The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DARROW CAGE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-846
PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. SECTION: “D” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Untimely and Incomplete
Expert Disclosures and Motion for Leave to Supplement Defendants’ Witness and
Exhibit List, filed by Defendants Gabriel Rivera-Alicea and CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc.
(“Defendants”).1 Plaintiff Darrow Cage (“Plaintiff”) Opposes the Motion,2 and
Defendants have filed a Reply.3 After careful review of the parties’ memoranda, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike and
GRANTS the Motion for Leave.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises out of a motor vehicle accident.4 On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff
was operating a 2023 GMC Sierra truck on Farrar Avenue in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, when he was struck by a 2016 Freightliner operated by Gabriel Rivera-
Alicea and owned by CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc.5 Plaintiff allegedly suffered physical
and mental injuries as a result of the accident.6
1 R. Doc. 31.
2 R. Doc. 33.
3 R. Doc. 35.
4 R. Doc. 1.
5 R. Doc. 1-2.
6 Id.
On September 23, 2025, the Court issued a Third Amended Scheduling Order
(the “Scheduling Order”) in this matter.7 In pertinent part, the Scheduling Order
provides as follows:
Written reports of experts, as defined by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), who may be witnesses for Plaintiffs, shall be
obtained and delivered to counsel for Defendant as soon as possible, but
in no event later than December 31, 2025. This deadline shall also apply
to all expert disclosures, as defined by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(C).
. . . .
Counsel for the parties shall file in the record and serve upon their
opponents a list of all witnesses who may or will be called to testify at
trial and a list of all exhibits which may or will be used at trial no later
than January 30, 2026 . . . .8
Plaintiff failed to provide his expert disclosures to Defendants by December 31, 2025.9
Plaintiff filed his Witness List and Exhibit list into the record on February 26, 2026.10
Giving rise to the instant Motion, Plaintiff listed the following individuals in his
Witness List:
6. Dr. Pedro Romaguera / Louisiana Primary Care Consultants;
7. Dr. Timothy Finney / Southern Orthopaedic Specialists;
8. Dr. Stephanie Casey and/or representative of Doctors Imaging[.]11
On March 18, 2026, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
Untimely and Incomplete Expert Disclosures and Motion for Leave to Supplement
7 R. Doc. 26.
8 Id. at pp. 1–2.
9 R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 3.
10 R. Docs. 28 and 29.
11 R. Doc. 29 at p. 1.
Defendants’ Witness and Exhibit List.12 In the Motion, Defendants seek to strike Dr.
Pedro Romaguera, Dr. Timothy Finney, and Dr. Stephanie Casey as witnesses for
Plaintiff.13 In support of their Motion, Defendants provide as follows:
Plaintiff failed to timely disclose the individuals he intends to call as
witnesses at trial and failed to provide the disclosures required by the
Scheduling Order, (R. 26), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(B) and (C). As such, witnesses 6, 7, and 8 on Plaintiff’s witness
list, (R. 29), should be struck in their entirety under Rule 37(c)(1) and
prohibited from offering any testimony at trial or, alternatively, those
witnesses should not be allowed to offer any testimony that would be of
the nature and kind typically given by experts under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.
Additionally, because Plaintiff did not disclose any expert witnesses on
the deadline required by the Scheduling Order, Defendants did not
disclose their expert witness on their previously filed Witness and
Exhibit List (R. 27). In the event that Plaintiff’s witnesses are not
struck, Defendants respectfully request leave to supplement their
witness list with their own expert pursuant to the attached
Supplemental and Amended Witness and Exhibit List now that Plaintiff
has filed his list of witnesses.14
Plaintiff has filed an Opposition.15 Plaintiff concedes that he “did not file the
witness list in a timely fashion.”16 Plaintiff nonetheless contends that “[t]hese doctors
all were identified by plaintiff to the defendants when plaintiff forwarded to
defendants his Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures as required by the court[,]”and such Rule
26(a) Initial Disclosures were sent to Defendants on June 26, 2024, which identify
the physicians and give a summary of their expected testimony.17 Additionally,
Plaintiff highlights that he “responded to discovery propounded by the defendants
