The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 23-60384-CIV-SINGHAL/REINHART
TODD CONLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIEL S. VACANTI, et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LIKE MANY of the family law matters the undersigned handled in state court, this
case is a sad one for two main reasons; first, because the parties once had a good
relationship that has turned bad, and second and perhaps more relevant here, because
this case should never have been brought at all. Now this matter has come before the
Court upon the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Bruce E. Reinhart (DE
[205]). On January 22, 2026, Magistrate Judge Reinhart issued the Report and
Recommendation recommending that Defendant’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs (DE [188]) be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Todd Conley filed objections late (the “Objections”) that the Court will
consider as timely. (DE [209]). Defendants did not object to Magistrate Judge Reinhart’s
findings. This Court has conducted a de novo review of the portions of the Report to
which Plaintiff has objected, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and the
remainder of the Report for clear error, and finds that the Objections are without merit
and are therefore overruled. Schwartz v. Jones, 2020 WL 905234, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
25, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Schwartz v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 842 Fed. Appx. 442 (11th
Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff’s arguments fit into four buckets—first, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate
Judge improperly decided it was unreasonable to litigate his federal copyright claim in
light of the statute of limitations. Second, Plaintiff raises the issue of his finances and
protests that he cannot pay the legal fees. Third, he alleges the Magistrate Judge wrongly
determined that awarding the Defendants’ legal fees would deter meritless suits, when
actually it would deter meritorious suits. And fourth, he protests that the attorneys’ fees
were improperly calculated. The Court addresses each in turn.
First, the Magistrate Judge properly found that Plaintiff’s decision to litigate this
time-barred claim was unreasonable. While the Court need not rehash the factual
scenario yet again given the long history of this case, some discussion is obviously
necessary given the somewhat repetitive nature of the objections. It should have been
obvious that the claim fell outside of the 3-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff knew the
Defendants were using the software in July 2019, but never filed suit until February 28,
2023. (DE [211] at 9). Plaintiff’s tolling argument was equally unreasonable. Generally,
the statute of limitations “begins to run when a claimant discovers the facts that give rise
to a claim and not when a claimant discovers that those facts constitute a legal violation.”
Mack v. Equable Ascent Fin., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 663, 665-66 (5th Cir. 2014); Merck & Co.
v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 646-47 (2010). Here, Plaintiff knew of the facts—that
Defendants were using the code—in 2019. He may have “believed that [Defendants’]
use was authorized through a business arrangement,” until spring of 2020, but the spring
of 2020 was when he discovered a legal violation, not when he discovered the facts.
Plaintiff should have known that this claim was time-barred, and he unreasonably wasted
resources in attempting to litigate the claim in five separate pleadings.
In the same vein, Plaintiff argues that the other eleven claims were meritorious, as
shown by the fact they survived a motion to dismiss in state court. They may be
meritorious in state court, but that is irrelevant as to whether they were unreasonable in
federal court, where Plaintiff initially filed. These claims belonged in state court to begin
with, and Plaintiff should not have used an obviously time-barred federal claim as a hook
to bring these other claims in federal court. Plaintiff’s litigation of this case was
unreasonable.
Plaintiff’s second argument is that paying Defendant’s legal fees would force
Plaintiff into financial straits. Although unfortunate, inability to pay is not an argument for
why Defendants are not legally entitled to their fees. This argument goes to collection,
not to the award of fees.
Third, Plaintiff essentially challenges the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his
claim is meritless and other similar claims should be deterred. For the reasons stated
above, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Plaintiff’s claim is meritless and future
litigants should be deterred from aggressively litigating obviously barred claims in five
pleadings.
Fourth, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s actual calculation of the amount
of legal fees. First, Plaintiff argues that the fees are not proportional and Defendants are
only entitled to 1/12th of their requested fees, since only 1/12th of the defended claims
were federal. But Defendants had to defend against all twelve claims in federal court.
The case—not just one claim—was dismissed. Defendants are entitled to their fees for
defending this case in federal court. If the Court did not grant Defendants’ fees for
defending all twelve claims, litigants would be incentivized to bring claims that belong in
state court in federal court since there would be no penalty for bringing them in the wrong
forum.
Plaintiff also challenges the 20% reduction to the total fees, instead seeking an
individualized reduction of certain fees. Considering the limited extent of Defendants’
errors in calculating their fees, a 20% reduction of all fees is reasonable. Emphasizing
how reasonable a reduction across the board is in comparison to the judicial labor of
reducing individual entries, Plaintiff himself does not even suggest how much each
problematic entry should be reduced. If Plaintiff will not suggest how much each reduction
should be, surely the Court should not have to make that determination instead. A 20%
reduction of total fees is both fair and a better use of resources.
Pre-litigation fees are also appropriate. They are a necessary part of defending
the unnecessary federal litigation the Plaintiff initiated.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept Objections as Timely Filed (DE [211]) is
GRANTED.
2. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (DE [205]) is
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED.
3. Defendant’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (DE [188]) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
4. Defendant’s counsel should be awarded $570,826.80 in fees.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 6th day of
April 2026.
P \
RAAG 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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