Ivanowski

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

ELAINE IVANOWSKI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

Civil No. 25-cv-40114-MRG

VIV AUTO PILOT, CLEANSKY ENERGY )

A/K/A TITAN GAS LLC, VIVIANA )

ENERGY, GLORIA GLAUDIN, and TITAN )

ENERGY – NEW ENGLAND INC., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

ORDER RE:MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT [ECF No. 58]

AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF Nos. 8& 17]

GUZMAN, J.

Plaintiff Elaine Ivanowski brings this action pro se against Defendants Viv Auto Pilot,

CleanSky Energy a/k/a Titan Gas LLC (“CleanSky”), Viviana Energy, Gloria Glaudin, and Titan

Energy – New England Inc. (“Titan Energy”)(collectively, “Defendants”),1 alleging various state

and federal law violations stemming from the allegedly “unauthorized enrollment [of Plaintiff]

into utility programs.” [Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1-1]. Construed liberally, the Complaint appears to

assert claims under Chapter 93A, common-law fraud, various federal and state criminal statutes,

and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. None areadequately pleaded.

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the

1Because service does not appear to have been properly effectuated on Defendants Viviana Energy

and Gloria Glaudin within 90 days, the Court sua spontedismisses the action without prejudice as

to those Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Complaint2 [ECF No. 58] and GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, dismissing certain

claims with prejudice and the remaining claims without prejudice.[ECF Nos. 8& 17].

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, the factual allegations of which are

assumed to be true when considering a motion to dismiss. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing A.G. ex rel. Maddoc v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st

Cir. 2013)). The Court has also considered “documents incorporated by reference in [the

complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Giragosian

v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg.

Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court

holds her pleadings “to less demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers and endeavors,

within reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of pro se claims due to technical defects.”

Santiago v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., Inc., No. 17-cv-12249, 2018 WL 5635014, at *2 (D. Mass.

Oct. 31, 2018) (quoting Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008)). Although the facts

as pled are, at times, difficult to understand, the Court construes them as follows:

Plaintiff alleges that, “after initiat[ing] utility services with National Grid,” between March

2018 and July 2024, Defendants enrolled her into utility programs without her consent and charged

2 In the Court’s January 12, 2026 Order, the Court instructed Plaintiff that, if she were to move to

amend her complaint, she “must file a single motion for leave to amend containing her new factual

assertions and/or legal claims,” and was strongly encouraged to include a proposed amended

complaint in her filing. [ECF No. 51 at 5]. Ultimately, Plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to

amend her complaint and instead only filed a proposed amended complaint. [ECF No. 58]. The

Court Clerk modified the ECF event type from “Amended Complaint” to “Motion to Amend

Complaint” and provided notice that parties should construe ECF No. 58 as the Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to Amend the Complaint.

her for services that she did not sign up for, resulting in improper charges totaling $316,000.

[Compl. ¶¶ 9–13]. These alleged programs, Plaintiff contends, include the “Low Income R-2

program,” “Distributed Solar Charge program,” “Renewable Energy Charge program,” “Electric

Vehicle Charge” program, “Energy Efficiency Charge” program, “Transmission Charge”

program, and “Transition Charge” program. [Id. at 14]. Plaintiff asserts that she sent Defendants a

demand letter pursuant to Mass. G.L. c. 93A on March 2, 2025, and that Defendants “failed to

provide a fair settlement within 30 days.” [Id. at 5, ¶ 14; see also id. at 22–25 (photocopies of

letters)]. Plaintiff brings this action to redress this alleged wrongdoing.

B. Procedural History

The Complaint, originally filed in Worcester Superior Court on July 25, 2025, was

removed to this Court on August 15, 2025. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 1]. Defendants Titan Energy and

CleanSky filed separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [ECF Nos. 8 & 17]. Prior

to ruling on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and after denying various of Plaintiff’s motions

ostensibly seeking to amend her complaint, [ECF Nos. 23, 25, and 33], the Court invited Plaintiff

to file a renewed motion for leave to amend her Complaint. [ECF No. 51]. In inviting Plaintiff to

do so, the Court noted that“Plaintiff may benefit from reviewing Defendants’ pending Motions to

Dismiss, [ECF Nos. 8, 17], becausethey contain arguments that Plaintiff’s currentComplaint fails

to clear the futility hurdle.” [Id. at 5]. The Court then mailed Plaintiff copies of the Local Rules

and District’s pro se guide and ordered Plaintiff to review both resources, instructing that

“Plaintiff’s compliance with procedural requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules is mandatory” and “pro se status does not insulate a party

from complying with procedural and substantive law.” [Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks and

citations removed)].

