BRADLEY v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 19-400

Filed: April 20, 2026

ELIZABETH G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

ORDER

“[T]o leave a place is one thing, but to leave it twice is quite another.” Oscar Wilde, The

Picture of Dorian Gray 48 (2003 ed., Penguin Classics). So too here, as the Court warily returns

to a fee dispute obviously better suited for resolution by agreement than by judicial intervention.

Invoking the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970

(“URA”), Plaintiffs previously sought an award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses

reflecting work required to bring the most recent group of settled plaintiffs to resolution. 1 (Pls.’

Second Fee Mot., ECF No. 190); 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). The Court granted that request in part and

directed Plaintiffs to submit a revised fee petition omitting all fees and costs associated with the

eight Group 1 Plaintiffs and including documentation supporting fees incurred after the filing of

the URA petition. (Op. on URA Fees, ECF No. 199). Plaintiffs timely filed their amended

submission, (Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot., ECF No. 200), and the United States subsequently objected,

(Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 201). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

request in part and awards a total of $415,326.51.

The Court’s preceding fee decision thoroughly recounts the factual and procedural

history of this litigation, as well as the applicable legal framework. (Op. on URA Fees at 2–7

(Background), 7–18 (Analysis)). Because that Opinion sufficiently addressed the foundational

background and relevant case law, this Opinion will not restate those elements and incorporates

them herein. While the Court provides a cursory summary of the relevant facts for context, its

analysis remains focused exclusively on the merits of Plaintiffs’ amended fee request and the

United States’ objections.

1

Plaintiffs previously sought and obtained a URA fee award in 2023, making the principal

request their Second Fee Motion. (ECF No. 113); Bradley v. United States, 164 Fed. Cl. 236, 244

(2023).

Left unresolved, URA fee petitions ordinarily proceed in a predictable sequence: once the

merits are resolved, plaintiffs submit their request, the United States responds, and the Court

addresses whatever narrow disputes remain. This case has unfolded quite differently. Plaintiffs

now seek $379,856.03 in attorneys’ fees and $50,461.03 in costs and expenses, totaling

$430,317.06. (Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. at 4). They represent that this figure reflects the Court-ordered

omission of certain costs and fees and includes supplemental fees for work performed after the

filing of their Second Fee Motion. (Id.). That earlier motion, filed on June 23, 2025, sought

$471,268.79 and reflected expenses and costs incurred from the inception of this case to May 20,

2025. (Pls.’ Second Fee Mot. at 24). As alluded to, Plaintiffs’ filing did not proceed in the

ordinary course. Once Plaintiffs filed their Second Fee Motion, the United States immediately

moved to strike that submission, (ECF No. 191), prompting full briefing, (ECF Nos. 192, 193).

Following a conference to discuss the Motion to Strike, the Court denied the United States’

request and deemed the Second Fee Motion filed as of that date. (Dkt. Entry 7/14/2025).

Although the Court set a schedule for the United States’ response, the United States

submitted its “Statement Respecting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Expenses.” (ECF No. 197). In lieu of a substantive response, the United States doubled down on

its position that this Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the fee petition, given the pending

appeal of the liability judgment. (Id. at 6–8 (citing Bradley v. United States, CAFC No. 25-1811

(docketed May 28, 2025))). Plaintiffs replied, informally requesting an additional $37,062.50 in

fees and costs incurred between May 20 and August 25, 2025. (ECF No. 198 at 12). On

December 17, 2025, the Court granted the Second Fee Motion in part and denied it in part,

directing Plaintiffs to submit an amended request omitting fees related to the “Group 1 Plaintiffs”

and including the costs “associated” with their Reply Brief. 2 (Op. on URA Fees at 19).

