“Merely 12 because some explanation was provided for [the plaintiff’s] late deliveries does not mean the contracting officer was required to accept these explanations, nor did it change [the plaintiff’s] historical past performance.”
How later courts described this case
- “Merely 12 because some explanation was provided for [the plaintiff’s] late deliveries does not mean the contracting officer was required to accept these explanations, nor did it change [the plaintiff’s] historical past performance.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Corrected
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 26-451
Filed under seal: April 3, 2026
Reissued: April 14, 2026
NOT FOR PUBLICATION ∗
ASRC FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORT, LLC
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
DAWSON MCG, LLC,
Defendant Intervenor.
Damien C. Specht, James A. Tucker, Joseph A. Ward, Kang Il T. Lee, Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Washington, DC, for the plaintiff.
W
Reta E. Bezak. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for the defendant.
Johnathan M. Bailey, Kristin E. Zachman, Cokinos Young, San Antonio, TX, for the defendant-
intervenor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HERTLING, Judge
The plaintiff, ASRC Federal Infrastructure Support, LLC (“AFIS”), brings this bid
protest against the defendant, acting through the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),
challenging the award of two contracts to the intervenor, Dawson MCG, LLC (“Dawson”), under
∗ Pursuant to the protective order in this case, this opinion was filed under seal on April 3, 2026,
and the parties were directed to propose redactions of confidential or proprietary information by
April 13, 2026. The parties proposed redactions, which are all accepted and denoted by [* * *].
This public opinion also includes other minor edits.
1
28 USC § 1491(b). The contracts are to provide student-support and facilities-operation services
at DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (“FLETC”) in Charleston, South Carolina.
AFIS has moved for a preliminary injunction to block the early transition of the contract
from the current provider of the services, AFIS’s affiliated company, ASRC Federal Field
Services, LLC (“AFFS”). AFFS’s current contracts were to end on March 31, 2026. AFIS filed
this protest on March 20, 2026, challenging the awards to Dawson. DHS refused to stay the
termination of AFFS’s contracts and the transition to Dawson.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2025, DHS issued a single solicitation for two distinct contracts: Student
Services (RFP No. 70LCHS25RPFB00001) and Facilities Operation Maintenance (RFP No.
70LCHS25RPFB00002) to support operations at FLETC. AR Tab 1z at 876; AR Tab 1za at
986; AR Tab 1a at 68; AR Tab 1x at 863.
The solicitation was issued as a competitive 8(a) set-aside acquisition. AR Tab 1a at 68.
The solicitation provided for a best-value tradeoff using a two-phase advisory down-selection
evaluation. AR Tab 1zm at 1170; AR Tab 1zn at 1184. Phase I consisted of Factor 1,
Demonstrated Prior Experience. AR Tab 1zo at 1193; AR Tab 1zp at 1199. Phase II consisted
of Factor 2, Oral Presentation; Factor 3, Capability of Key Personnel; Factor 4, Past
Performance; and Factor 5, Price Proposal. AR Tab 1zo at 1193; AR Tab 1zp at 1199. The
Non-Price/Cost factors were of equal importance and, when combined, were significantly more
important than Cost/Price. AR Tab 1zo at 1194; AR Tab 1zp at 1200. The solicitation specified
that DHS would “not make an award at a significantly higher overall price to achieve only
slightly better performance capabilities.” AR Tab 1zo at 1194; AR Tab 1zp at 1200.
DHS was to evaluate Factor 1, Demonstrated Prior Experience, based on an offeror’s
prior experience with and knowledge of the performance work statement (“PWS”) requirements.
AR Tab 1zo at 1194; AR Tab 1zp at 1200. DHS was to consider prior experience that was
similar in scope and complexity of the requirements of these two contracts. Id.
Factor 2, Oral Presentations, would be assessed on the “level of confidence that the
offering contractor will successfully perform all requirements in regards to the technical
approach and management approach.” AR Tab 1zo at 1194; AR Tab 1zp at 1200. The oral
presentations also included responses to three questions provided prior to the oral presentation
and five situational questions asked during the oral presentation. AR Tab 1zo at 1194-95; AR
Tab 1zp at 1200-01. DHS was also to consider matters such as the offerors’ technical approach,
management and operation of facilities, and quality and quantity of the proposed labor force. Id.
