Tasneem

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ATIF TASNEEM, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

* Civil Action No. 25-30072-MGM

STUFFT, et al. *

*

Defendant. *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Dkt. No. 7)

March 31, 2026

MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from Syeda Saima Akram’s (“Syeda”) unscheduled consulate interview for

her visa petition which has been pending with the Department of State’s National Visa Center

(“NVC”) since 2022. Plaintiff, Syeda’s brother, serves as Syeda’s financial guarantor for the petition,

which means he is contractually obligated to prevent Syeda from becoming dependent on the U.S.

government for subsistence. The Complaint asserts claims for unreasonable delay under the

Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1) & 555(b) (Count I); seeks to compel

agency action pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act (“Mandamus Act”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and

1651 (Count II); and alleges Fifth Amendment due process violations (Count III). These claims are

brought against Natalie A. Baker (the Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan), Marco Rubio (the

Secretary of the Department of State), and Julie Stufft (the Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of

Consular Affairs). Plaintiff seeks a court order requiring Defendants to process Syeda and her

family’s visa applications within 15 days of the order or as soon as reasonably possible and grant

attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act or other authorities.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), all Defendants moved to dismiss for mootness as to

Plaintiff’s claims against two Defendants, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all Defendants

moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In response, Plaintiff

filed an opposition.1

For the reasons that follow, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count III

and denies it as to Counts I and II.

II. BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2006, Tasneem Syed, Plaintiff’s father, properly filed a Form I-130, Petition

for Alien Relative, with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for his Pakistani

citizen adult daughter Syeda. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 17.) Her husband and her four children are

derivative beneficiaries. (Id.) On August 16, 2010, USCIS approved the Form I-130. (Id. ¶ 18.) At

some point thereafter, USCIS sent Syeda a letter stating that the approval of her Form I-130 was

being revoked because her father had passed away. (Id. ¶ 19.) However, Syeda was given the option

to revive her Form I-130 by seeking humanitarian reinstatement, a process through which USCIS

may exercise its discretion to reinstate a Form I-130 that was revoked because of a petitioner’s

death. (Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2)). In May 2019, Syeda submitted documents

1 On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authorities informing the court that

his family will not become public charges in light of the Department of State’s pausing immigration

processing in Pakistan and in other countries due to the risk of certain foreign nationals entering the

United States and becoming financial burdens. The court takes judicial notice (see Newton Covenant

Church v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 956 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2020)) that on January 21, 2026, the

Department of State issued an announcement stating that it has “paused all visa issuances to

immigrant visa applicants.” U.S. Dep’t of State, “Immigrant Visa Processing Updates for

Nationalities at High Risk of Public Benefits Usage,” Travel.State.Gov (last updated Feb. 2, 2026),

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/immigrant-visa-processing-updates-

for-nationalities-at-high-risk-of-public-benefits-usage.html (accessed Mar. 23, 2026). Under the

Frequently Asked Questions section, the notice goes on to state, “Immigrant visa applicants who are

nationals of affected countries [which includes Pakistan] may submit visa applications and attend

interviews, and the Department will continue to schedule visa interviews.” Id. Therefore, the

announcement does not appear to have an impact on Plaintiff’s requested relief: the scheduling of

Syeda’s visa interview.

supporting her reinstatement request of her Form I-130, and named Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, as a

substitute financial sponsor. (Id.) On January 31, 2022, USCIS notified Syeda that it had reaffirmed

the Form I-130 and that it would send the Form I-130 to the NVC. (Id. ¶ 20.)

On March 13, 2024, the NVC notified Syeda that her and her derivative beneficiaries’ cases

had been “Documentarily Qualified,” meaning that all necessary documents had been submitted and

that the visa applications were now in the queue to be scheduled for a visa interview. (Id. ¶ 22.) On

April 19, 2024, Plaintiff emailed the NVC regarding Syeda’s case, and three days later, NVC

informed him: “This case is documentarily complete, which means the NVC has all the documents

we requested. Your application is waiting for an interview appointment, where a consular officer will

adjudicate it.” (Id. ¶ 24. (citing Ex. A)). However, Defendants have yet to schedule an interview for

Syeda or take any further action in processing Syeda’s visa application. (Id. ¶ 25.)

As a result of not having her immigration petition adjudicated, Plaintiff, Syeda, and her

family have suffered in several ways. The lack of family support has affected Plaintiff’s ability to take

care of his disabled 12-year-old son and to manage his businesses. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Additionally, the time

difference and the distance between the United States and Pakistan have made communication

challenging, and he has only been able to visit his sister twice due to financial reasons. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Finally, Syeda and her husband have had to start a real estate business in Pakistan, rather than in the

United States, and it is not doing well. (Id.) Syeda’s college-age children cannot attend college

because of the lack of quality education in Pakistan, and one of her older children cannot pursue a

PhD for the same reason. (Id. ¶ 8.)

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court accepts all well-pleaded

factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, but “do[es] not credit legal

labels or conclusory statements.” Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2022). Additionally,

“some latitude” may be appropriate where a plausible claim may be indicated “based on what is

known,” and at least where “some of the information needed may be in the control of [the]

defendants.” Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012). “While a district court is generally

limited to considering facts and documents that are part of the complaint, it may also consider

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, matters of public record, and other matters

susceptible to judicial notice.” Newton Covenant Church, 956 F.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks and

original alterations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to establish at least one

“material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” N.R. by and

through S.R. v. Raytheon Co., 24 F.4th 740, 746 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Scheme

1. Consular Processing

“A [non-citizen] needs an immigrant visa to enter and permanently reside in the United

States.” Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 46 (2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a)). To obtain a

visa, the non-citizen must fall within one of six family preference categories. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§

1151(a)-(b)). Of these, five are subject to annual limitations on visas, including the third preference

category (which includes married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens) that is relevant in the case at

bar. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(1), 1153(a)(1)-(4).