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-

pleaded facts as true, construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all

reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d

74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011)).

“[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the complaint must set forth “more than labels

and conclusions,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and must contain “factual

allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain

recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.

2008) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio,

406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)). The alleged facts must be sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does

not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.” Grajales

v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). “A determination of plausibility is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id.at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679).

Here, the Court construes the complaint liberally because it was filed pro se. SeeErickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).A pro selitigant’s filings are to be “liberally construed.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Therefore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”

must be held to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). However, “[t]his is not to say that pro se plaintiffs

are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888,

890 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation and footnote omitted).

B. Rule 9(b) Standard for Pleading Allegations of Fraud

Additionally, claims that “sound[] in fraud must satisfy the requirements of the heightened

pleading standard” of Rule 9(b) “regardless of what label the pleader assigns to it.” Declude, Inc.

v. Perry, 593 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (D. Mass. 2008). Rule 9(b) provides: “[i]n alleging fraud or

mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.

Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Thus, the standard “is satisfied by an averment ‘of the who, what, where, and

when of the allegedly false or fraudulent representation.’” Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389

F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (quotingAlt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 29 (1st

Cir. 2004)). “The other elements of fraud, such as intent and knowledge, may be averred in general

terms.” Id. However, the complaint must “also identify[ ] the basis for inferring scienter” by setting

forth “specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that a statement was

materially false or misleading.” N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567

F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).Accordingly, tosatisfyRule 9(b), the

complaint must set forth “specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that

a statement was materially false or misleading.” Id.(quotations and citations omitted).

C. Leave to Amend

Under Rule 15(a)(2), leave to amend a complaint shall be “freely give[n] . . . when justice

so requires.” Courts have discretion to deny leave to amend for several reasons, including “futility

of amendment.” U.S. ex rel. Gagne v. Worcester, 565 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).“‘Futility’means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d

617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). The Court reviews aproposed amended complaint for

futility under the “standard [that] applies to motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”

Adorno v. Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 443 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Glassman,

90 F.3d at 623).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A

Plaintiff brings a claim under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A (“Chapter 93A”)

against Defendants for allegedly enrolling her into energy programs without her consent and

charging her more than $300,000. [Compl. ¶¶ 10–15]. “To state a claim under [Chapter 93A], a

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish four elements: first, that the defendant has

committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; second, that the unfair or deceptive act or practice

occurred ‘in the conduct of any trade or commerce;’3 third, that the plaintiff suffered an injury;

and fourth, that the defendant’s unfair or deceptive conduct was a cause of the injury.” Rafferty v.

Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1222 (Mass. 2018) (citing first Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 2; and

thenHerman v. Admit One Ticket Agency LLC, 912 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2009)).

To determine whether a business practice is unfair under Chapter 93A, courts must

consider: “(1) whether the practice . . . is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,

statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,

3 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 1(b) defines “trade” and “commerce” as including:

“advertising, the offering for sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any services

and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, any security as defined in

subparagraph (k) of section four hundred and one of chapter one hundred and ten A and any contract

of sale of a commodity for future delivery, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value

wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people

of this commonwealth.”

oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or

competitors or other businessmen).”PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915,

917–18 (Mass. 1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

An act or practice is deceptive “‘if it possesses a tendency to deceive’ and ‘if it could

reasonably be found to have caused a person to act differently from the way he [or she] otherwise

would have acted.’” Walsh v. TelTech Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting

Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 486–87 (Mass. 2004)).

Chapter 93A claims that sound in fraud, like Plaintiff’s claim, trigger the heightened Rule

9(b) pleading standard. Distefano v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 25-10272-NMG, 2026 WL

560027, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2026).

Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a claim under Chapter 93A because she does not

allege specific facts supporting the existence of an unfair or deceptive act or practice attributable

to any Defendant. Her conclusory assertion that Defendants fraudulently enrolled her in utility

services without her consent is insufficient, standing alone, to meet her pleading burden. Plaintiff

contends that she has satisfied this burden by “provid[ing] the Court with multiple utility bills.”