12 R. Doc. 31.
13 R. Doc. 31-1.
14 Id. at pp. 1–2.
15 R. Doc. 33.
16 Id. at p. 1.
17 Id.
and identified these three (3) doctors as potential witnesses.”18 Plaintiff further
submits that that he has provided medical records from all three doctors to the
Defendants.19 Therefore, Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is absolutely no prejudice to
the defendants in this matter and no justification for striking these witnesses and not
allowing them to testify at trial.”20 As a final point, Plaintiff voices “no objection to
the amendment of defendants’ witness and exhibit lists to add Dr. Estrada . . . .”21
Thus, Plaintiff only argues that the Motion to Strike should be denied.22
Defendants, in Reply, assert that Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, discovery
responses, and medical records do not absolve Plaintiff’s failure to make a Rule
26(a)(2)(C) expert witness disclosure.23 Defendants contend that “[t]he prejudice to
Defendants is clear. By withholding timely Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures, Plaintiff
deprived Defendants of the ability to evaluate the actual opinions to be offered, decide
whether depositions were necessary, retain rebuttal experts if needed, and file
targeted Daubert or motions in limine . . . .”24 Additionally, Defendants aver that
Plaintiff has failed to offer an adequate explanation for his failure to comply with
Rule 26(a)(2)(C).25 And if the Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s witnesses,
Defendants “renew their request for leave to supplement their witness and exhibit
list to add Dr. Lance Estrada, the Independent Medical Examiner.”26 Therefore,
18 Id. at p. 2.
19 Id.
20 Id. at p. 3.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 R. Doc. 35 at p. 3.
24 Id.
25 Id. at p. 4.
26 Id. at p. 6.
Defendants argue that their Motion to Strike should be granted, or in the alternative,
that their Motion for Leave should be granted.27
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose disclosure requirements upon
proponents of expert testimony.28 Expert witnesses who are “retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony” must submit written reports.29 Treating
physicians, however, are exempt from this reporting requirement.30 However, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C), non-reporting expert witnesses must disclose: (1) the
subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (2) a summary of the facts and opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify.31 These disclosures must be made in
accordance with the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling orders or, absent a
stipulation or a court order, at least 90 days before trial or within 30 days of the other
party’s disclosure when offered solely to rebut or contradict such evidence.32
According to the Fifth Circuit, “When a party fails to disclose information
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), the party is not allowed to use that
information . . . to supply evidence on a motion . . . or at a trial, unless the failure was
27 Id.
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 1993 and 2010 Advisory Committee Notes; Leggett v. Dolgencorp, LLC, Civ. A.
No. 16-17264, 2017 WL 4791183, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2017) (Vance, J.).
31 Rea v. Wisconsin Coach Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12-1252, 2014 WL 4981803, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 3,
2014) (Duval, J.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)).
32 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D).
substantially justified or is harmless.”33 Courts in this Circuit consider the following
four factors in determining whether a failure to disclose was harmless or
substantially justified: (1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2)
the importance of the testimony; (3) the potential prejudice in allowing the testimony;
and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure that prejudice.34 The Fifth Circuit
considers the same four factors when determining whether to exclude witnesses and
exhibits as a sanction for violating a Rule 16 scheduling order.35
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants seek to exclude treating physicians Dr. Pedro Romaguera, Dr.
Timothy Finney, and Dr. Stephanie Casey as Plaintiff’s witnesses.36 Plaintiff, in turn,
asserts that Defendants would not be prejudiced in allowing the named treating
physicians to testify as Plaintiff’s witnesses.37 For the reasons set forth below, the
Court finds that Plaintiff violated both Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(c) and the Court’s
33 In re Complaint of C.F. Bean LLC, 841 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34 Logan v. Westfield Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 17-29, 2020 WL 412216, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2020) (Brown,
C.J.) (quoting Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 883 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Hooks v. Nationwide Housing Sys., LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-729, 2016 WL
3667134, at *3 (E.D. La. July 11, 2016) (Barbier, J.) (citing Betzel v. State Farm Lloyds, 480 F.3d 704,
707 (5th Cir. 2007)). See also Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990).
35 Williams v. American Strategic Ins. Corp., Civ. A. No. 13-5411, 2014 WL 1246846, at *1 (E.D. La.
Mar. 25, 2014) (Africk, J.) (citing Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 1996);
Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990)).
