The opinion
[Cite as Gringo v. Hanak, 2026-Ohio-1452.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
ANTHONY J. GINGO, JR., M.D., :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115341
v. :
JANE HANAK, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 23, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-23-973797
Appearances:
Reminger Co. L.P.A., Brianna M. Prislipsky, and Brian D.
Sullivan, for appellee.
Vasvari | Zimmerman and Raymond V. Vasvari, Jr., for
appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
Defendant-appellant Jane Hanak (“Hanak” or “Jane Hanak”) appeals
the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Anthony Gingo, Jr.,
M.D. (“Dr. Gingo”). Hanak also appeals the trial court’s award of $145,000 in
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, as well as its finding
that she is a vexatious litigator. After a thorough review of the facts and the law, we
find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
Dr. Gingo is a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist who
performed a surgical procedure on Hanak in April 2017. On September 5, 2019,
more than two years after that procedure was performed, Hanak initiated
proceedings against Gingo, alleging that he and Dr. Kimberly Kraus, a gynecologist
who performed a subsequent procedure, rendered negligent medical care and
treatment. See Hanak v. Kraus, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-921015. The complaint
was voluntarily dismissed on January 24, 2020. On January 26, 2021, Hanak refiled
the complaint. See Hanak v. Kraus, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-21-943309. Dr. Gingo
filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Hanak appealed. This court
affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Hanak v. Kraus, 2022-Ohio-1941 (8th Dist.).1
Sometime between June and August 2022, Hanak published a review
of Dr. Gingo on the online platform Yelp. The review stated the following:
Gingo MD is a sexual predator. He is NOT a Pelvic Reconstruction
specialist. He is a Rapist. Commits Insurance Fraud. The Hospital
Lawyers hide this criminal/Felon. He has NO hospital privileges to
perform any cosmetic or reconstruction pelvic surgeries.
Urogynecologist are reconstruction specialist requiring a 3 year
fellowship in addition to being a board certified gynecologist which are
1 While her appeal was pending before this court, Hanak, acting pro se, filed multiple
lawsuits in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that related to her surgery.
Dr. Gingo was a named defendant in some of the suits. See Hanak v. Univ. Hosp., et al.,
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-22-963270, Hanak v. Southwest Gen. Hosp., et al., Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CV-22-963730, Hanak v. Gingo, et al., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-22-964069, and Hanak
v. Kraus, et al., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-22-964286.
trained in reproductive organs. Dr. Gingo butchered me without my
consent or knowledge, practicing and experimenting on women for
over 5 years. He would not tell me what he had done. Major
gastrointestinal issues developed as well as sexual disfunction [sic]. He
did not have hospital privileges. He altered my consent, added internal
procedures, extending my anesthesia, exasperating my autoimmune
disease, altering my body to suit “His” perverted sexual tastes and
desires. Taking graphic nude photos in the surgical room, unconscious,
without my knowledge. SW General will hide the privilege lists of the
doctors who practice at this privately owned, by doctors, facility. Go to
Cleveland Clinic. Their doctors [sic] privileges are listed for every
doctor under Treatments and services. Why does SW General hide
their doctor’s [sic] lists? As long as they receive insurance payment,
they don’t care about patient safety, money is their God they ascribe to.
SW has their own police department. City police refuse to take your
report, internal investigations are illegal. The SW police do not even
have a detective. Maybe this is why Sexual assault and battery is not
reported, you simply are forced to “Cease and Desist.” Seriously, Run
for your life. Gingo and Kraus have many lawsuits. Sadly, a preganant
[sic] woman lost her life after a major stroke, damaged babies, nurses
suing him for his outrageous behavior. This doctor and Hospital
appear to hate women. They conceal Hate Crimes. Crimes against
humanity and civil rights.[2]
Dr. Gingo’s wife, Holly Gingo (“Holly”), saw the review on Yelp and
informed Dr. Gingo about it. She estimated she saw the review about two to three
months after Hanak posted it.