A United States citizen or lawful permanent resident (“petitioner”) initiates the immigration

process for their non-citizen relative (“beneficiary”) when they file the Form I-130 (Petition for

Alien Relative) with USCIS. Scialabba, 573 U.S. at 47 (citing 8 U.S.C §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i),

(a)(1)(B)(i)(I), (b); 8 CFR § 204.1(a)(1)). The Form I-130 is not the same as a visa application and its

approval does not confer any immigration benefit; rather, its purpose is solely to establish the

underlying qualifying relationship that allows a non-citizen to apply for permanent residency. Id.; see

also Pishdadiyan v. Clinton, No. CIV.A. 11-10723-JLT, 2012 WL 664774, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Feb. 7,

2012); see also U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative,

https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last visited Mar. 24, 2026).

If USCIS approves the Form I-130, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), that generally does not

result in the non-citizen receiving a visa “then and there, but only in getting a place in line” unless

the non-citizen is what is known as an immediate relative for whom there are no visa restrictions.

Scialabba, 573 U.S. at 47-48. The non-citizen relative is “placed in a queue with others in her category

. . . in order of ‘priority date’—that is, the date [the Form I-130] was filed with USCIS.” Id. at 48.

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(1); 8 CFR § 204.1(b); 22 CFR 42.53(a)). Within the five family preference

categories, the number of visas available for each year varies based on country with demand

regularly outweighing supply. Id. The availability of a visa is determined by the Department of State’s

“cut-off date for each family preference category, indicating that visas . . . are available for

beneficiaries with priority dates earlier than the cut-off.” Id. (citing 8 CFR § 245.1(g)(1); 22 CFR §

42.51(b)); see also Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 9 Visa Bulletin, Immigrant Numbers for

March 2026 (March 17, 2026).

Regardless of whether a visa is available, immediately after USCIS approves a Form I-130,

the case is forwarded to the Department of State’s NVC. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(3); see also U.S.

Citizenship & Immigration Services, “Consular Processing,” USCIS.gov (last reviewed July 20, 2023),

https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/consular-processing

(accessed Mar. 23, 2026). Once at the NVC, the Form I-130 sits until “an immigrant visa number is

available for [the non-citizen relative].” Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The NVC is responsible for

requesting “the immigrant visa application fee and all documentation[] [including the DS-260

Immigrant Visa Application]” if the priority date “matches or will soon match the most recent date

allowed (the Cut-Off date)” and will “hold [the] petition and all documentation until [the non-

citizen’s] immigrant visa interview can be scheduled at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate.” U.S. Dep’t of

State, National Visa Center, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-

visas/immigrate/national-visa-center.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2026).

Once a visa is available and the non-citizen relative is deemed “documentarily qualified

[meaning that the Department of State has determined the non-citizen has paid the necessary fees

and submitted all required documents],” the Department of State schedules an immigration visa

interview with a consular officer at an embassy with jurisdiction over the beneficiary’s residence. 8

U.S.C. § 1202(a); 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.61(a), 42.62; Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2022);

see also U.S. Dep’t of State, IV Scheduling Status Tool,https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-

visas/visa-information-resources/iv-wait-times.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2026) (“Interviews can

only be scheduled if a visa is available.”).

Only when a non-citizen is invited for an interview with a consular officer can the non-

citizen “properly” complete and execute their visa application. 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(2) (explaining that

an applicant must “personally appear[] before a consular officer” to formally execute their visa

application). After the interview, the consular officer must “issue,” “refuse,” or “discontinue

granting the visa” pursuant to an outstanding order under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) § 243(d). 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a).

2. The Role of a Substitute Sponsor under Humanitarian Reinstatement

The INA forbids admission to the United States of any non-citizen who “is likely at any time

to become a public charge.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). “A family-based immigrant is presumptively

likely to become a public charge.” Belevich v. Thomas, 17 F.4th 1048, 1050 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 8

C.F.R. § 213a.2(a)(1)(i)(A), (a)(2)(i)). “But that presumption can be overcome if a [petitioning]

relative executes an ‘affidavit of support.’” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(a)(1)(i)(A); 8 C.F.R. §

213a.2(a)(2)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(D)). Under 8 U.S.C. §

1183a(f)(1)(D), therefore, the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident petitioner usually also serves

as the sponsor. This affidavit of support serves as a contract through which the sponsor promises

the United States that he or she will support the non-citizen “at an annual income that is not less

than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line.” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A).

There are certain situations in which the sponsor may be different than the petitioner. One

such case is if the petitioner passes away prior to the approval of a visa but after the approval of the

Form I-130. In this situation, “approval of a petition or self-petition [Form I-130] made under § 204

of the Act . . . is revoked as of the date of approval.” 8 CFR 205.1(a). However, USCIS can exercise

its discretionary power to nevertheless reinstate the approval of the petition if “a person related to

the [non-citizen] in one of the ways described in § 213A(f)(5)(B) [8 USC § 1183a(f)(5)(B)] of the

Act is willing and able to file an affidavit of support under 8 CFR part 213a as a substitute sponsor.”

8 CFR 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2).

Under 8 USC § 1183a(f)(5)(B), “a spouse, parent, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sibling, child

(if at least 18 years of age), son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law,

grandparent, or grandchild of a sponsored [non-citizen] or a legal guardian of a sponsored [non-

citizen]” may serve as the substitute sponsor so long as they fulfill all of the conditions listed under 8

USC § 1183a(f)(1) except the requirement that they also have to be the petitioner. Id. If USCIS

grants humanitarian reinstatement, because the Form I-130 is not revoked, the priority date and the

non-citizen’s underlying family preference category remains the same, despite the death of the U.S.

citizen or lawful permanent resident petitioner because the only aspect that changes is the identity of

the sponsor. 8 CFR 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C)(2); see also U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Humanitarian

Reinstatement, https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/humanitarian-reinstatement (last visited Mar. 22,

2026).