The United States now opposes Plaintiffs’ amended fee request on both procedural and

substantive grounds, primarily arguing that the demand exceeds the scope of the Court’s

instructions and lacks sufficient evidentiary support. (Def.’s Resp. at 3–10). Specifically, the

United States contends that Plaintiffs inappropriately included costs and fees incurred before

August 11, 2025 (the day the United States’ prior responsive briefing was filed) and maintains

that reimbursement is unavailable for work related to the appeal currently pending before the

Federal Circuit. (Id. at 3–6). Furthermore, the United States asserts that the expenses associated

with Plaintiffs’ reply brief were unnecessary because Plaintiffs allegedly refused to negotiate a

resolution. (Id. at 6). Beyond these categorical objections, the United States argues that the fee

award should be further reduced due to inaccuracies and vague entries within the billing records,

which it claims are insufficient to allow for an objective assessment of reasonableness under the

URA. (Id. at 7–10). The Court addresses each argument in turn.

The United States’ overarching contention is that the amended request improperly

expands the scope of the original fee request, violating both the Court’s specific directives and

general principles of fee-shifting. (Def.’s Resp. at 3–6). First, the United States believes it was

improper that Plaintiffs included fees and costs in their amended motion that accrued before the

2

The Court also directed Plaintiffs not to file a reply brief in order to minimize their burden and

avoid a continual accumulation of additional fees. (Op. on URA Fees at 19).

2

United States filed its Response on August 11, 2025. (Id. at 3–4). The United States points out

that although the Court’s order limited additional fees to those “associated with” the Reply Brief,

Plaintiffs’ demand reaches back to May 20, 2025, over a month before the Second Fee Motion

was filed. (Id.). According to the United States, the only fees reasonably tied to the Reply are

those incurred between the filing of the United States’ Response on August 11 and the filing of

Plaintiffs’ Reply on August 25. (Id. at 4).

While the Court’s prior instruction specifically directed Plaintiffs to submit a fee request

associated with their reply brief, (Op. on URA Fees at 18), that order must be interpreted within

the broader context of equitable fee-shifting and the realities of this ongoing litigation. The Court

acknowledges that its prior directive could have more clearly indicated that the amended request

was to include fees incurred after the filing of the Second Fee Motion, rather than referring to

them solely as fees associated with the reply brief. However, to construe the Court’s directive as

limiting recovery strictly to the hours spent drafting the reply brief would create an artificial and

illogical gap in the record, leaving the period between the initial motion and the final submission

unaccounted for. This would be particularly inequitable given the full briefing and conference

that occurred due to the United States’ Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 191). Capturing all fees and

costs incurred since the Second Fee Motion is essential to making Plaintiffs whole and to

preventing both a time-based windfall and the inefficiency of repeated supplemental filings.

Significantly, this clarification does not reopen the door to fees that could have been

sought in the Second Fee Motion but were excluded. The United States asserts that by failing to

include the work performed between May 20 and June 23 in their original motion, Plaintiffs have

waived their right to seek those fees now. (Def.’s Resp. at 4). The Court is so persuaded.

Plaintiffs’ Second Fee Motion included billing records covering work performed from the

outset of the litigation through May 20, 2025. (Pls.’ Second Fee Mot. Exs. A, G). The Motion

itself, however, was not filed until June 23, 2025. (Id.). Beyond asserting the reasonableness of

these fees, Plaintiffs offer no explanation for the lack of billing entries or expenses during the

thirty-three-day gap preceding the filing date, nor did they move to amend or supplement their

previous request to include them. (Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. at 15–18). The supplemental billing

records for May 21 through June 23, 2025, reflect 20.1 hours of work totaling $12,074.00:

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Review of follow-up correspondence re

FOIA #2 (.1); update review and fees after

Michael

5/21/2025 1.80 575.00 $1,035.00 May 21 internal deadline throughout

Armstrong

motion; creation of final draft of exhibits

(1.7)

Courtney Review FOIA response letter (.1); update

5/21/2025 0.30 230.00 $69.00

Ham fees and expenses (.2)

3

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Finalized exhibits, including fee exhibits

Michael

5/22/2025 3.50 575.00 $2,012.50 and motion; review comparison against all

Armstrong

invoices

Lindsay S.C. Work on fee application; confer with team

5/22/2025 1.70 765.00 $1,300.50

Brinton re same

Michael

5/23/2025 0.20 575.00 $115.00 Review Pressly status as it relates to appeal

Armstrong

Review memoranda from M. Armstrong re

Bradley fee application; review final draft

(.3); review notice of appeal (.1); review

Meghan S. memoranda from L. Brinton re strategy re

5/23/2025 0.80 765.00 $612.00

Largent fee app (.1); review notice of appeal (.1);

review memorandas from L. Brinton and M.

