Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ANGIE DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00695-SEP

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al, )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants. )

Before the Court are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants David Dooley, Janie

Stephens, Kelly Wilkens, Valerie Nelson, Dawn Davis, Lisa Maxwell, and St. Louis County,

Docs. [11], [22], [31], [43]. The Motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the

reasons set forth below, the MotioFnAsC aTrSe A gNrDa nBtAeCdK iGnR pOaUrNtD a 1 n d denied in part.

On May 15, 2020, Plaintiff Angie Davis’s son, Dwight Williams (“Williams”), died

Id. th

while in custody at the St. Louis County Jail. Doc. [1] ¶ 1. On May 14 , Williams was

2

arrested and transported to the St. Louis County Jail. ¶¶ 16, 37. During his medical

intake at the jail, Williams reported “a history of addiction and his prescription use of

Suboxone to treat addiction to intake nurse Defendant David Dooley and Defendant Janie

Id.

Stephens, as well as a recent incision and drainage procedure on his left hand,” which

appeared infected. ¶¶ 28-29. Williams told Defendant Kelly Wilkens that he had been

admitted to a hospital “to receive intravenous antibiotics for three (3) days” a week prior to

Id.

his arrest, and that he was expected to return on May 15 to have a Penrose drain removed.

¶ 30. Wilkens “examined [Williams’s] hand, removed [the] Penrose drain that had been

placed in it during his incision and drainage operation, . . . and provided [Williams] . . . an

1 SeeNeitzke v. Williams

For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court assumes that the factual allegations in the

Complaint are true. , 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

2

Plaintiff’s Complaint stateisd .that, while Williams was pronounced dead at 6:48 a.m. on May 15,

2020, Doc. [1] ¶ 40, he was escorted to his cell following his admittance to the jail on May 15 at

approximately 11:30 p.m., ¶ 37. While not relevant to the issues decided in this motion, the

Id.

antibiotic . . . [and] an anti-inflammatory.” ¶ 32. Following Wilken’s treatment, “Dooley

continued his intake examination,” determined that Williams was experiencing acute

Id.

withdrawal, and “provided Williams Clonidine, Loperamide, and Promethazine pursuant to

Dr. Davis’s physician’s standing order.” ¶ 33. “Stephens also knew and noted the fact

Id.

that [Williams] was prescribed Suboxone by his doctor,” but neither Stephens nor Dooley

Id.

gave Williams Suboxone. ¶¶ 35-36. Following his intake examination, Williams was

escorted to his cell at approximately 11:30 pm. ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges that it was

Id.

“obvious” to both the correction officer who escorted Williams and his cellmate that

Williams “was experiencing acute withdrawal or OUD.” ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff provided no

additional information as to any specific symptoms that Williams was exhibiting or the

severity of those symptoms.

Id.

On May 15 at 6:20 a.m., Williams was found unresponsive in his cell, and at 6:48 a.m.

he was declared dead. ¶¶ 39-40. “The St. Louis County medical examiner’s report

Id.

determined [Williams’s] cause of death to be cardiomyopathy exacerbated by opioid

withdrawal.” ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he sudden cessation of . . . Williams’s

Id.

prescription medication and the failure to provide . . . Williams with his prescription

medication led to acute withdrawals that caused . . . Williams’s death.” ¶ 42.

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims against St. Louis County; nurse practitioner

Wilkens; registered nurse Dooley; Stephens; Chief Operating Officer of St. Louis County’s

Correction Medicine Valerie Nelson, who was “responsible for supervising nurses and . . .

the Medication Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) program”; Dr. Dawn Davis, the lead physician

at the St. Louis County Jail; and nurse manager Lisa Maxwell, who was “directly responsible

Id.

for training St. Louis County employees at the jail to administer the [MAT] program”

Id.

(collectively “Defendants”). ¶¶ 8-13. The individual defendants were named in their

individual capacities only. ¶¶ 9-14.

Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants§ violated Williams’s Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 by acting with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs (Count I). Doc. [1] ¶¶ 77-94. Plaintiff further

alleges that Defendants St. Louis County, Nelson, Dr. Davis, and Maxwell (the “Supervisory

Id.

Defendants”) failed to train, supervise, and discipline medical staff at the jail “to ensure that

¶¶ 95-112. Plaintiff also alleges that the County knew about and allowed an

“unconstitutional custom and/or practice to ignore obvious signs of a severe medical

Id.

condition and not provide appropriate, adequate medical treatment, including but not

limited to providing detainees their prescribed medications” (Count III). ¶¶ 113-19.

Lastly, Plaintiff a§lleges that all Defendants violated the Americans with Disa§bilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a), by

Id.

“failing to accommodate [Willaims’s] disability . . . [b]y refusing to provide medically

necessary treatment,” (Counts IV and V). ¶¶ 120-32.

Defendants move to dismiss. Docs. [11], [22], [31], [43]. Defendant Maxwell moves

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 4(m), arguing that

Plaintiff’s service of process was deficient and that she was served more than 90 days after

the Complaint was filed. Doc. [31]. St. Louis County and the other individual defendants

argue that the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Docs. [11], [22], [43].

Plaintiff opposes the motions, arguing: (1) that Maxwell waived her affirmative defense

pursuant to Rule 12(h)(1), Doc. [35]; and (2) that the Complaint alleged facts sufficient to

state claims against the other defendaLnEtsG,A DL oScTsA. N[1D8A]R,D [ 25], [45].

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The notice pleading standard

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give “a short and plain

statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To meet this standard and

Ashcroft v.

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

Iqbal Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

Determining if well-pled factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

Id.

relief” is a “context-specific task” requiring the court to “draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” at 679. The factual content of the plaintiff’s allegations must “allow[]

Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co.

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” , 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir.

Whitney v. Guys, Inc.

Iqbal Twombly

2018) (quoting , 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012)). In determining

the plausibility of a plaintiff’s claim, and instruct the Court to consider

Iqbal Twombly

whether “obvious alternative explanations” exist for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Iqbal

, 556 U.S. at 682 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 567). The Court must then determine

Id.

whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of the law. , 556 U.S. at 679. The well-pled

facts must establish more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”

Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must liberally construe a complaint in

Lustgraaf v.

favor of the plaintiff,” , 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir.

Behrens

2010), and “grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,”

, 619 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2010). But if a claim fails to allege one of the elements

Crest Contr. II, Inc. v. Doe

necessary to recovery on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. , 660 F.3d 346, 355

Iqbal Twombly

(8th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” , 556 U.S. at 678 (citing , 550

Id.

U.S. at 555). Although courts must accept all well-pled factual allegations as true, they “are

Twombly

not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (quoting

, 550 U.S. at 555). DISCUSSION

I. Count I: Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

At all times relevant to the Complaint, Williams was a pretrial detainee, so his

See Morris v. Zefferi

constitutional claims are brought pursuant to the protections of the Fourteenth

Amendment. , 601 f.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010). But a pretrial

See Grayson v. Ross see also

detainee’s medical claims are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate

Morris v. Cradduck

indifference standard. , 454 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2006);

, 954 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2020) (a pretrial detainee has the same

rights to medical care under the due process clause as an inmate has under the Eighth

Estelle v. Gamble

Amendment). Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide

adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals. , 429 U.S. 97, 103

McRaven v. Sanders Vaughn v. Gray

(1976). A deliberate indifference claim “has both an objective and subjective component.”

, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting , 557 F.3d

Id.

objectively serious medical need”; “the subjective component requires a plaintiff to show

Vaughn

that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” (quoting

, 557 F.3d at 908).

