Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-23669-BLOOM/Elfenbein

KERSHA LEANIE LAMPSON HODGSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STARBOARD CRUISE SERVICES, INC.,

CELEBRITY CRUISE LINE, INC.,

INTERNATIONAL CRUISE SHOPS, LTD.,

and CELEBRITY SILHOUETTE, INC.,

Defendants.

___________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Starboard Cruise Services, Inc.

(“Starboard”), and International Cruise Shops, LTD’s (“ICS”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint, ECF No. [13], and Celebrity Cruise Line, Inc. (“Celebrity”) and Celebrity Silhouette,

Inc.’s (“Silhouette”) Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. [21]. Plaintiff Kersha

Leanie Lampson Hodgson (“Plaintiff”) filed Responses in Opposition to both Motions to Dismiss.

ECF Nos. [16]; [21]. Starboard and ICS, and Celebrity and Silhouette (collectively “Defendants”),

filed their Replies in Support. ECF Nos. [22]; [25]. The Court has reviewed the Defendants’

respective Motions to Dismiss, the briefs in support and opposition, the record, and is otherwise

advised of the premises. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motions are granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a maritime employment-related injury Plaintiff suffered on board the

cruise ship M/V Celebrity Silhouette. The Complaint alleges that on August 6, 2022, Plaintiff was

hired by ICS to work as a Sales Associate on Celebrity’s cruise ship M/V Celebrity Silhouette.

ECF No. [1] ¶ 8. Once on board, Plaintiff came under the direction and control of Starboard and/or

Celebrity. Id. ¶ 9. ICS was her Jones Act employer and, thus, owed her the duties and benefits of

a maritime employer, including “the duties to provide a seaworthy vessel, to provide prompt,

proper and adequate medical care, and to provide maintenance and cure until [she] was at

maximum medical cure.” Id. ¶ 12. Because Starboard and Celebrity directly controlled her work,

they were her borrowing Jones Act employers and therefore also owed her the duties of a maritime

employer. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Silhouette was the owner and operator and/or bare boat charterer and/or

owner pro hac vice of the cruise ship, M/V Celebrity Silhouette. Id. ¶ 16. Similarly, Celebrity was

the owner and/or bare boat charterer and/or owner pro hac vice of the cruise ship, M/V Celebrity

Silhouette. Regarding the relationship between the Defendants, Starboard, Celebrity, and ICS

engaged in a joint venture to sell merchandise to Celebrity’s passengers. Id. ¶ 23.

Although ICS was Plaintiff’s nominal employer, once she joined the M/V Celebrity

Silhouette, it was agreed that Plaintiff was working for Starboard under a Starboard supervisor and

assisting Starboard in selling goods in its on-board shops. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff’s Starboard supervisor

reported directly to and was under the supervision of Celebrity’s Hotel Director; thus, all final

orders came from Celebrity. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff provided her “sales services” for the benefit of

Starboard on a vessel owned and operated by Celebrity, and her “equipment, clothing, shoes,

supplies, and food” were provided by either Starboard or Celebrity. Id. ¶ 33.1 One hundred percent

of Plaintiff’s work was controlled, supervised, and directed by a Starboard supervisor, who in turn

was under the supervision of Celebrity, not ICS.2 Id. ¶ 34. Starboard or Celebrity also paid

1 While Plaintiff was originally hired to “work as a seaman and crewmember for ICS, . . . she never

performed any seaman’s work directly under ICS [a]nd never performed any functions on the vessel as a

crewmember, other than her work as a Sales Associate” for Starboard. Id. ¶ 34.

2 Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges that “one hundred percent of Plaintiff’s work on the M/V [Celebrity

Silhouette] was under the control supervision and direction of [Celebrity].” Id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiff’s salary, maintained the right to terminate her employment, “directed Plaintiff’s medical

treatment, made all decisions regarding when and where Plaintiff would sign off, provided for her

repatriation, and provided her medical care off the vessel.” Id. ¶¶ 34–37.

