Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SAM JACKSON CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1569

VERSUS DISTRICT JUDGE FALLON

VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, INC., ET. AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE NORTH

ORDER AND REASONS

The Court has before it two Motions to Dismiss in the above-captioned action, one filed

by Defendants Volunteers of American Southeast Louisiana, Inc. (“VOASELA”), Jeff Mullan,

Greg Brown, and Jason Stereal (collectively, the “Volunteers Defendants”), R. Doc. 15, and one

filed by Defendants Express Services Inc. of Colorado, Express Services, Inc. (together, “Express

Services”), and Sandra Anderson (collectively, the “Express Defendants”), R. Doc. 17. Both sets

of Defendants argue that pro se Plaintiff Sam Jackson’s claims against them must be dismissed on

several grounds. Plaintiff has filed no opposition to either motion. Having considered the briefing

in light of the applicable law and record facts, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN

PART Defendants’ motions for the following reasons.

I. BACKGROUND & PRESENT MOTIONS

Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint for Employment Discrimination with this Court on July

30th, 2025. R. Doc. 1. Plaintiff checked boxes to indicate that his claims were raised pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Id. at 3. Plaintiff

provided no written statement of his claim, but checked boxes to indicate that the discriminatory

conduct of which he complained in this action included termination of his employment, failure to

promote him, failure to accommodate his disability, unequal terms and conditions of his

employment, and retaliation, and that he claimed the Defendants discriminated against him based

on his race, color, gender/sex, religion, and age. Id. at 4. He attached to his complaint an unsigned

employment contract between “Express Employment professionals” and himself, R. Doc. 1 at 7–

11, and charges of discrimination against “VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA INC” (the “Volunteers

Charge”) and “Express professional employee” (the “Express Charge”) filed with the United States

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), along with the responding EEOC

Determination and Notice of Right to Sue letters. R. Doc. 1-1.

The Volunteers Charge states:

I began my employment with Volunteer of America in December 2024, most

recently as a Monitor, earning $ 10.00 per hour. I was told after I worked the

recommended hours I would transition to full time. I worked the required hours and

was not hired for fulltime employment. Justin LNU (black male) worked for

approximately (sic) months and transition (sic) to fulltime. I believe my religion as

a Christian was the reason I did not transition to fulltime. According to the

company, they no longer needed my services. I believe I have been discriminated

against because of my religion, Christian, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Id. at 1. The Express Charge states:

I went to Express Employment Professional for job seeking in November 2024.

Initially I was working in a coffee shop. I was called by Cassandra (LNU). She

advised that she found employment with Volunteers of American. I asked to work

both jobs, she threatened me and said I can only work one or be fired. I was told

after I worked the recommended hours I would transition to full time. I worked the

required hours and was not hired for fulltime employment. Justin LNU (black male)

worked for approximately months and transition to fulltime. According to the

company, they no longer needed my services. I believe I have been retaliated

against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Id. at 11.

Both the Volunteers Defendants and the Express Defendants now seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims against them. R. Doc. 15, 17. The Volunteers Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should

be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted because:

a. Jackson has not alleged that VOASELA employed him, which is a prerequisite for

liability under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.

b. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA do not provide for individual liability.

c. Jackson did not exhaust his administrative remedies before asserting his sex or race

discrimination claims under Title VII, his ADEA or ADA claims, or his retaliation

claim.

d. The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish that VOASCLA

terminated Jackson’s employment, failed to promote him, or subjected him to

unequal terms and conditions of employment based on his religion.

R. Doc. 15-1 at 2. The Express Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against them should be

dismissed either for failure to state a claim, or for deficient service of process under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) or (5). R. Doc. 17-1 at 1.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2008)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is plausible on its face when the

plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow the court to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 570. Although a court must liberally construe the

complaint in light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996),

courts “do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions.” Arias-Benn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)).

III. DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, the Court notes that it construes Plaintiff’s pleadings with all deference due

a pro se litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are “to

be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers”). Accordingly, the Court construes the allegations made in Plaintiff’s employment

discrimination charges to be incorporated as part of his complaint. But even by this standard,

Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert only Title VII claims. Plaintiff makes no factual

allegations which can be construed as alleging either an ADEA or ADA claim. Accordingly, any

and all claims under those statutes are hereby DISMISSED.

As to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims, it is well established that Title VII does not impose

individual liability. Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 388 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2003)

(“Individuals are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants, Mullen, Brown, Streal, and

Anderson, also must be and hereby are DISMISSED.

Additionally, a plaintiff alleging workplace discrimination must exhaust all administrative

remedies before asserting a claim under Title VII in federal court. Castro v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal

Justice, 541 F. App’x 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2013). “The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when

plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory right-to-sue notice.” E.E.O.C.

v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 (E.D. La. 2011). The exhaustion requirement

“is strictly construed, and courts have routinely dismissed cases in which the plaintiff did not allege

that they received a right-to-sue letter or failed to present evidence that such a letter had issued.”

Ordonye v. Clement, No. 24-2084, 2025 WL 371385, at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2025). Here, Plaintiff

received right-to-sue letters from the EEOC as to the Volunteers Charge and the Express Charge.

R. Doc. 1-1. However, only claims that are “like or related to” the charge’s allegations are deemed

to be exhausted by the charge filing. Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Volunteers Charge, even construed liberally, can be read only to make out a claim for race- or

religion-based discrimination. R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. Similarly, the Express Charge can be read only to

make out a claim for race-based discrimination. Id. at 11. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as to any other form of discrimination, and those claims must

also be DISMISSED.

The claims that remain are Plaintiff’s claims against VOASELA for race- or religion-based

discrimination and against Express Services for race-based discrimination under Title VII.

VOASELA argues Plaintiff’s remaining claims against it should be dismissed because, it asserts,

Plaintiff makes no allegation that VOASELA employed Plaintiff. “[A]n employment relationship

between the plaintiff and the defendant is a prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action.”

Lavergne v. HCA Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).

However, in the Volunteers Charge, Plaintiff does allege that he “began [his] employment with

Volunteer of America in December 2024, most recently as a Monitor, earning $ 10.00 per hour[.]”

R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. At the motion to dismiss stage, this suffices as an allegation that an employment

relationship between Plaintiff and VOASELA, misnamed by Plaintiff as Volunteer of America,

existed.

Finally, VOASELA and Express Services1 both argue that Plaintiff’s remaining Title VII

claims against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

1 Express Services also argues that Plaintiff’s claims against it should be dismissed because Plaintiff served

it seven days late. However, “[t]he district court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action

granted, given that the Volunteers Charge, the Express Charge, and the Complaint contain only

conclusory allegations against them and little or no factual support for Plaintiff’s claims. However,

Rule 15 of Civil Procedure provides that a court should freely give a party leave to amend its

complaint when justice so requires, unless amendment would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2);

Foman y. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court cannot hold at this time, and on the basis of

the scant record before it, that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the Court will grant

Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to the remaining Title VII claims against VOASELA and

Express Services only.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons;

IT IS ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss, R. Doc. 15 and 17, are GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART, namely, all claims brought under ADA or the ADEA, all claims

against individual defendants Mullen, Brown, Streal, and Anderson, and unexhausted Title VII

claims are hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff file an amended complaint as to his remaining

Title VII claims of race- and religion-based discrimination against VOASELA and race-based

discrimination against Express Services, containing more fulsome factual allegations against those

parties in support of his claims, no later than thirty days from the date of this order. Failure to

comply with this order and file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s

remaining claims without further notice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of April, 2026.

be CBr

United States District Judge

for ineffective service of process.” George v. U.S. Dep? of Labor, 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (Sth Cir. 1986). Under these

circumstances, the Court declines to penalize a pro se litigant for a short delay in properly executed service.