“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

Holden v. Hirner

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the

Coleman v. Rahija

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” , 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011)

(quoting , 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The subjective

component—whether a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need—

requires mor e N u th r a v n . O m lm er s e t e n d e C gl n ig ty e . n , ce. Rather, it requires a state of mind similar to cri B m a i r n t a o l n

v. Taber

recklessness 563 F. Supp. 3d 946, 965 (D. Minn. 2021) (quoting

, 820 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2016)). “Such a mental state can be inferred from facts

that demonstrate the response to the medical care was obviously inadequate” or by

Id. Estelle v. Gamble

showing that a defendant “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care or

intentionally interfere[d] with prescribed treatment . . . .” (citing , 429

U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)).

Here, assuming all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations to be true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in h§is favor, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a deliberate

indifference claim under 1983 against Defendants Dooley and Stephens. Plaintiff alleges

that Williams reported “his prescription use of Suboxone to treat addiction to the intake

nurse Defendant Dooley and Defendant Stephens”; that Dooley “determined that Mr.

Wiliams was in acute withdrawal, but instead of providing Mr. Williams with his

prescription medication, Suboxone, he provided Mr. Williams Clonidine, Loperamide, and

Promethazine”; that Stephens “knew and noted the fact that Mr. Williams was prescribed

Suboxone by his doctor through Assisted Recovery Centers of America”; and that “[n]either

Defendant Dooley or Stephens ensured that Mr. Williams received his prescription

Suboxone.” Doc. [1] ¶¶ 28, 33-36. Such allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to state a

claim that Williams’s addiction and withdrawal was a serious medical need that had been

“diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” and that Dooley and Stephens

“intentionally interfere[d] with prescribed treatment.” §

Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim under 1983 against any other

See Holden Nur

with the exception of Dooley and Stephens, had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s serious

medical need or his prescription for addiction treatment. , 663 F.3d at 342;

563 F. Supp. 3d at 965 . While Plaintiff makes several conclusory statements alleging that

“St. Louis County and all Defendants knew that Mr. Williams had a confirmed

see, e.g.

buprenorphine prescription of Suboxone” and that Defendants were aware of [Williams’s]

disability,” , Doc. [1] ¶¶ 19, 21, he makes no specific allegations that Williams told

any individuals other than Dooley and Stephens about his addiction treatment or that any

See Iqbal

other individual defendant actual reviewed his medical records prior to his death

approximately eight hours after his intake at the jail. , 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly,

while the Complaint states that Williams was suffering from acute withdrawal and that it

was “obvious” to his cellmate and a correctional officer, such allegations are similarly

Id.

conclusory, as they do not specifically state the symptoms Williams was exhibiting or their

severity. ; Doc. [1] ¶¶ 37-38. Without additional information, the Court cannot infer

whether any other individual defendant might have been deliberately indifferent to

Williams’s serious medical needs. As such, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count I are

denied as to Defendants Dooley and Stephens and granted as to the remaining individual

dIIe. fendaCnotusn. t III: Municipal Liability

“Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if

Troupe v. Young

the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom; or (3) a

Corwin v. City of Independence

deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” , 143 F.4th 955, 973

(8th Cir. 2025) (quoting , 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016)).

“To establish liability based on a custom, the plaintiff has to show the following: (1) The

existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by

the governmental entity’s employees; (2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization

of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the

Troupe Johnson v. Douglas Cnty. Med.

officials of that misconduct; and (3) That . . . the custom was a moving force behind the

Dep’t

constitutional violation.” , 143 F.4th at 973 (citing

Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View,

, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013). “Notice is the touchstone of deliberate

Mo.

indifference in the context of section 1983 municipal liability.”

Watkins v. City of St. Louis

Plaintiff’s municipal custom claim must satisfy the same pleading standard as his

individual capacity claims. , 102 F.4th 947, 953 (8th Cir. 2024)

Id.