On January 13, 2023, Dr. Gingo filed suit against Hanak and her
husband, Mark Hanak, alleging defamation, defamation per se, and defamation by
2 Hanak included the Yelp review as an exhibit in her brief in opposition to
Dr. Gingo’s motion for summary judgment.
implication based on Hanak’s Yelp review.3 He also sought to have Hanak and her
husband declared vexatious litigators.
Hanak answered and filed numerous counterclaims, all of which the
trial court eventually dismissed. Hanak filed a “second answer,” various motions to
compel, and for sanctions against Dr. Gingo. The trial court denied the motions to
compel and for sanctions.
Dr. Gingo moved for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit and
portions of Hanak’s deposition. Hanak responded, arguing that there was no
evidence of damages, the statements made in her Yelp review were true, and there
was no evidence anyone actually saw the Yelp review before it was taken down.
Attached to Hanak’s opposition brief were numerous unauthenticated exhibits.
The trial court granted Dr. Gingo’s motion for summary judgment in
part. The court found that Hanak admitted to making multiple statements about
Dr. Gingo, and those statements were false. The court further found that Hanak’s
statements were defamation per se, because they were words that “import an
indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment and
tend to injure” Dr. Gingo’s profession. The trial court entered judgment in Dr.
Gingo’s favor on the defamation per se claim and left the defamation by implication
3 Mark Hanak was a named defendant throughout this litigation; however, the trial
court’s damages and attorney fees awards named only Jane Hanak. Mark Hanak is not a
party to this appeal; therefore, discussion will be limited to Jane Hanak.
claim pending.4 The court declared the Hanaks vexatious litigators pursuant to
R.C. 2323.52. The court set the matter for a damages hearing.
Hanak, who proceeded pro se until this point, obtained counsel, who
moved for reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment. In support of her
motion, Hanak attached an affidavit from Irene Fox (“Fox”), a friend and nurse who
was previously employed at the same hospital as Dr. Gingo. The trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration.
At the damages hearing, Dr. Gingo testified as to the harm caused by
Hanak’s Yelp review. The trial court subsequently awarded the doctor $245,000 in
damages, which included $50,000 for damage to reputation, $50,000 for mental
anguish, and $45,000 for loss of society. The award also included $100,000 in
punitive damages, based upon a finding that Hanak acted with hatred, ill will, or a
spirit of revenge, or with disregard to Dr. Gingo’s rights and safety. Later, the court
held a separate hearing on attorney fees and awarded $93,437.47 in attorney fees to
Dr. Gingo.
Hanak filed for leave to appeal to this court, which was granted. Hanak
raises eight assignments of error for our review:
I. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it granted
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gingo in the liability phase of this
defamation action because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the alleged defamatory assertions in the Yelp Review of Dr.
Gingo were true or false.
II. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it granted
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gingo in the liability phase of this
4 Dr. Gingo later dismissed his claim for defamation by implication.
defamation action because Dr. Gingo had the burden to prove actual
damages, and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Dr.
Gingo was actually damaged by the allegedly defamatory assertions in
the Yelp Review about him.
III. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it granted
summary judgment to Dr. Gingo in the liability phase of this
defamation action because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the Yelp Review was published with actual malice.
IV. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it granted
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gingo in the liability phase of this
defamation action because the assertions in the allegedly defamatory
Yelp Review, even if published by Mrs. Hanak, relate to matters of
public concern and were thus privileged as a matter of Ohio law.
V. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it quashed the
subpoena issued to Dr. Michael Deucher and excluded Mrs. Hanak’s
primary supporting witness, Irene Fox, from testifying at the damages
hearing, because the testimony of these witnesses was directly relevant
to whether the assertions in the allegedly defamatory Yelp Review were
true and were made maliciously.
VI. The Trial Court’s excessive damages award against Mrs. Hanak
constitutes plain error.
VII. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it declared
Mrs. Hanak to be a vexatious litigator on summary judgment.
VIII. The Trial Court erred to Mrs. Hanak’s prejudice when it
considered only improperly authenticated excerpts from her
deposition, in lieu of the complete, authenticated transcript, as the
basis for its summary judgment decision.
