Bellamy

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

AIESHYA KAY BELLAMY, )

) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-775

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

)

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF )

SOUTH CAROLINA, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 16]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion to

Transfer. ECF No. 16. The motion is fully briefed. Plf. Response Br., ECF No. 20; Defs. Reply

Br., ECF No. 21. Being duly advised, having reviewed the parties’ briefs, evidence, and

applicable law, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants and that venue

is improper. With its only pending motion resolved, this action shall be transferred to the

District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Aieshya Kay Bellamy is an African American woman with more than 15 years

of experience as an underwriter. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 6–13. She was hired by Defendant Blue Cross

Blue Shield of South Carolina (“Blue SC”) in or around September 2017 as a senior underwriter

based in Columbia, South Carolina. The parties seem to agree that, by 2021, Plaintiff had

relocated to Ohio and worked remotely for Blue SC from her residence in Ohio. Throughout her

employment, Plaintiff received positive performance reviews. Beginning in 2019, she began

expressing interest in management positions and advancement opportunities. In 2020, Plaintiff

applied for an underwriting management position. Despite Plaintiff’s positive performance

reviews and years of experience, Defendants promoted a white male employee with less

experience than Plaintiff, citing that he had received specialized training and was groomed for

the position by Defendant Masqood Ali, the Vice President of Major Group Underwriting in

Columbia, South Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 16–24. Plaintiff complained that she was not given

opportunities to work on complex cases or to receive training necessary to advance in

management. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 25.

In 2021, Plaintiff took approximately three months of maternity leave under the Family

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). She alleges that Defendants retaliated against her by: (a)

assigning her five times the number of prospect cases compared to other employees; (b)

assigning her additional projects and teams; and (c) transferring her book of business to a white

male counterpart. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 27–28.

Plaintiff applied for a director’s position in June 2022. Although the position’s posting

initially did not include a specific location, after Plaintiff had applied, she was told the job

required her to be on site in South Carolina and asked her to provide her “relocation timeline”

from Ohio “within 48 hours” to remain an active candidate. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 34–35. Shortly

thereafter, Plaintiff withdrew her application. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 36. Throughout her tenure,

Defendants Ali, John O’Grady, and Rick Griggs made negative comments about Plaintiff and

other female employees having family commitments outside of work. On September 12, 2022,

Plaintiff served a demand letter on Defendants, but no action was taken. She was constructively

discharged in October 2022. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 59–60.

Plaintiff claims she timely filed a charge for gender and race discrimination with the

South Carolina Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). ECF No. 1, ⁋ 61. She received a right to sue letter on January 23, 2025, and timely

filed the present action. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01 et seq. and Title VII, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants committed employment discrimination based on her race and gender in

the following ways: hostile workplace, retaliation, constructive discharge, and harassment.

Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, in

the alternative, transfer the case to the District of South Carolina.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

Defendants move to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(2). In the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Weller

v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974)). That burden shall meet the preponderance

of the evidence standard. Welsh, 631 F.2d at 439. “[I]n the face of a properly supported motion

for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set

forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d

1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Weller, 504 F.2d at 930). “[When] . . . the district court relies

solely on written submissions and affidavits to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than

resolving the motion after either an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery, the burden on the

plaintiff is ‘relatively slight,’ and ‘the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that

personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal.’ ” Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech

Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d

1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988)); Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458). In that instance, the court views the

pleadings and affidavits submitted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court “should

not weigh ‘the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal.’” Id. (quoting Theunissen,

935 at 1459). Dismissal is proper “only if all the specific facts” alleged by the plaintiff

“collectively fail to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.” Gronski v. InContact, Inc., 774 F.

Supp. 3d 873, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (quoting Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d

147, 149 (6th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in original).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)

Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(3). Plaintiff also bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that venue

is proper. Tobien v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 133 F.4th 613, 621 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing

Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458). As with a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court may consider

facts outside the complaint but must “draw all reasonable inferences and resolve factual conflicts

in favor of the plaintiff.” Harrison Prosthetic Cradle Inc. v. Roe Dental Lab., Inc., 608 F.

