Conaler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IRRION CONALER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-899

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF SECTION: D(5)

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint, filed by Defendant Gary Westcott in his official capacity as

Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.1 Plaintiffs

Irrion Conaler and Cecile Dawson have filed a Response in Opposition.2 Defendant

has replied.3 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, the

First Amended Complaint, and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ employment as Juvenile Justice Specialists

at the Bridge City Center for Youth, which is part of the Office of Juvenile Justice,

and under the direction of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections.5 During the summer of 2022, Plaintiffs allege that their supervisor,

1 R. Doc. 9.

2 R. Doc. 17.

3 R. Doc. 18.

4 Unless otherwise noted, the factual background is drawn from the Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint. See R. Doc. 8.

5 R. Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 10, 11 and 15, 16.

Steven Lacy, began to sexually harass and assault them.6 Dawson claims that Lacy

sent sexually harassing text messages then, in two instances, forcibly kissed her and

sexually battered her at work in places that were out of view of the security cameras

in the facility.7 Conaler also alleges that Lacy used similar tactics to sexually harass

and assault her.8 Conaler alleges that Lacy’s behavior toward her escalated as time

went on, including two instances where he tried to kiss Conaler, then exposed his

genitals and pushed her head towards his genitals.9 Neither plaintiff reported his

behavior at first out of fear of retaliation or termination of employment.10 Lacy’s

behavior went unreported until Dawson confided in another supervisor, Gerald

Golden, that Lacy had sexually harassed and assaulted her, which Golden reported.11

An investigation commenced. Both Conaler and Dawson participated in the

investigation, which eventually resulted in Lacy’s suspension and subsequent

termination on November 20, 2023.12 While the investigation was pending, Conaler

and Dawson allege that they were the victims of retaliation from their co-workers and

supervisors in the form of unwarranted disciplinary actions, targeted harassment,

and bullying.13 Conaler also received a two-day suspension.14

Dawson filed her initial charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 30, 2024, and amended that charge

6 Id. at ¶ 17.

7 Id. at ¶ ¶ 20-23.

8 Id. at ¶ 24.

9 Id. at ¶ 25.

10 Id. at ¶ 27.

11 Id. at ¶ 28.

12 Id. at ¶ 30.

13 Id. at ¶¶ 32-56.

14 Id.

of discrimination on February 20, 2024.15 The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on

February 26, 2025.16 Conaler filed her initial charge of discrimination with the EEOC

on May 29, 2024, and the EEOC issued a notice of the right to sue on February 6,

2025.17 Plaintiffs Conaler and Dawson filed suit in this Court on May 7, 2025, and

filed their Amended Complaint on September 3, 2025.18 In their First Amended

Complaint, Plaintiffs assert three claims against the Defendant: (1) a claim for sexual

harassment and discrimination based on sex under Title VII due to their supervisor

Steven Lacy’s conduct toward them, (2) a claim for retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.

2000—e3(a), and (3) a claim for hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, 42

U.S. C. 2000e-2(a).19

In response to the First Amended Complaint, Defendant Gary Westcott, in his

official capacity as the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, filed the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.20

As to Counts 1 and 2 of the First Amended Complaint, Defendant contends that

Plaintiff Irrion Conaler failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the

EEOC. Defendant argues that, regarding Conaler’s claims, it is “apparent from both

the EEOC charge and the Amended Complaint that the EEOC charge was not timely

filed within 300 days of the last act of alleged sexual harassment.”21 Defendant next

states that Conaler has failed to include two discrete acts of retaliation in the EEOC

15 Id. at ¶¶ 45, 52.

16 Id. at ¶ 7.

17 Id. at ¶ 8.

18 R. Docs. 1, 8.

19 R. Doc. 8 at pp. 11-13.

20 R. Doc. 9.

21 R. Doc. 9-1 at p. 9.

charge and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the alleged

retaliatory acts on April 23, 2024 and May 7, 2024.22 Defendant notes that these two

acts of alleged retaliation occurred before the charges were filed with the EEOC and

contends that these were not included in the charges filed on May 29, 2024.23

Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint does not state a

cognizable Title VII retaliation claim because “Plaintiffs have failed to allege

sufficient facts as to the second prong of the prima facie case, that is, that they

suffered materially adverse employment actions.”24 Because the “alleged retaliatory

adverse employment actions in the Amended Complaint involve letters of counseling,

threatened discipline or threats of termination that did not come to fruition, or

alleged comments and conduct by supervisors that fail to meet the minimum,”