“Conclusory assertions that are unsupported by facts will not satisfy this pleading

standard.” . In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant St. Louis County had specific

and detailed knowledge of a pervasive, widespread and well-known custom and practice of

not providing OUD patients with their prescribed medications” and “ignor[ing] obvious

signs of . . . serious medical notions and not provid[ing] appropriate, adequate medical

treatment,” and that such customs were the “moving force behind [Williams’s] injury and

death.” Doc. [1] ¶ 115-17. In support of the claim, Plaintiff alleges that in March 2014, over

Id.

six years before Williams’s death, St. Louis County corrections officials “acknowledged a

pattern of their nurses failing to distribute OUD medications.” ¶ 53. In response to the

issue, “St. Louis County nurse managers created a PDCA (“Plan-Do-Check-Act”), a quality

Id.

control process, to address [the County’s] pervasive pattern of failures to treat detainees

with [OUD], including the pervasive failure to provide detainees medication.” ¶ 54.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the issue continued for years, ultimately resulting in Williams’s death.

¶ 56. He cites testimony provided by a “former long time Nurse Manager,” who stated

that acute withdrawal “caused or contributed to cause more than twenty (20) deaths at the

Id.

St. Louis County jail in the eight years prior to 2015,” but that the “2014 PDCA

acknowledging the medication distribution problem at the jail was never completed.”

¶¶ 58-59. And he states that another former nurse manager similarly testified that “the

failure to provide Suboxone to detainee patients was a ‘persistent problem’ at the jail

through at least 2023”; that “MAT eligible patients were frequently not being referred to

custom and practice was not

the MAT program or provided with Suboxone”; and that “while the MAT policies were

being administered at all Id.

technically in force during May 2020, the . . . was that MAT

.” ¶¶ 63-67.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the constitutional issue before it in this case

is whether Defendants Dooley and Stephens violated Williams’s Eighth and Fourteenth

See

Amendment rights by denying him access to his prescribed Suboxone, not the

Dulany v. Carnahan

appropriateness of alleged denials of specific medications to inmate patients generally.

, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[I]nmates have no constitutional

free to exercise their independent medical judgment.”). Plaintiff’s allegat§ions relating to

the denial of Suboxone to the jail population are insufficient to sustain a 1983 custom

claim against the County. As it stands, the Court cannot determine the frequency, severity,

or result of any deprivation of prescription medication for acute withdrawal. Despite

Plaintiff’s attempt to extrapolate from deprivations that allegedly took place “in the eight

years prior to 2015,” long before Williams’s death, Doc. [1] ¶¶ 58, 60, Plaintiff has not

See Watkins v. City of St. Louis

“assert[ed] specific instances or provide[d] specific examples . . . that could support an

inference of an unconstitutional policy or custom.” , 102 F.4th

947, 954 (8th Cir. 2024). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a

custom claim under section 1983, Plaintiff’s Count III against St. Louis County must be

dIIiIs.m issCeodu. nt II: Supervisory Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline

Plaintiff also claims that the Supervisory Defendants failed to train, supervise, or

discipline their employees, resulting in Williams’s death. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 95-112. “A

municipality can be liable under [section 1983] for a failure to train or supervise its

employees where: (1) the municipality’s training practices are inadequate; (2) the

municipality was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others in adopting those practices

such that the failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipality;

Mitchell v. Saint Louis Cnty., Mo.

and (3) an alleged deficiency in the municipality’s training practices actually caused the

Ulrich v. Pope Cnty.

plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.” , 160 F.4th 950, 963

(8th Cir. 2025) (citing , 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013). “To be

Id. Andrews v.

deliberately indifferent, a municipality must have ‘notice that its procedures were

Fowler

inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.’” (quoting

, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).

Similarly, while supervisory officials cannot be held individually liable under Section

1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory, “a

Troupe

supervisor may be held liable ‘if a failure to properly supervise and train [an] offending

Tlamka v. Serrell Andrews v. Fowler

employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.’” , 143 F.4th at 972 (quoting

, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting , 98 F.3d

1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996))). “When a ‘supervising official who had not direct participation

actor, the supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless plaintiff proves that the

Davis v.

supervisor (1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by a

Buchanan Cnty., Mo. S.M. v. Krigbaum

subordinate, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts.’”

Livers v. Schenck

, 11 F.4th 604, 624 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting , 808 F.3d

335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing , 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012))). This

Krigbaum

“rigorous standard” requires proof that the “supervisor had notice of a pattern of conduct

by the subordinate that violated a clearly established constitutional right.” , 808

F.3d at 340.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisory Defendants failed to properly train,

supervise, or discipline their employees to “ensur[e] they provided detainees with their

prescription medications and monitored detainees who presented under the treatment of

an outside physician with OUD.” Doc. [1] ¶ 105. Plaintiff further alleges that: “Defendant

id.

St. Louis County and Defendant Dr. Davis oversaw policies and procedures relevant to” the

treatment of individuals “suffering from [Opioid Use Disorder (“OUD”)]” like Williams,

¶¶ 100-01; the Supervisory Defendants “were responsible for training, supervision, and

id.

discipline related to the [Medication Assisted Treatment] program at the St. Louis County

jail and ensuring that detainees received their prescription medication,” ¶ 102; the

Supervisory Defendants “failed to properly train the medical staff at the jail to ensure that

id.

patients would receive appropriate care, including their MAT and prescribed medication,”

¶ 103; and the Supervisory Defendants “were also aware of a pervasive, widespread and

well-known custom and practice of not providing OUD patients with their prescribed

id.

medications and Defendants St. Louis County and Dr. Davis were deliberately indifferent to

this custom and practice,” ¶¶ 73, 107.

As to notice, Plaintiff alleges that “[p]rior to [Williams’s] death, Defendants St. Louis

County, Dr. Davis, Nelson, and Maxwell knew that [OUD] was a serious medical need, and

they also know that St. Louis County jail was failing to provide medical care to this patient

Id.

population, including failing to provide detainees with their outside medical doctor’s

prescription and/or Suboxone.” ¶ 73. In support, Plaintiff cites to the “testimony” of

two former nurse managers, who allegedly stated that acute withdrawal had contributed to

approximately 20 inmate deaths in the eight years preceding 2015, and that “failure to

Id.

provide Suboxone to detainee patients was a ‘persistent problem’ at the jail through at least

2023.” ¶¶ 57-67.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim that Defendants had notice that

their training program or supervisory standards were insufficient and were resulting in

violations of inmates’ constitutional rights. “A pattern of similar constitutional violations

Connick v. Thompson Bd. Of

by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown see alsoMitchell

purposes of failure to train.” , 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting

, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); , 160 F.4th at

962 (plaintiff must comply with “requirement of alleging—with enough factual matter—

that [supervisory defendant] had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts by her

subordinates”). Here, like her custom claim, Plaintiff has failed to identify specific prior

instances of unconstitutional or improper conduct that would put the Supervisory

Troupe

Defendants on notice that their training and supervisory regimens were constitutionally

insufficient. While Plaintiff claims the allegations here are similar to those made in ,

the plaintiff in that case made specific allegations concerning “previous jail deaths” that had

Troupe

been “discussed by recent media reports, the St. Louis City Council, and internal reports.”

, 143 F.4th at 962. Plaintiff has made no such allegations in this case against any of

the Supervisory Defendants. As such, Plaintiff’s Count II against Defendants St. Louis

CIVo.u ntyC, Doru.n Dtasv IiVs, aanndd VN:e lAsoDnA i sa ndids mRAis sCelda.i ms

Plaintiff claims that St. Louis County and the individual defendants violated his

rights under both the ADA and the RA by “refusing to provide medically necessary

treatment for [Williams’s] disability.” Doc. [1] ¶¶ 120-32. “Title II of the ADA . . . prohibits

Randolph v. Rogers

qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the

benefits of services, programs, or activitie§s of a pu e b t l s ic e q entity.” , 170 F.3d

850, 857 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 12131 .). To prevail on a Title II ADA claim,

a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a person with a disability as defined by statute; (2)

Id.

that he is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that he was excluded from

§the bene f e i t t s b e e q c . ause of discrimination based upon his disability. at 858 (citing 42 U.S.C.

12131 ). “A qualified individual with a disability is defined as any person who

Id. §

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. V. Yeskey

in programs or activities provided by a public entity.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 12131(2)). A

state prison is a “public entity” under the statute. , 524

U.S. 206, 210 (1998). For all intents and purposes, “[t]he ADA and RA are ‘similar in

Randolph

substance’ and, with the exception of the RA’s federal funding requirement, ‘cases

Gorman v. Bartch

interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.’” , 170 F.3d at 857

prima facie

(quoting , 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a case under Title II

because ADA and RA claims are based solely on medical treatment decisions. Docs. [12] at

3 Lustgraaf

14, [23] at 14; [44] at 12. The Court agrees. Assuming all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations

to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, , 619 F.3d at 873,

she fails to plead violations of either the ADA or the RA. There is a difference between

because of See Postawko v. Missouri

alleging inadequate treatment for a prisoner’s disability and alleging that a prisoner was

Dep’t of Corr. Rogers v. Missouri Dep’t

denied access to medical services his or her disability.

of Corr.

, 2017 WL 1968317, at *13 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2017);

, 2011 WL 3320521, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011). While Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a claim that certain Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Williams’s serious

medical needs, she does not allege facts sufficient to establish that such inadequate

Postawko v. Missouri Department of Corrections

treatment was discriminatory in nature.

In , the United States District Court of

the Western District of Missouri found that a plaintiff did “not merely allege inadequate

medical treatment” where the complaint asserted that the MDOC “follow[ed] one policy for

inmates with chronic [Hepatitis C] and another policy for inmates with other disabilities

under which they do receive lifesaving medications.” 2017 WL 1968317, at *13. There, the

plaintiff successfully pled a claim under the ADA because the allegations challenged a policy

under which inmates with a certain disability were not provided access to lifesaving

Id. see alsoMcNally v. Prison Health Servs.

medication, while inmates with other disabilities did have access to lifesaving medications.

; , 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58-59 (D. Me. 1999) (rejecting

the argument that a plaintiff could allege only that he received poor medical treatment and

3

Defendants leveled several other arguments against Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims as well. Docs.

not bring an ADA claim where the plaintiff demonstrated that the jail refused to provide

him with HIV medications but allowed inmates access to medications for other disabilities).

See, e.g.,

Drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on

the alleged inadequate care Williams received related to his OUD. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 122,

124, 130 (Defendants “refus[ed] to provide medically necessary treatment”). Plaintiff

makes no attempt to allege that Williams was treated differently than other inmates with

respect to his medical conditions. Instead, the allegations appear to be “formulaic

Iqbal

recitation[s] elements” of an ADA or RA claim, which the Court is not required to accept as

true. , 556 U.S. at 679. Reading Plaintiff’s Complaint as a whole, the Court finds no

factual allegations that support a finding that his claims are based on anything other than

SeeBurger v. Bloomberg

medical treatment decisions. Those allegations alone cannot support a claim under the

ADA or RA. , 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[W]e

agree with two other circuits that have recently concluded a lawsuit under the [RA or ADA]

cannot be based on medical treatment decisions”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Counts IV and V

Vag. ainstR aulll De e1f2en(bd)a(n5t)s Ianrseu dfifsimcieisnste dSe. rvice of Process

“In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.

ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.”

Printed Media

, 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). “If a defendant is

Servs., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc.

improperly served, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant,”

Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics

, 11 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), even if the

Printed Media Servs.

defendant “had actual notice of the lawsuit,” , 74

F.32d 882, 885-86 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing , 11 F.3d at 843).