Armstrong re strategy re fee application in

light of same (.2)

Work on fee application; confer with team

Lindsay S.C. re same (.2); review notice of appeal; confer

5/23/2025 0.70 765.00 $535.50

Brinton with team re same (.2); draft client update re

appeal (.3)

Review docketed case by CAFC;

Michael

5/28/2025 0.40 575.00 $230.00 conference re notice of docketing; e-mail

Armstrong

correspondence to J. Sundook re same

APPEAL – Review filing order (.1); review

Meghan S.

5/28/2025 0.20 765.00 $153.00 memoranda from M. Armstrong re CAFC

Largent

error in caption; respond to same (.1)

Zariah D. APPEAL - Review and update deadlines

5/28/2025 0.60 185.00 $111.00

Jones and case status

Follow-up with DOJ re appeal; multiple

telephone conferences with clerk’s office;

Michael

5/29/2025 2.20 575.00 $1,265.00 conference re draft of EOA/COI/notice of

Armstrong

prior case; draft letter to court per CAFC

instructions

4

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

APPEAL - Review e-mail correspondence

from J. Sundook re correcting caption; draft

e-mail correspondence to M. Armstrong re

same (.1); review e-mail correspondence

from M. Armstrong to J. Sundook (.1);

review email correspondences from J.

Arbab, M. Armstong and L. Brinton; draft

Meghan S.

5/29/2025 0.90 765.00 $688.50 e-mail correspondence to L. Brinton and M.

Largent

Armstrong re same (.1); review entry of

appearance by J. Arbab (.1); review entry of

appearance (.1); review certificate of

interest (.1); review notice to clerk re

caption (.1); review memoranda from M.

Armstrong re same (.1); draft and send

response to same (.1)

Finalize entry of appearance, COI, notice

Michael

5/30/2025 0.70 575.00 $402.50 and letter to court re caption; forward letter

Armstrong

to DOJ

Meghan S.

5/30/2025 0.10 765.00 $76.50 Review client correspondence

Largent

Courtney

5/30/2025 0.60 230.00 $138.00 Client correspondence

Ham

Zariah D. APPEAL - Review and update deadlines

5/30/2025 0.30 185.00 $55.50

Jones and case status

Michael Review e-mail correspondence from DOJ;

6/2/2025 0.20 575.00 $115.00

Armstrong check case status

APPEAL – Review DOJ entry of

Lindsay S.C.

6/5/2025 0.20 765.00 $153.00 appearance (.1); review e-mail

Brinton

correspondence with DOJ (.1)

Michael

6/7/2025 0.20 575.00 $115.00 Summary of case status for appeal

Armstrong

5

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Work on matter re reimbursement of

Lindsay S.C.

6/7/2025 0.20 765.00 $153.00 attorney fees (.1); review appeal deadlines,

Brinton

memoranda to team (.1)

Michael Review Sauer West oral argument and brief;

6/10/2025 0.40 575.00 $230.00

Armstrong prepare summary of same

Michael Conference with L. Brinton re docketing

6/18/2025 0.10 575.00 $57.50

Armstrong statement

Lindsay S.C. Review status of appeal; confer with M.

6/18/2025 0.10 765.00 $76.50

Brinton Armstrong re same

APPEAL - Draft docketing statement,

including review of stipulation and

Michael identification of possible error as to interest

6/23/2025 2.40 575.00 $1,380.00

Armstrong (.9); conference as to need to finalize URA

motion; edits to URA motion and exhibits;

file same (1.5)

Meghan S. Confer with team on fee application; review

6/23/2025 0.20 765.00 $153.00

Largent same

Meghan S.