Under Factor 3, Capability of Proposed Key Personnel, DHS would evaluate the strength
of the key personnel proposed, including their educational qualifications, relevant experience,
and recognition as respected leaders in their field. AR Tab 1zo at 1195; AR Tab 1zp at 1201.
Under Factor 4, Past Performance, DHS would evaluate offerors’ recent and relevant
performance of projects of similar size, scope, and complexity completed during the past five
years. AR Tab 1zo at 1195; AR Tab 1zp at 1201. Offerors were to demonstrate satisfactory
performance of relevant services like those in the solicitation. Id. Past performance was
2
evaluated on the following factors: capable and committed adequate resources to perform
efficiently and effectively; performance conformed to the contract; work performed on schedule
at reasonable cost; and effective management of the workforce and maintenance of good
business relations. AR Tab 1zo at 1196; AR Tab 1zp at 1202.
For each contract, DHS evaluated Factors 1 through 3 as follows:
Rating Definition
High Confidence The Government has high confidence that the offeror understands the
requirement, proposes a sound approach, and will be successful in
performing the work.
Some Confidence The Government has some confidence that the offeror understands the
requirement, proposes a sound approach, and will be successful in
performing the work.
Low Confidence The Government has low confidence that the offeror understands the
requirement, proposes a sound approach, or will be successful in
performing the work.
AR Tab 1zo at 1197; AR Tab 1zp at 1203.
DHS would evaluate Factor 4 based on a four-level confidence rating system, as follows:
Rating Definition
High Confidence Based on the Offeror’s recent (within 5 years) and relevant (similar in
magnitude and scope of this effort) performance record, the
Government has a high expectation that the Offeror will successfully
perform based on the offeror’s performance.
Some Confidence Based on the Offeror’s recent (within 5 years) and relevant (similar
magnitude and scope of this effort) performance record, the
Government has a reasonable expectation that the Offeror will
successfully perform based on the offeror’s performance.
Neutral The Offeror does not have recent (within 5 years) and relevant (similar
in magnitude and scope of this effort) performance; or the Offeror’s
performance record is so sparse, a meaningful confidence rating cannot
be reasonably assigned. This rating is neutral, neither favorable or
unfavorable.
Low Confidence Based on the Offeror’s recent (within 5 years) and relevant (similar in
magnitude and scope of this effort) performance record, the
3
Government has a limited expectation that the Offeror will successfully
perform based on the offeror’s performance.
AR Tab 1zo at 1198; AR Tab 1zp at 1204.
DHS would evaluate Factor 5, price, based on an offeror’s total evaluated price, including
all option periods, for “accuracy, realism, reasonableness and completeness.” AR Tab 1zo at
1196; AR Tab 1zp at 1202. For evaluation purposes, DHS would calculate total evaluated price
by adding the total price for the base period and all options, including the six-month option under
FAR 52.217-8. AR Tab 1zo at 1197; AR Tab 1zp at 1203.
Factors 1-4 of both procurements were of equal weight and, together, were far more
important than price. AR Tab 1zo, PI Appx 1194; AR Tab 1zp, PI Appx 1200.
Initial Evaluations of AFIS and Dawson
DHS concluded that AFIS proposed the offer with the lowest evaluated price, which was
approximately [* * *] percent lower than the Independent Government Estimate (“IGE”). AR
Tab 13 at 2961. AFIS received a High Confidence rating for Factor 1, a Some Confidence rating
for Factor 3, and Low Confidence ratings for Factors 2 and 4. Id. AFIS received the lowest
evaluation ratings for Factors 2 and 4 (Low Confidence) of all offerors. Id. In summarizing
AFIS’s oral presentation, the evaluators concluded that AFIS had failed to utilize its familiarity
with the contract as the incumbent and did not provide “specific methods or assurances that
would deliver real benefits or added value to the government.” 1 Id.