In her capacity as a Sales Associate, Plaintiff was required to exert herself physically, as

she was constantly required to bend and lift heavy items, and stand for long periods of time. Id. ¶

53. The vessel was short-staffed and Plaintiff was required to do the job of two crewmembers. Id.

¶ 55. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that these were dangerous conditions,

particularly given that Defendants assigned her these duties “without proper equipment such as a

trolley, or other assistance or rest[.]” Id. ¶¶ 72–73, 86–87.

Prior to her employment, Plaintiff underwent a pre-employment medical evaluation and

was found fit for duty with no restrictions, illnesses, or injuries, and no limitations. Id. ¶ 54. On

September 11, 2022, Plaintiff was ordered to lift and carry numerous heavy boxes on a repetitive

basis. When Plaintiff began lifting one of the last boxes, she felt a sharp pain in her lower back

and began to experience menstrual bleeding and abdominal pain. Id. ¶ 55. Consequently, Plaintiff

went to the ship’s infirmary3 complaining of “lower back pain” and “abdominal pain.” Id ¶ 57.

After examining Plaintiff, the on-board physician diagnosed Plaintiff with endometriosis and

dysmenorrhea, but “ignored [her] complaints of lower back pain.” Id. The next day, Plaintiff

returned to the infirmary “with reduced but persistent pain” and was “sent back to work on full

duty.” Id. ¶ 58.

On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff returned to the infirmary “with complaints of continued

lower abdominal pain that was not improving with the use of Tylenol or Tramadol.” Id. ¶ 59. The

physician once again diagnosed Plaintiff with dysmenorrhea and declared her unfit for duty. Id.

3 The “infirmary was owned, operated, controlled, supervised, and maintained” by Celebrity. Id. ¶ 56.

Plaintiff returned to the infirmary on November 10, 2022, and was assessed with dysmenorrhea

and sent back to work on full duty. Id. ¶ 60. Over the next weeks, Plaintiff was treated for her

continued menstrual pain and was diagnosed with endometriosis. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff was medically

disembarked and sent back to her home country of Nicaragua. Id. ¶¶ 61–62.

Once Plaintiff returned home, she was examined by a physician who diagnosed her with

“grade 4 endometriosis.” Id. ¶¶ 62–65. Her physician also noted that she was not at maximum

medical improvement (“MMI”) and recommended a complete hysterectomy—a procedure which

the Plaintiff did not want to undergo. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. Although there were less invasive treatments

available, Defendant refused to offer any procedure other than a hysterectomy. Id. ¶ 66.

Notwithstanding her treatment, Plaintiff has not been found at MMI for her lumbar, endometriosis,

or cyst conditions. Id. ¶ 67.

The Complaint asserts the following claims against Defendants: Jones Act Negligence

against Starboard (Count I); Jones Act Negligence against Celebrity (Count II); Jones Act

Negligence against ICS (Count III); Unseaworthiness against Celebrity (Count IV);

Unseaworthiness against Celebrity Silhouette (Count V); Maintenance and Cure Claim against

Starboard (Count VI); Maintenance and Cure Claim against Celebrity (Count VII); Maintenance

and Cure Claim against ICS (Count VIII); Maintenance and Cure Claim against Celebrity

Silhouette (Count IX); Failure to Provide Prompt, Proper, and Adequate Medical Care against

Starboard (Count X); Failure to Provide Prompt, Proper, and Adequate Medical Care against

Celebrity (Count XI); and Failure to Provide Prompt, Proper, and Adequate Medical Care against

ICS (Count XII). See generally id. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages for her Maintenance and

Cure claims. Id. at 39.

Defendants Starboard and ICS, and Celebrity and Silhouette, now seek to dismiss the

claims against them, via their respective Motions to Dismiss, because (1) Plaintiff’s Employment

Agreement provides that Maltese law governs and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring causes of

action under United States law; (2) the Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading;

and (3) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to determine who her employer is under the Jones

Act. See generally ECF Nos. [13]; [21]. As for Counts I through III, Defendants contend that those

claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to properly establish the notice necessary to

sustain a Jones Act negligence claim. See ECF Nos. [13] at 14–16; [21] at 14–15. Defendants

assert that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages must be stricken because the demand lacks

adequate factual support. See ECF Nos. [13] at 17–18; [21] at 17–18. Finally, Defendants Celebrity

and Silhouette seek to dismiss the Complaint due to insufficient service of process, arguing that

service of process was rejected by CT Corporation System (“CT Corporation”). ECF No. [21] at

18.

Plaintiff responds that the choice of law provision of the Employment Agreement is not

enforceable and that the Complaint does not violate the prohibition against shotgun pleadings. See

ECF Nos. [16] at 5–9, 15–16; [24] at 5–14. Regarding her employer allegations, Plaintiff contends

that she has provided more than sufficient facts to establish that either Starboard, Celebrity, or ICS

was her employer, and at the pleadings stage, she need not allege only one Jones Act employer but

may plead in the alternative. See ECF Nos. [16] at 16; [24] at 14. Plaintiff further argues that she

has established notice, as the Complaint properly identifies a dangerous condition and there are

specific details about how Defendants’ acts made them actually or constructively aware of the

dangerous condition. ECF Nos. [16] at 17–18; [24] at 14–16. Plaintiff maintains that she has

sufficiently alleged a basis for punitive damages because there is no need to establish “intentional

harm.” ECF Nos. [16] at 19–20; [24] at 16–17. Therefore, the “repeated recommendations for

medical care, maintenance and cure” and Defendants’ repeated refusals to provide them without

any good faith basis are sufficient to support punitive damages. ECF No. [24] at 16. Regarding

Celebrity and Silhouette’s insufficient services of process argument, Plaintiff contends that

Silhouette has not met its burden of proof to show defective service of process, relying on a

purported letter claiming that CT Corporation is not its registered agent. ECF No. [24] at 18–19.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘[t]he moving party bears the burden to show that

the complaint should be dismissed.’” Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Fils–Amie, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1228

(S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Mendez–Arriola v. White Wilson Med. Ctr. PA, No. 09–495, 2010 WL

3385356, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010)). A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557 (alteration in original)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When a defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the plaintiff’s

allegations as true and evaluate all possible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the

plaintiff. See Am. Marine Tech, Inc. v. World Grp. Yachting, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1079 (S.D.

Fla. 2019). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts “are not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.

2006). “[T]he court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will

support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d

1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court is

generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits. See Thaeter, 449

F.3d at 1352. However, pursuant to the incorporation by reference doctrine, “a district court may

consider evidence attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into a motion for

summary judgment ‘if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed,

meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.’” Swinford v. Santos, 121 F. 4th 179, 187 (11th Cir.

2024) (quoting Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Shotgun Pleading

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed as it constitutes an impermissible

shotgun pleading. ECF Nos. [13] at 7; [21] at 7. Turning first to Counts I–III, Defendants assert

that those claims violate the third type of shotgun pleading—“a complaint that does not separate

‘each cause of action or claim for relief’ into a different count.” ECF Nos. [13] at 8; [21] at 8

(quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)).

According to Defendants, Counts I–III comingle various theories of negligence, as all three counts

allege that Defendants owed the same duties to Plaintiff to provide her with a reasonably safe

working environment, including the provision of prompt, proper, and adequate medical treatment

aboard the vessel and shoreside, and then proceed to list the same identical thirty (30) ways in

which each Defendant breached this duty. ECF Nos. [13] at 8; [21] at 8 (quoting ECF No. [1] at

¶¶ 71(a)-(cc), 77(a)-(cc), 85(a)-(cc)). Not only do Defendants contend that Counts I–III commingle

multiple causes of action, they also argue that they “contain overlapping allegations and

improperly lump the same exhaustive list of breaches against all Defendants.” ECF Nos. [13] at

10; [21] at 10. Accordingly, Defendants insist that the counts do not give Defendants fair notice

of the theories of liability each must defend or the specific factual allegations that support each

cause of action. Id.

Plaintiff responds that her Complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading because she

alleges “in great detail the dangers and conditions which caused her injury and nature of her

accident and the ensuing failures for her to receive prompt medical care, maintenance & cure

thereafter.” ECF Nos. [16] at 15; [24] at 13 (emphasis removed). While Plaintiff acknowledges

that she has asserted similar claims against all three Defendants, she argues that such pleadings are

permissible as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) allows for alternative pleadings. However,

Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ argument that she has improperly commingled her

negligence claims.

“A complaint that fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow the defendant to

frame a responsive pleading [violates Rule 8(a)(2) and] constitutes a ‘shotgun pleading.’”

Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x. 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Byrne

v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128–29 (11th Cir. 2001)). Such unclear pleadings “exact an intolerable

toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, and impose

unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and

resources.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cramer

v. Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997)). The negative externalities also extend beyond a

single case. “[J]ustice is delayed for the litigants who are ‘standing in line,’ waiting for their cases

to be heard.” Id. Accordingly, shotgun pleadings are condemned by the Eleventh Circuit, which

has specifically instructed district courts to dismiss shotgun pleadings as “fatally defective.” B.L.E.

v. Georgia, 335 F. App’x. 962, 963 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun pleadings, the “unifying

characteristic” of which being that all shotgun pleadings “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate

notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm

Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). The first and “most common

type” of shotgun pleading “is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and

the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. The second type of shotgun

pleading is the complaint that is “guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague,

and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. Third

is the pleading “that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action

or claim for relief.” Id. at 1323. Fourth is the pleading that asserts “multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,

or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id.

The Court finds that Counts I–III of the Complaint commit the third type of sin identified

by the Eleventh Circuit in Weiland—failing to separate “into a different count each cause of action

or claim for relief.” 792 F.3d at 1323; see Gautam v. City of Sunrise, No. 25-CV-60841, 2025 WL

2418392, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2025). For instance, in Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Starboard

was negligent based on (1) its failure “to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe working

environment,” (2) its failure “to instruct and/or train its crewmembers to perform tasks with a

procedure, method, or policy that would avoid injuries,” and (3) its “[failure] to implement safe

and reasonable work methods. Those allegations constitute three distinct forms of negligence,

specifically, failure to provide, failure to implement, and failure to train. Courts in this district have

been clear that distinct theories of negligence must be pled in separate counts as opposed to

pleading all the various theories of liability under one general negligence claim. See e.g., Miles v.

Carnival Corp., 767 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (“Plaintiffs may not ‘cram multiple,

distinct theories of liability into one claim’”) (quoting Ortiz v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-cv-24838,

2020 WL 6945958, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2020)); White v. Carnival Corp., No. 25-CV-20925,

2025 WL 1865127, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2025) (“When a plaintiff asserts distinct theories of

negligence liability in a maritime case, the courts in this district have been clear that the plaintiff

must bring each as a separate count.”); Ortiz, 2020 WL 6945958, at *1 (ordering plaintiff to amend

complaint to “separately allege an independent count” for various theories of liability that were

lumped into a single claim (citing Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-23359-Civ, 2012 WL

2049431, at *5–*6, n.2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012))); Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No.

15-22295, 2015 WL 8227674, *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (same); Lanza v. Hobby Lobby

Stores, Inc., No. 24-cv-24043, 2025 WL 507308, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2025) (“Because

Plaintiff seeks to advance multiple theories of negligence, she must separate each cause of action

into a separate paragraph, and [she must] support each cause of action with specific (non-

conclusory) factual allegations.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Doe By v. Hernando

Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 8:23-CV-1772-CEH-AAS, 2023 WL 5758934, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2023)

(“To avoid improper commingling, claims that Plaintiffs assert under distinct theories of liability

must be set forth in different counts.”). Because Counts II–III have the same defects, the Complaint

is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend to permit Plaintiff to cure the pleading

deficiencies.

B. Insufficient Service of Process

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Celebrity and Silhouette contend that Plaintiff

provided insufficient service of process. ECF No. [21] at 18. Plaintiff attempted to serve both

Defendants by providing copies of the Complaint and summons to CT Corporation, which returned

letters denying service of process. Id. at 18–19. Regarding Celebrity, CT Corporation denied

service because it is the registered agent for “Celebrity Cruises, Inc.”, not “Celebrity Cruise Line,

Inc.” Id. at 19. Regarding Silhouette, it rejected service of process as CT Corporation is not its

registered agent. Id. Attached to Defendants Celebrity and Silhouette’s Motion to Dismiss are the

letters denying service of process. ECF Nos. [21-1]; [21-2]. Furthermore, Defendants’ Certificate

of Interested Parties clarifies that “[t]he vessel, Celebrity Silhouette, is 100% owned by RCL

Celebrity Ships LLC (who Plaintiff erroneously labels ‘Celebrity Silhouette Inc.’), which is an

indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.” ECF No. [32] at 2.

Plaintiff responds that Silhouette has failed to meet its burden of proof regarding deficient

service of process.4 ECF No. [24] at 18. Plaintiff points out that she served process upon Silhouette

in a concurrent state action via CT Corporation. Id. In that state action, Plaintiff highlights that

4 While Plaintiff responds to Silhouette’s service of process arguments, Plaintiff does not respond to the

argument Celebrity presents in their Motion regarding insufficient service of process, and thus the Court

deems the argument unrebutted.

Silhouette did not object to service of process and later appeared in the state action, despite moving

to dismiss on a different basis. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Silhouette did not attack any

defect in the return of service, relying instead on a letter stating that CT Corporation System is not

its registered agent. Id. Plaintiff argues that Silhouette “has not overcome the presumption of

regular service” as the letter is not sufficient to do so, and seeks to bolster her argument by claiming

that Silhouette had “actual knowledge” of the litigation and has been “actively participating” in it.

Id. at 19. Plaintiff also argues that since “[Silhouette] purports to be a foreign corporation,” valid

service may be accomplished pursuant to the rules for foreign entities, namely Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(f)(3) and 4(h)(2). Id.5

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[u]nless federal law provides otherwise or

the defendant’s waiver has been filed, a domestic or foreign corporation [being served in a judicial

district of the United States] . . ., must be served: (A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for

serving an individual; or (B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an

officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to

receive service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so

requires—by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). An individual

may be served within a U.S. judicial district by “(1) following state law for serving a summons in

an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or

where service is made; or (2) doing any of the following . . . (C) delivering a copy of each to an

agent authorized by appointment or law to receive such service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

Under the Florida statute, “a domestic corporation or registered foreign corporation may be served

5 Plaintiff, in her Complaint, alleges that Silhouette is a foreign corporation with its principal place of

business in Miami, Florida. ECF No. [1] ¶ 7.

with process required or authorized by law by service on its registered agent designated by the

corporation under chapter 607 or chapter 617, as applicable.” Fla. Stat. § 48.081(2).

“While a plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving valid service of process, a ‘return

of service that is regular on its face is presumed to be valid absent clear and convincing evidence

presented to the contrary.’” Friedman v. Schiano, 777 F. App’x 324, 331 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Robles-Martinez v. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, 88 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)). “Regular

on its face means the return of service attests to all the information required by the service statute.”

Id. Further, “clear and convincing evidence ‘must be of such weight that it produces in the mind

of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations

sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA

1983).