6/23/2025 0.10 765.00 $76.50 APPEAL - Review docketing statement

Largent

Confer with M. Armstrong re strategy and

URA briefing (.2); work on docketing

Lindsay S.C.

6/23/2025 1.00 765.00 $765.00 statement; research pleadings and related

Brinton

information for correct interest calculation

(.4); final review of fee application (.4)

(See id. Ex. N (Plaintiffs’ text reproduced verbatim)).

Although internal review processes may have contributed to the gap in Plaintiffs’ records,

such circumstances do not excuse the omission. Simply stated, fees and expenses incurred

between May 21 and June 23 could have been included in the original filing but were not.

Because these amounts were available at the time of filing and were not timely submitted, they

must be omitted from the recoverable fee calculation and are deemed waived. See, e.g., Superior

Waste Mgmt. LLC v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 239, 296–97 (2023) (“A party’s failure to raise

an argument in an opening or responsive brief constitutes waiver.”) (citing Sarro & Assocs., Inc.

6

v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 44, 58-59 (2021)). To hold otherwise would afford Plaintiffs a

second opportunity to advance claims that should have been raised in their ordinary course.

Accordingly, any fees or costs incurred before June 23, 2025, that were omitted from the Second

Fee Motion are forfeited and will not be awarded.

The United States further challenges the reliability of the billing records submitted,

asserting that Plaintiffs have failed to provide the “adequate evidence” necessary to support their

fee demand. (Def.’s Resp. at 5 (citing Hippely v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 389, 439 (2024))).

The Government’s objection centers on a discrepancy between the figures presented in Plaintiffs’

Reply Brief and those claimed in the Amended Fee Motion. (Id.). Specifically, while Plaintiffs

previously represented that they incurred $37,032.50 in additional fees since May 20, 2025, their

amended demand for that same period has risen to $44,620.50. (Compare Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. at

18 with ECF No. 198 at 12). Plaintiffs attribute this $7,587.50 increase to time entries that had

not yet been recorded in their billing system at the time of the prior filing. (Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. at

16 n.8). However, the Government characterizes this inconsistency as a pattern of negligent

record-keeping, noting that this is the second time Plaintiffs have submitted a fee demand that

was not current. (Def.’s Resp. at 5). The United States argues that when billing records prove

unreliable due to subsequent upward adjustments, the Court should decline to award the

additional amounts and exclude $7,587.50. (Id. (citing Pressly v. United States, No. 18-1964,

2025 WL 1780947 (Fed. Cl. May 12, 2025); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983))).

The Court disagrees with the United States’ characterization. The demand identified by

the United States was not part of an actual fee motion before the Court and, as such, was

reasonably subject to revision as additional entries were finalized in counsel’s billing system. See

Pressly, 2025 WL 1780947, at *20 (holding that asserting fee entitlement in a reply brief rather

than by separate motion is improper). Although the Court would have preferred that these

later-recorded entries been included with the materials accompanying the Reply Brief, their

omission does not render them inherently unreliable. The United States offers no evidence that

the challenged fees were not actually incurred or that the amounts claimed are unreasonable, and

the mere fact that the records were updated does not, without more, justify disregarding them in

full.

The United States further argues that Plaintiffs may not recover any fees related to the

liability appeal now pending before the Federal Circuit. (Def.’s Resp. at 6). Citing the liability

appeal and the Court’s own prior observation that appellate fees must be sought directly from the

Circuit, the United States contends that Plaintiffs’ amended submission improperly seeks

reimbursement for work outside this Court’s jurisdiction. (Id. (citing CAFC No. 25-1811); July

14, 2025 Hearing Tr. at 8:1–3, ECF 195)). In further support, the United States points to Federal

Circuit Rule 47.7, which dictates that the parties must follow specific procedures for requesting

fees incurred on appeal; the United States maintains that Plaintiffs’ approach risks double

recovery or circumvents the proper appellate process. (Id.). Accordingly, the United States

maintains that all entries attributable solely to the pending appeal should be excluded. (Id.).