AFIS’s Past Performance submission (Factor 4), received a Low Confidence rating. DHS
noted that it had addressed multiple issues with AFFS on the incumbent contract. Id. DHS also
noted that AFIS had received marginal Contract Performance Assessment Reporting System
(“CPARS”) ratings on the incumbent contract, and that FLETC had encountered consistent
issues with preventive maintenance records and deliverables under the incumbent contract,
highlighting AFFS’s performance gaps. DHS observed that AFIS had received multiple Letters
of Concern and Corrective Action Reports in support of contracts referenced within its past
performance submission. Id. Given these weaknesses, DHS concluded that the value of AFIS’s
proposal was not worth the trade-off of its lowest price. Id. at 2962.
Alternatively, Dawson proposed the highest evaluated price. Id. In evaluating Factor 1,
DHS concluded that Dawson had demonstrated relevant experience providing support for
various government facilities that are all larger in size, scope and complexity than the FLETC
contract requirements. Id. at 2963. DHS found Dawson’s staffing plan to be superior, given the
problems it had encountered with AFFS’s staffing levels under the incumbent contract. Id.
Dawson’s proposal also detailed how it would implement comprehensive maintenance programs
and utilize its experience to improve facility support. Id.
1
As noted above, the incumbent is not AFIS but its affiliate AFFS.
4
For the student-services contract, DHS noted that AFIS demonstrated several strengths,
including thorough responses from well-prepared subject-matter experts and strong institutional
knowledge as the incumbent. AR 17 at 2987. DHS also concluded, however, that AFIS’s offer
lacked clarity, and that proposed value-added items largely overlapped with existing PWS
requirements. Id. The evaluators found that AFIS had made misrepresentations regarding past
program creation and failed to leverage its institutional knowledge as the incumbent. Id. The
evaluators noted specifically that AFIS had claimed “no loss of weapons, despite documented
incidents of unaccounted weapons.” Id. DHS also found that critical operational requirements
were missing from the offer, and that key personnel lacked the required experience. The
evaluators did not find any significant strengths that would increase the value of the government
in return for the lower price. Id. at 2988.
Alternatively, Dawson again proposed the highest evaluated price. Id. at 2988. The
evaluators noted that Dawson proposed a fully qualified list of key personnel who met or
exceeded all minimum qualifications, and that Dawson’s proposal included a fleet of vehicles.
Id. DHS found that Dawson’s proposal reflected expertise that Dawson can leverage to
“maintain continuity in training operations, prevent gaps in ammunition management, and
support uninterrupted training schedules.” Id. DHS concluded that Dawson’s higher evaluated
price was worth the premium “[b]ased on Dawson’s cumulative technical evaluation . . .
[c]ombined with the[ ] confidence rating for factors 1-4.” Id. at 2989.
Award of Contracts
On July 8, 2025, DHS notified AFIS that its proposal was unsuccessful and that both
contracts had been awarded to Dawson. AFIS protested the award to the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”). AR Tab 2 at 1207. DHS announced on August 14, 2025, that it
would take corrective action, and GAO dismissed the protest.
On March 5, 2026, ASRC Federal Operating Group president Michael Manzo spoke by
telephone with David Johnson, President and CEO of Dawson. (ECF 1 at Ex. A, ¶ 3.) 2 Mr.
Johnson told Mr. Manzo that Dawson had been negotiating with DHS since March 2, 2026, to
work out the details of the award to Dawson. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Mr. Johnson also told Mr. Manzo of a
memorandum that he had not seen but heard required that all DHS contracts held by ASRC
federal-related companies be terminated by March 6, 2026. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.)
On March 6, 2026, DHS informed AFIS that both contracts had again been awarded to
Dawson, and on that same day AFIS filed an agency-level protest, objecting to the pre-award
negotiations with Dawson, the change of scope in the contracts based on these negotiations, and
the apparent influence of the DHS memorandum referenced by Mr. Johnson on both the award
and the alleged change in scope of the contracts. On March 11, DHS informed AFIS that it had
overridden the stay of performance triggered by the agency-level protest. AFIS was also told
that DHS would delete the option periods from the incumbent contract, thereby changing the end
2
This exhibit, a declaration by Mr. Manzo, is not in the administrative record. It is referenced
here only to provide factual background and is not relied on for any aspect of the decision aside
from consideration of a possible remedy.
5
of the contract from July 31, 2026, to March 31, 2026. DHS executed that modification two
days later
.
Post-Award Debriefing
On March 12, 2026, DHS provided AFIS with a post-award debriefing for both contracts.