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a necessary element of a Title

VII retaliation claim.25 Lastly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ claim for retaliatory

harassment is one for retaliatory hostile work environment and that such a claim is

not recognized by the Fifth Circuit and as such must be dismissed.26

Plaintiffs Conaler and Dawson respond that the Partial Motion to Dismiss

should be denied.27 Regarding Defendant’s argument that Conaler’s charge was

untimely, Conaler argues that the First Amended Complaint alleges that she was

sexually harassed from “late 2022 through 2023,” which is sufficient to demonstrate

22 Id. at p. 10.

23 Id. at p. 11 (citing R. Doc. 9-2).

24 Id. at p. 12.

25 Id. at p. 14.

26 Id. at pp. 14-15.

27 R. Doc. 17.

that the charge filed with the EEOC was not untimely. As to Defendant’s argument

regarding exhaustion, Conaler states that this argument is “false,” because the last

three sentences of the charge “specify both discrete acts.”28 Plaintiffs next respond to

the argument that they have not sufficiently pleaded a retaliation claim under Title

VII. Conaler contends that she has met the requirement of pleading a retaliation

claim, including the second prong, a materially adverse employment action, because

she alleges that “she was subjected to unwarranted discipline, false accusations of

policy violations, slandering to her military command, heavy handed discipline,

suspension without due process in retaliation for engaging in protected activity to

report the sexual harassment and assaults.”29 Dawson contends that she, too, has

sufficiently pleaded a claim for retaliation under Title VII as to the second prong of a

claim because she alleges materially adverse actions taken by her employer,

“including false accusations of policy violations, targeting her with harassment and

bullying, refusing to give her the support necessary to do her job, spreading false

rumors that harm her reputation and purposefully violating rules in her presence

with the hope of getting her in trouble.”30 Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that their claim for

a hostile work environment under Title VII survives Defendant’s motion because

unlawful retaliation is recognized by Title VII.31

In reply, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff Conaler has sufficiently exhausted

her administrative remedies as to her sexual harassment claim but maintains that

28 Id. at pp. 4-5.

29 Id. at pp. 6-7.

30 Id. at p. 10.

31 Id. at pp. 10-11.

the charge that she filed with the EEOC was untimely.32 Because the charge was

filed on May 29, 2024, Defendant argues that “at least one act of sexual harassment

must have occurred within the 300 days before May 29, 2024, meaning the last act of

sexual harassment must have occurred on or after August 3, 2023.”33 Defendant

contends that, taken together with her argument in her response to the present

motion, Plaintiff’s “choice not to include any specific dates in the complaint… makes

it clear that she is attempting to evade dismissal by obfuscation.”34 In the alternative,

Defendant suggests that if the Court were to find that it is unclear from Plaintiff’s

pleading and Defendant’s evidence that the claim is time-barred, the Court should

“require Conaler to amend her complaint to specifically state the dates on which she

contends Lacy sexually harassed her.”35 As to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, Defendant

urges that Dawson’s allegations of retaliatory adverse employment actions fail to

“meet the standard of a materially adverse employment action” under binding

precedent and that the bulk of Conaler’s allegations—except for her two-day

suspension—must be dismissed for the same reason.36 Lastly, Defendant reiterates

that the final claim for retaliatory harassment, or hostile work environment must be

dismissed because “the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected a claim for retaliatory

harassment.”37

32 R. Doc. 18 at p. 2, n. 1.

33 Id. at p. 3.

34 Id. at pp. 3-4.

35 Id. at p. 5.

36 Id. at pp. 6-7 (internal quotations omitted).

37 Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant can seek dismissal

of a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.38 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”39 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.”40 But, no matter the factual content, a claim is not plausible

if it rests on a legal theory that is not cognizable.41

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as

true and views those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.42 The

Court, however, is not bound to accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted

factual inferences, or legal conclusions.43 “Dismissal is appropriate when the

complaint on its face shows a bar to relief.”44 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, a court is generally prohibited from considering information outside the

pleadings, but may consider documents outside of the complaint when they are: (1)

38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

40 Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678) (quotation

marks omitted).