B. Whether Defendants are Properly Named

“Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and

‘Controversies.’” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). The doctrine of

mootness enforces the mandate “that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the

review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st

Cir. 2003) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 n. 10 (1974)). Thus, mootness can be viewed

“as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.’” Id. (citing United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,

445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)). “The heavy burden of showing mootness is on the party raising the

issue.” Lowe v. Gagné-Holmes, 126 F.4th 747, 755 (1st Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Defendants do not assert that Plaintiff does not have standing to initiate the suit.2

Rather, Defendants’ mootness argument is limited to the improper naming of the Secretary of State

and the Senior Bureau Official of the Bureau of Consular Affairs as Defendants. Defendants initially

frame Plaintiff’s complaint as requesting the favorable adjudication of Syeda’s visa petition from

these two Defendants and asserted that such a request would make his action moot because neither

Defendant can provide such a remedy. (Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 8 at 6.) Later, however,

Defendants depict Plaintiff’s requested remedy as seeking “to compel action on specific Visa

Applications, which is the exclusive province of a U.S. consulate.” (Id. at 6-7.) The court agrees with

2 Because Defendants do not raise the issue of whether, as a financial sponsor, Plaintiff had

prudential standing to initiate this action, the court will not sua sponte conduct a zone of interests

inquiry because prudential standing cannot “be the basis for a sua sponte dismissal absent

extraordinary circumstances.” CSL Plasma Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 33 F.4th 584, 588 (D.C.

Cir. 2022) (citing Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. v. I.R.S., 804 F.3d 1193, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(explaining that the zone of interests test must be treated procedurally like any other “non-

jurisdictional issue”)).

this latter characterization of Plaintiff’s request for relief: Plaintiff is not seeking a favorable

adjudication because such a remedy, as Plaintiff correctly stated in his opposition, is outside the

bounds of Defendants’ legal obligations. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mot., Dkt. No. 10 at 11.) Rather, Plaintiff is

seeking to have consular officers “conclude . . . matter[s] presented to [them]” “within a reasonable

time,” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), in light of the statutory requirement that “all immigrant visa applications

shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer” under 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b). (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶

27-28.)

In support of their mootness argument as to the Secretary of State, Defendants assert that

the INA “grants consular officers ‘exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding

even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations.’” Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985

F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir.

1999)); see also Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The [INA]

thereby conferred upon consular officials the authority to issue or withhold visas . . . Congress

specifically exempted the exercise of this power from review by the Secretary of State.”); see also

Munyaneza v. Blinken, No. 21-CV-2778 (TSC) 2022 WL 4598629, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2022).

However, as the Al-Gharawy court pointed out, there is nothing in Baan Rao or Saavedra Bruno

that “precludes the Secretary—who oversees the Department of State . . . —from directing consular

officers ‘to conclude ... matter[s] presented to [them]’ ‘within a reasonable time,’ and Defendants

have identified no authority supporting such a defense.” Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)).

In Raouf v. U.S. Dep’t of State, the court considered the holding in Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc.,

but ultimately found the Secretary of State to be a proper party at the motion to dismiss stage,

because the plaintiff was simply asking for the defendant to make a decision on her non-citizen

spouse’s visa application. Raouf v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 702 F. Supp. 3d 19, 29 (D.N.H. 2023). The INA

entrusts the Secretary of State with “the administration and the enforcement of the provisions of

this chapter and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to . . . the powers, duties, and

functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).

While this authority does not extend to “those powers, duties, and functions conferred upon the

consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas,” that was irrelevant in Raouf, as it is in

this case, since the issue was the timing, as opposed to the substance, of a decision on the visa

application. Id.; see also Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2024) (finding that while the

INA does grant “consular officers ‘exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding

even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations,” that had no bearing on the relief

Plaintiff sought: to have her adjudication completed.)

Finally, Defendants cite Munyaneza, 2022 WL 4598629, at *2, where the Plaintiff’s non-

citizen spouse’s visa had been placed in administrative processing following an interview with a

consular officer. The court found that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue the Secretary of State and the

Acting Legal Adviser because of the “exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding

even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations.” Id. (citing Baan Rao Thai Rest., 985

F.3d at 1024). The reliance on Munyaneza is unpersuasive here because unlike in Munyaneza, Syeda

has not even been able to formally submit her visa and therefore, her visa has not been placed in

administrative processing following an interview. There is nothing in Munyaneza to support

Defendants’ argument that the “exclusive authority to review applications for visas” includes

scheduling interviews. Finally, Plaintiff, here, unlike in Munyaneza, did not include the Acting Legal

Adviser as a defendant.

As to the Senior Bureau Official, Defendants have not met their “heavy burden” of showing

mootness because they have not cited any authority supporting their assertion the Senior Bureau

Official was wrongly listed as a defendant. Lowe, 126 F.4th at 755. Defendants have not shown that

the Senior Bureau Official does not have the authority to direct consular officers to adjudicate,

including by scheduling interviews, within a reasonable time. See Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 10

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). At this stage in litigation, the court finds all of the defendants have been

appropriately named.