Summary Judgment
Hanak’s first through fourth and eighth assignments of error
challenge the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gingo.
For ease of discussion, we combine these assigned errors for review.
In the first assignment of error, Hanak argues that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because there was an issue of fact regarding
whether the published statements were true. In the second and third assignments
of error, Hanak challenges the definition of defamation per se. In the fourth
assignment of error, Hanak claims the Yelp statements were matters of public
concern and therefore privileged. In the eighth assignment of error, Hanak claims
that the trial court erred in considering only part of her deposition.
An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment
de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). In a de novo
review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and
independently reviews the record to determine whether the denial of summary
judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any
material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving
party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made. Id., citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217 (1994).
The moving party has the initial responsibility of informing the trial
court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements
of the nonmoving party’s claims. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293
(1996). “To accomplish this, the movant must be able to point to the evidentiary
materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in rendering
summary judgment.” Id. These include “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact, if any.” Civ.R. 56(C). “These evidentiary materials must show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 293.
If the moving party fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment
is not appropriate. However, if the moving party satisfies this initial burden, then
the nonmoving party has the burden to set forth specific facts by the means listed
above in Civ.R. 56(C) demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
Defamation Per Se
“Defamation is a false publication that injures a person’s reputation,
exposes him [or her] to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace; or
affects him adversely in his [or her] trade or business.” Kanjuka v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 2002-Ohio-6803, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). To establish a claim for defamation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a false statement of fact was made about the
plaintiff, (2) the statement was defamatory, (3) the statement was published, (4) the
plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication, and (5) the
defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the statement.
Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4193, ¶ 77, citing Pollock v. Rashid,
117 Ohio App.3d 361 (1st Dist. 1996).
Defamation per se occurs when the defamation is manifested by the
very words spoken. Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.,
2021-Ohio-1198, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). A statement is defamatory per se where it supports
an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment,
imputes some loathsome or contagious disease that excludes one from society or
tends to injure one in the person’s trade or occupation. Montgomery at id., citing
Kanjuka at ¶ 16. Where the statement constitutes defamation per se, damages and
actual malice are presumed. Montgomery at id., citing Kanjuka at id.5
In his motion for summary judgment Dr. Gingo claimed that Hanak’s
Yelp review was defamation per se.
For the reasons set forth below and based on our de novo review, the
following statements from Hanak’s Yelp review, which she admitted to publishing,
were actionable:
1. Dr. Gingo is a sexual predator.
2. Dr. Gingo is a rapist.
3. Dr. Gingo commits insurance fraud.
5 The expression of an opinion is generally immune from liability under the Ohio
and United States Constitutions. Montgomery at ¶ 33, citing Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 2011-
Ohio-3484 (10th Dist.). Although Hanak stated in her brief in opposition to Dr. Gingo’s
motion for summary judgment that her “opinion” was based on “fact,” on appeal, Hanak
does not contend that her statements were nondefamatory because they were her opinion.
4. Dr. Gingo does not have hospital privileges to perform cosmetic or
pelvic reconstruction surgeries.
5. Dr. Gingo butchered Hanak.
6. Dr. Gingo altered Hanak’s consent.
7. Dr. Gingo experiments on other women.
8. Dr. Gingo altered Hanak’s body to suit his perverted sexual taste and
desires.
9. Dr. Gingo concealed hate crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes against civil rights.
10. Dr. Gingo hates women.
A plaintiff must prove falsity as an essential element of a defamation
claim and, because falsity is an essential element, a true statement cannot provide
the basis for such an action. Natl. Medic Servs. Corp. v. E. W. Scripps Co., 61 Ohio
App.3d 752, 755 (1st Dist. 1989). Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense
to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery, 2021-Ohio-1198, at ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing
Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433 (1996).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Dr. Gingo averred
that the statements made by Hanak were false and that he had never raped, sexually
assaulted, or acted in any inappropriate fashion to any person, including Hanak;
never concealed any kind of criminal conduct, including hate crimes, crimes against
humanity, and crimes against civil rights; never rendered medical care and
treatment without proper licenses or privileges; never altered any patient’s consent
records; did not alter Hanak’s body to “suit any claimed personal desires”; never
committed insurance fraud; did not take graphic photographs of Hanak without her
consent or for any improper purpose; and has not experimented on other women.
In response, Hanak argues that issues of material fact remain whether
her statements were true. To support her claim, Hanak attached numerous exhibits
to her brief in opposition.
“Civ.R. 56(C) provides an exclusive list of materials that a trial court
may consider when deciding a motion for summary judgment.” Hopper v. Landen
Auto Mart, LLC, 2025-Ohio-2275, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Varnau v.
Wenninger, 2011-Ohio-3904, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). Again, those materials are “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts
of evidence, and written stipulations of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C). “[A] party may properly
introduce evidence not specifically authorized by Civ.R. 56(C) by incorporating it by
reference through a properly framed affidavit pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E).” Hopper at
id., citing Wilson v. AIG, 2008-Ohio-5211, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.).
Hanak’s list of exhibits include numerous printouts purportedly
about Dr. Gingo, including an online “license lookup,” Google search results,
printouts from various local hospitals, personal medical information, letters from
law firms, letters from various hospitals, emails, educational material, a hospital
employee handbook and bylaws, emails between Hanak and hospital employees,
and the Yelp review. Also included in the exhibit list (marked Exhibit 1B) was the
first page of Dr. Gingo’s first set of requests for admissions and interrogatories.
None of the exhibits, except perhaps for Exhibit 1B, are the type of
materials enumerated in Civ.R. 56(C). Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing
to consider these materials.
Hanak’s statements that Dr. Gingo, an OB/GYN, committed rape and
insurance fraud, surgically altered Hanak’s body for fetishistic purposes, and
participated in hate crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights abuses were
allegations that import indictable criminal offenses involving moral turpitude and,
for Dr. Gingo in particular, were injurious to his work providing intimate healthcare
to women. Consequently, the trial court was correct in finding that Hanak’s
statements were defamation per se. Additionally, because the statements were
defamation per se, Dr. Gingo did not need to prove actual damages or that the
statements were made with malice as was asserted in Hanak’s second and third
assignments of error.
Hanak also cannot show that her statements were privileged as
asserted in her fourth assignment of error.
If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of defamation, a defendant
“may invoke the defense of ‘conditional’ or ‘qualified privilege.’” A & B-Abell
Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d
1, 7 (1995), citing Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237 (1975). Hanak argues that her
statements were privileged because they “implicated matters of public health and
safety,” the “community’s safety and welfare,” and matters of “significant social and
legal concern.”
The essential elements of a communication protected by qualified
privilege are that the statement was made in good faith, there is an interest to be
upheld, the statement is limited in its scope to this purpose, a statement made on a
proper occasion, and publication was in a proper manner and to proper parties only.
Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5720, *21-22 (10th Dist. Dec. 20,
2011), citing Austin v. Peterson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 27 (9th Dist. Jan. 13, 1999).
Hanak has failed to demonstrate that any of the above circumstances
apply. Hanak has provided no evidence that her statements were made in good
faith. Her statements were also not limited in scope and were not published in a
proper manner or to proper parties. Indeed, Hanak took a single grievance related
to a surgical procedure and extrapolated it into a rape allegation, human rights
abuses, and various other crimes, which she then published on the internet, where
it was publicly visible.
Finally, Hanak contends that the trial court erroneously considered
only parts of her deposition testimony rather than the entire transcript. If there were
portions of Hanak’s deposition testimony that she wanted the court to consider, she
should have included those portions in her brief in opposition to Dr. Gingo’s motion
for summary judgment.
The statements made by Hanak in her Yelp review would tend to
subject Dr. Gingo to ridicule, contempt, and hatred. Dr. Gingo met his burden of
demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
The first through fourth and eighth assignments of error are
overruled.