Further, for block-billed entries that combine appellate and non-appellate tasks, the United States

seeks a reduction of at least 75%, maintaining that substantial reductions are warranted when

billing records fail to distinguish between compensable and non-compensable work. (Id. (citing

Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2 Micro International Ltd., 726 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir.

2013))). The Court accepts the United States’ argument.

7

When the block-billed entries and the specifically labeled appellate entries are

aggregated, the billing records reflect 8.8 hours of appeal-related work, corresponding to $5,395

in fees: 3

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Research, draft, and edits to opposition to

Michael

6/27/2025 1.90 575.00 1,092.50 motion to strike; review docketing

Armstrong

statement[ 4]

APPEAL – Review docketing statement

Meghan S. (.1); review response to motion to strike;

6/27/2025 0.40 765.00 306.00

Largent draft and send memoranda to team re same

(.3)[ 5]

Lindsay S.C.

6/27/2025 .1 765.00 76.50 Review docketing statement

Brinton

Michael Review communication from DOJ appellate

7/8/2025 0.10 575.00 57.50

Armstrong counsel re motion to extend

Lindsay S.C. E-mail correspondence with Appellate

7/8/2025 0.20 765.00 153.00

Brinton counsel re extension request

Michael

7/11/2025 0.20 575.00 115.00 Review motion to extend

Armstrong

Meghan S.

7/11/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50 APPEAL – Review motion for extension

Largent

3

Because the Court has determined that fees and costs incurred from May 20 to June 23 are not

recoverable, it does not evaluate those entries to determine whether any portion of the work may

have related to the pending appeal. Further, the Court reduces block-billed entries based on the

portion attributable to non-appeal work, using either the time expressly allocated in the entry or a

reasonable estimate derived from the tasks described.

4

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 80% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced to

$873.60.

5

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 75% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced to

$229.50.

8

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Review defendant’s extension request (.1);

Lindsay S.C.

7/11/2025 0.20 765.00 153.00 review e-mail correspondence with DOJ

Brinton

and court clerk (.1)

Zariah D. APPEAL - Review and update deadlines

7/11/2025 0.20 185.00 37.00

Jones and case status

Michael Review July 17 order, including review of

7/17/2025 0.20 575.00 115.00

Armstrong caption

Meghan S.

7/17/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50 APPEAL – Review order

Largent

Lindsay S.C.

7/17/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50 Review court order

Brinton

Meghan S. Review e-mail correspondence from J.

7/25/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50

Largent Arbab

Michael Review DOJ e-mail correspondence re

7/26/2025 0.10 575.00 57.50

Armstrong moving to stay appeal re Pressly

Michael Review e-mail correspondence to and from

7/28/2025 0.20 575.00 115.00

Armstrong DOJ re appeal

Review memoranda from M. Armstrong re

Meghan S. strategy re briefing appeal; respond to same

7/28/2025 0.20 765.00 153.00

Largent (.1); review correspondence to DOJ re same

(.1)

E-mail correspondence with DOJ re

Lindsay S.C.

7/28/2025 0.40 765.00 306.00 abeyance pending Pressly (.2); confer with

Brinton

team re same (.2)

Lindsay S.C.

7/29/2025 0.20 765.00 153.00 E-mail correspondence with DOJ re appeal

Brinton

Meghan S.

8/6/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50 APPEAL – Review motion

Largent

9

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Lindsay S.C.

8/6/2025 0.20 765.00 153.00 Review motion to hold appeal in abeyance

Brinton

Review upcoming deadlines in CFC and

Michael CAFC cases; review and research re DOJ

8/11/2025 1.20 575.00 690.00

Armstrong response to plaintiffs’ second URA

motion[ 6]

Research URA briefing pending appeal; e-

Lindsay S.C. mail correspondence with counsel in Pressly

8/13/2025 0.30 765.00 229.50

Brinton matter (.2); work on matters re

reimbursement of fees (.1)[ 7]

APPEAL -- Review clerk’s order to stay

briefing (.1); review DOJ response to URA

Michael

8/18/2025 1.00 575.00 575.00 fee motion; draft skeleton of reply,

Armstrong

including review of fees and costs to date

(.9)[ 8]

Meghan S.