C. Plaintiff’s APA (Count I) and Mandamus Act (Count II) Claims

Defendants assert Plaintiff’s APA and Mandamus Act claims should be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff “does not cite to, nor could he, any specific or

unequivocal command placed on the Department or the U.S. Embassy” to schedule Syeda’s

consular interview or otherwise adjudicate her visa petition. (Dkt. No. 8 at 10.) And while they

acknowledge that “[t]ime has passed since the initial submission of the plaintiff’s Beneficiary’s

petition,” they argue that “a mere delay in scheduling an interview does not necessarily mean the

delay is unreasonable.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff, in response, asserts that Defendants have failed to

conduct their nondiscretionary duty of reviewing and adjudicating “his family’s properly filed visa

application through conclusion and within a reasonable time pursuant to the INA and the APA.”

(Dkt. No. 10 at 12.)

“While the APA does not provide an independent source of subject matter jurisdiction,”

Conservation L. Found. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1261 (1st Cir. 1996), “federal courts can utilize the APA

in conjunction with other statutes, such as § 1331, to give the court jurisdiction to compel action

from a government agency unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” Pishdadiyan, 2012 WL

601907, at *11 (citing Norton v. Couth Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)).

“Although the exact interplay between these two statutory schemes has not been thoroughly

examined by the courts, the Supreme Court has construed a claim seeking mandamus under the

[Mandamus Act] ‘in essence,’ as one for relief under § 706 of the APA.” Indep. Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 105

F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4

(1986)). Courts in the First Circuit have construed “the APA and the [Mandamus Act] to be

coextensive to the extent that the APA creates a nondiscretionary duty on consular officials to act

upon a visa or naturalization petition without unreasonable delay.” Mustafin v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-

12484-ADB, 2025 WL 1594754, at *4 (D. Mass. June 5, 2025) (citing Pishdadiyan, 2012 WL 601907,

at *11); see also Litvin v. Chertoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008) (“The APA, in

conjunction with § 1331, provides courts with jurisdiction to ‘compel agency action unlawfully

withheld or unreasonably delayed.’”); Vorontsova v. Chertoff, No. CIV. A. 07-10426-RGS, 2007 WL

3238026, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2007) (“Although there are differences in the applicable tests, a

claim seeking mandamus under the [Mandamus Act] is in essence the same as a claim for relief

under the APA . . . A claim under [APA] § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154-156 (D. Mass. 2007); Morgovsky v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 517 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584-585 (D. Mass. 2007); King v. Off. for C.R. of U.S. Dep’t of

Health & Hum. Servs., 573 F. Supp. 2d 425, n.2 (D. Mass. 2008) (citing Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105

F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir.1997)); Manshadi v. Allen, No. 24-CV-10118-ADB, 2025 WL 524173, at *3 (D.

Mass. Feb. 18, 2025). Accordingly, the court considers Plaintiff’s APA (Count I) and Mandamus Act

(Count II) claims together.

Evaluating the APA claim in conjunction with the Mandamus Act is a two-step process.

First, the court must determine whether “a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete

agency action that it is required to take.” Mustafin, 2025 WL 1594754, at *4 (citing Norton v. S. Utah

Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis omitted)). Upon finding that the first prong has

been met, the court must then evaluate, coextensively with the Mandamus Act, “whether the

agency’s delay ‘is so egregious that mandamus is warranted.’” Rezaii, No. 1:24-CV-10838-JEK, 2025

WL 750215, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2025) (citing Kokajko v. FERC, 837 F.2d 524, 526 (1st Cir.

1988)).3

1. Defendants failed to carry out a nondiscretionary agency action that they were required to take

There is no First Circuit precedent on whether consular officials have a nondiscretionary

duty to act upon a visa without unreasonable delay, but district courts within the First Circuit have

“typically” found that such a duty exists. Manshadi, 2025 WL 524173, at *3 (citing Durrani v. Bitter,

No. 24-cv-11313, 2024 WL 4228927, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2024)); see also Conley v. U.S. Dep’t of

State, 731 F. Supp. 3d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2024) (explaining that courts in the First Circuit have

generally found a “nondiscretionary duty on consular officials to act upon a visa or naturalization

petition without unreasonable delay”); Pishdadiyan, 2012 WL 601907, at *11 (collecting cases); Dy v.

Blinken, 703 F. Supp. 3d 314, 317 (D. Mass. 2023); Litvin, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 11; King, 573 F. Supp.

2d at 429 n. 2; Tang, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 154-156; Morgovsky, 517 F.Supp.2d at 584-585; Vorontsova,

2007 WL 3238026, at *3.

Embedded within this larger issue lies the question presented before this court: If consular

officers have a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate visas, does that duty extend to the scheduling of

a visa application interview? Courts have come out on both sides based on their differences in

interpretation of the last sentence of 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b)

in relevant part states, “All immigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a

consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (emphasis added). 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) states that once a visa

application has been properly completed and executed before a consular officer, the officer “must”

3 Some courts articulate the second prong for claims brought under the APA and the Mandamus Act

as being whether the delay was “unreasonable” as opposed to “egregious.” See Roe v. Mayorkas, No.

22-cv-10808-ADB, 2023 WL 3466327, at *17 (D. Mass. May 12, 2023) (“Resolving whether . . .

delay is egregious requires a fact-bound analysis that the Court declines to engage in at this early

stage of the litigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

issue, refuse, or discontinue granting the visa. Courts generally fall into the three groups described

below.4

One group of courts that have found a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to schedule

consular interviews rely, in part, on the use of the “imperative words ‘shall’ and ‘must,’ [found in 8

U.S.C. § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)] indicating that they impose a mandatory duty to

adjudicate visa applications.” Russell v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-520-JDP, 2024 WL 1908814, at *3 (W.D.

