315(b); see also Pautsch v. Maryland Real Estate

Comm’n, 423 Md. 229, 260-62 (2011).

To recap, then, most licenses under the Health Occupations

Article and Business Occupations and Professions Article can be

revoked or suspended if the holder is convicted of a felony. And

most can also be revoked either for a misdemeanor of moral

turpitude, or a misdemeanor related to fitness to practice. Although

you asked about these two Articles in particular, statutes elsewhere

in the Code have similar provisions. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann.,

Agric. § 2-310(3) (veterinarians). In addition, the same underlying

conduct that led to the conviction might serve as the basis for

disciplinary action by licensing agencies on separate grounds, but

we focus here on disciplinary action based solely on the conviction

itself, as that was the premise of your question.

5

See, e.g., BO&P §§ 2-315(a)(1)(iii), (b) (accountants),

16-701.2(a)(3), (c) (appraisal management companies), 3-311(a)(1)(vii),

(b) (architects), 4-314(a)(1)(viii), (b) (barbers), 5-314(a)(1)(vii), (b)

(cosmetologists), 6-316(a)(1)(vi), (c) (electricians), 7-309(a)(1)(iv), (b)

(foresters), 16-701.1(a)(4), (c) (home inspectors), 8-310(a)(1)(iii), (b)

(interior designers), 9-310(a)(1)(iii), (b) (landscape architects),

11-409(a)(3), (e) (maritime pilots), 12-312(a)(1)(v), (b) (plumbers),

14-317(a)(1)(iii), (b) (professional engineers), 15-317(a)(1)(iii), (b)

(professional land surveyors), 16-701(a)(1)(v), (b) (real estate

appraisers), 19-408(a)(4) (security guards), 6.5-314(a)(1)(iii), (b)

(stationary engineers).

6

See BO&P § 17-322(b)(24), (d) (real estate brokers may be

disciplined for a felony, misdemeanor related to fitness to practice, or

crime that constitutes a violation of any provision of the real estate

brokers statute); BO&P § 18-309(4) (security system technicians may be

disciplined for a felony, theft offense, or crime of moral turpitude);

BO&P § 20-314(a)(6) (private home detention monitors may be

disciplined for a felony conviction); BO&P § 21-311(a)(3) (individual

tax preparers may be disciplined for a misdemeanor or felony related to

fitness to practice, as opposed to any felony).

92 [110 Op. Att’y

Some of the crimes for which a licensee could be disciplined

are potentially eligible for expungement under the Expungement

Law. As we have noted, certain felonies are expungeable. CP

§ 10-110(a)(2). Other crimes that are expungeable might,

depending on the facts, be crimes of moral turpitude or relate to

fitness to practice. For example, in Burke v. Maryland Board of

Physicians, a physician pleaded guilty to five misdemeanor counts

of writing prescriptions outside the course of regular professional

duties and in violation of professional standards, under § 5-902 of

the Criminal Law Article. 250 Md. App. at 348-49. The licensing

board determined that this was a crime of moral turpitude and

revoked the physician’s license. Id. at 353-54. A licensing board

thus might impose discipline, such as a license suspension or

revocation, on the basis of a conviction. Then, after the discipline

has become final, a court might expunge the records of the crime

that formed the basis of discipline. That scenario presents the

question you asked, which we will turn to now.

II

Analysis

Your question is: when a licensing board bases a disciplinary

order on a criminal conviction, and the records of the conviction

are later expunged, must the board “rescind” or “vacate” the order,

or otherwise “remove [it] from public view”? That question raises

two related legal issues. First, when a court expunges a conviction,

does that action invalidate or void any discipline that relied on the

conviction? Second, does an expungement order under the

Expungement Law reach the records of a licensing board’s

disciplinary action, such that, even if the discipline itself is not

affected, the records reflecting the disciplinary action must be

destroyed or removed from public access? We consider each

question in turn.

A. Expungement of a Criminal Conviction Does Not

Invalidate Earlier License Discipline that Relied on the

Conviction

To begin, we consider whether expungement invalidates or

voids any discipline that relied on the conviction. For the reasons

explained below, our view is that although expungement seals

certain records of a criminal investigation, arrest, and conviction,

expungement does not retroactively invalidate or void the

conviction itself.