Supp.3d 541, 546 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Audi AG & Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Izumi, 204

F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Mich. 2002)). If venue is improper, “The district court . . . shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it

could have been brought.” Harrison Prosthetic Cradle Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 546 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over All Defendants.

When resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), federal courts must first

consider whether the forum state’s long-arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction and, second,

whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution. IHF Ltd. v. Myra Bag, 391 F. Supp. 3d 760, 767 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (citing Mid-

West Materials, Inc. v. Tougher Indus., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729–30 (N.D. Ohio 2007)).

Even when the state’s long-arm statute prong is satisfied, personal jurisdiction may nevertheless

fail “unless exercising jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Calkins v. Danaher Corp., 739 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (N.D.

Ohio 2024) (Boyko, J.) (quoting J.M. Smucker Co. v. Hormel Food Corp., 526 F. Supp. 3d 294,

300 (N.D. Ohio 2021)).

1. Ohio’s long-arm statute

The Court must first determine whether Ohio’s long-arm statute provides personal

jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following provisions of Ohio’s

long-arm statute are satisfied:

(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who

acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the

person’s:

(1) Transacting any business in this state;

. . .

(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act

outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons,

when the person might reasonably have expected that some person

would be injured thereby in this state[.]

Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A). The Court finds Ohio’s long-arm statute is satisfied.1

“Section (A)(1) has been found to be satisfied when an out-of-state employee regularly

communicates or otherwise works with Ohio-based employees.” Dugger v. Honeywell Int’l,

Inc., No. 1:21-CV-00892, 2021 WL 5961624, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2021) (Polster, J.)

1 Defendants argue that it is unnecessary to evaluate Ohio’s long-arm statute

because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the due process analysis. ECF No. 16 at PageID #: 80. The

Court disagrees.

(citing The Rightting, LLC v. Brown, No. 3:09 CV 135, 2009 WL 249694, at *3–4 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 2, 2009)). Similarly, Section (A)(6) is satisfied when the out-of-state defendant has

intentionally committed a tortious act—such as employment discrimination—with the reasonable

expectation that the injury will occur in Ohio. Dugger, 2021 WL 5961624, at *5. Because

Plaintiff worked remotely from her home in Ohio, and because she has alleged claims of

employment discrimination, Ohio’s long-arm statute is satisfied.

2. Due Process

Next, the Court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction in this case

would comport with due process. “Due process requires that an out-of-state defendant have

‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state sufficient to comport with ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” Calkins, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (quoting Blessing v.

Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 904 (6th Cir. 2021)). The “minimum contacts” analysis considers

“the defendant’s contact with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with the persons

who reside there.” Id. (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)); see Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021) (recognizing a defendant must

deliberately reach into the forum state “by, for example, ‘exploiting a market’ in the forum State

or entering a contractual relationship centered there.”) (cleaned up).

There are two personal jurisdiction categories: general and specific. Goodyear Dunlop

tires operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). General jurisdiction is proper when

“a defendant’s contacts with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it]

essentially at home in the forum State.” Flake v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 538 F. App’x

604, 617 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865,

873 (6th Cir. 2002) (same). In the context of corporations, general jurisdiction is proper where

the company is either incorporated or has its principal place of business (i.e., its headquarters).

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (recognizing a

corporate defendant is “at home” at its place of incorporation and its principle place of

business.). Plaintiff argues that Blue SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries having contacts in Ohio is

sufficient to render Blue SC “at home” in this state. ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 377–79. It is

undisputed that Blue SC and the individual defendants in this case are all residents of South

Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 2–5. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Blue SC or any of its affiliates

or subsidiaries are incorporated or headquartered in Ohio such that they are “at home” in Ohio.

Therefore, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over all Defendants.

Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the

underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State

and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (internal citations

and quotation omitted). The analysis focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum

state, and the case of action in the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977);

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.

The Sixth Circuit prescribes a three-part test for assessing specific jurisdiction:

[1] First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the

privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in

the forum state. [2] Second, the cause of action must arise from the

defendant's activities there. [3] Finally, the acts of the defendant or

consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial

enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of

jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Air Prods. & Controls, Inc., 503 F.3d at 550 (quoting S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401

F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)). “Failure to meet any one of the three prongs means that personal

jurisdiction may not be invoked.” Maclin v. Reliable Reports of Texas, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d

845, 849 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (Polster, J.).

Plaintiff argues specific personal jurisdiction is proper for two main reasons: (1) Blue

SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries conduct business in Ohio, and (2) Blue SC permitted Plaintiff to

work remotely from Ohio and, therefore, the employment discrimination was effectuated in

Ohio. ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 373–75. Both fail for independent reasons.

a. Blue SC’s subsidiaries and affiliates

The first prong for specific personal jurisdiction is satisfied when an out-of-state

defendant “reaches out beyond one state and create[s] continuing relationships and obligations

with citizens of another state.” Calkins, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (quoting Calphalon Corp. v.

Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2000)). “The purposeful-availment requirement prevents

the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant ‘solely as a result of . . . the unilateral activity of

another party or a third person.’” Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 671 (6th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). As such, “an employee’s

personal contacts with a forum are not automatically attributed to their employer.” Phillips v.

Persons Servs. Corp., No. 2:20-cv-2392, 2021 WL 5277481, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2021)

(citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478). Stated another way, “the plaintiff cannot be the

only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 278.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the

district court can maintain personal jurisdiction over each defendant.” Carbone v. Kaal, 140

F.4th 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added); see Olsavsky v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc.,

No. , 2009 WL 10715843, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that a defendant company’s

business contacts in Ohio, alone, was insufficient to bring individual defendants within the reach

of Ohio’s long-arm statute). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants Ali, Griggs, or

O’Grady purposefully availed themselves to Ohio law or engaged in any discriminatory conduct

in Ohio. Instead, the Complaint alleges that the discriminatory employment decisions the

individual Defendants made occurred in South Carolina, not Ohio. Accordingly, the Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants.

Regarding Blue SC, Plaintiff first claims that National Alliance, an organization built by

and operating as a subsidiary of Blue SC, operates nationwide, including in Ohio. ECF No. 20 at

PageID #: 373. Her evidence further indicates that CSG, a Blue SC affiliate, was awarded a

contract to administer Medicare Part A and Part B Fee-for-Service claims in Ohio and Kentucky.

ECF No. 20-3 at PageID ##: 418–20. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she provided underwriting

services for another Blue SC’s affiliate, Alliance Group, which provides products to customers

headquartered in South Carolina with employees nationwide, including in Ohio. ECF No. 20 at

PageID ##: 374–75; ECF No. 20-14, ⁋⁋ 6–7. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff satisfied her

burden to make a prima facie showing that Blue SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries satisfy the

purposeful availment prong, her employment discrimination claims fail on the “arise out of”

prong.

The second prong for specific personal jurisdiction requires “an affiliation between the

forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place

in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulations.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S.

at 359–60 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Fran. Cty., 582 U.S.

255, 262 (2017)). “This is a ‘lenient standard,’ requiring only that the cause of action have a

‘substantial connection’ to the defendant’s activity in the state.” MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v.

Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894, 903 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bird, 289 F.3d at 875). The Supreme Court

recently held that the second prong “contemplates that some relationships will support

jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes.” Ford Motor Co., 592

U.S. at 362; Sullivan, 79 F.4th at 672.