DHS’s post-corrective action evaluations of the two offers for the student-services
contract were as follows:
Offeror Factor 1 – Factor 2 – Factor 3 – Factor 4 – Evaluated
Demonstrated Oral Capability of Past Price
Prior Presentation Proposed Performance
Experience Key
Personnel
Dawson Some High High High [* * *]
Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
AFIS High Some Some Low [* * *]
Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
AR Tab 17 at 2986-87.
DHS’s evaluations of the two offers for the facilities-operations contract were as follows:
Offeror Factor 1 – Factor 2 – Factor 3 – Factor 4 – Evaluated
Demonstrated Oral Capability of Past Price
Prior Presentation Proposed Performance
Experience Key
Personnel
Dawson High High High High [* * *]
Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
AFIS High Low Some Low [* * *]
Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
AR Tab 13 at 2960-61.
6
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
AFIS filed its complaint on March 20, 2026. (ECF 1.) The complaint raises five counts.
Count I alleges that the agency’s evaluation of proposals under factor 2 of the student-services
procurement was arbitrary and capricious; count II alleges the agency’s evaluation of proposals
under factor 2 of the facilities procurement was arbitrary and capricious; count III alleges the
agency’s evaluation of proposals under factor 4 was arbitrary and capricious; count IV alleges
the agency violated regulations by awarding the contracts for requirements that differed from
those solicited and conducting negotiations only with Dawson concerning the changed
requirements; and count V alleges the best-value tradeoff analyses were arbitrary and capricious
and based on flawed underlying evaluations. For relief, AFIS seeks, among other things, a
preliminary injunction prohibiting DHS from proceeding with performance pending the outcome
of the protest and a permanent injunction blocking DHS from proceeding with performance of
the awards and from proceeding with new award decisions until it has reevaluated proposals in a
fair and consistent manner, in accordance with the terms of the solicitation.
Having learned that DHS would not stay award or performance of the contracts, AFIS
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on March 27, 2026, seeking to block transition and
performance of both contracts until the protest is resolved. On March 31, 2026, the defendant
and the defendant-intervenor filed their responses to the motion (ECF 28; ECF 29), and on April
1, 2026, the plaintiff filed its reply (ECF 30) to the responses. Oral argument was held on April
2, 2026, and an oral ruling was issued at the conclusion of the argument, and an order denying
the motion was filed. This opinion memorializes and explains the rationale for the oral ruling.
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDING
The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over “an action by an interested party
objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to
a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).
AFIS challenges DHS’s award of the student services and facilities contracts to Dawson,
alleging that DHS improperly evaluated its proposal and that DHS improperly held discussions
with Dawson. AFIS alleges it was prejudiced by DHS’s errors. Accordingly, AFIS’s claims fall
within the court’s bid-protest jurisdiction.
For a plaintiff to have statutory standing in a bid protest, it must be an “interested party.”
28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); see CACI, Inc.- Fed. v. United States, 67 F.4th 1145, 1152 (Fed. Cir.
2023). To qualify as an interested party, an offeror must allege facts, that, if true, “establish that
it (1) is an actual or prospective bidder, and (2) possesses the requisite direct economic interest.”
Rex Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Percipient.ai,
Inc. v. United States, 153 F.4th 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 2026 WL 79975 (2026).
In determining whether a protestor has alleged facts demonstrating the “requisite direct
economic interest,” a court must decide whether those alleged facts show the protestor was
prejudiced by the alleged errors. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996). To establish prejudice for standing purposes in a post-award bid protest, the protestor’s
7
complaint must “show that there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract
award but for the alleged error in the procurement process.” Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v.
United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v.
United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)). To determine whether it
has standing, a protester’s allegations are assumed to be true. See Am. Relocation Connections,
LLC v. United States, 789 F. App’x 221 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
AFIS is an actual bidder for the student services and facilities contracts. Assuming its
allegations to be true, AFIS, as the lowest bidder and provider of services on the predecessor
contracts, would have had a substantial chance of receiving the contract award if it can prove
DHS made the errors alleged. As a result, the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for
standing.
IV. STANDARD FOR AWARD OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The purpose of a preliminary injunction in
a bid protest is to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the case on the merits. See Cont’l
Serv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 722 F. App’x 986, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing four factors to
obtain this extraordinary remedy. First, the moving party must establish that it is likely to
succeed on the merits. A plaintiff may not be granted preliminary relief “unless it establishes
both of the first two factors, i.e., likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.”
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis
in original); see also Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). If
the moving party has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, it must also show that it will
suffer irreparable harm without preliminary injunctive relief. Third, the balance of equities must
tip in the moving party’s favor. Fourth, a preliminary injunction must be in the public interest.
PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits, AFIS must show that it is “more
likely than not” to succeed on its claims that DHS’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706); Veterans Contracting Grp., Inc. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 613, 621 (2017). AFIS
need only raise “serious questions over [DHS]’s evaluation of proposals in this procurement” by,
for example, “point[ing] to inconsistencies, omissions, unequal treatment of offerors, and cherry-
picked data.” FMS Inv. Corp. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 439, 443 (2018).
The plaintiff attempts to demonstrate it will be likely to succeed on the merits by arguing
DHS misevaluated AFIS and/or Dawson under each of the five solicitation factors. The plaintiff
prevails on its initial argument regarding Dawson’s proposal and DHS’s evaluation of the
Dawson team, and this claim therefore leads the analysis.
8
1. FACTORS 1 AND 4 3
Dawson’s evaluation
AFIS argues that DHS improperly credited Dawson with high confidence under Factors 1
(Demonstrated Prior Experience) and 4 (Past Performance) of its proposals for both the student
services and facilities-operations contracts. It contends that DHS erroneously rated Dawson
based on various experiences performed by affiliates of Dawson, rather than by Dawson itself.
Citing Judge Bruggink’s decision in Advanced Management Strategies Group, Inc. v. United
States, 139 Fed. Cl. 404, 417 (2018), AFIS argues that it is arbitrary and capricious to credit an
offeror for the past performance of its affiliates unless the proposal explains how those affiliates
will be specifically involved in the contract’s performance.
As Chief Judge Solomson explained last week, a proposal that relies on affiliates both to
perform responsibilities under the contract and to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate
successful past performance must detail the tasks and share of the work any affiliate will
perform, outline any intra-corporate agreements, and explain the resources any affiliate will
contribute and the oversight and accountability mechanisms in place. Noblis MSD, LLC v.
United States, Case No. 25-1637C, slip op. at 49, 2026 WL 851951, at * 24-25 (Fed. Cl. March
25, 2026). Here, AFIS claims that Dawson’s proposal only vaguely references its affiliates
without identifying how any of them will participate in contract performance. In addition,
Dawson’s offers for both contracts rely on the past performance of its affiliates for support
without identifying the role any of the affiliates will play in fulfilling the responsibilities of these
contracts. AFIS argues that given these shortcomings, the reliance on affiliates to support
Dawson’s past performance is inadequate, and DHS’s rating of high confidence for Dawson’s
past performance is arbitrary and capricious.
The defendant responds by highlighting that Dawson’s proposal explicitly noted that the
combined experience, past performance, and resources of the entire Dawson enterprise, including
affiliates and the parent company, are being offered to fulfill the contract. Tab 6c, PI Appx
2191. The defendant also points to Dawson’s oral presentation, during which team members
from different Dawson affiliates were introduced and their roles explained. See Tab 6a, PI Appx
2097, 2100, 2108; Tab 9a, PI Appx 2833-2837. The defendant argues that these factors provided
DHS with enough information to credit Dawson with its affiliates’ experience under the
solicitations’ evaluation factors.
Dawson responds to the plaintiff’s reliance on Noblis case by distinguishing it on its
facts. Dawson argues that Noblis involved a situation in which the solicitation was silent about
3
The defendant noted during oral argument that because it understood the plaintiff to be
protesting only phase II of the award process, when factors 2-5 were evaluated, the
administrative record for this motion does not include any documents pertaining to phase I,
during which Factor 1 was evaluated. Only the record provided can be reviewed, and this
analysis does not preclude the defendant from providing a more extensive record for
consideration on motions for judgment on the administrative record.
9
affiliate or subcontractor past performance, which Chief Judge Solomson dubbed “Permutation
Four: The Silent Solicitation Default Rule.” Noblis, 2026 WL 851951 at *25-26.