It is not uncommon for judges to resolve factual disputes where the motion to dismiss is

not an adjudication on the merits. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008). “A judge

may make factual findings necessary to resolve motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,

improper venue, and ineffective service of process.” Id. (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1360 at 78 n.15 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that “the defense

of improper service of process involves a matter in abatement and does not go to the merits of the

action” and that any “factual question raised by the affidavits or other evidence presented on a

Rule 12(b)(4) or a Rule 12(b)(5) motion should be determined by the district court.”).

In the present case, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Compliance—Return of Service. ECF

No. [11]. The Return of Service forms for “Celebrity Cruise Line, Inc.” and “Celebrity Silhouette”

are included. ECF Nos. [11-2]; [11-4]. Regarding Silhouette, Defendants’ Certificate of Interested

Parties clarifies that M/V Celebrity Silhouette is wholly owned by RCL Celebrity Ships LLC. See

ECF No. [32] at 2. Moreover, Defendant Silhouette attaches a “notice of rejected service of

process” letter from CT Corporation informing Plaintiff that it is “not the registered agent of the

party [Plaintiff] [was] attempting to serve.” ECF No. [21-1]. Those documents demonstrate that

neither Celebrity nor Silhouette were properly served under their correct name.

The Eleventh Circuit has held “when a plaintiff has actually sued and served the correct

party, but merely mistakenly used the wrong defendant's name, a mere misnomer exists and it may

be disregarded where it is fairly certain that no prejudice has resulted to the defendant.”

Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. L.F. Staffing Services, Inc., No. 07-80865-CIV, 2008 WL

11333664 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 874

(4th Cir. 1947); People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635, 641 (E.D. La.

1968)). Here, however, that is not the case, and this Court firmly rejects the conclusion that, with

regard to Defendant Silhouette, the difference between “Celebrity Silhouette” and “RCL Celebrity

Ships LLC” is a “mere misnomer.” Further, despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, courts in

this District have relied on extrinsic evidence, including letters of notice rejecting service of

process, at the motion to dismiss stage. See Vazquez v. Graco, Inc., No. 23-20703-CV, 2023 WL

11988787, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2023).

Accordingly, the Court is persuaded by the discrepancies between the Defendants’ correct

names and the incorrect names evidenced on the Plaintiff’s Returns of Service. See ECF Nos. [32];

[11-2]; [11-4]. Those discrepancies find further support in Defendants’ notice of rejected service

of process letter, ECF No. [21-1]. Thus, Plaintiff has not met the requirements for sufficient service

of process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Florida Statutes. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(h)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Fla. Stat. § 48.081(2).

Plaintiff further argues that the letter is a hearsay document and thus is not competent

evidence by which Silhouette can refute a return of service; however, Plaintiff fails to offer any

legal or factual support for this proposition. Accordingly, “[w]hen a litigant raises an argument

only generally and fails to offer specific factual contentions or fails to support the argument with

legal authority, a court may summarily reject the argument.” Cortaza v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-

23705, 2023 WL 2165149, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2023); see, e.g. Jacobus v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 664 F.

App’x 774, 777 (11th Cir. 2016); United States Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff similarly argues that Defendant did “not provide any evidence that CT

Corporation did not have sufficient agency relationship with Silhouette.” ECF No. [24] at 20.

However, that contention is also devoid of any factual or legal support. Thus, the Court finds

service of process insufficient. Should Plaintiff seek to amend her Complaint, she must serve each

improperly served Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [13], is GRANTED.

2. Celebrity Cruise Line, Inc. and Celebrity Silhouette, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the

Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. [21], is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint no later than April 14, 2026. Moreover,

if Plaintiff refers to her “Employment Agreement” and “employment contract” in

her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff shall attach it to the Amended Complaint.

Case No. 25-cv-23669-BLOOM/Elfenbein

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on March 31, 2026.

BETH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

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