Motion to Quash and Exclusion of Witness Testimony
In the fifth assignment of error, Hanak argues that the trial court
erred when it quashed subpoenas for two nonparties: Dr. Michael Deucher and her
friend Irene Fox, a nurse.6 According to Hanak, their testimony was relevant to
whether the alleged defamatory statements were true and whether they were made
maliciously.
Hanak claims that Dr. Deucher’s testimony was necessary to show
that Dr. Gingo lacked relevant privileges to perform the medical procedures on
Hanak. She claims that Fox’s testimony was relevant because Fox would have
testified that Dr. Gingo violated hospital policy, performed nonconsensual
procedures on Hanak, did not have the privileges to perform the procedures, and
committed insurance fraud.
Civ.R. 45(C)(4) provides:
On timely motion, the court from which the subpoena was issued shall
quash or modify the subpoena, or order appearance or production only
under specified conditions, if the subpoena does any of the following:
(a) Fails to allow reasonable time to comply;
(b) Requires disclosure of privileged or otherwise protected matter and
no exception or waiver applies;
(c) Requires disclosure of a fact known or opinion held by an expert not
retained or specially employed by any party in anticipation of litigation
6Dr. Deucher and Fox were two of the dozen nonparty witnesses Hanak
subpoenaed; the trial court granted the motions to quash of all nonparty witnesses.
or preparation for trial as described by Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(h), if the fact or
opinion does not describe specific events or occurrences in dispute and
results from study by that expert that was not made at the request of
any party;
(d) Subjects a person to undue burden.
We review a trial court’s ruling to quash or enforce a subpoena for an
abuse of discretion. HDDA, LLC v. Vasani, 2025-Ohio-2000, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.), citing
Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-1035 (10th Dist.). We also review
a trial court’s decision to exclude a witness from testifying for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Thompson, 2010-Ohio-1680, ¶ 65 (2d Dist.), citing Urbana ex rel.
Newlin v. Downing, 43 Ohio St.3d 109 (1989) (appellate courts review the decision
whether to exclude or admit testimony of a lay witness pursuant to Evid.R. 701
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.) An abuse of discretion occurs when “a
court [exercises] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over
which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
In his motion to quash, Dr. Deucher argued that the notice he was
provided (two weeks) was insufficient time for him to manage his schedule of
patients in order to appear for the damages hearing. The subpoena also reflected
numerous matters that were irrelevant to a damages hearing, such as Dr. Gingo’s
surgical privileges at the time he operated on Hanak. As it relates to Fox, the nurse
had previously worked at the same hospital as Dr. Gingo but had no personal
knowledge of the care he rendered to Hanak. Fox did not observe Hanak’s surgery,
had no knowledge of discussions between Dr. Gingo and Hanak, and had only
reviewed Hanak’s medical records (it is unclear which medical records she
reviewed).
Hanak contends that she did not intend to have Fox testify as an
expert; instead, Fox was to testify to what she told Hanak about Dr. Gingo, which
led to Hanak believing that her statements were true. The matter of whether the
statements were defamatory had already been determined; therefore, any testimony
regarding the veracity of the statements was not properly before the trial court.
Dr. Deucher and Fox had no personal knowledge of Dr. Gingo’s
damages; therefore, Dr. Deucher’s motion to quash, and the exclusion of Fox’s
testimony, was not an abuse of discretion.
The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Damages Award
In the sixth assignment of error, Hanak argues that the trial court’s
damages award constitutes plain error.
As an initial matter, we note that although Hanak stated that she was
challenging the award of attorney fees in this assigned error, her argument is devoid
of mention of the issue. Therefore, in accordance with App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A),
we decline to consider the propriety of the award.
Hanak concedes that she did not challenge the damages award with
the trial court; therefore, we review solely for plain error. Plain error “may only be
applied in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances” where an
unobjected-to error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial process thereby challenging the legitimacy of the
underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123
(1997).
According to Hanak, the award was excessive because Dr. Gingo
could not show that anyone saw the Yelp review, he did not know if he lost doctor
referrals because of the review, and he never asked Hanak to remove the review.