Wis. May 1, 2024); see also Iqbal v. Blinken, No. 2:23-CV-01299-KJM-KJN, 2023 WL 7418353, at *6

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2023) (“[T]he use of the word ‘shall’ indicates a mandatory nondiscretionary duty

to review and adjudicate immigrant visa applications.”). For a consular officer to adjudicate an

immigrant visa petition, a beneficiary must attend a consular interview to formally execute their visa

petition (see 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(2)), “so a mandatory duty to adjudicate filed visa applications

necessarily includes a mandatory duty to schedule consular interviews.” Russell, 2024 WL 1908814, at

*3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *6 (explaining that the visa

interview is “an unquestionably crucial component of the visa process” as it helps determine

whether the non-citizen is eligible for the visa).

Non-citizens would be left in a legal limbo if no one could “take any actions to prod [the

agency] to schedule an interview, but [they] also [could not] bring suit to compel the agency to

schedule the interview so it can adjudicate [their] application, as statutorily required.” Iqbal, 2023 WL

7418353, at *7; see also Russell, 2024 WL 1908814, at *3 (explaining that interpreting § 1202(b) and §

42.81(a) as requiring the “State Department to adjudicate visa applications only after an application

4 A fourth less common approach can be seen in Azam v. Bitter where the court found a clear,

nondiscretionary duty to schedule a visa applicant for a consular interview under the APA, but did

not exercise subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not pled that the defendant had

“abdicated their responsibility to review and adjudicate visa petitions or are, in bad faith, abusing

their discretion in reviewing or adjudicating visa petitions.” Azam v. Bitter, No. CV 23-4137 (RMB),

2024 WL 912516, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2024).

is filed,” would quash “any mandatory effect that these laws have in the first place”). The result

would be an agency being able to “avoid its duty to adjudicate applications by simply not scheduling

any interviews.” Russell, 2024 WL 1908814, at *3 (citing Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *6). Such an

interpretation would entail “an absurd result.” Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *6 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic

Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd

results are to be avoided”)); see also Iqbal, 2023 WL 7418353, at *7 (quoting Liu v. Michael Chertoff, No.

07-00734, 2007 WL 2119427, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (“To hold [that a nondiscretionary duty

to adjudicate plaintiffs’ immigrant visa petitions, which include the action of scheduling their

interviews, within a reasonable time does not exist] would be to sanction the perpetual delay of

governmental obligations that are clearly mandated by law.”)).

In Azam, a New Jersey district court rejected Defendant’s argument that the court should

find no discretionary duty under § 1202(b) because of its statutory title (“Other documentary

evidence for immigrant visa”) because a title “cannot override the plain meaning of its text.” Azam,

2024 WL 912516, at *6 (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 221 (2012)). Rather, the court found, this section could be read as imposing two

requirements: “First, a consular official must be the official who ‘review[s] and adjudicate[s]’ the visa

application,” and “[s]econd, that visa application ‘shall’ in fact be ‘reviewed and adjudicated’ by a

consular official.” Id. (quoting § 1202(b)).5

5 The Al-Gharawy court also examined 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b), 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a), and 22 C.F.R. § 42.43

(which lists the circumstances under which a consular officer “shall suspend action in a petition

case” and if the officer does so, the regulation directs that she must “return the petition, with a report

of the facts, for reconsideration by DHS”) (emphasis added). Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 13. The

court concluded that while the “INA vests consular officers with significant discretion to render a

substantive decision to grant or deny a visa, there is reason to doubt that it has given consular

officials similarly wide discretion indefinitely to delay a decision on a visa application.” Id. Although

the court conducted its analysis to determine whether the consular non-reviewability doctrine

applied to a visa undergoing “administrative processing,” the court’s observations regarding the little

discretion counselor officers have when it comes to the adjudication of visa petitions is relevant

here. Id.

A second group of courts has held, as Defendants assert, that there is no nondiscretionary

duty on the Department of State to schedule interviews. See e.g., Babamuradova v. Blinken, 633 F. Supp.

3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2022); Mueller v. Blinken, 682 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2023); Ali v. United

States Dep’t of State, 676 F. Supp. 3d 460, 470 (E.D.N.C. 2023); Nasab v. Blinken, No. 1:22-CV-02084

(CJN), 2022 WL 4473922, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2022); Zarei v. Blinken, No. 1:21-CV-02102 (CJN),

2021 WL 9146060, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021). Within this camp, some of the courts turned to the

broader statutory context of § 1202(b) by looking to its title and the rest of the section. In doing so,

they found the purpose of the statutory provision to be to describe “what documentation a visa

applicant must provide and to whom they must submit the documentation.” Babamuradova, 633 F.

Supp. at 14. Therefore, the relevant sentence in § 1202(b) could best be understood as “merely

‘cabin[ing] the State Department’s discretion as to who may review and adjudicate immigrant visa

applications . . . [rather than mandating] that all applications actually be adjudicated.’” Mueller, 682 F.

Supp. 3d at 535 (citing to Babamuradova, 633 F.Supp.3d at 15).

These courts also find it unlikely that Congress would impose a duty for all immigrant visas

to be adjudicated given that “the ramifications of adopting [such an] interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §

1202(b) are extreme” since the section “provides guidelines for all immigrant visa applicants.” Id.

(emphasis in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted). They find it unlikely that Congress

would impose such a far-reaching duty while burying it “in a provision discussing the necessary

documents needed for a visa application generally.” Zarei, 2021 WL 9146060, at *1 (“Congress, we

have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary

provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”) (citing Whitman v. Am.

Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).

In addition to relying on the statutory context, Defendants point to courts that have noted

the broad authority that Congress has given the Secretary of State to “‘administ[er] and [] enforce []’

the INA and ‘administer, coordinate, and direct the Foreign Service of the United States and the

personnel of State.’” Ali, 676 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(3)(A) in relevant

part). Each Chief of Mission also has “broad discretion to oversee U.S. government operations in

that country.” Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 3927). Therefore, if a consular office or embassy does not have

the capacity to interview someone, “it cannot do so.” Id.