[ECF No. 61 at 1]. But those documents do not plausibly support an inference of any unfair or

deceptive act.At most, the bills show that Plaintiff was charged for metered services and enrolled

in various programs. They do not identify any false statement, unauthorized enrollment

mechanism, deceptive conduct, or other misconduct, nor do they connect any Defendant to the

alleged wrongdoing. The billing statements therefore fail to bridge the gap between lawful billing

and the conclusory allegation of fraud.See, e.g., Piard v. Murphy, No. 24-CV-40005-MRG, 2025

WL 2778022, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679) (“Based on the

complaint and supporting documents filed . . . [the plaintiff] has only raised an ‘inference

of...the mere possibility of misconduct[,]’ which is insufficient to state a claim for relief.”);

Nowell v. Medtronic Inc., 372 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1257–58 (D.N.M. 2019), aff’d, No. 19-2073,

2021 WL 4979300 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (“conclusory

allegations amount to ‘naked assertions devoid’ of the ‘factual enhancement’ necessary to bridge

the gap between possible and plausible”); Brown v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., No. 3:25-CV-50

(SVN), 2025 WL 2783593, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2025)(citing Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d

140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)) (“Although [Plaintiff] alleges that [the billing] statements were untrue,

Plaintiff alleges no non-conclusory facts to support the conclusion that such statements were untrue

or that [Defendant] knew that such statements were untrue. Instead, Plaintiff relies on bald

assertions and legal conclusions that [Defendant] knowingly overbilled him, which do not suffice

to withstand a motion to dismiss, particularly under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.”).

Plaintiff further fails to allege the role of each Defendant in the purported scheme, instead

referring to Defendants collectively without differentiation. [Compl. ¶ 15]. Such undifferentiated

allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See, e.g., Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v.

Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (a “complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as

to who did what to whom, when, where, and why—although why, when why means the actor’s

state of mind, can be averred generally”); Burnham v. Dudley Dist. Ct., No. 15-cv-40031-DHH,

2015 WL 5698418, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2015) (citing Atuahene v. Hartford, 10 F. App'x 33,

34 (2d Cir. 2001)) (“[When] a plaintiff brings a claim against multiple defendants, the plaintiff

must ...draft [their] complaint in such a manner that it is clear what the alleged factual allegations

and legal claims are against each individual defendant” and they “cannot simply refer to the

defendants collectively where it cannot be reasonabl[y] inferred that all the defendants engaged in

the alleged misconduct.”).4

Accordingly, the Complaint does not satisfy Rule 8(a)’s plausibility requirement and also

fails to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to plead the

circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity.5

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Chapter 93A claim

without prejudice.

B. Allegations of Identity Theftand Racketeering in Massachusetts

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed “identity theft” and that Defendants “may have

forged [her] signature or identity to falsify renewable energy application forms” and “may have

4 Although the Court does not decide the motion on this ground, it is unclear whether Plaintiff

complied with the Chapter 93A demand letter requirement. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). A

plaintiff’s failure to send a proper demand letter is fatal to a Chapter 93A claim, and the letter must

be received by the defendant and must identify the specific allegedly unfair or deceptive conduct

at issue. See Jones v. Bank of N.Y., 542 F. Supp. 3d 44, 57 (D. Mass. 2021); Smith v. Jenkins, 777

F.Supp. 2d 264, 267–68 (D. Mass. 2011); Wagner v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 494 F. Supp.

3d 80, 88 n.8 (D. Mass. 2020). Relief is limited to the conduct described in the demand letter.

Schuster v. Harbor, 471 F. Supp. 3d 411, 424–25 (D. Mass. 2020) (quoting Flores v. OneWest

Bank, F.S.B., 886 F.3d 160, 167 (1st Cir. 2018)) (“Demand letters must therefore ‘set out

specifically any activities . . . as to which they seek relief. Separate relief on actions not so

mentioned is foreclosed as a matter of law.’”). Here, Plaintiff attaches two purported demand

letters, but neither is addressed to a specific defendant, includes a mailing address, or appears

complete. [Compl. at 22–25]. The letters differ in content and appear to be missing portions, and

there is no indication they were sent or received. [Id.] On this record, the Court cannot reasonably

infer that Plaintiff served a valid demand letter on any Defendant. If Plaintiff amends her

Complaint, she should address this.

5 See Distefano, 2026 WL 560027, at *2 (dismissing Chapter 93A claim sounding in fraud for

insufficient factual allegations); Brown, 2025 WL 2783593, at *11 (citing Rolon, 517 F.3d at 149)

(“Although he alleges that [the] statements were untrue, Plaintiff alleges no non-conclusory facts

to support the conclusion that such statements were untrue or that [Defendant] knew that such

statements were untrue. Instead, Plaintiff relies [on] bald assertions and legal conclusions that

[Defendant] knowingly overbilled him, which do not suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss,

particularly under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.”).

illegally used customers’ personal information, forged signatures, and impersonated identities

when interfacing with state administrators of renewable energy programs.” [Compl. ¶ 16].

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in “racketeering” [Compl. at 7, 17].

There is no private right of action to sue for identity theft. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806

F.Supp.2d 452, 458 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 672 F.3d 64 (finding enforcement of Massachusetts

consumer protection laws specific to identity theft is restricted to the Massachusetts Attorney

General); see also Andrews v. Earl's Restaurants USA Inc., No. 19-CV-817-PB, 2019 WL

6879214, at *2 (D.N.H. Dec. 17, 2019) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim failed “because no private

right of action for damages exists under either the Massachusetts criminal identity theft statute or

its federal law counterpart”).There is also no private right of action or damages for Massachusetts-

specific racketeering allegations. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 271A, § 1 et seq.; see also Beychok v.

Baffert, No. 3:24-CV-100-CHB, 2024 WL 5112755, at *18 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2024) (finding

that there is “no provision for a civil cause of action or damages” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

271A).

In the absence of private rights of action, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to

dismiss Plaintiff’s identity theft and state racketeering claims with prejudice.

C. Allegations of Fraud

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed fraud, including “consumer fraud,” “tax

fraud,” “fraudulent enrollments,” “making false statements,” “civil fraud,” “providing false

consumer information,” “securities fraud,” “mortgage or loan fraud,” “defrauding the state,”

“record falsification” or “falsified utility records,” “potential tax fraud,” “deceptive billing,”

“fraudulent use of interstate power lines,” and violations of “mail/wire fraud statutes.” [See Compl.

at 3, 5, 9, 11, 16–19, 25]. However, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiff’s Chapter 93A

claim, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations to establish that Defendants engaged

in the conduct that she alleges amounts to fraud.6 Plaintiff does not allege the time, place, or

content of any allegedly fraudulent communication, the method by which she was purportedly

enrolled, or the identity of any individual or entity who made a misrepresentation. Nor does she

allege facts supporting a plausible inference that any Defendant acted with fraudulent intent.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud claims without

prejudice.

D. Allegations of Forgery, Racketeering, Breach of Contract, and other Statutory

Claims

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants committed forgery, unspecified racketeering,

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act violations, breach of contract, and

other statutory claims, including violations of utility laws, “licensing rules,” “marketing, self-

certification processes, and properly documenting scope of work,” “renewable energy standards

and rebate programs,” “emissions standards,” “above-market charges and interstate commerce,”

“reporting/disclosure laws for publicly traded companies,” “energy regulatory laws.” [Compl. at

16–19, 25]. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird

Treaty Act, Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, the Lacy Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act,

and Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. [Compl. at 19–20]. However, Plaintiff does not

provide sufficient factual allegations to establish that Defendants committed any of the alleged

violations or misconduct.SeeIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that complaints be plausible on their

face, meaning that the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

6 Supraat 8–9.

556). Finally, the Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations of mail or wire

communications in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme warranting additional discovery under New

England Data Services, Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1987). Home Orthopedics Corp. v.

Rodríguez, 781 F.3d 521, 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting application of Becher when complaint

failed to meet ordinary plausibility standard).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss these remaining claims

without prejudice.

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend [ECF No. 58] is denied because her proposed

pleading fails to cure any of the defects outlined above. Mann v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp.,

316 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Grant v. News Grp. Bos., Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995)

(leave to amend may be denied “as a matter of law, where a proposed amendment would not cure

the deficiencies in the original complaint”). Although the present motion is denied as futile,

mindful of her pro se status, Plaintiff will be granted one final opportunity to file another motion

for leave to amend—containing a proposed amended complaint—that addresses the issues

discussed above. The proposed amended complaint shall not include the claims dismissed with

prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:

Plaintiff’s claims under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A are dismissed

without prejudice because the Complaint fails to plausibly allege any unfair or deceptive

act and does not meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

Plaintiff’s purported state-law claims for identity theft and racketeering are dismissed

with prejudice because no private right of action exists for those claims.

e Plaintiff's fraud-based claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead with

particularity, including failure to allege the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged

fraud.

=Plaintiff’s remaining claims—including RICO, breach of contract, forgery, and various

statutory violations—are dismissed without prejudice because they are unsupported by

sufficient factual allegations.

e The action is also dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Viviana Energy and

Gloria Glaudin for failure to effect timely service under Rule 4(m).

e Although the current motion to amend is denied as futile, the Court grants Plaintiff one

final opportunity to file a motion for leave to amend, accompanied by a proposed

amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in this Order. Claims dismissed

with prejudice may not be reasserted. Plaintiff has thirty days from entry of this order to

file a motion for leave to amend, including a proposed amended complaint. Failure to

comply with this deadline will result in dismissal.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2026

/s/ Margaret R. Guzman

Margaret R. Guzman

United States District Judge

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