36 R. Doc. 31. The parties do not dispute that these three witnesses are treating physicians of Plaintiff.
See R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 7 (“These witnesses, Dr. Pedro Romaguera, Dr. Timothy Finney, and Dr.
Stephanie Casey, are Plaintiff’s treating physicians.”); R. Doc. 33 at p. 3 (“Obviously, the removal of
these treating physicians, most especially Dr. Timothy Finney, from testimony at the trial of this
matter would prevent plaintiff from presenting substantial evidence in support of his claim for
damages.”).
37 R. Doc. 33.
Scheduling Order, but further finds that striking the treating physicians as witnesses
is not warranted.38
A. Plaintiff’s disclosures do not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
Under the Court’s Scheduling Order, Plaintiff’s deadline to provide expert
reports and expert disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was December 31, 2025.39
According to the parties and the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff provided
Defendants with Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures on June 26, 2024.40 Additionally,
Plaintiff provided discovery responses to Defendants in the form of medical records
from “(1) Dr. Romaguera/Louisiana Primary Care Consultants (for treatment dated
February 1, 2023 through June 21, 2023); (2) Dr. Stephanie Casey/Doctors Imaging
(for treatment dated March 13, 2023); and (3) Dr. Timothy Finney / Southern
Orthopaedic Specialsts [sic] (for treatment dated May 8, 2023 through August 14,
2024).”41 Plaintiff further provided Defendants with updated medical records and
38 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff has violated both Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and the
Court’s Scheduling Order. Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis folds into one. See Williams, 2014 WL
1246846, at * 1 (“When determining whether to exclude witnesses and exhibits as a sanction for a
violation of a Rule 16 scheduling order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit looks
to the same factors as those described with respect to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(“If a
party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not
allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,
unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”).
39 R. Doc. 26 at p. 1. Additionally, under the Court’s Scheduling Order, Plaintiff had until January 30,
2026 to file a witness list and an exhibit list. R. Doc. 26 at p. 2. Plaintiff, however, did not file his
witness and exhibit lists until February 26, 2026. See R. Docs. 28 and 29. Because the Court’s analysis
of a Scheduling Order violation is identical to that of one for a Rule 26 violation, the Court only
undergoes a Rule 26 violation analysis but notes infra that Plaintiff has also violated the Court’s
Scheduling Order. See supra note 38.
40 R. Doc. 33 at p. 1; R. Doc. 33-1.
41 R. Doc. 33 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 33-2).
bills from Dr. Timothy Finney on “November 20, 2024; January 27, 2025; February
13, 2025; April 1, 2025; May 28, 2025; August 1, 2025; and December 1, 2025[.]”42
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s disclosures do not satisfy the requirements of
Rule 26(a)(2)(C). As another Section of this Court found in Hooks v. Nationwide
Housing Systems, LLC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided no information as
to what his treating physicians intend to testify other than “about facts, data, and
symptoms they observed in their patients during treatment.”43 Thus, Plaintiff’s Rule
26(a)(2)(C) expert disclosure “falls woefully short because it provides absolutely no
detail about the causation opinions the treating physicians will provide nor does it
summarize any facts upon which the treating physician will testify.”44
Although Plaintiff argues that the medical records contain the bases for the
opinions of his treating physicians, “disclosures consisting of medical records alone
are insufficient to satisfy the disclosure standard of Rule 26(a)(2)(C).”45 While
“Courts must take care against requiring undue detail” in Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
disclosures, courts in this Circuit have made clear that the summary disclosure
should, at the very least, provide an abstract, abridgement, or compendium of the
opinion and facts supporting the opinion.46 Allowing Plaintiff to shift his burden to
42 R. Doc. 33 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 33-3).
43 Hooks v. Nationwide Housing Systems, LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-729, 2016 WL 3667134, at *4 (E.D. La.
July 11, 2016) (Barbier, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Logan v. Westfield Insurance Company, Civ. A. No. 17-29, 2020 WL 412216, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 24,
2020).