None of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination allegations relate to Blue SC’s affiliates

or subsidiaries. CSG is the only Blue SC affiliate Plaintiff identifies as having direct contacts in

Ohio. But she does not allege that she worked for CSG or, indeed, any other Ohio-based Blue

SC subsidiaries or affiliates. Similarly, even if she had provided underwriting services for

Alliance Group, she does not allege such services were provided directly to any Ohio-based

customers or employees. Rather, she admits her customers were headquartered in South

Carolina. ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. That her South Carolina-based customers may have employed

individuals in Ohio is not due to Plaintiff’s employment but resulted from unilateral third-party

decisions not fairly attributable to Blue SC. See Sullivan, 79 F.4th at 671. Importantly, Plaintiff

did not seek any training, promotions, or management positions with CSG, National Alliance,

Alliance Group, or any other Blue SC subsidiaries. Instead, her promotion applications related

to leadership roles within Blue SC, which she acknowledges does not have any offices or

operations in Ohio. These facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out of” contacts

with Ohio established by Blue SC’s affiliates or subsidiaries. Therefore, the Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Blue SC based on its affiliates and subsidiaries.

b. Plaintiff’s telework arrangement

Plaintiff’s second argument that Blue SC purposefully availed itself to Ohio law by

permitting her to work remotely from Mahoning County also fails. When considering whether

retaining a remote employee satisfies the purposeful availment prong, courts evaluate several

factors, including whether:

(1) the defendant solicited the employment of the plaintiff in

the forum state; (2) the plaintiff worked predominantly from within

the forum state; (3) the plaintiff was a high-level employee in the

defendant’s business; (4) the plaintiff signed the employment

contract in the forum state; (5) the defendant had knowledge of, and

“facilitated,” the plaintiff’s remote employment; and (6) the work

the plaintiff performed in the forum state advanced the defendant’s

business interests in the forum state.

Carpenter v. Southern Airways Express, No. 2:21-945cv-568, 2021 WL 5937749 (S.D. Ohio

Dec. 16, 2021) (citing Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC, 359 F. Supp. 3d 499, 511 (E.D. Ky. 2019)).

In Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, the court held personal jurisdiction existed because, although the

foreign company did not operate any stores or sell merchandise in Kentucky, it had (a) actively

recruited the plaintiff for an executive-level position while she was living in Kentucky, (b)

negotiated and executed the plaintiff’s employment contract to permit her to work remotely from

Kentucky, and (c) provided the plaintiff with a computer and cellphone for business use in

Kentucky. 359 F. Supp. 3d at 511; see Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 250, 260

(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding personal jurisdiction existed because the employer hired the plaintiff

“with the express agreement . . . that she would work from New York.”).

In contrast, the court in Carpenter v. Southern Airways Express concluded plaintiff’s

remote work in Ohio for an out-of-state airline company’s call center was insufficient to

establish personal jurisdiction. 2021 WL 5937749 at *1. The court determined that the

plaintiff’s decision to work remotely from Ohio was a “unilateral decision” because defendants

had not: (a) actively recruited her in Ohio; (b) bargained for or required her to work from Ohio;

(c) met with her in Ohio; (d) supplied her with materials to work remotely from Ohio; or (e)

tasked her with extending the defendants’ business in Ohio. Id. at *6. Other courts have reached

the same conclusion under similar circumstances. See Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am.,

Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 647, 653 (E.D.N.C. 2018) aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019)

(“Plaintiff’s choice to complete her work in North Carolina for her own reasons is a unilateral

decision that cannot be fairly attributed to the defendant as an attempt to avail itself of the

privileges of conducting business in North Carolina.”); Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of

United States, No. TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 5759766, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020) (holding the

plaintiff’s “decision to conduct most of her work from Maryland, even if known to and

supported” by her employer “constitutes ‘unilateral activity’ that does not establish purposeful

availment.”).

In this case, Blue SC did not recruit Plaintiff while she was living in Ohio, negotiate her

employment contract while she was in Ohio, or require her to work from Ohio. Rather, she

unilaterally decided to relocate to Ohio approximately three years after Blue SC had hired her.