Gen. 82] 93

1. Expungement Does Not Retroactively Invalidate or Void

the Underlying Conviction

Because expungement is a statutory remedy, the effect of

expungement is a question of statutory interpretation. See In re

Cintron, 265 Md. App. 481, 500-01 (2025). At one time,

Maryland’s highest court left open the question whether courts

might have inherent or equitable authority to expunge criminal

records. See Doe, 273 Md. at 275-76. But the enactment of the

Expungement Law “obviated” any “common law right of

expungement” and established the “primary remedial mechanism”

in the area. Reid v. State, 239 Md. App. 1, 15 (2018). The

expungement procedure derived from the Expungement Law is

therefore “exclusive and mandatory” except in juvenile cases. See

Md. Rule 4-501. So, in considering how expungement affects

criminal convictions, the expungement statute controls. We thus

apply the ordinary principles of statutory construction.

“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain

and effectuate’ the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it

enacted the statute.” E.g., Zukowski v. Anne Arundel County, 490

Md. 243, 264 (2025) (citation omitted). This search for legislative

intent begins with the statute’s plain language. Id. It also considers

context, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole and the

underlying “purpose, aim or policy” of the legislation. Id. We may

also examine other extrinsic evidence of intent, including

legislative history. E.g., Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113-

14 (2018). But a court “will not read into the statute words that

give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond

the words the Legislature used.” E.g., Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643,

671 (2014) (citation omitted).

In considering the effect of expungement, the natural place to

begin is the language of the statutory provision defining “expunge”

and “expungement.” Expunge means “to remove information from

public inspection in accordance with” the Expungement Law. CP

§ 10-101(e). And the definition of “expungement” elaborates on

that theme, defining the term to mean removal of records from

public inspection, generally by obliteration or removal to a “secure

area.” Id. (f). Expungement, then, concerns the protection and

sealing of certain documents. It is “a form of record-keeping.”

Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 498. Nothing in this language suggests

an intent to go further and invalidate or void the original conviction.

The other provisions of the Expungement Law that deal with

expungement’s effects also suggest that expungement does not

94 [110 Op. Att’y

erase a conviction for all purposes. There are two such provisions.

Section 10-108 governs access to expunged records and imposes

penalties for their misuse, but it deals only with records. Similarly,

§ 10-109 protects information on expunged convictions from being

disclosed, by preventing the expungement beneficiary from being

compelled to disclose it, but only in specified situations. These

provisions are limited in scope, and they would be unnecessary if

expungement in general meant that a person would be treated for

all purposes as though they had never been convicted. Again, the

law protects specified records and information reflecting the

conviction from disclosure. But to conclude that the conviction is

invalidated would require a step further. We see no support in the

law for that further step.

Indeed, the General Assembly has rejected the idea that

expungement requires the State to behave for all purposes as

though the conviction never happened. The Legislature

specifically excluded certain items from expungement’s reach,

including court opinions, some trial transcripts, and police work

product. CP § 10-102(c). As we will discuss further below, its

focus was primarily on police and court records, see infra Part II.B,

perhaps because they are the records that impose the greatest

stigma on individuals or perhaps because an expungement process

limited to police and court records would be more administrable.

And it allowed for the review of even these records on a showing

of good cause. CP § 10-108(b)(1). When the Legislature decided

what expungement does and does not do, we must respect its policy

judgment. See, e.g., Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502; see also, e.g.,

Ready, 243 Cal. App. 2d at 115-16; E.A., 208 N.J. Super. at 68;

D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 173.

The Appellate Court also has rejected the argument that

expungement means across-the-board “erasure.” Cintron, 265 Md.

App. at 500-01. In Cintron, the Howard County police had

investigated an alleged crime by a Baltimore City police officer and

sent copies of evidence from the police record to the Baltimore City

police. Id. at 487-88. The charge was later expunged. Id. But the

expungement order did not include the Baltimore City police

among the custodians required to expunge police records. Id. The

City police later used its copies of the evidence in a disciplinary

proceeding against the officer. The court held that this use of the

evidence was proper, because the City police were never subject to

an expungement order. Id. at 498-99. In the court’s view, the

“clear and unambiguous” language of the statute reflected a

legislative “balance” between privacy and law-enforcement needs.

Id. at 500-01. And under that clear language, the effect of

Gen. 82] 95

expungement is limited to the terms of an expungement order, even

when that limitation means some public records of a conviction

will remain unexpunged. See id. Cintron indicates that courts, to

respect the legislative balancing of interests, will not expand the

reach of expungement beyond what the statute “clear[ly] and

unambiguous[ly]” provides. Because the statute makes no

reference to expungement invalidating the original conviction, it

would not have that effect.

The probation-before-judgment statute offers an illuminating

contrast. That statute lets the court stay the entry of judgment in a

criminal case and place the defendant on probation. CP § 6-220.