A third group of courts have fallen somewhere in between, holding that, “to the extent that

§ 1202(b) imposes a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate [a visa] application . . . that duty attaches

only after [the] visa application is complete—i.e., after [the applicant] has appeared before a consular

officer.” Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *5 (citing Farooq v. Blinken, 2023 WL 5658357, at *3 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 11, 2023) (emphasis added)); see also Khalili-Araghi v. Bitter, 2023 WL 5988590, at *5 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 13, 2023)). This is due to the regulatory requirement that an applicant must “personally appear

before a consular officer” to formally execute their visa application. Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *5

(citing 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(2)). After the “formal execution of a visa application,” the consular officer

“must issue the visa,” “refuse the visa,” or “discontinue granting the visa.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81.

The court finds that 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) along with “§ 1202(b) and § 42.81(a) impose a

mandatory duty to take all steps necessary to adjudicate properly filed visa applications, including

scheduling petitioners for consular interviews” without unreasonable delay. Russell, 2024 WL

1908814, at *3; Durrani, 2024 WL 4228927, at *2 (“Because neither party has offered a reason to

depart from that principle, the Court will follow it here and exercise jurisdiction under the

[Mandamus Act] to act on the APA claim.”).

In reaching its conclusion on this matter, the court finds the reasoning laid out by the first

group of courts persuasive. In reviewing the use of imperative words “shall” and “must” in

§ 1202(b) and § 42.81(a), the court agrees with Azam in finding that these “words mean what they

say.” Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *6. When these two provisions are read alongside 22 C.F.R. §

42.43, the numerous strict requirements associated with the adjudication of visa petitions indicate

that officers do not have as much discretion to indefinitely delay a decision on a visa application as

in making substantive decisions. Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (citing 22 C.F.R. § 42.43); see also

Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen [a] suit challenges the authority of the

consul to take or fail to take an action as opposed to a decision taken within the consul’s discretion,

jurisdiction exists.”) (citing Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir.1988)).

To find that no mandatory duty exists for Defendants to adjudicate Syeda’s visa or that the

duty does not kick in until after the interview would leave Plaintiff in limbo since he would not be

able to “take any actions to prod [the agency] to schedule an interview, but [he] also [could not]

bring suit to compel the agency to schedule the interview so it can adjudicate [Syeda’s] application,

as statutorily required.” Iqbal, 2023 WL 7418353, at *7. Such a finding would result in Plaintiff, who

has already been waiting for twenty years to be reunited with his family, being left essentially

powerless to compel agency action.

2. The Court Cannot Determine at this Stage Whether There was Unreasonable Delay under the APA

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim because there has been no unreasonable delay in the processing of Syeda’s visa petition.

(Dkt. No. 8 at 12.) Finding that Defendants have a mandatory, non-discretionary duty under

§ 1202(b), 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a), and 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) to adjudicate Syeda’s visa application without

unreasonable delay, which includes scheduling her interview, the court now turns to the second

question under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1): Was the delay so egregious such that mandamus is warranted? See

Rezaii, 2025 WL 750215, at *4. In answering this question, the First Circuit follows, but has not

expressly endorsed, the “TRAC” factors laid out in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.

Federal Communications Commission, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), to evaluate whether a timeframe for

agency action is unreasonable. See Anversa v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 835 F.3d 167, 178 (1st Cir.

2016). Unreasonable delay is analyzed using these TRAC factors:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects

the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule

of reason;

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when

human health and welfare are at stake;

(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher

or competing priority;

(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay;

and

(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that

agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Ahmed, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 11 (citing Telecommunications Research & Action Center, 750 F.2d at 80).

“Because an analysis of the TRAC factors typically requires the court to wade through the

particular facts and circumstances of an agency’s delay, courts generally conclude that ‘undertaking

such a fact-bound analysis at [the motion to dismiss] stage is premature.’” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp.

3d at 17–18 (citing Thomas v. Pompeo, 438 F. Supp. 3d 35, 44 n.6 (D.D.C. 2020)); see also Da Costa v.

Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 643 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2022) (“There is no categorical prohibition

on deciding unreasonable-delay claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage, so the question of whether

discovery is necessary depends, as with any sort of claim, on the particular Complaint.”); Gonzalez v.

Cuccinelli, 985 F.3d 357, 375 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding “[in]sufficient information to resolve this issue

on a motion to dismiss” because “[a] claim of unreasonable delay is necessarily fact dependent and

thus sits uncomfortably at the motion to dismiss stage and should not typically be resolved at that

stage”); Litvin, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (“The question of whether that delay is unreasonable goes to

the merits of the case, not this court’s jurisdiction, and is better addressed after Parties have engaged

in discovery.”). The court here lacks a sufficient basis to hold at this stage that Plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible claim of unreasonable delay. A preliminary examination of the TRAC factors

indicates why.

The first two TRAC factors are usually considered together. Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp.

3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021). “The first factor asks whether the agency’s response time . . . is governed

by an identifiable rationale [which is also described as a rule of reason],” and “the second looks at

whether Congress has provided a timetable that may supply content for th[e] rule of reason.”

Manshadi, 2025 WL 524173, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in the original). The

court lacks sufficient information to determine whether this factor leans in the Plaintiff’s or

Defendants’ favor at this early stage.

Defendants assert the identifiable rationale as being that interviews are scheduled based on

“when the NVC determines that the case is documentarily complete, which is predicated on when

the non-citizen submits the required supporting documents and pays the necessary fees.” (Dkt. No.

