The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA LESKO, FOR PUBLICATION
April 23, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 8:48 AM
V No. 376081
Washtenaw Circuit Court
SUPREME FELONS, INC., LC No. 24-001552-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.
YOUNG, J.
In this action brought under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231
et seq., plaintiff, Patricia Lesko, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting the motion for
summary disposition filed by defendant, Supreme Felons, Inc., on grounds that plaintiff lacked
standing to pursue this action. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff works for a newspaper that operates as “The Ann Arbor Independent.” On
September 11, 2024, plaintiff sent defendant an email requesting that defendant produce certain
documents that were allegedly subject to FOIA. In the email, plaintiff wrote that “The Ann Arbor
Independent would like copies” of these documents; that, if defendant refused, then “The Ann
Arbor Independent’s only recourse” would be civil action; and that “[t]he newspaper would like
these records in digital format.”
On September 13, 2024, plaintiff sent defendant a second email requesting additional
documents under the auspices of FOIA. In this email, like the last one, plaintiff wrote that “The
Ann Arbor Independent would like copies of” these documents; that, if defendant refused to
provide the documents, then “The Ann Arbor Independent’s only recourse” would be to pursue a
civil action; and that “[t]he newspaper would like these records in digital format.”
On September 18, 2024, Billy Cole, acting on behalf of defendant, denied these FOIA
requests, stating that defendant “is not a public body and [is] therefore not subject to the FOIA.”
On October 25, 2024, defendant’s counsel sent a more formal denial letter addressed to plaintiff
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which stated that defendant “will not provide you or your publication with” the requested
documents in part because defendant was not a public body.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro per, filed the complaint giving rise to this action on November 21,
2024. As the case caption suggests, plaintiff filed the complaint in her individual capacity,
challenging defendant’s denial of the September 11 and September 13 FOIA requests.
On May 13, 2025, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff lacked
standing to bring this FOIA action because the at-issue FOIA requests were made on behalf of The
Ann Arbor Independent, so only The Ann Arbor Independent had standing to challenge the denial
of those requests.1
In response, plaintiff argued that she signed the requests for the documents, so she was “the
requesting person” under FOIA and could bring this claim arising out of the denial of those FOIA
requests.
At a June 11, 2025 hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion because it agreed
with defendant that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge defendant’s denial of the FOIA requests.
The court reasoned that, because the FOIA requests were made on behalf of The Ann Arbor
Independent, only The Ann Arbor Independent had standing to bring a FOIA action challenging
the denial of those requests.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. UAW v
Central Michigan Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 493; 815 NW2d 132 (2012). A trial court’s
ruling that a party lacks standing is likewise reviewed de novo. Id. A motion for summary
disposition in which the defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing is properly brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(5). See Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins Trust Bd of
Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 619; 873 NW2d 783 (2015); Glen Lake-Crystal River
Watershed Riparians v Glen Lake Ass’n, 264 Mich App 523, 528; 695 NW2d 508 (2004). When
reviewing a (C)(5) motion, a court “must consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.” Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich
App 146, 152; 673 NW2d 452 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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In defendant’s motion, it incorrectly alleged that The Ann Arbor Independent was a corporation,
when in reality The Ann Arbor Independent was an assumed name for The Adjunct Advocate, Inc.
It does not make a substantive difference for purposes of the relevant analysis whether the separate
legal entity is “The Ann Arbor Independent” or “The Adjunct Advocate”—the point is that
plaintiff as an individual is distinct from the legal entity on whose behalf she submitted the FOIA
requests. To avoid possible confusion, this opinion discusses “The Ann Arbor Independent” as
the separate legal entity on whose behalf the at-issue FOIA requests were made.
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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by holding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring
this FOIA action in plaintiff’s individual capacity. We disagree.
In Michigan, “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action.” Lansing
Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372; 792 NW2d 686 (2010).
Michigan’s FOIA provides that “a person has a right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of
the requested public record of the public body.” MCL 15.233(1). The act defines “person” as “an
individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, firm, organization, association,
governmental entity, or other legal entity.” MCL 15.232(g). If a person desires to exercise their
rights under FOIA, the person must “make a written request for the public record to the FOIA
coordinator of a public body.” MCL 15.235(1). “A request from a person . . . must include the
requesting person’s complete name, address, and contact information, and, if the request is made
by a person other than an individual, the complete name, address, and contact information of the
person’s agent who is an individual.” MCL 15.233(1). If a person’s request is denied, then “the
requesting person” may commence a civil action “to compel the public body’s disclosure of the
public record.” MCL 15.240(1)(b).
The pertinent facts of this case are simple. Plaintiff sent defendant two emails in which
she wrote that “The Ann Arbor Independent would like copies” of certain documents; that, if
defendant refused to provide the documents, then “The Ann Arbor Independent’s only recourse”
was civil action; and that “[t]he newspaper would like these records in digital format.” Both emails
were signed by plaintiff and used the title “Editor.” Underneath plaintiff’s name was written “The
Ann Arbor Independent,” and underneath that was the address and contact information for the
newspaper.