When the defendant fulfills the conditions of probation, “the court

shall discharge” them “without judgment of conviction,” and the

discharge is “not a conviction for the purpose of any

disqualification or disability imposed by law.” Id. § 6-220(i). The

absence of equivalent language in the Expungement Law suggests

that the General Assembly did not similarly intend that an

expunged conviction would no longer be a conviction for any

purpose. And even the probation-before-judgment statute does not

authorize the court to set aside a final conviction once it has been

entered. Rather, the defendant will avoid a “conviction” only in

cases where the court never enters judgment to begin with; that is,

where it stays entry of judgment and then dismisses the charges on

completion of probation. See Hall v. Prince George’s County

Democratic Cent. Comm., 431 Md. 108, 126, 130 (2013).

Courts in other states have also observed that expungement or

sealing of criminal records is not equivalent to voiding or vacating

the conviction. For example, a New York appellate court held that

a statute that “simply create[d] a mechanism for restricting future

access to existing records” of certain drug-related charges did not

“contemplate any alteration of the underlying criminal judgment

reflected in those records.” People v. M.E., 121 A.D.3d 157, 160

(N.Y. App. Div. 2014). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly

explained that expungement “of a conviction merely deletes the

evidence of the underlying conviction from court records” and

“does not invalidate the conviction,” contrasting that concept with

vacatur, which results from legal or factual flaws in the original

proceedings and “invalidates the conviction itself.” State v.

Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 754-56 (2018). And along the

same lines, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed that

expungement “casts no doubt on the integrity of the conviction

itself, but denotes a policy judgment to remove the conviction from

a person’s public record.” Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d

237, 243 (2023). Although these opinions interpreted different

96 [110 Op. Att’y

statutes with different language, they offer support for the general

proposition that expungement and vacatur of conviction are

different things.

To be clear, we do not address the prospective effects of

expungement. That is, we do not consider what effects

expungement may have on governmental actions taken after a court

grants expungement. We conclude only that expungement does not

actually vacate, retroactively invalidate, or render void ab initio, an

earlier final judgment of conviction. The Expungement Law

defines expungement’s effects. And those effects do not include

invalidating the underlying conviction.

2. Because Expungement Leaves the Underlying

Conviction in Existence, It Does Not Invalidate

Discipline that Relied on an Expunged Conviction

Given our conclusion that expungement does not invalidate

the conviction itself, nothing requires the invalidation of a final

administrative agency action that relied on a later-expunged

conviction (assuming nothing else changed). The factual and legal

basis of the administrative agency’s action remains in existence.7

We reached a similar conclusion decades ago in the related

context of gubernatorial pardons. 37 Opinions of the Attorney

General 188 (1952). In that opinion, the Board of Dental

Examiners had revoked a dentist’s license for a crime of moral

turpitude, but the Governor later pardoned that crime, and the

Board asked about the status of the dentist’s license following the

pardon. Id. at 188-89. We concluded that the pardon did not

restore the dentist’s license, noting that [t]he pardon “contain[ed]

nothing which indicate[d] that the conviction was erroneous.” See

id. at 191-93. So, although the dentist could have potentially

applied for a new license under the standards governing a new

7

We need not decide when an agency may have discretion to revisit

a past disciplinary order on the ground that the underlying conviction

was expunged. See, e.g., Cinque v. Montgomery County Planning Bd.,

173 Md. App. 349, 361 (2007) (discussing the inherent authority of

administrative agencies to reconsider quasi-judicial decisions); 106

Opinions of the Attorney General 38, 48 n.10 (2021) (same). But see

Lawrence N. Brandt, Inc. v. Montgomery County Comm’n on Landlord-

Tenant Affs., 39 Md. App. 147, 160-61 (1978) (holding that authority to

reconsider a quasi-judicial decision ends once petition for judicial review

is filed or time for judicial review expires). We conclude only that an

agency is not required to do so, and that the expungement does not

invalidate the agency action by operation of law.

Gen. 82] 97

application, he was not entitled to his old license back. See id. at

193. The reasoning of our 1952 opinion suggests that if a form of

post-conviction relief does not call the validity of the original

conviction into doubt, it does not invalidate license discipline based

on the conviction.

Out-of-state authority supports the conclusion that

expungement does not bear on the propriety of a license revocation

when the expungement occurred after the licensing board’s action.

See, e.g., Schillerstrom v. State, 180 Ariz. 468, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1994); 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-192, 1993 WL 486032, at *6,

*8 (Nov. 16, 1993) (“[T]he sealing of a licensee’s criminal

conviction does not affect any prior disciplinary action taken by the

agency against that licensee.”); Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No. OP-2000-

1, 2000 WL 992134, at *11-12 (July 11, 2000) (concluding that

disciplinary board could disclose existence of, and reason for,

disciplinary action even where underlying records were expunged);

1993-1994 Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. 89, 1994 WL 2269, at *3-4 (Jan.