8 at 13.) Defendants cite several cases that have identified scheduling in order of whose visa petition

is deemed “documentarily complete” to be the “rule of reason.” See, e.g., Kennedy v. United States Dep’t

of State, No. 24-CV-11556-DJC, 2025 WL 662566, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2025). Thus, Defendants

focus on March 13, 2024, when Syeda’s visa petition was found to be documentarily complete, as

the relevant date for when the clock started ticking.

However, Defendants have not explained why it took over two years between when USCIS

forwarded the Form I-130 to the NVC (January 31, 2022) and when the Form I-130 was deemed

“documentarily qualified” (March 13, 2024). Related to this, Defendants do not address when

Syeda’s visa became available under the third family preference category as a married daughter of a

U.S. citizen. See supra Section A, Consular Processing. Additionally, unlike the cases Defendants cite,

here, USCIS granted a humanitarian reinstatement, an event which may have affected Department

of State’s scheduling of Syeda’s interview. Without any additional information, the court cannot

determine the amount of time that transpired between Syeda’s visa becoming available and her

Petition being deemed “documentarily qualified,” whether there was any delay, and the reason(s) for

that possible delay. At this point, only the Department of State has this information. See Barrios

Garcia v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 25 F.4th 430, 453 (6th Cir. 2022) (finding that the Government’s

analysis of the first TRAC factor fails on several grounds and that “Plaintiffs’ lack of evidence [does

not] terminate their suits at the motion-to-dismiss stage” in part since “the machinery of the U-visa

and prewaitlist-work-authorization adjudication processes is known only to USCIS”); see also Jingjing

Liu v. Mayorkas, No. 20-CV-654 (CRC), 2021 WL 2115209, at *4 (D.D.C. May 25, 2021) (“[I]t would

be premature at this stage for the Court to accept USCIS’s factual representations about its

purported rule of reason.”).

Although the court cannot attribute any delay prior to January 31, 2022, to USCIS (see

Alshawy v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. CV 21-2206 (FYP), 2022 WL 970883, at *6 (D.D.C.

Mar. 30, 2022), at this stage, the court is hesitant to endorse Defendant’s proposed rule of reason

given the complex history of Syeda’s visa application. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v.

Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[The rule of reason] cannot be decided in the

abstract, by reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency inaction is

presumed to be unlawful but will depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the task at hand,

the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the agency.”); see

also Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (“These representations . . . do not provide sufficient

information for the Court to conclude, at the motion to dismiss stage, that Defendants’ delay is

based on a rule of reason.”).

Unlike in Durrani where the first TRAC favor was found to weigh in favor of the defendant,

the court does not have sufficient information to determine whether the government has acted

rationally and has been diligently working on Syeda’s visa petition. Durrani, 2024 WL 4228927, at *4

(finding in the defendant’s favor for the first TRAC factor given that there did not appear to be a

“lack of rationality on the part of the government, [in light of] the current logjam and resource

constraints” nor evidence that defendants had not been diligently working on the plaintiff’s mother’s

application).

As to the second TRAC factor, “while Congress stated a policy preference [of 180 days after

the initial filing of the application] for expeditious visa adjudication, it did not provide a mandatory

timeline, leaving it to the Court to determine whether the delay is unreasonable.” Manshadi, 2025 WL

524173, at *5; see also Dastagir, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (“With no set timeline, the Court looks to case

law for guidance.”). For the reasons stated above, the court cannot yet determine whether the delay

is unreasonable.

The third and fifth factors are ordinarily assessed together and relate to the “interests

prejudiced by delay,” including the “impact on human health and welfare and economic harm.”

Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D.D.C. 2005). Here, the factors favor Plaintiff

who has described hardship in taking care of his disabled son, managing his businesses, and seeing

his sister and her family. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7.) His sister and her family, moreover, have had limited

educational and economic opportunities because of not being able to emigrate to the United States.

(Id. ¶ 8-9.) While the court acknowledges that these hardships may not be out of the ordinary, “[n]o

doubt, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to show that their interests are weighty, implicate health

and welfare and are harmed by” Defendant’s unreasonable delay in scheduling the visa interview.

Barrios Garcia, 25 F.4th 430 at 452.

As to the fourth TRAC factor, which concerns “the effect of expediting delayed action on

agency activities of a higher or competing activity,” courts are hesitant to grant a motion to dismiss

where an analysis of facts that are “most likely to be within the exclusive control of the agency” is

required. Rezaii, 2025 WL 750215, at *5. This is because “[r]equiring claims of unreasonable agency

delay to plausibly surmount the TRAC factors would, contrary to Twombly and Iqbal, effectively

impose a heightened pleading standard that unfairly places a thumb on the scales in favor of the

government.” Id. (citing Li v. Jaddou, No. 22-50756, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1 n.2 & n.3 (5th Cir. May

12, 2023) (per curiam)).

Here, Defendants assert that “[g]iven that the plaintiff does not have the right to ‘cut the

line’ in front of others patiently waiting their own turn, the fourth TRAC factor effectively precludes

this lawsuit.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 15 (citing Kennedy, 2025 WL 662566, at *4.)) Courts tend to give this

factor more weight than the others as courts have consistently “refused to grant relief . . . where ‘a

judicial order putting [the petitioner] at the head of the queue [would] simply move[] all others back

one space and produce no net gain.’” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1100

(quoting In re Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

However, there are several unknowns in Syeda’s case that prevent the court from

ascertaining whether Syeda would truly be “cutting the line” or merely having her place in the queue

corrected. This court does not know what effect, if any, Syeda’s humanitarian reinstatement had or

should have had on visa processing, when Syeda’s visa became available, and whether the only

relevant factor in scheduling visa interviews is the order in which visa applicants’ applications are

deemed “documentarily qualified.” Because Defendants rely solely on case law without providing

any agency policies answering these questions, the court finds it premature to determine whether

this factor favors Defendants. See Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 19.