45 Hooks, Civ. A. No. 15-729, 2016 WL 3667134 at *5 (citing Williams v. State, Civ. A. No. 14-00154,
2015 WL 5438596, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2015) (Jackson, C.J.)).
46 Rea v. Wisconsin Coach Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12-1252, 2014 WL 4981803, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3,
2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 2010 Advisory Committee Notes) (internal quotation marks omitted);
See Logan, Civ. A. No. 17-29, 2020 WL 412216 at *7 & 8 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 2010 Advisory
Committee Notes; Rea, Civ. A. No. 12-1252, 2014 WL 4981803 at *5); Hooks, Civ. A. No. 15-729, 2016
WL 3667134 at *5 (“This Court has explained that courts must take care against requiring undue
provide Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures by providing Defendants with his medical records
would make Rule 26(a)(2)(C) meaningless. Plaintiff’s disclosures fall well below the
Rule 26(a)(2)(C) standard, as they do not provide a summary of the facts and opinions
to which his treating physicians are expected to testify. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has violated Rule 26(a)(2)(C) and the Scheduling Order.47
B. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C) and the Court’s
Scheduling Order, while serious, in this matter is harmless.
The Court now turns to whether the expert opinions of Plaintiff’s medical
providers should be excluded at trial under Rule 37(c) for Plaintiff’s failure to comply
with Rule 26(a)(2)(C). As explained above, the Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to
consider the following factors in determining whether Plaintiff's failure to comply
with Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was harmless or substantially justified: “‘(1) the importance of
the evidence; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the evidence; (3) the
possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4) the explanation
for the party's failure to disclose.’”48 The Court takes each factor in turn.
1. Importance of the evidence
The first factor, the importance of the evidence, weighs against striking
Plaintiff’s witnesses. Defendants contend that “[w]hile the testimony of the witnesses
sought to be excluded is important to the Plaintiff, permitting these witnesses to
detail in Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures.”) (quoting Anders v. Hercules Offshore Servs., LLC, 311 F.R.D.
161, 164 (E.D. La. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 R. Doc. 26 at p. 1 (“Written reports of experts, as defined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(B), who may be witnesses for Plaintiffs, shall be obtained and delivered to counsel for
Defendant as soon as possible, but in no event later than December 31, 2025. This deadline shall also
apply to all expert disclosures, as defined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C).”).
48 Bailey v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 729 (5th Cir. 2010)(quoting Texas A & M Research
Found. v. Magna Transp., 338 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2003)).
testify at trial would result in substantial prejudice to Defendants given the advanced
stage of the litigation.”49 Plaintiff emphasizes that “the removal of these treating
physicians, most especially Dr. Timothy Finney, from testimony at the trial of this
matter would prevent plaintiff from presenting substantial evidence in support of his
claim for damages.”50 The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
In this personal injury suit, the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries are
fundamental to his case, and the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians is
essential to prove the nature and extent of his injuries. Dr. Pedro Romaguera, Dr.
Timothy Finney, and Dr. Stephanie Casey have collectively provided three years of
medical treatment to the Plaintiff.51 Defendants acknowledge the importance of the
treating physicians as witnesses as well.52 Excluding these witnesses would severely
limit Plaintiff’s ability to provide important medical evidence. Accordingly, the Court
finds that this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
2. Prejudice to Defendants
The second factor – the prejudice to the opposing party by including the
evidence – is neutral. Defendants argue that the potential prejudice to them is high,
as “[t]rial is two months away and the first time any witnesses have ever been
formally disclosed was nearly a month after the expert deadline passed, and just three
days before discovery closed.”53 Plaintiff, in turn, contends that “under the
49 R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 8.
50 R. Doc. 33 at p. 3.
51 See id. at p. 2.
52 R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 8.
53 Id. (emphasis original).
circumstances of this case, where there has been full disclosure of the witnesses and
the nature of their testimony, not to mention provision of periodic expert reports,
there can be no prejudice to the defendants in this matter.”54
The Court agrees that allowing Plaintiff’s medical providers to offer expert
causation testimony at trial would ordinarily prejudice Defendants as Plaintiff has
failed to comply with the “formal” Rule 26 disclosure requirements. Although
Plaintiff’s disclosures fall woefully short of the requirements imposed by Rule
26(a)(2)(C), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s piecemeal disclosures placed Defendants
on notice that the treating physicians intended to testify as to medical causation
based upon their treatment of Plaintiff.55 Defendants concede as much when they
argue that Plaintiff failed to “formally” disclose the witnesses.56 Defendants do not
dispute that they have been provided with all of Plaintiff’s medical records, nor do
they dispute that Plaintiff has sought,57 and been granted,58 three continuances
without opposition from Defendants based on Plaintiff’s continued medical treatment
by his named treating physicians.59
To be clear, the Court does not in any way give Plaintiff “a pass” for his failure
to comply with the Court’s Order and the law. Instead, the Court is only
acknowledging that, thankfully for Plaintiff, Defendants suffered little or no
54 R. Doc. 33 at p. 3.
55 See R. Doc. 33-1 at p. 3, ¶¶ 5–7.
56 See R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 8.
57 See R. Docs. 14, 19, and 23. Plaintiff’s Motions to Continue also included specific references to the
treating physicians and included as exhibits some of the treating physician’s medical records regarding
Plaintiff.
58 See R. Docs. 16, 20, and 24.
59 See R. Doc. 35.
prejudice as a result of his non-compliance. To the extent that Defendants potentially
suffered any prejudice, and as explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ request
to supplement their witness list, thereby eliminating any remaining prejudice to
Defendants. Therefore, this factor is neutral.60
3. Whether a continuance could cure any prejudice
The third factor, whether a continuance could cure the minimal prejudice to
Defendants, weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendants allege that the “the availability
of a continuance to cure such prejudice weighs in favor of exclusion. The case has
been continued three times before, and the Court should decline to do so again where
a party failed to comply with the Court’s deadlines and Rule 26(a).”61 Plaintiff does
not address this factor.62
Defendants sought a continuance via their request to “be given leave to add
Dr. Estrada as a witness.”63 The Court grants such request, allowing Defendants to
cure any prejudice arising from Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C).
Therefore, this factor is neutral or favors Plaintiff.
60 Defendants argue that they are prejudiced because that by the time Plaintiff filed his witness list,
“the deadlines for expert disclosures, discovery, and trial preparation were already expiring or had
expired, leaving Defendants with no fair opportunity to evaluate the proposed testimony, conduct
meaningful discovery, retain rebuttal experts, or prepare appropriate motions.” R. Doc. 35 at p. 5. The
Court notes, however, that Defendants have not sought any relief, such as a request to extend the
discovery deadline, from the Court as of the date of this Order and Reasons. The Court therefore gives
minimal credence to Defendants’ argument.
61 R. Doc. 31-1 at pp. 8–9.
62 See R. Doc. 33.
63 R. Doc. 31-1 at p. 9.
4. Explanation for Plaintiff’s failure to disclose
The fourth and final factor, the explanation for Plaintiff’s failure to disclose,
weighs in Defendants’ favor. Defendants assert that Plaintiff “does not provide [a]
sufficient explanation for missing the disclosure deadline, missing the witness-list
deadline, and never serving Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summaries.”64 Plaintiff does not address
this factor and merely states that “[a]dmittedly, deadlines set by the court should and
must be respected.”65 The Court finds that this factor favors granting Defendants’
Motion to Strike, as Plaintiff has failed to offer any explanation whatsoever for his
failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(c) and the Scheduling Order.
Based on the above four-factor analysis, the Court finds that a majority of the
factors weigh in favor of finding that Plaintiff’s Rule 26(a)(2)(C) violation is harmless
so as to allow Plaintiff’s treating physicians to offer expert testimony at trial. The
Court therefore denies Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Untimely and
Incomplete Expert Disclosures. However, the Court finds that good cause exists to
grant Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement their Witness and Exhibit list.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
Untimely and Incomplete Expert Disclosures and Motion for Leave to Supplement
64 R. Doc. 35 at p. 4.
65 R. Doc. 33 at p. 3.
Defendants’ Witness and Exhibit List®* is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Untimely and Incomplete Expert Disclosures is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to
Supplement Defendants’ Witness and Exhibit List is GRANTED. The Clerk’s Office
is directed to file Defendants’ Supplemental and Amended Witness and Exhibit List§7
into the record.
New Orleans, Louisiana, April 8, 6.
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
66 R. Doc. 31.
87 R. Doc. 31-3.
14