Dr. Gingo testified that he had been practicing medicine in Cleveland,
Ohio as a board-certified OB/GYN since 1992. According to Dr. Gingo, as a male
OB/GYN, he has had to develop relationships and trust with his patients: “An
OB/GYN is different. Again, it’s very personal. You grow up with a lot of these
women, you deliver them, you deliver their babies, it’s — and — it’s just a very, very
personal and sensitive interaction.” (Tr. 109-111).
Dr. Gingo testified that once he found out about the review, the
process to get Yelp to take the review down took weeks; it was not instantaneous.
Dr. Gingo testified that after the review was published, his patient load dropped by
half. Dr. Gingo, who was 62 at the time of the hearing, planned on working until he
was 75 years of age. However, the stress from the review was so severe that he
decided to retire, testifying that being a doctor is “the only thing I wanted to do my
whole life and she’s ruined it.” (Tr. 132). He further testified “that’s why I’m
quitting, because I get that sense from all my patients now. I can’t — I don’t feel the
same interaction any longer. I don’t know who saw this, I don’t know who read it
and it’s ruined me,” “my reputation has been destroyed.” (Tr. 143, 147).
Additionally, because of the protections afforded by HIPAA, Dr. Gingo was
constrained from addressing the statement publicly, even in his own defense.
Dr. Gingo testified that he was pressured to step down from his position as chairman
of the quality committee at the hospital where he worked as a result of the review
and that the review severely impacted his close relationships and friendships.
Finally, he testified that it has negatively impacted intimate relations with his wife.
Holly Gingo, Dr. Gingo’s spouse, testified to the impact that the
review had on their 36-year marriage as well as her husband’s medical practice,
where she was employed as a nurse. According to Holly, their patient numbers
dropped soon after the review was published, from 100-120 patients per week to 60-
68 patients per week. She further testified that her husband used to practice
cosmetic gynecology but ever since Hanak posted her review, their office has
received no new patient inquiries for the service.
The evidence presented at the damages hearing supported the trial
court’s award of $145,000 in compensatory damages. The defamatory statements
also supported the trial court’s award of $100,000 in punitive damages, because it
is clear that Hanak’s statements were published with hatred, ill will, a spirit of
revenge, or with disregard to Dr. Gingo’s rights and safety. Moreover, these awards
were only given after a full hearing during which Hanak was given the opportunity
to cross-examine Dr. Gingo and his witnesses and to present her own testimony in
her defense. Therefore, we cannot say that this is the exceptional case that warrants
reversal.
The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
Vexatious Litigator
In the seventh assignment of error, Hanak challenges her designation
as a vexatious litigator.
In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court found that
Hanak was a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. 2323.52. A vexatious litigator “is a
person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in
vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions.” R.C. 2323.52(A)(3).
R.C. 2323.52(B) provides a party can be declared a vexatious litigator
“in a court of common pleas with jurisdiction over the person who has allegedly
engaged in the habitual and persistent vexatious conduct . . . .” The parties concede
that Hanak had already been declared a vexatious litigator at the time the order in
this case was entered. See Hanak v. W. Res. Ins. Co., et al., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-
23-973505 (order dated Feb. 6, 2024). In that case, pursuant to R.C. 2323.52(D)(1),
the trial court ordered that Hanak was prohibited from
1. Instituting legal proceedings in the court of claims or in a court of
common pleas, municipal court, or county court;
2. Continuing any legal proceedings that the vexatious litigator had
instituted in the court of claims or in a court of common pleas,
municipal court, or county court prior to the entry of the order;
3. Making any application, other than an application for leave to
proceed under R.C. 2323.52(F), in any legal proceedings instituted by
. . . Jane Hanak . . . or another person in the court of claims or in a court
of common pleas, municipal court, or county court.
(Order dated Feb. 6, 2024).
Thus, because Hanak had already been declared a vexatious litigator,
she would have had to challenge that finding by appealing the court’s decision in
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-23-973505.
The seventh assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR