State of Tennessee v. Rhonda Carole Sterbenz

04/16/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 14, 2026

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RHONDA CAROLE STERBENZ

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County

No. 2022-CR-48457 William A. Lockhart, Judge

No. M2025-00912-CCA-R3-CD

Rhonda Carole Sterbenz, the Defendant, was convicted by a Coffee County Circuit Court

jury of driving under the influence (DUI), fifth offense; DUI per se, fifth offense; violating

the open container law; and failing to exercise due care. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2024)

(DUI); § 55-10-416 (2024) (open container); § 55-8-136 (2024) (failure to exercise due

care). The DUI convictions merged, and the Defendant received an effective sentence of

two years and one day. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient

to support her DUI convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM

GREENHOLTZ and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.

John E. Nicoll, District Public Defender; Brennan M. Wingerter, Public Defender-

Appellate Division; and Willis McKee (at trial), Assistant Public Defender, for the

appellant, Rhonda Carole Sterbenz.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Craig Northcott, District Attorney General; and Michael S. Hibdon,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Defendant was seen on February 3, 2022, by a Coffee County Sheriff’s

investigator standing outside her inoperable motor vehicle after a 9-1-1 caller reported that

a vehicle had hit a sign off the roadway and the driver smelled of alcohol. The Defendant

exhibited several signs of impairment, and the investigator found a half-empty bottle of

alcohol in the vehicle. The vehicle’s engine was still warm, and the Defendant admitted to

having drunk alcohol earlier and to pulling her vehicle off the roadway because it had

mechanical issues. The investigator arrested the Defendant for DUI, and a test of her blood

obtained approximately one hour later revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .221%.

At the trial, Coffee County Sheriff’s Investigator Cody Koon testified that he

received basic police academy training for determining whether a person was driving under

the influence. He detailed that he was trained to look for evidence of a suspect’s red, watery

eyes; slurred speech; unsteadiness; delayed reactions; and difficulty focusing on multiple

tasks at one time. He stated that he also received training in administering field sobriety

tests. He noted that he had participated in about five DUI investigations. Investigator

Koon stated he regularly responded to motor vehicle crashes.

Investigator Koon testified that he and his vehicle were not outfitted with cameras

on the night of the arrest. He stated that he investigated the Defendant as a result of a 9-1-

1 call received at 10:55 p.m. A recording of the call was received as an exhibit and played

for the jury. The recording reflected that the caller described the driver as a woman who

“smelled like alcohol” and that the woman’s vehicle “crashed through a signpost” and was

parked alongside “Grace Haven’s Circle.”

Investigator Koon testified that he arrived at the crash site at 11:03 p.m. and

observed that the Defendant’s vehicle had hit a street sign and that the driver’s side door

and hood were open. He stated that he saw the Defendant near the driver’s side door with

a “battery jump box.” Photographs of the vehicle and its location were received as an

exhibit. He said that the roadway was wet and that the weather was cool and clear. He

stated that no obstacles were in the road, that the roadway was straight, and that there were

no signs of tire marks on the roadway from the vehicle braking before the crash. He stated

that the Defendant’s vehicle’s engine was warm but not running.

Investigator Koon testified that when he approached the Defendant, he noticed she

was unsteady on her feet; had red, watery eyes; and had a strong odor of alcohol coming

from her breath. He said she told him that she was not injured and that she had consumed

alcohol earlier that day. The Defendant informed him that she would not attempt a field

sobriety test due to a prior hip injury. He stated that the Defendant said that she had “to

pull over” her vehicle off the roadway because the vehicle had “issues.” He said that the

Defendant consented to a search of her vehicle and that he found a half-empty bottle of Jim

Beam Red Stag liquor in a brown bag between the driver’s and the passenger’s seats.

Photographs of the Defendant’s vehicle and the bottle were received as exhibits.

Investigator Koon testified that he identified the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle, but

that he did not observe the Defendant driving the vehicle. He stated that the Defendant

responded that she did not know “exactly where she was” nor the time. He said he placed

the Defendant under arrest for DUI.

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Investigator Koon testified that he took the Defendant to the Coffee County jail at

11:23 p.m. for a blood draw. He discovered that the jail did not have the staff to draw her

blood and that he took her to Unity Medical Center, where the Defendant’s blood was

drawn at 12:15 a.m.

On cross-examination, Investigator Koon testified that he did not take any notes

while investigating the incident. He stated that he wrote his incident report the same

morning as the blood draw. He admitted that the arrest warrant application stated that the

Defendant had been drinking “earlier” and did not specify if earlier referred to the day of

the warrant application. He agreed that he testified at a preliminary hearing that the

Defendant “didn’t advise specifically when or how she drank. She had just said that she

had drank previously that night.” He said that he did not know how long the Defendant’s

vehicle had been on the side of the roadway before he arrived. He affirmed that he did not

know when the Defendant drank from the bottle, nor if she drank while driving.

On redirect examination, Investigator Koon testified that when he used the term

“day” he was indicating that the Defendant drank prior to when he met the Defendant that

night. He said that he believed the Defendant had been drinking and had been driving her

vehicle because the vehicle was parked in an abnormal way, was over the road curb, and

was “against” a street sign. He testified that even though the roads were wet, there was no

evidence that a road obstruction led to the Defendant’s vehicle troubles. Additionally, he

observed that the Defendant’s speech was slurred and that she was unsteady on her feet.

He stated that all of his observations supported his reasoning that the totality of the

circumstances supported that the Defendant had been drinking and had been driving.

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Special Agent Kelly Hopkins, an expert

in the toxicology of alcohol, testified that she analyzed the Defendant’s blood sample for

the presence of alcohol. She stated that she received specialized training and education to

qualify her to work in the TBI toxicology unit. She said that the TBI used an extensive

evidentiary verification system to ensure that samples received by the lab were properly

handled and analyzed. She testified that the Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .221%.

A TBI alcohol report with the Defendant’s blood alcohol results was received as an exhibit.

Agent Hopkins testified that the alcohol in three to five drinks could be fully

absorbed by a 150-pound person within twenty minutes and that the person’s blood alcohol

content would be .08%. She said that a person who had stopped drinking would lose .01-

.02% of the person’s blood alcohol concentration level per hour. She testified that a 150-

pound person would be required to drink between twelve and fourteen drinks containing

one to one and a half fluid ounces of “hard liquor” over a twenty-minute period for the

person with an empty stomach to reach the Defendant’s reported blood alcohol content an

hour after drinking. Agent Hopkins stated that a 750-milliliter bottle of hard liquor

contained approximately twenty-four drinks. She said that alcohol delayed a person’s

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reaction time, decreased critical judgment, and resulted in slurred speech and impaired

vision. She stated that a person under the influence of alcohol could not safely perform the

multitasking that driving required. She said the higher the blood alcohol content, the more

likely the effects of alcohol would be visible.

On cross-examination, Agent Hopkins testified that the closer in time the blood

draw is to the incident in question, the more accurate the blood alcohol content percentage

would be because the blood alcohol content changes over time. She stated it was possible

for a crash to be discovered long after it occurred and that the blood draw of a driver would

not reflect the driver’s blood alcohol content at the time of the crash. She confirmed that

it was possible the Defendant could have consumed enough alcohol before officers arrived

to reach a blood alcohol content of .221% at testing. She said that she could not extrapolate

the Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration to a specific time earlier in the day because

the information she had available only allowed her to determine the alcohol content at the

time of the blood draw.

On redirect examination, Agent Hopkins testified that a blood draw an hour after a

person was stopped by police was not unusual. She stated that a wrecked vehicle could be

evidence of impairment. She said that alcohol could impair a person’s decision-making

ability and cause a driver to wreck. She testified that someone under the .08% blood

alcohol content legal limit could still be impaired by looking at the totality of the

circumstances.

Vehicle mechanic William Wilhoit testified for the Defendant. He stated that he

worked on the Defendant’s vehicle after the crash. He said the Defendant’s vehicle was

inoperable because the timing belt was damaged. He stated that a broken timing belt would

cause a vehicle’s power steering and braking system to revert to its manual function. He

said that the Defendant’s vehicle had no damage to the front bumper.

On cross-examination, Mr. Wilhoit testified that the vehicle could be pushed even

without an operable engine. He stated that once a vehicle loses engine power, the resulting

loss of power steering can increase the difficulty of driving the vehicle. He said that the

vehicle’s striking another object would not affect the timing belt’s integrity unless the

vehicle hit “something substantial” and noted that a broken timing belt would not change

the direction of the vehicle.

After receiving the proof, the jury found the Defendant guilty of DUI, fifth offense;

DUI per se, fifth offense; violation of the open container law; and failing to exercise due

care. After merger of the DUI convictions, the Defendant was ordered to receive an

effective sentence of two years and one day. This appeal followed.

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The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her DUI

convictions because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was in

physical control of an operable motor vehicle while intoxicated. The Defendant does not

challenge any of her other convictions on appeal. The State responds that the evidence is

sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s DUI convictions. We agree with the State.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521

(Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate

courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility

of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are resolved by the

trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676

S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

“A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v.

Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.

2009)).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 states in relevant part:

It is unlawful for any person to drive or to be in physical control of any

automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and

highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of

any shopping center, trailer park, or apartment house complex, or any other

premises that is generally frequented by the public at large, while:

(1) Under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, controlled substance,

controlled substance analogue, drug, substance affecting the central nervous

system, or combination thereof that impairs the driver’s ability to safely

operate a motor vehicle by depriving the driver of the clearness of mind and

control of oneself that the driver would otherwise possess; [or]

(2) The alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath is eight-

hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more[.]

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A totality of the circumstances approach is used in determining whether a defendant is in

physical control of a vehicle. State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993). The

jury is permitted to consider “all circumstances,” including the defendant’s location in

relationship to the vehicle, the location of the ignition key, whether the motor was running,

the defendant's ability to direct the use or non-use of the vehicle, and whether the vehicle

was capable of operation. Id. (emphasis in original).

The Defendant relies upon the vehicle’s inoperability to support her claim that no

evidence demonstrated she was in physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

However, the Defendant conflates the operability of the vehicle as the deciding factor

rather than its being just one of the factors to be considered in determining whether

someone was in physical control of a motor vehicle. See id.

The record reflects that the evidence is more than sufficient for a rational trier of

fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the DUI

offenses. The Defendant was by the driver’s side door when Investigator Koon arrived,

had a battery jump box in her hand, and stated she was attempting to restart her vehicle.

Investigator Koon testified that the Defendant’s vehicle’s engine was warm, that there was

no one else in the Defendant’s vehicle, and that the vehicle was partially over a curb and

against a street sign. He testified that the Defendant informed him that she had to pull off

the roadway because her vehicle was having “issues.” Investigator Koon found a half-

empty bottle of alcohol in the Defendant’s vehicle, and the Defendant admitted to drinking

alcohol earlier. Investigator Koon testified that the Defendant had slurred speech, was

unsteady on her feet, had red, watery eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol coming from her

breath. The Defendant’s blood was drawn for testing about an hour after her arrest. Agent

Hopkins determined that the Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .221% and that twelve

to fourteen drinks consumed during a one-hour period would have been required for the

Defendant to reach this blood alcohol concentration level.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could have

determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was under the influence of

alcohol while driving or being in physical control of her motor vehicle based upon the

Defendant’s statements, the officer’s observations of the Defendant’s impairment, the

circumstances of her vehicle’s crash, and her .221% blood alcohol content one hour after

her arrest. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient because no direct

evidence was presented at the trial that the Defendant was intoxicated contemporaneously

with her driving an operable vehicle. However, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for the jury to infer that the Defendant was under the influence while driving or being in

physical control of a motor vehicle. See Hall, 976 S.W.2d at 140; Sutton, 166 S.W.3d at

691. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

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In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

s/ Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.__ __

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

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