The sixth factor is neutral as no impropriety is alleged by Plaintiff. See Ahmed, 759 F. Supp.

3d at 14.

Accordingly, in light of the fact-intensive nature of a TRAC inquiry, the court finds that a

more thorough analysis is better suited for a later stage of litigation. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 357 at 375.

D. Due Process Violation

The court construes Plaintiff to allege a violation of his procedural and substantive due

process rights based on his right to reunification with his sister in the United States and to

fundamental fairness in administrative adjudication.6

Plaintiff cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024) to

support his assertion that the right to family relationships is fundamental. (Dkt. No. 10 at 26.)

However, Plaintiff’s asserted liberty interest is specifically in family unity by having Syeda join him in

the United States, and based on Muñoz, this court concludes that he does not have this fundamental

right. See Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 909. In Muñoz, where the plaintiff relied on a “right to reside with her

non-citizen spouse in the United States,” the Court held that “a citizen does not have a fundamental

liberty interest in her non-citizen spouse being admitted to the country.” Id. at 909-10. Although in

Muñoz the plaintiff asserted a procedural due process claim, the Court explained that even if she had

alleged a violation of “her substantive due process right to bring her non-citizen spouse to the

United States,” such a claim “[could not] succeed . . . because the asserted right is not a longstanding

and deeply rooted tradition in this country.” Id. at 919 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Since then, several courts have extended the holding and reasoning in Muñoz to other family

members to find that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents have no such protected liberty

interest nor a plausible allegation of denial of due process. See, e.g., Chen v. Rubio, 158 F.4th 393, 396

(2d Cir. 2025) (“Plaintiffs point us to no reason – and we find none – to treat a citizen sponsoring a .

. . sibling differently from one sponsoring a spouse.”); Lin v. Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-01403 (RER),

6 The court construes this to be Plaintiff’s claim based on his complaint which alleges an entitlement

to “a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1651 and this Court’s inherent equitable

authority compelling Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff’s family’s visa application.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶

39.) Plaintiff goes on to claim a “statutorily created entitlement to adjudication of his family’s visa

applications.” (Id. ¶ 40.) The delay in adjudication, Plaintiff alleges, has resulted in a “deprivation of

[his] protected interest without due process.” (Id.) Plaintiff goes on to describe Defendant’s conduct

as “egregious,” “without rational justification,” and causing a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive and

procedural due rights” (Id. ¶ ¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff does not specify the exact manner in which

Defendant’s conduct has resulted in such violations, but in his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff

clarifies that he retains a liberty interest in having 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) enforced collaterally with 5

U.S.C. § 555(b) and § 706(1) as well as in family unity. (Dkt. No. 10 at 25-26.)

2025 WL 1884304, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2025) (holding that Plaintiff does not have a liberty

interest in cohabitating with her brother in the United States); see also Durrani, 2024 WL 4228927, at

*7 (“[P]laintiff has neither a liberty interest in reuniting with his mother nor a liberty interest in

receiving an adjudication of his mother’s visa application.”); Nasir v. United States Dep’t of State, 749 F.

Supp. 3d 938, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“Plaintiff’s due process claim must fail, as she has no due process

right to the prompt adjudication of her father’s visa.”); Esghai v. United States Dep’t of State, No. 24

CIV. 2993 (PAE), 2024 WL 4753799, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2024) (holding that plaintiff’s

asserted liberty interest in his non-citizen mother’s visa application was not “deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition”); Morassaei v. United States Dep’t of State, No. SACV 24-823 PA

(DFMX), 2024 WL 5047480, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2024) (“If, as the Supreme Court declared in

Muñoz, . . . a spouse has no fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause to bring a non-

citizen spouse to the United States, there is no basis to conclude that [plaintiff] has a fundamental

right to bring her father to the United States.”). Plaintiff has not provided any reason to deviate

from the holdings in these cases. Therefore, this court holds that Plaintiff does not have a

fundamental right to reside with his sister in the United States.

As to Plaintiff’s right to fundamental fairness in administrative adjudication, to succeed on a

procedural due process claim, “a plaintiff must [first] show that there was a cognizable liberty or

property interest at stake.” Smirnov v. Clinton, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)). “If a cognizable liberty or property interest is at stake, due

process requires only a meaningful opportunity to present a case.” Mahmood v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., No. CV 21-1262 (RC), 2021 WL 5998385, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). However, “[g]enerally, there is no property right in an immigrant visa.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). This makes sense when considering the Al-Gharawy court’s explanation

that “[t]he Supreme Court ‘long ago held that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an [non-

citizen’s] lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, a[] [non-citizen] at the threshold of initial

entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.’” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at

20 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020)). “As a result, visa-

application procedures cannot violate the Due Process Clause because ‘[w]hatever the procedure

authorized by Congress is, it is due process.’” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338

U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). Due process to fundamental fairness in administrative adjudication is

guaranteed by the court which assures that defendants in such cases comply with their statutory

duties. Id.

Although the cases cited involve non-citizen plaintiffs, the court does not see why the

analysis would differ when applied to a U.S. citizen who is not even the petitioner, but rather only a

financial sponsor for the non-citizen. And Plaintiff has not cited any caselaw supporting his asserted

liberty right in fundamental fairness in administrative adjudication. There is no reason to deviate

from D.C. district courts’ holdings that there is no property right in an immigrant visa or the

procedures through which it is procured and that due process to fundamental fairness is guaranteed

through the courts. Mahmood, 2021 WL 5998385, at *10; Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 20.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part as to Plaintiff’s

due process claim (Count III). Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part as to Plaintiff’s APA

claim (Count I) and Writ of Mandamus claim (Count II).

It is So Ordered.

_/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni________

MARK G. MASTROIANNI

United States District Judge