ECF No. 1, ⁋ 5; ECF No. 20-12. Although Defendants accommodated her telework request,

Plaintiff acknowledges that she was still required to provide underwriting services to customers

located in South Carolina. See ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. Indeed, Plaintiff presents no evidence that

she provided services directly to any Blue SC customers, affiliates, or subsidiaries located in

Ohio. As in Carpenter, Plaintiff’s telework arrangement with Defendants constitutes a

“unilateral decision” on her part that is insufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction.

B. Improper Venue and Transfer

Even if the Court could exercise personal jurisdiction, Defendants urge the Court to

dismiss this action for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer this action to the District

of South Carolina. ECF No. 16. They argue that Plaintiff was initially hired in South Carolina,

worked in the South Carolina office for three years before moving to Ohio, where she continued

servicing South Carolina customers and accounts remotely. ECF No. 16 at PageID #: 84.

Plaintiff retorts that she worked in Ohio, provided underwriting services for Alliance Group

which serviced Ohio residents, and suffered the effects of Defendants’ discrimination in Ohio.

ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 382–83. Defendants have the better argument.

The general venue statute provides that venue is proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of

property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought

as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any

defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect

to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). It is undisputed that all Defendants are South Carolina residents

and, as such venue is proper in South Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 2–5. Pursuant to § 1391(b)(2),

venue is proper if a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”

in this district. King, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2. That analysis coincides with the analysis of 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) under Title VII, which provides that venue is proper in:

(1) [A]ny judicial district in the State in which the unlawful

employment practice is alleged to have been committed;

(2) [T]he judicial district in which the employment records relevant

to such practice are maintained and administered; or

(3) [T]he judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have

worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

King v. Forest River, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-590, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 2016)

(Gaughan, J.) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)). When “the plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction

that does not satisfy one of the venue requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is

improper.” Vazima v. Potter, No. 4:05-cv-2793, 2006 WL 8450988, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 26,

2006). If venue is improper, courts must “dismiss, or in the interest of justice, transfer the case

to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” King, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).

In the present case, the only connection between the alleged unlawful employment

practices and Ohio is Plaintiff’s living arrangements. Plaintiff does not dispute that Blue SC is

headquartered in South Carolina, does not maintain offices in Ohio, and that her colleagues,

supervisors, and managers were in South Carolina. Her clients were also located in South

Carolina and even if those customers retained Ohio-based employees, Plaintiff offers no

evidence that she provided underwriting services directly to any Ohio businesses or residents.

ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. In addition, each of the promotions and leadership positions Plaintiff

sought were based in South Carolina. The decision-makers regarding those promotions and

leadership opportunities were based in South Carolina. As such, it is likely that most, if not all,

witnesses (e.g., other Blue SC employees, Plaintiff’s former supervisors and managers, etc.) and

evidence (e.g., employment records, communications, etc.) relating to Plaintiff’s employment

discrimination claims are in South Carolina, not Ohio. It is also telling that Plaintiff filed a

discrimination charge with the South Carolina Human Rights Commission—not OCRC. ECF

No. 1, ⁋ 61. Although she worked remotely from her home in Ohio, for all intents and purposes,

Plaintiff worked in South Carolina, the alleged discrimination occurred in South Carolina, and,

as such, the District Court of South Carolina is the proper venue.

Accordingly, venue is not proper in this jurisdiction and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),

this case shall be transferred to the District of South Carolina.

IV. CONCLUSION

In a single motion, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer (ECF No. 16), Defendants sought a

ruling on either its request for dismissal or transfer. For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned

has responded by providing a transfer. There is, therefore, no other pending motion before the

Court. As ruled above, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants and, even if the

Court had personal jurisdiction, venue is improper. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer

(ECF No. 16) is granted and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this case shall be transferred to the

District of South Carolina.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 25, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge