holding that language in an order in a related case, stating that a “suit was frivolous and filed merely to vex, [a party and her attorneys],” was insufficient “to meet the requirement for a bad faith finding”
How later courts described this case
- holding that language in an order in a related case, stating that a “suit was frivolous and filed merely to vex, [a party and her attorneys],” was insufficient “to meet the requirement for a bad faith finding”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CATHERINE BROWN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 21-1844
MINYANGO TOKPAH, ET AL. SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are non-party D.M.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc.
101) and Defendants Andrea Stewart, Gerald Palmer, and Anti Fraud
Warriors, LLC’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 105). For the following
reasons, both Motions for Attorney’s Fees are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Given this action’s extensive factual and procedural history, the Court
incorporates the background outlined in its August 28, 2025 Order and
Reasons by reference.1 The following facts are particularly relevant to the
instant Motions for Attorney’s Fees.
Plaintiff Catherine Brown filed this suit against various Defendants
alleging that each had engaged to some degree in stalking, harassing,
threatening, attacking, intimidating, or defaming her through online activity.
On November 4, 2022, this Court granted Defendants Andrea Stewart, Gerald
Palmer, and Anti Fraud Warriors, LLC’s (the “Dismissed Defendants”) Motion
to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Plaintiff had not made a “prima
1 Doc. 97.
facie showing that personal jurisdiction” extended to the Dismissed
Defendants.2
After Plaintiff failed to take necessary steps to prosecute this litigation,
on January 24, 2024 and January 8, 2025 respectively, this Court issued two
Notices to Show Cause.3 Plaintiff filed replies to each.4 In those Replies,
Plaintiff made allegations against D.M. without naming D.M. as a defendant.5
D.M. was granted leave to intervene so that she could file her “Motion to
Enforce Compromise, and Motion to Redact or Strike” (“Motion to
Enforce/Redact”). In D.M.’s Motion to Enforce/Redact, D.M. alleged that, upon
discovering her name in the public record, she reached an agreement with
Plaintiff’s counsel to redact her name from the record of this suit. D.M. further
alleged that Plaintiff failed to honor their agreement to remove D.M.’s name
from the record. D.M. then argued that her name should be redacted from the
record because the parties had reached an agreement to do so and, in the
alternative, the allegations against her were immaterial.6 The Court granted
D.M.’s Motion to Enforce/Redact in part, ordering Plaintiff to redact all
reference to D.M’s legal name by September 4, 2025.7 Plaintiff filed redacted
versions of Docs. 73, 73-1, 80-1, and 82 on September 3, 2025, and the Court
ordered the Clerk of Court replace the unredacted versions in the record.
2 Doc. 68.
3 Docs. 69, 81.
4 Docs. 73, 82.
5 Plaintiff’s Replies originally identified D.M. by her legal name. They have since been
redacted.
6 Doc. 94.
7 Because enforcing the alleged agreement would not entitle D.M. to redaction, her requested
relief, the Court analyzed D.M.’s Motion to Enforce/Redact under the standard for redaction.
Doc. 97; see Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, No. 22-50707, 2024 WL 980494, at *3 (5th
Cir. Mar. 7, 2024) (stating that even where the parties agree to remain anonymous, the
Court must determine whether anonymizing or redacting the record is appropriate).
On September 11, 2025, D.M. filed her Motion for Attorney’s Fees,
seeking to sanction Plaintiff for her conduct in this action. Roughly a month
later, the Dismissed Defendants filed their own Motion for Attorney’s Fees,
adopting similar arguments to those in D.M’s Motion. Plaintiff opposes both
Motions for Attorney’s Fees.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the “bedrock principle known as the ‘American Rule,’ ‘[e]ach
litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract
provides otherwise.’”8 As an exception to the “American Rule,” the Supreme
Court has held that “federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney’s
fees,” such as “when a party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons.’”9 “It is well-settled, however, that the threshold for the
use of inherent sanctioning power is high, and once the power is invoked, it
must be ‘exercised with restraint and discretion.’”10 “A court should invoke its
inherent power to award attorney’s fees only when it finds that ‘fraud has been
practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.’”11 A
“finding of bad faith must be supported by clear and convincing proof.”12
8 Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp. 568 U.S. 371, 382 (2013) (citation modified) (quoting Hardt v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010)).
9 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991) (citation modified) (first quoting
Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); then quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)).
10 Maguire Oil Co.v. The City of Houston, 143 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Chaves
v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)).
11 Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Rihner, 41 F.3d 997, 1005 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Chambers,
501 U.S. at 46).
12 Hammervold v. Blank, 3 F.4th 803, 811 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Moore, 739 F.3d 724,
730 (5th Cir. 2014)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. D.M.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
D.M. argues that an award of attorney’s fees is warranted because
Plaintiff “abused these proceedings and engaged in unnecessary, bad faith
actions as retribution against D.M.”13 D.M. avers that sanctions are warranted
because “the Court has already determined that [Plaintiff’s] filings ‘might have
become a vehicle for improper purposes.’”14 D.M. also argues that Plaintiff’s
refusal to abide by the terms of their alleged compromise agreement and to
redact D.M.’s legal name from Plaintiff’s filings demonstrates Plaintiff’s bad
faith. D.M. further asserts that Plaintiff’s conduct in this action has “no place
in legitimate civil litigation,” because she has used this “proceeding as a
platform to publicly smear a non-party.”15 Plaintiff opposes, asserting she has
acted in good faith throughout the proceedings.
To the extent D.M.’s argument relies on language from this Court’s prior
ruling, D.M. takes a statement of law out of context and imputes a finding of
bad faith where none was made.16 In the Court’s Order on D.M.’s Motion to
Enforce/Redact, the Court held that that redaction was appropriate given that
D.M. was not named as a defendant and that Plaintiff had stated her intent to
remove D.M. from this suit.17 In so holding, the Court found that under these
circumstances, the balance between public and private interests weighed in
favor of redaction. To the extent that the Court’s Order on D.M.’s Motion to
13 Doc. 101-1 at 4.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 6.
16 In the Court’s Order on D.M.’s Motion to Enforce/Redact, the Court wrote that “Courts have
denied access to judicial records when those files ‘might have become a vehicle for improper
purposes’ such as when records are ‘used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal.’”
Doc. 97 at 12 (quoting Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, No. 22-50707, 2024 WL 980494,
at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2024)).
17 Doc. 97 at 12.
Enforce/Redact implied Plaintiff had an “improper purpose,” the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s conduct was not so egregious as to support a finding of bad
faith.18
As to D.M.’s assertion that Plaintiff’s refusal to abide by their alleged
compromise constitutes bad faith conduct warranting sanction, the Court
disagrees. As seen in Procaccino v. Jeansonne, a party’s refusal to honor a
settlement agreement may constitute bad faith conduct warranting an award
of attorney’s fees in certain circumstances.19 In Procaccino, “[a]ll of the
evidence in the record amply supported a finding that the parties had settled
[the suit] and that [the defendant] changed his mind, opting to aggressively
pursue motion practice instead of honoring the settlement agreement.”20
However, sanctions are not warranted under these facts, because Plaintiff’s
refusal to abide by the terms of their alleged agreement did not unnecessarily
multiply the proceedings. Unlike in Procaccino, D.M. is not a party to the suit
and the alleged compromise had no substantive effect on the claims pending
before the Court. Further, even if Plaintiff and D.M. had formed an enforceable
agreement to redact D.M.’s legal name from the record, they still would have
needed to file a motion to redact. 21 Only then could the Court analyze whether
redaction was appropriate. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s refusal to
honor the purported settlement agreement does not amount to bad faith,
oppressive, vexatious, or wanton conduct.
Turning to D.M.’s argument that Plaintiff has used this “proceeding as a
platform to publicly smear a non-party,” D.M. has not provided clear and
18 See Matta v. May, 118 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that language in an order in
a related case, stating that a “suit was frivolous and filed merely to vex, [a party and her
attorneys],” was insufficient “to meet the requirement for a bad faith finding”).
19 No. 07-4748, 2017 WL 6733722, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2017).
20 Id.
21 Sealed Appellant, 2024 WL 980494, at *3.
convincing evidence that the statements Plaintiff made about D.M. were made
in bad faith. While D.M. has not been named as a Defendant, factual
allegations regarding her could conceivably form additional context for
Plaintiff’s claims against other Defendants. Further, the Court has not made
factual findings as to the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding D.M. As
such, the Court cannot ascribe malicious intent to Plaintiff’s actions in this
litigation. Accordingly, because D.M. has not demonstrated that Plaintiff acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, sanctions are
unwarranted.
B. The Dismissed Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees
The Dismissed Defendants echo the arguments in D.M.’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees, arguing that Plaintiff “abused these proceedings and engaged
in unnecessary, bad faith allegations against Movants as retribution against
Movants because of their alleged online comments.”22 The Dismissed
Defendants also argue that by filing her claims against them in a district where
the Court lacked jurisdiction, Plaintiff used this litigation to harass them.
Plaintiff opposes, asserting that she brought her claims against the Dismissed
Defendants in good faith and that all assertions and arguments regarding the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Dismissed Defendants were made in
good faith.
The Court finds that the Dismissed Defendants have not demonstrated
that Plaintiff engaged in bad faith conduct warranting sanctions. To the extent
that the Dismissed Defendants argue that Plaintiff engaged in bad faith
conduct by making false accusations against them, the Court has not made
findings as to the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s claims and declines to do so
here. While Plaintiff’s claims are adverse to the Dismissed Defendants, there
22 Doc. 105-4 at 4.
has been no showing that the claims are false or were made with the intent to
harass, annoy, or increase expenditures. As to the argument that Plaintiff
acted in bad faith by bringing her suit in a forum where the Court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the Dismissed Defendants, the Court finds no
evidence of bad faith. Although the Court determined that Plaintiff did not
make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the Dismissed
Defendants, her arguments were not frivolous.2? Thus, the Dismissed
Defendants have not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
Plaintiffs conduct in this litigation is sanctionable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, both D.M.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc.
101) and Defendants Andrea Stewart, and Anti Fraud Warriors, LLC’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 105) are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 9th day of April, 2026.
mw
Gg TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23 “TA] district court [should] resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc
reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must
have been unreasonable or without foundation.” McKethan v. Tex. Farm Bureau, 35 F.3d
559, 1994 WL 499701, at *3 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (alteration in
original) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S.
A412, 421-422 (1978)).