4, 1994) (same); cf. Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Safety,

169 N.H. 32, 37 (2016) (recognizing that although references to

“habitual offender” status on driving record were subject to

expungement under New Hampshire law, the status itself would

not be). As with our opinion on the dentist’s license, other

jurisdictions recognize that where expungement does not call the

validity of the original conviction into question, it does not affect

administrative actions based on the conviction. See Ballard v.

Board of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 452 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1983) (holding that because expungement under Arizona

law did not invalidate the conviction, it did not require restoration

of police officer’s pension, which had been revoked for felony).

We therefore conclude that expungement of the records of a

criminal conviction does not invalidate or vacate, or require the

rescission of, disciplinary action by a licensing board that relied on

the conviction. The General Assembly defined expungement as the

protection and sealing of certain records and information. But we

see no evidence that it intended the underlying convictions

themselves would be vacated or retroactively voided. And that

means administrative agency actions based on the original

conviction, at least those that became final before the expungement

order, retain their foundation.

98 [110 Op. Att’y

B. Although Expungement Typically Reaches Only Police

and Court Records, Some Limited Types of Records from

License Discipline Proceedings May Be Subject to

Expungement

We must also consider whether, even if expungement does

not invalidate license discipline that relied on a conviction,

documents related to that discipline can or must be expunged, i.e.,

destroyed or protected from public disclosure under the

Expungement Law. As we have discussed, expungement deals

primarily with the confidentiality of records. It is thus possible

that, even if expungement does not restore a license, it still requires

the licensing board to destroy (or remove from public access)

records about the revocation of the license.

However, as we will explain, we think only limited types of

records from license discipline proceedings will be subject to

expungement, for two reasons. First, the standard expungement

order issued by Maryland courts only reaches police records and

court records. Licensing boards’ records fall into neither of those

categories. Although the expungement statute also contemplates a

request to expunge “other records” held by the State, an

expungement order will not reach “other records” without a

specific request. Second, even if the petitioner so requests, the term

“other records” likely does not include records generated by a

licensing board itself in the disciplinary process. Instead, it would

likely reach only records that originated as court or police records

and were received by the board. We turn now to flesh out those

two points.

1. An Expungement Order Ordinarily Reaches Only Police

and Court Records

The standard form expungement order found in the Maryland

Rules reaches only police records and court records. “An order for

expungement of records shall be substantially in [this] form . . . as

modified to suit the circumstances of the case.” Md. Rule 4-508(a).

The form order reads:

Having found that [name] of [address] is

entitled to expungement of the police records

pertaining to that individual’s arrest,

detention, or confinement on or about [date],

at [location], Maryland, by a law enforcement

officer of the [law enforcement agency], and

the court records in this action, it is . . .

Gen. 82] 99

ORDERED that the clerk forthwith shall

serve on each custodian of police and court

records designated in this Order and on the

Central Repository a copy of this Order

together with a blank form of Certificate of

Compliance; and it is further

ORDERED that within 60 days after the entry

of this Order or, if this Order is stayed, 30 days

after the stay is lifted, the clerk and the

following custodians of court and police

records and the Central Repository shall (1)

expunge all court and police records

pertaining to this action or proceeding in their

custody (2) file an executed Certificate of

Compliance, and (3) serve a copy of the

Certificate of Compliance on the

applicant/petitioner/defendant[.]

Md. Rule, Form 4-508.1 (emphasis added).

Records held by a licensing board are not “police records” or

“court records” within the meaning of the Expungement Law. The

law defines these records not only in terms of their nature but also

their custodian. Police records are “official record[s] that a law

enforcement unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository

maintains” about a person’s arrest or detention. CP § 10-101(i).

Records not in the custody of a law enforcement unit, booking

facility, or the Central Repository are thus not “police records,” and

licensing boards do not come within any of those categories. Id.

(g). Similarly, court records are “official record[s] of a court that

the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps” about criminal

proceedings. Id. (d). So, again, licensing board records cannot be

“court records” because they are not kept by court personnel. A

standard expungement order conforming to Form 4-508.1 therefore

will not reach the records of a licensing board.

The form’s focus on police and court records is consistent

with the Expungement Law’s focus on those records. The first

provision of the Expungement Law (after the definitions section)

reads: “A police record or a court record is subject to expungement

under this subtitle.” CP § 10-102(a). Similar language recurs

throughout the law’s procedural provisions. Sections 10-105 and

10-110 govern expungement in cases where charges were filed

(other than certain cannabis charges). If a petitioner requests

expungement and the State’s Attorney does not object, “the court

shall pass an order requiring the expungement of all police records

100 [110 Op. Att’y

and court records about the charge.” CP §§ 10-105(d)(2),

10-110(e)(3). If the State’s Attorney does object but the court finds

the petitioner entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the

expungement of all police records and court records about the

charge.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(1). And “every custodian

of the police records and court records that are subject to the order

of expungement” must comply. CP §§ 10-105(f), 10-110(h).