8/18/2025 0.10 765.00 76.50 APPEAL – Review order

Largent

Review court order staying appeal (.1);

Lindsay S.C. work on reply brief; confer with team (.1);

8/18/2025 0.40 765.00 306.00

Brinton review court order staying appeal (.1); work

on reply brief; confer with team (.1)[ 9]

6

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 80% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced to

$552.

7

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 66.6% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced

to $152.85.

8

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 90% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced to

$517.50.

9

This block-billed entry is recoverable at an 50% rate; the award for this entry will be reduced to

$153.

10

Total

Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Summary of Work

Billed

Zariah D. APPEAL - Review and update deadlines

8/18/2025 0.50 185.00 92.50

Jones and case status

(See Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. Ex. N (Plaintiffs’ text reproduced verbatim); see also Def.’s Resp. Ex. 1,

ECF No. 201-1 (objections)). 10

Fees for appellate work are generally awarded by the appellate court or, in some

instances, remanded to the trial court after the appeal is resolved. Fed. Cir. R. 47.7; Phillips v.

Gen. Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Because the liability appeal remains

pending, any award of fees attributable to appellate work would be premature at this stage.

Brewer v. Am. Battle Monuments Comm’n, 814 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts have

thus generally refrained from ‘premature’ fee awards[.]”). Moreover, absent an express mandate,

it is improper for this Court to determine fees incurred in proceedings beyond its own.

Greenwood v. United States, No. 10-15L, 2018 WL 3829225, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 13, 2018)

(finding that an appellate mandate specifying that each party bear its own costs—without

addressing attorney fees—divests the trial court of jurisdiction to award URA fees). As the

Federal Circuit has noted in similar fee-shifting contexts, it is “in a better position . . . to

determine the amount of fees and expenses to be awarded in connection with the appeal” before

it. Gavette v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 808 F.2d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, fees

attributable to the pending appeal must be deferred until the appeal has run its course and, if

warranted, sought before the Federal Circuit.

Next, the United States argues that Plaintiffs’ refusal to negotiate the costs associated

with preparing the Reply Brief renders those fees unreasonable and unnecessary. (Def.’s Resp. at

6 (citing Arnold v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 13, 41 (2022))). Specifically, the United States

posits that supplemental fee litigation was avoidable and resulted from Plaintiffs’ unwillingness

to engage in good-faith discussions. (Id.). According to the Government, Plaintiffs “blindsided”

both the Court and opposing counsel by filing their motion without prior consultation,

misrepresented the likelihood of settlement, and employed “overly litigious” tactics. (Id. at 7).

On this basis, the United States seeks a 40% across-the-board reduction. (Id.).

The Court is again unpersuaded. It is true that the Court has repeatedly encouraged the

parties to resolve fee-related issues without judicial intervention and has, at times, all but

implored counsel to narrow their disputes through cooperative efforts. Despite these

10

The Court assumes that Plaintiffs included these appellate-related entries inadvertently, as

entries of this nature were omitted from the earlier billing records. (See Pls.’ Second Fee Mot.

Ex. A). In that submission, any descriptions referencing an “appeal” appear to relate to an earlier

appeal that was dismissed. Their appearance in the later compilation suggests an unintentional

inclusion rather than a deliberate effort to expand the scope of the fee request.

11

opportunities, the parties have been unable to do so, and their continued intransigence to reach

even a limited agreement is disappointing. Nevertheless, the failure to resolve these matters

informally does not alter the Court’s obligation to adjudicate the fee request before it or diminish

the reasonableness of the work performed. While the Court expects and encourages counsel to

confer in good faith to streamline fee disputes, such cooperation is not required by statute or rule,

and the absence of agreement between the parties does not provide a basis to reduce an otherwise

reasonable fee request. The failure of counsel to resolve fee issues informally does not render the

underlying entries suspect, nor does it establish that the fees were not actually incurred. In the

absence of evidence demonstrating that the challenged time is excessive, duplicative, or

otherwise unreasonable, the mere fact that counsel did not work together to narrow their

differences does not justify a downward adjustment.

The Government’s secondary argument focuses on the quality of the descriptions within

the billing records. (Def.’s Resp. at 7–10). The United States contends that Plaintiffs failed to

comply with the Court’s directive to omit fees associated with the eight Group 1 Plaintiffs,

arguing that Plaintiffs’ revised records are deficient because they do not identify specific

plaintiffs or groups. (Id. at 8). Relying on URA principles that reimbursement belongs to the

property owners, not counsel, the United States asserts that Plaintiffs bear the burden of linking

each billing entry to a compensable claimant and that counsel’s failure to maintain

group-specific records cannot be cured by conclusory declarations. (Id.). According to the

Government, these generalized descriptions prevent meaningful review and warrant a substantial

reduction—specifically, a 50% cut to the $272,124.50 in requested fees and costs incurred

between September 20, 2022, and May 20, 2025. (Id. at 9).

The United States’ argument is at odds with the Court’s prior order. That order expressly

limited the Government’s response to “fees and costs” incurred after the filing of the Second

URA Motion and did not authorize objections to fees incurred beforehand. (Op. on URA Fees at

19). Accordingly, the United States’ request for a 50% reduction of fees and costs incurred

between September 20, 2022, and May 20, 2025, exceeds the scope of what is presently before

the Court and is therefore improper. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the United States’

contention that Plaintiffs’ amended submission is deficient simply because the billing records do

not identify individual plaintiffs or groups by name. The Court’s prior directive required

Plaintiffs to omit fees associated with the eight Group 1 Plaintiffs; it did not impose a

requirement to restructure historical billing records or to provide claimant-by-claimant

annotations. (Id. at 7–9). Plaintiffs complied with the Court’s order by identifying and excluding

the relevant entries, and the United States offers no evidence that any of the remaining time was

improperly attributed or that the exclusions were incomplete. (Pls.’ Am. Fee Mot. Ex. N).

Generalized assertions that the records lack sufficient detail do not establish that the fees are

unreasonable, nor do they justify a sweeping 50% reduction. In the absence of concrete evidence

that the challenged entries are excessive, duplicative, or misallocated, the Court declines to

impose a reduction based solely on the format of counsel’s billing records. The $85,572.13

reduction for Group 1 fees is facially reasonable. (See id. at 3).

Having previously ruled that the following fees are reasonable, the Court now directs that

they be reimbursed pursuant to Judge Sweeney’s initial URA fee decision:

12

Firm Attorneys’ Fees Expenses Total

Arent Fox Schiff $5,965.49 $1,947.73 $7,913.22

Lewis Rice $57,205.54 $11,794.44 $68,999.98

(Op. on URA Fees at 15 (citing Bradley v. United States, 164 Fed. Cl. 236, 259–60 (2023)).

Consistent with the URA and the directives contained in this Order, the Court further awards

Lewis Rice the following fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs since the Court’s first URA

decision:

Date Attorneys’ Fees Expenses Total

09/20/2022 $272,124.50 $36,658.86 $308,783.36

through

05/20/2025

06/24/2025 to $29,569.95 $60.00 $29,629.95

08/25/2025

Collectively, Plaintiffs are awarded $415,326.51 in attorney fees and expenses. Finding

no just reason for delay, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter partial judgment in this

amount pursuant to RCFC 54(b). However, in accordance with RCFC 62, that judgment is

STAYED pending the outcome of the appeal on liability. As the Court has now resolved URA

fees and directed entry of judgment as to liability and just compensation, (ECF Nos. 165, 186),

no claims remain pending in this matter. Because no further case or controversy exists, the Clerk

is directed to CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Tapp

DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

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