Service of a complaint is governed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Service may be achieved by the individual being served personally; by leaving a copy of the

summons and complaint at the person’s residence with a suitable person who resides

there; by delivering the summons and complaint to an agent legally authorized to receive

them for such purposes; or by a method approved under state law in the state where the

district court is located or where the individual is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

Here, an executed proof of service of filed on July 9, 2025, stating that an employee

th

Missouri 63010. Doc. [7] at 2. On October 24 , Maxwell, through counsel, filed a consent

inter alia

motion for leave to file an answer out of time with an attached answer, in which she

asserted, , that “Plaintiff failed to properly serve” her. Doc. [28-1] ¶ U. On October

st

31 , the Court denied the motion “for failure to show good cause of excusable neglect per

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).” Doc. [30]. On December 4, Maxwell filed an amended motion to

leave to file a motion to dismiss out of time and attached a motion to dismiss and a

supporting affidavit. Docs. [31], [32], [33]. Maxwell argues that dismissal is necessary

under Rules 12(b)(5) and 4(m), as she was not properly served. Doc. [31]. Maxwell

attached an affidavit stating that she “did not receive a copy of the Summons and Complaint

in this case on July 8, 2025,” and only received a copy when “it was mailed to [her] by [her]

Id.

attorney in November 2025.” Doc. [31-1] ¶¶ 6-7. Maxwell further states that neither she

nor any of her family members lived, resided, or worked at 2322 Oaker Dr. at any time.

¶¶ 4-5. In response, Plaintiff argues that Maxwell waived any affirmative defense under

Rule 12(b)(5) by filing her initial motion for leave and that any such defense is now

untimely under Rule 12(h)(1). Doc. [35]. The Court granted Maxwell’s amended motion

for leave, Doc. [38], and will thus address her motion to dismiss.

Rule 4(m) directs the Court, after notice to the plaintiff, to dismiss an action against

a defendant upon whom service has not been made within 90 days after the filing of the

complaint, or order that service be made within a specified time. As applied to this matter,

the Rule 4(m) period for service of the Complaint expired on August 12, 2025, 90 days after

its filing. Plaintiff has not presented evidence contesting Maxwell’s statement that she was

not served, instead relying on argument that she waived the defense by attempting to file

See

an answer. Plaintiff does not acknowledge that Maxwell did assert an affirmative defense

based on improper service of process in her proposed answer. Doc. [28-1] ¶ U. Rule

12(h)(1) states that a party can waive “any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by,” as

relevant here, failing to “include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by

Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.” But Maxwell asserted the affirmative defense in her

proposed responsive pleading, so the Court will not find that she waived it by not

discussing it in her motion for leave to file that very pleading.

On the record before the Court, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Maxwell is

of 14 days to properly serve Maxwell under Rule 4(e) and file a properly executed proof of

service under Rule 4(1). Failure to submit proof of proper and timely service within 14

days of this Order will result in dismissal of Maxwell as a party to this suit.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Docs. [11], [22], [31],

and [43] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows. Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss Counts II, II, 1V, and V are GRANTED, and the counts are DISMISSED without

prejudice. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count I are GRANTED IN PART as to

Defendants Kelly Wilkens, Dr. Dawn Davis, and Valerie Nelson and DENIED IN PART as to

Defendants David Dooley and Janie Stephens. An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany

this Memorandum and Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants St. Louis County, Kelly Wilkens, Dr.

Dawn Davis, and Valerie Nelson are terminated as parties to this litigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of the date of this

Memorandum and Order, plaintiff will file an amended proof of service under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(1), showing that defendant Lisa Maxwell was properly served with

the summons and complaint under Rule 4(e). In the absence of an amended proof of

service that complies with Rule 4(e) and (m), Plaintiff shall show cause why her claims

against defendant Lisa Maxwell should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

effect timely service of process upon her. Failure to timely comply with this order will

result in dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against defendant Lisa Maxwell without prejudice

and without further notice.

Dated this 30 day of March, 2026. /

SARAH E. PITLYK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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