41 Shandon Yinguang Chem. Indus. Joint Stock Co., Ltd. v. Potter, 607 F.3d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 2010).

42 Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin, 886 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2018).

43 Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005).

44 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed. Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

attached to the motion; (2) referenced in the complaint; and (3) central to the

plaintiff’s claims.45

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant Westcott’s motion challenges portions of all three claims brought by

Plaintiffs and moves to dismiss them for failure to state a claim for which relief can

be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court will discuss each of the

challenged claims in turn.

A. Plaintiff Irrion Conaler Exhausted her Administrative Remedies and

Sufficiently Pleaded that She Timely Filed Her Charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

Defendant first challenges Plaintiff Irrion Conaler’s retaliation claim for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies and her sexual harassment claim for

failure to timely file a charge with the EEOC.46 Each argument will be discussed in

turn.

1. Plaintiff Conaler Administratively Exhausted Her Remedies with

the EEOC Regarding Her Retaliation Claim.

“Title VII requires that claims be brought with the EEOC before courts may

consider them.”47 EEOC charges are to be construed liberally, but a court will not

consider claims “that were not asserted before the EEOC or that do not fall within

the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of

45 Maloney Gaming Mgmt., LLC v. St. Tammany Parish, 456 Fed. Appx. 336, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2011).

The Court has considered the Charge of Discrimination filed by Plaintiff Irrion Conaler (R. Doc. 9-2)

because it was attached to the motion, referenced in the Amended Complaint, and central to the claims.

However, the Court did not consider any other exhibits, i.e., the Office of Juvenile Justice Unusual

Occurrence Report (R. Doc. 9-3) and the letter to Mr. Lacy (R. Doc. 18-1).

46 R. Doc 9-1 at pp. 8-11.

47 Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2016).

the charge of discrimination.”48 A plaintiff must not be allowed to “circumvent the

statutory scheme, since Title VII clearly contemplates that no issue will be the subject

of a civil action until the EEOC has first had the opportunity to attempt to obtain

voluntary compliance.”49

While Defendant initially moved to dismiss Conaler’s retaliation claim for

failure to exhaust, in its Reply, Defendant “concedes Conaler sufficiently exhausted

this retaliation claim and, thus, Defendant withdraws its motion to dismiss on this

retaliation claim only.”50 The Court thus denies Defendant’s motion as moot

regarding the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

2. Plaintiff Conaler Has Sufficiently Pleaded that Her EEOC Charge

Was Timely Filed.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e), an employee must file an EEOC charge “within

one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred.”51 That time period is extended to 300 days if the person aggrieved has

initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant

or seek relief from such practice.52

The First Amended Complaint states that “[b]eginning in late 2022 through

2023, Lacy used the same tactics to sexually harass and assault Conaler.”53 Plaintiff

48 Id. (internal quotations omitted).

49 Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970).

50 R. Doc. 18 at n. 1.

51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e).

52 Conner v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps., 247 F. App'x 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotations omitted). The parties do not dispute that Louisiana is a “deferral state” which thus permits

employees 300 days to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

53 R. Doc. 8 at ¶ 24.

filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC on May 29, 2024.54 Defendant

argues that “what is clear is that there was no alleged acts of harassment by Lacy

after Conaler initially reported the harassment to her coworker in April 2023, and

when it was subsequently reported to a supervisor on May 3, 2023” and that

“assuming the last act of harassment occurred on May 3, 2023, the date Lacy’s

harassment was reported to management, Ms. Conaler had 300 days, or until

February 27, 2024, to file a timely charge with the EEOC concerning the sexual

harassment.”55 Plaintiff counters that the charge was timely filed with the EEOC

because the Amended Complaint states that the harassment began in late 2022 and

went through 2023.56

Because a “complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff” when

ruling on a Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court

finds that the allegation that Conaler was sexually harassed by Lacy from “late 2022

through 2023” is to be accepted as true and construed in Plaintiff’s favor that her

charge with the EEOC was timely filed.57 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party.58 The Court thus denies Defendant’s motion as it relates to

the timeliness of the filing of a charge with the EEOC.

54 See R. Doc. 9-2.

55 R. Doc. 9-1 at p. 9 (internal citations omitted).

56 R. Doc. 17 at p. 5.

57 Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). The Court, having considered

the charge filed by Conaler with the EEOC, notes that Conaler alleges in her charge that she

experienced discrimination and retaliation beginning in November 2022, with the latest event

occurring on May 7, 2024. (R. Doc. 9-2).

58 Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin, 886 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2018).

B. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim for Retaliation under Title VII.

Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to

make a prima facie showing regarding their claim for retaliation under Title VII.59

Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they

“suffered materially adverse employment actions.”60

To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that “(1)

he engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially adverse

action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the

adverse action.”61 “An employee has engaged in an activity protected by Title VII if

she has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by

Title VII or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.”62 For an employer's act to

constitute a materially adverse action, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.”63 “An employment action is not materially

adverse if it amounts only to ‘petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place

at work and that all employees experience.’”64

59 R. Doc. 9-1 at pp. 11-12.

60 Id.

61 Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).

62 Dixon v. Moore Wallace, Inc., 236 F. App'x 936, 937 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88

F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1996)).

63 Cabral, 853 F.3d at 767 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.

53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)).

64 Soublet v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (E.D. La. 2011) (Vance, J.) (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)).

Because Defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the claim as it relates to

the second prong of a Title VII claim for retaliation—a materially adverse action—

the Court only considers the sufficiency of the Complaint as it relates to that element.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Conaler was suspended for two days

without pay, in addition to “unwarranted or heavy-handed disciplinary actions

against Conaler, false accusations of policy violations, slandering her to her military

command, [and] violating procedure to drug test her.”65 The Court agrees with

Plaintiff that the action of suspending Conaler for two days without pay constitutes

a materially adverse action under Title VII and thus denies the motion to dismiss as

it relates to Ms. Conaler’s claim of retaliation.66

As to Dawson’s claim for retaliation under Title VII, the Amended Complaint

alleges that Defendant also took adverse action against her “including false

accusations of policy violations, targeting her with harassment and bullying, refusing

to give her the support necessary to do her job, spreading false rumors that harm her

reputation and purposefully violating rules in her presence with the hope of getting

her in trouble.”67 Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true in the light most favorable

to the non-movant, the Court finds that actions of making false accusations of policy

violations and targeting Ms. Dawson with harassment and bullying are sufficient—

65 R. Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 56, 77.

66 The Court notes that, viewing the well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, the allegations of false accusations of policy violations also sufficiently plead the second

prong of a Title VII retaliation claim. Because the Court finds that Conaler has sufficiently alleged the

second prong of a Title VII retaliation claim—a materially adverse action as a result of her two-day

unpaid suspension—the Court finds it unnecessary to consider whether the remainder of the

allegations sufficiently allege additional materially adverse actions. See R. Doc. 18 at pp. 1-2.

67 R. Doc. 8 at ¶ 78

at the pleading stage—to allege a claim of retaliation under Title VII.68 These

allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, rise above

“petty slights or minor annoyances” that would not constitute materially adverse

actions under a Title VII retaliation claim.69 The Court thus declines to dismiss

Dawson’s claim for retaliation under Title VII.

C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Retaliatory Hostile Work

Environment.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable Title VII

retaliatory harassment claim in Count 3 of their Amended Complaint because their

claim is “based on the totality of the conduct by their supervisors.”70 Defendant states

that a retaliatory hostile work environment claim under Title VII has never been

recognized by the Fifth Circuit and is thus foreclosed as a matter of law.71 Plaintiffs

respond that both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court recognize a cause of action

under Title VII for unlawful retaliation and that the statute further prohibits “an

employer from discriminating against an employee because that individual opposed

any practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.72” Plaintiffs aver that they

68 Furthermore, the Court notes that many of the cases cited by Defendant in support of its motion

pertain to motions for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ P. 56, which is analyzed under a different

standard than a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and does not require the Court to

accept all well-pleaded facts as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g.,

Credeur v. Louisiana Through Off. of Att'y Gen., 860 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017); King v. Louisiana, 294

F. App'x 77 (5th Cir. 2008); Earle v. Aramark Corp., 247 F. App'x 519 (5th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Liberty

Mut. Grp., Inco., 616 F. App'x 654 (5th Cir. 2015); Johnson-Luster v. Wormuth, No. CV 19-2235, 2022

WL 767837 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2022); and Soublet v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D.

La. 2011).

69 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68.

70 R. Doc. 9-1 at p. 14.

71 Id. at pp. 14-15.

72 R. Doc. 17 at p. 11.

have sufficiently pleaded a claim for hostile work environment. Plaintiffs do not deny

Defendant’s assertion in its motion that their claim for hostile work environment is

one based on retaliation.73

The Fifth Circuit “has not recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment

cause of action.”74 While Plaintiff relies on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jones v.

Flagship International, which found that the plaintiff in that case had established a

prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the retaliation in that case stemmed

from the employer’s suspension and termination of the employee, not a hostile work

environment.75 This decision did not create a retaliatory hostile work environment

claim in the circuit and, rather, addressed a claim for retaliation under Title VII.76

Because the Fifth Circuit has never recognized such a claim, the Court finds that the

claim is not legally cognizable under Fifth Circuit precedent. Thus, the Court grants

Defendant’s motion to dismiss as it relates to Plaintiffs’ claim for retaliatory hostile

work environment.

D. Plaintiff is Not Granted Leave to Amend Claim Foreclosed as a Matter

of Law.

In one sentence of their Opposition brief, Plaintiffs request that should the

Court find that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the

73 See id. at pp. 10-11.

74 Montgomery-Smith v. George, 810 F. App’x 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Bryan v. Chertoff, 217

Fed.App’x. 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2007) (declining to “recognize a retaliatory hostile work environment”

cause of action).

75 793 F.2d 714, 729 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Jones did establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation

under § 704(a), i.e., that but for her filing of charges with the EEOC she would not have been suspended

and fired…”).

76 See id.

Court also grant leave to amend under Rule 15.77 Plaintiffs offer no further

information as to how or where they would amend their Complaint to cure any

deficiency. Courts must “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”78 In

exercising their discretion, courts consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith, or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, and futility of the amendment.”79 “An amendment is

futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”80

The Court finds that leave to amend the claim for retaliatory hostile work

environment would be futile.81 Because a claim for retaliatory hostile work

environment under Title VII is not recognized by the Fifth Circuit, this Court declines

to grant leave to amend the claim for retaliatory hostile work

environment/harassment.82

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

77 R. Doc. 17 at p. 11. The Court further notes that Plaintiffs did not move to further amend their

Complaint following the filing of Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.

78 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).

79 Nolan v. M/V SANTE FE, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Gregory v. Mitchell, 635 F.2d 199,

203 (5th Cir. 1981)).

80 Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted).

81 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court

does not abuse its discretion when it denies leave to amend if it is futile).

82 Jamieson By & Through Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (“When futility is

advanced as the reason for denying an amendment to a complaint, the court is usually denying leave

because the theory presented in the amendment lacks legal foundation or because the theory has been

adequately presented in a prior version of the complaint.”).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim® filed by Defendants is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The

Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claim for retaliatory hostile work

environment/harassment under Title VII and that claim is DISMISSED. In all other

respects, the Motion is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, April 16, 2026.

(ends & Vettir

WENDY B./VITTER

United States District Judge

83 R. Doc. 9.

16