There are no analogous provisions referring to any other category

of records.

The implementing Rules also assume that only police and

court records are subject to expungement. Rule 4-502 defines

“records” to mean “police records” and “court records” only. See

Md. Rule 4-502(j). All of the other provisions of the Rules then

reference expungement of “records.” See, e.g., Md. Rules 4-501,

4-504(a), 4-508(a), 4-510.

Some provisions of the expungement statute do contemplate

expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records.

Section 10-105(a), in particular, states that a person “may file a

petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record,

court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political

subdivision.” CP § 10-105(a) (emphasis added); see also CP

§ 10-110(a) (same). But even when such “other records” exist (an

issue we discuss in Part II.B.2, below), an expungement order will

not reach them without a specific request. See Davis v. Magee, 140

Md. App. 635, 654-55 (2001); Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502. In

Davis, for example, the expungement petitioner argued that a

county had failed to comply with an expungement order because

its social services agencies had maintained records of a child abuse

investigation related to the criminal charges. 140 Md. App. at 641,

652. The court declined to decide whether the child abuse

investigation records were expungeable, because the petitioner had

not asked for them to be expunged. See id. at 655.

Thus, in the bulk of cases where a licensee informs one of

your boards that a conviction has been expunged, the expungement

order will not reach records of your board. The standard form

expungement order only reaches police and court records. And

even to the extent other records are expungeable, an expungement

order will not reach them except upon specific request. We turn

now to the question of what non-police and court records a

petitioner may in theory request to have expunged.

Gen. 82] 101

2. The Provision for Expungement of “Other Records”

Does Not Reach All Records Relating to License

Discipline

As just noted, some provisions of the Expungement Law seem

to contemplate expungement of “other records” beyond police and

court records. CP §§ 10-105(a), 10-110(a). But other provisions

of the statute assume that only police and court records can be

expunged. Supra Part II.B.1. The Expungement Law is thus

ambiguous on the question of whether, and to what extent, it allows

expungement of “other records.” When this type of ambiguity

arises, we try to harmonize the provisions of the statutory scheme

as far as possible. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Robinson, 435

Md. 62, 77 (2013).

For reasons that we will explain below, although not free from

doubt, we think the best way to harmonize the law’s provisions

here, consistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation,

is to give meaning to the statutory references to “other records” but

read them to mean only records that are the same in substance as

police and court records without technically meeting the statutory

definitions of those terms. On this understanding, “other records”

would mean documents that originated as police or court records

but have come into the hands of other custodians, including

licensing boards.

As a starting point, we do not think the term “other records”

can be read so broadly as to cover all public records that mention

the criminal charge. Although the term may be broad in the

abstract, “the meaning of [even] the plainest language is controlled

by the context in which it appears,” e.g., Adelakun v. Adelakun, 491

Md. 1, 22 (2025) (quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v.

Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017)), and the

context here suggests that the meaning is more limited.

For one thing, reading “other records” that broadly would

create conflict with the requirements of other statutes. We have a

mandate to read, where possible, the General Assembly’s

enactments on the same subject as a “consistent and harmonious

body of law.” See, e.g., State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115 (1997)

(quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 (1992)). The Health

Occupations boards are subject to a statutory requirement to post

disciplinary orders on their websites. HO § 1-607. A reading that

required the expungement of all records mentioning a conviction,

and in particular that required expungement of final disciplinary

orders, would put the Expungement Law in conflict with this

102 [110 Op. Att’y

statutory mandate, and we should avoid such a conflict if we can.

Similarly, the Public Information Act affirmatively requires the

disclosure of “any orders and findings that result from formal

[licensing] disciplinary actions.” Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov.

(“GP”) § 4-333(b)(7).8 Although the Public Information Act defers

to confidentiality mandates found in other law, see GP

§ 4-301(a)(2), a reading that allowed expungement of final

disciplinary orders would create at least some tension with the

apparent legislative intent that such orders be available to the

public.

A reading of “other records” that encompassed all public

records referencing a conviction would also create significant

practical problems. “When seeking legislative intent, we consider

not only the objectives and purpose of the enactment, but

the consequences resulting from one construction rather than

another.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 69 (1994). For example,

the law does not contemplate expungement by redaction alone,

except in the narrow case of docket and index entries. See CP

§ 10-101(f); Md. Rules 4-511, 4-512. This would potentially

mean, under a broad reading of “other records,” that the entire

record would have to be destroyed or removed if it contains any

reference to a criminal charge. That requirement could create

serious difficulties both within and outside the context of licensing

discipline records. For example, voter registration files maintained

by State and local boards of elections refer to criminal convictions

because a felony conviction can temporarily suspend the right to

vote. See Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 3-102(b)(1). What happens

if one of those felony convictions is expunged?

Reading “other records” to cover all public records

mentioning a conviction would also leave licensing boards in a

bind when asked about the status of licenses revoked for criminal

conviction. As we have explained, expungement does not

invalidate the license discipline itself. Supra Part II.A. But if all

records mentioning the conviction (which would include the final

disciplinary order and most or all records of the disciplinary

proceedings) were expunged, then, if asked about the licensee’s

status, agency staff could not respond without obtaining a court

order to disclose information from expunged records. See CP

§ 10-108(a).

8

Indeed, under the Public Information Act’s licensing records

exemption, the final disciplinary order will often be the only document

from a disciplinary proceeding that the licensing board may disclose to

the public. See GP § 4-333(a)(1), (b)(7); see also 71 Opinions of the

Attorney General 305, 310-11 (1986).

Gen. 82] 103

Further, without a clear limiting principle, the broad reading

would require expungement, by destruction or removal to a secure

area, of even (for example) emails among licensing agency staff

mentioning a licensee’s conviction. Failure to destroy those

emails, or remove them, would expose agency employees to

criminal penalties and the loss of their jobs. See CP § 10-108(d).

Despite all these potential issues, nothing in the law gives

custodians of “other records” notice or the opportunity to be heard

on the expungement petition. See CP §§ 10-105(d)(1),

10-110(e)(1). We thus do not think that the General Assembly

intended the “other records” language to cover all public records

that mention a conviction, because of the tension among statutes

and the practical problems such a reading would create.

But the provision must cover some records beyond police

records and court records, as we cannot read the phrase “other

records” out of the statute entirely. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power

Supply Ass’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 214-15 (2000)

(stating the rule of interpretation that words in the statute should

not be rendered meaningless). Again, the traditional canons of

statutory interpretation guide our efforts to assign meaning to this

phrase. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512 (1987).

First, we think the phrase “other records” most likely only

covers records that are closely related to police and court records.

This follows from the principle that we should harmonize the

statute’s provisions to the extent we can. E.g., Robinson, 435 Md.

at 77. As we previously noted, various provisions of the

Expungement Law assume that expungement only applies to police

and court records. Supra Part II.B.1. For example, the statute

provides that if the court, after a hearing, finds the petitioner

entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the expungement of

all police records and court records about the charge,” with no

mention of “other records.” CP §§ 10-105(e)(2), 10-110(f)(2).

And the Expungement Law’s scope provision states that “[a] police

record or a court record is subject to expungement under this

subtitle,” again with no mention of “other records.” CP

§ 10-102(a). The best way to reconcile these provisions with the

need to give some meaning to the “other records” language is to

conclude that “other records” must be akin, at least in substance, to

police and court records.

Other textual evidence also supports the view that “other

records” should be closely related to police and court records.

Originally, the “other records” provision applied to “police records,

104 [110 Op. Att’y

court records, and other records . . . pertaining to the charge.” E.g.,

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 737(a) (1996 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis

added). In the code revision process that created the Criminal

Procedure Article, the phrase “pertaining to the charge” was

eliminated. 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 10 (Revisor’s Note to CP

§ 10-105). But changes in a code revision bill are presumed to be

non-substantive. See, e.g., Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528,

538-39 (2006). Thus, “other records” must still “pertain[] to the

charge” to be expungeable. And under the canon of interpretation

known by the Latin name ejusdem generis, “other records” must

“pertain to the charge” in the same way as “police records” and

“court records.” The ejusdem generis canon construes a term at the

end of a list to include only items “of the same class or general

nature as those specifically mentioned.” See, e.g., In re Wallace

W., 333 Md. 186, 190-91 (1993). We must therefore read “other

records” as covering records that “pertain[] to the charge” in ways

similar to the defined categories of police and court records.

The history of the “other records” provision again supports

this focus on police and court records. The language first appeared

in 1982, when the General Assembly for the first time authorized

expungement of certain conviction records.9 1982 Md. Laws, ch.

872. Among other changes, the 1982 bill amended the language

authorizing a petition for expungement to read: “[A] person . . .

may file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and requesting

expungement of the police records, court records, and other

records maintained by the State of Maryland and its subdivisions,

pertaining to the charge.” Id. (amending Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27,

§ 737(a)(7)) (new language emphasized) (now codified at CP

§ 10-105(a)). But the bill also reenacted, without change, language

that seemed to limit expungement to police and court records. See

id. (Art. 27, § 737(e)) (“If the court finds that the person is entitled

to expungement, it shall enter an order requiring the expungement

of police records and all court records pertaining to the charge.”).

And other aspects of the 1982 bill’s legislative history indicate that

the Legislature was still focused on police and court records. The

title of the bill was: “An Act concerning Police and Court

Records—Expungement.” Id. The bill file, including the bill

request form and written testimony on the bill, also assumes the bill

would deal only with police and court records. See generally Bill

File on H.B. 1074, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. There was no discussion

9

Specifically, the 1982 legislation allowed expungement of

convictions the Governor had pardoned. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. Prior

law had only authorized expungement in the case of a non-conviction

disposition like acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi. See id.

Gen. 82] 105

in the legislative history of what other categories of records might

be expunged.

The General Assembly also is presumed to know that the

Maryland Rules have never contemplated expungement of records

related to convictions, other than police and court records.

Compare Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512, with Md. Rules 4-501 to 4-512

(1984 Repl. Vol.). “One of the fundamental precepts of statutory

interpretation is that the General Assembly is aware of existing law

when it enacts new legislation.” LeCronier v. United Parcel Serv.,

196 Md. App. 131, 141 (2010). And just as we do when there are

two statutes on the same subject, we must attempt to harmonize a

statute and court rule on the same subject when possible. See, e.g.,

Battley v. Banks, 177 Md. App. 638, 650-51 (2007). Not only the

text of the Rules themselves, but also the longstanding practice

under the rules of limiting expungement to police and court

records, is relevant. See, e.g., 72 Opinions of the Attorney General

81, 85 (1987) (explaining that a “longstanding practice . . .

consistently and publicly followed, is persuasive as to the

legislative intent”). If the General Assembly believed the Rules

were inconsistent with the statute, we would expect it to have said

so more clearly on one of the many occasions it has amended the

Expungement Law in the last forty years.

To sum up, then, we think the best way to reconcile the

available evidence of legislative intent is to conclude that “other

records” are records that are not within the statutory definitions of

“police records” and “court records,” but are similar in nature to

police and court records and “pertain to the charge” in the same

way as those records. The question becomes: what records might

fall into that category?

We can think of only one category of records that is

sufficiently related to “police records” and “court records” (and

that pertains to the charge in the same way) but does not fulfill the

statutory definitions: records that originated as police or court

records but are not held by a court or police department. The

Expungement Law defines police records and court records both

by their nature and by their location. Thus, a record that is a police

or court record by virtue of its content would not fulfill the statutory

definition if found in the hands of a different custodian, like a

licensing board. So, for example, a criminal court docket sheet is

a “court record” only if found in the records of the court itself. See

CP § 10-101(d). And an arrest report is a “police record” only if a

police department holds it. See id. (i). But if one of these records,

like a docket sheet or an arrest report, were to come into the hands

106 [110 Op. Att’y

of another agency, like a licensing board, it would not be

expungeable as a “police record” or “court record.” The most

likely reading, in our view, is that the reference to “other records”

was intended to address that gap. Importantly, these records (that

originated as police and court records but are now found elsewhere)

“pertain to the charge” in the same way as police and court

records—namely, they also originated as part of the criminal

proceedings.

Indeed, at least some other states, when faced with similar

ambiguity in their expungement statutes, have read those statutes

as limited to records originating from the police investigation or

court proceedings. In Oregon, for example, expungement applies

to “the record of conviction and other official records in the case,

including the records of arrest.” Or. Op. Att’y Gen. No.

OP-2000-1, 2000 WL 992134, at *5 (citation omitted). The

Oregon Attorney General interpreted “other official records in the

case” to mean “all records that were generated by law enforcement

or the court in the course of the criminal investigation and judicial

proceeding” but not records of licensing agency disciplinary

proceedings. Id. at *7. Oregon’s language is narrower than

Maryland’s in some ways (“in the case” instead of “pertaining to

the charge”) but broader in others (“in the case” instead of

“pertaining to [just] the charge”). The Oregon Attorney General’s

reading is thus some indication of how a Maryland court might read

Maryland’s “other records” language.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky read the phrase

“records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters arising out

of the arrest or charge” as applying only to records that were, by

their nature, “criminal records” or “law enforcement records.” See

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro. Gov’t v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d

335, 353-54 (Ky. 2024). This would exclude “internal employment

files” or “personnel files,” even when information in those files was

obtained from police records. See id. at 354-55. Again, this

reading gives meaning to the phrase “other matters” while still

striking a reasonable balance between expungement and

government functioning, and focusing on the records that are the

expungement law’s core concern.

There are also other states that have taken similar approaches.

See, e.g., D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 172 (concluding that the term

“conviction records” did not include records related to a civil

forfeiture); Director of Revenue v. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d 391, 392-93

(Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute authorizing expungement “from all

official records [of] all recordations of [an] arrest, plea, trial or

Gen. 82] 107

conviction” did not reach notation of administrative suspension for

DUI in driving record); 1983 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 2-384, 1983 WL

178761, at *2 (Dec. 21, 1983) (concluding that whether term “all

official records pertaining to the case” includes records of licensing

body would require case-by-case determination based on how

“interconnected” the records are). But see, e.g., Janevicius v.

White, No. 1-13-2423, 2014 WL 2719322, at *6-7 (Ill. App. Ct.

June 12, 2014) (unpublished) (affirming order expunging

information about criminal charge from driving record, under

statute authorizing expungement of “arrests and charges not

initiated by arrest”).

An example will illustrate how our reading works in practice.

Suppose, to use one of the hypotheticals you raised in your opinion

request, a licensed drug counselor were convicted of a drug-related

offense, and the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists

determined the crime to be one of moral turpitude and revoked the

counselor’s license. The files of the board would then likely

contain records that originated as police or court records in the

criminal case, such as a docket sheet, charging documents, a plea

agreement, or the judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Oltman, 162

Md. App. at 468. But it would also contain records that originated

from the board itself, like meeting minutes and the final order of

discipline. Assume the former licensee then petitioned for

expungement and specifically sought expungement of records of

the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists as “other

records.”

Under our interpretation, the former category of documents

(e.g., the criminal charging document) would be subject to

expungement as “other records,” but the latter (e.g., the board’s

minutes) would not. The former, in the hands of the licensing

board, would not be “court records” as defined in CP § 10-101, but

they would be other records pertaining to the charge in the same

way as court records, because they would have originated from the

criminal case itself. On the other hand, the latter would pertain to

the criminal charge only indirectly, and in a different way, because

they would not have originated from the criminal case itself, but a

collateral proceeding. Thus, only the former set of records could

be subject to an expungement order.

In sum, our opinion is that the Expungement Law does not

authorize or require expungement of all records of a license

discipline proceeding arising from a criminal conviction. The most

reasonable reading is that it authorizes expungement only of

records that originated as part of the criminal case and later came

108 [110 Op. Att’y

into the hands of the licensing agency, such as charging documents

or criminal judgments (and even then, only if specifically requested

and ordered by the court). This reading gives effect to the statutory

references to “other records” while acknowledging that court

records and police records are otherwise the statute’s exclusive

focus.

C. Legislative Clarification of the Scope of Expungement May

Be Advisable

We acknowledge that there are policy arguments that could

support a broader scope of expungement. After all, the overall

purpose of expungement is to reduce the stigma borne by

individuals with criminal records. Supra Part I.A. The continued

availability of State records that reference a criminal conviction,

but fall outside the category of “other records,” arguably

undermines that purpose. And even for records that are

expungeable, an expungement petitioner will likely have difficulty

identifying every custodian of expungeable records. See Cintron,

265 Md. App. at 502 (noting this “pragmatic concern[]”).

For these reasons and given the ambiguity in the statutory

scheme, the General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the

law governing the following issues: which records, if any, beyond

police records and court records are subject to expungement under

the Expungement Law; under what circumstances expungement

may affect previously issued license discipline that relied

exclusively on a criminal conviction; and the relationship between

the Expungement Law and statutes that require public posting of

licensing boards’ disciplinary orders.

III

Conclusion

As the law currently stands, expungement of a criminal

conviction requires the destruction, or removal to a limited-access

area, of certain records but does not invalidate or void the original

conviction. Thus, any professional disciplinary actions that relied

on the criminal conviction also are not invalidated by

expungement. In addition, expungement generally does not require

the destruction or removal of all records related to a license

discipline matter based on a criminal conviction. Rather, the best

reading of current law in our view is that expungement can, at most,

only reach records in the hands of licensing agencies that originated

in the criminal case as police or court records. And even these

Gen. 82] 109

records will not be subject to an expungement order unless the

expungement petitioner makes a specific request.

Anthony G. Brown

Attorney General of Maryland

Thomas S. Chapman

Deputy Chief, Opinions and

Advice

Patrick B. Hughes

Chief Counsel, Opinions and Advice