After these FOIA requests were denied, plaintiff brought this action in her individual
capacity under MCL 15.240(1)(b). That subsection only allows “the requesting person” to bring
a civil action on the basis of a denied FOIA request, and the central question on appeal is whether
plaintiff—who personally submitted the FOIA requests but on behalf of her newspaper—was “the
requesting person” for purposes of MCL 15.240(1)(b).
As the dissent provides, “[o]ne way to think about this is as plaintiff claiming that two
‘persons’ submitted joint FOIA requests to defendant—one ‘person’ was the Ann Arbor
Independent, the other was plaintiff as an individual.” We can find no record evidence that plaintiff
made this request in her individual capacity.
We note first that plaintiff provided her work address and additional work-related
information on the forms. We acknowledge this is not dispositive to determining whether she is
jointly filing as an individual and an agent of her newspaper. When “ a person other than an
individual” files a request for documents under FOIA, that request “must include . . . the complete
name, address, and contact information of the person’s agent who is an individual.”
MCL 15.233(1). The information that MCL 15.233(1) required plaintiff to include in her FOIA
requests was the same regardless of whether plaintiff submitted the requests in her individual
capacity or as the Ann Arbor Independent’s agent. Thus, that plaintiff included her name, the Ann
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Arbor Independent’s address, her title at the Ann Arbor Independent, and the contact information
for the Ann Arbor Independent clarifies that plaintiff is acting as an agent of the Ann Arbor
Independent but does not foreclose she is acting in her individual capacity as well, although it is
informative. Plaintiff acting in her individual capacity is foreclosed by the content of the request.
Plaintiff’s requests, sent from her Ann Arbor Independent email address, speak on behalf
on “the Ann Arbor Independent” and mention that should defendant fail to comply with the
request, the “Ann Arbor Independent’s only recourse is to . . . sue Supreme Felons.” The email
specifies that “The Ann Arbor Independent would like copies of the following public records . . . .”
In a later email, plaintiff thanked defendant for “acknowledging the newspaper’s second FOIA
request.” Here, the only “requesting person” was the non-individual corporate entity. Plaintiff, an
individual who herself can make a FOIA request, acted only in her capacity as an agent of the non-
individual corporate entity. An agent cannot become an individual “requesting person” by signing
a document and providing their name and address. They must also be requesting something. Here,
the only “person” requesting documents, according to the FOIA requests themselves, is the Ann
Arbor Independent. The corporate entity remains “the requesting person” and only that
“requesting person” may commence a civil action “to compel the public body’s disclosure of the
public record.” MCL 15.240(1)(b).
Defendant argues, the trial court agreed, and we likewise agree that Detroit Free Press, Inc
v City of Southfield, 269 Mich App 275; 713 NW2d 28 (2005) is a helpful guide. There, the
plaintiff—the Detroit Free Press—brought a FOIA action against the City of Southfield. The case
arose after the city denied a FOIA request sent to it by the “plaintiff’s Lansing Bureau Chief, Chris
Christoff.” Id. at 279. As relevant to the instant case, “[t]he city argue[d] that plaintiff did not
have standing to sue because only Christoff, himself, may be considered a ‘requesting person’
under the FOIA.” Id. at 290. This Court disagreed, explaining:
The FOIA provides that “a person” has a right to inspect, copy, or receive public
records upon providing a written request to the FOIA coordinator of the public
body. MCL 15.233(1), 15.235(1). The statute then grants “the requesting person”
standing to commence an action in a circuit court to compel disclosure of records
which the public body has refused to disclose. MCL 15.235(7)(b), 15.240(1)(b).
Under the FOIA, “ ‘[p]erson’ means an individual, corporation, . . . or other legal
entity.” MCL 15.232(c). A corporation acts through its individual agents as a
matter of course. Here, Christoff’s request was written on “Detroit Free Press”
letterhead, and Christoff identified himself as the “Lansing Bureau Chief.” He also
stated that he was a journalist for plaintiff and that he intended to use the requested
information for an article “in our newspaper.” Therefore, plaintiff issued the
request and had standing to pursue its claim. [Id. at 290-291.]
This Court never ruled on whether Christoff was a “requesting person” for purposes of
MCL 15.240(1)(b) but this Court held only that the plaintiff newspaper was “the requesting
person” for purposes of the statute. We decline to opine whether MCL 15.240(1)’s use of the
singular “requesting person” necessarily means that there can only ever be one “requesting
person.” We hold only that here, as in Free Press, there was one requesting “person” and that
“person” was the Ann Arbor Independent.
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Briefly, defendant argues that plaintiff—who is representing herself—is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, but this argument appears premised on defendant’s contention that
only plaintiff’s newspaper can prosecute the at-issue FOIA claim. Because plaintiff is prosecuting
this case in her individual capacity, she can represent herself. See Const 1963 Art 1, § 13 (“A
suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper
person or by an attorney.”); and MCL 600.1430 (“Every person of full age and sound mind, may
prosecute or defend civil actions in any court by an attorney, or may, at his election, prosecute or
defend civil actions in person.”). Defendant also argues in passing that plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, but defendant does not explain why, thus abandoning the issue by failing to
adequately brief it. See Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
Plaintiff also argues before this Court that the trial court erred by concluding that defendant
was not a “public body” for purposes of FOIA. The trial court never concluded this, however.
The court went no further than concluding that plaintiff did not have standing. We decline to
review an issue that was not decided by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
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