The solicitations here expressly contemplated and permitted the consideration of affiliate
past performance. The solicitations specifically provided that past performance of any critical
subcontractor, parent, or affiliated or predecessor company to an offeror could be considered in
evaluating past performance. Tab 1zp § M.2. Section L of the solicitation further allowed
offerors to submit additional past performance information for affiliates, if the proposal
demonstrated that the affiliate’s resources would affect contract performance. Tab 1zm § L.16 at
1175; see also Tab 3 at 1227. The solicitation required offerors to show that the parent or
affiliate would have meaningful involvement in the contract.
Due to these elements of these two solicitations, Dawson argues that this case reflects
Chief Judge Solomson’s “Permutation Three: The Committed Teaming Requirement,” in which
an affiliate’s past performance may be considered if the offer reflects that the affiliate will have
meaningful involvement in the performance of the contract. Noblis, 2026 WL 851951 at *24.
Therefore, Dawson contends that the general references to its affiliates in its proposals satisfied
the terms of the solicitations, and the plaintiff’s reliance on Noblis is misplaced.
It is arbitrary and capricious for an agency to credit an offeror for the past performance of
its affiliates if the proposal does not explain how those affiliates will be meaningfully involved in
contract performance. Noblis, 2026 WL 851951 at *27; Advanced Mgmt. Strategies Grp.,
139 Fed. Cl. at 417. Even under Noblis’s “Permutation Three,” an agency may only credit an
offeror for the past performance of the offeror’s affiliates if the offer demonstrates that those
affiliates will have a significant, committed role in the contract. Noblis, 2026 WL 851951 at
*24. A solicitation may allow an agency to rely on the past performance of an offeror’s affiliates
in evaluating an offer, but to do so the offer must reflect some evidence of the terms of the
agreement between the offeror and those affiliates and provide specific details about the
affiliates’ participation in the performance of the contract. Vague or general references in the
offer to the offeror’s affiliates are insufficient to show that their experience will have a
meaningful impact on contract performance by the offeror. See IAP World Servs., Inc., B-
407917.2, 2013 CPD ¶ 171, 2013 WL 3817472, at *7.
For the facilities-operation contract, Dawson provided six past performance examples for
projects covering all functional areas of the contract and claimed to have performed each one
itself. AR Tab 6c at 2192-2211. The record reflects, however, that each of these contracts was
performed instead by Dawson’s affiliates: Dawson Technical Inc. performed one contract (AR
Tab 11 at 2946); D7 LLC performed a second contract (id); Dawson Solutions LLC performed a
third contract (id. at 2947); Dawson Enterprises LLC performed two other contracts (id.); and
Aktarius LLC performed the sixth contract. (Id.) Thus, the past performance claimed by
Dawson to support its facilities offer was attributable entirely to Dawson’s affiliates, not Dawson
itself.
Similarly, for the student-services contract, Dawson provided six projects for its past
performance, asserting that it had performed two of them. AR Tab 7c at 2478-97. The other
four projects were attributed to proposed subcontractors. Of the two projects Dawson claimed as
10
its own, only one ([* * *]) was performed by Dawson; the other ([* * *]) was performed by
Dawson Technical Inc., an affiliate. AR Tab 15 at 2975; AR Tab 19zi at 3604.
The entirety of Dawson’s explanation of how its affiliates will participate in the two
contracts is limited to a statement on the cover page of the past-performance sections of its
offers, which reads:
[* * *]
AR Tab 6c at 2191; AR Tab 7c at 2477.
This language fails to specify which of its affiliates will participate in performing the
contracted work, which key personnel from those affiliates will be assigned to the performance
of which tasks under either contract, or what resources, if any, those affiliates will provide.
There are stray references in the record identifying the roles of affiliates. For example,
Dawson’s affiliate [* * *]. AR 9a at 2835, 2847. Dawson’s proposal in this record does not
otherwise tie any specific affiliate to a particular task or responsibility under either contract. The
generic language in Dawson’s offer does not explain how the experience or past performance of
any of the participating affiliates will benefit the performance of the contracts at issue. Nowhere
does either offer specify the mutual obligations of any affiliate to Dawson, either generally or as
to the specific performance of these contracts. Indeed, the affiliates on whose experience
Dawson relies are not clearly identified anywhere in Dawson’s proposal. Dawson’s offers
merely aggregate the entire corporate family under the single name “DAWSON,” without
distinction, and propose that the whole team will be available to support the work under the
contracts.
Given the generalized nature of the role and responsibilities of its affiliates outlined in
Dawson’s proposal, there is no meaningful way DHS could have evaluated Dawson’s past
performance and applied it to its evaluation of Dawson’s offers. Some flexibility is due to an
agency evaluating offers and making determinations, but to do so an agency must have at least a
bare minimum of facts on which to make an informed decision. Here, no such facts exist.
Perhaps if Dawson had at least explained the relationships among its affiliates and spelled out
which affiliate would perform which task DHS could have made an informed decision. Perhaps
Dawson’s affiliates do operate as a single team, but even that is not evident from the offers, aside
from the marketing pablum quoted above. This record does not support DHS’s confidence levels
for Dawson’s prior experience or past performance.
The defendant’s argument that Dawson introduced its team in its oral presentation is also
inadequate to salvage DHS’s evaluations of prior experience and past performance. The
capabilities of key personnel were evaluated under Factor 3, not under either Factor 1 or Factor
4. The record does not reflect that DHS considered key personnel when evaluating prior
experience or past performance. See AR Tab 11 at 2941-42. Indeed, the objectives of Factors 1
and 4 were to demonstrate that an offeror had successfully executed contracts of a similar size
and nature in the past.
During the oral presentations, Dawson’s key personnel did not identify their role with any
affiliate, appearing simply as part of Dawson’s team. The record includes no evidence that DHS
11
understood who from Dawson’s affiliates would be meaningfully involved in any particular
aspect of either of the contracts. See AR Tab 11; AR Tab 13; AR Tab 15; AR Tab 17 (lacking
any discussion whatsoever of Dawson’s key personnel). Even if the record was not so barren,
DHS would not benefit. An agency may rely on personnel from an offeror’s affiliate to evaluate
an offeror’s key personnel, but unless the offeror explains how its affiliates that employ these
key personnel will otherwise be involved in the performance of the contract, an agency may not
simply treat affiliate personnel as alter-egos of the affiliate itself. Personnel can come and go,
but an affiliate would still be responsible for performance. This reality explains why past
performance and key personnel are treated as different subjects for an offer and evaluated
separately. The effort by the defendant to conflate the two elements must fail.
Dawson’s proposals do not provide DHS with enough information to allow for informed
judgment. DHS could not have reasonably evaluated either proposal under Factors 1and 4. See
Advanced Mgmt., 139 Fed. Cl. at 417.
Having shown that DHS’s evaluation of Factors 1 and 4 is arbitrary and capricious, AFIS
must next show that it is prejudiced by DHS’s error.
To succeed on the merits, a protester must demonstrate a significant and prejudicial error
in the procurement process. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Importantly, a
protester does not need to prove that, but for the alleged error, it would have been awarded the
contract. Data Gen., 78 F.3d at 1562 (citation omitted). Instead, a protester must establish that it
had a substantial chance of receiving the contract but for the error. Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582.
This standard requires a protester to show it was within the zone of active consideration. CACI,
Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
On the current record, DHS could not have reasonably evaluated Dawson’s proposal
under Factors 1 and 4 because Dawson failed to provide evaluators with sufficient information to
make any meaningful assessment. See Advanced Mgmt., 139 Fed. Cl. at 417. Without this
necessary information, DHS should have assigned Dawson lower ratings for Factors 1 and 4 in
both procurements. As two of Dawson’s four non-pricing factor ratings require downgrading,
and AFIS has a significant price advantage, AFIS has demonstrated prejudice from the
misevaluation of Factors 1 and 4.
AFIS’s evaluation
The plaintiff argues that DHS’s evaluation of AFIS’s proposal under Factor 4 (past
performance) for both the student-services and facilities-operation contracts was in error because
DHS improperly relied on flawed CPARs to evaluate AFIS’s past performance. According to
AFIS, AFFS submitted a rebuttal to the negative CPARs, but DHS did not consider those
rebuttals. As DHS did not consider those rebuttals, AFIS argues the assessment lacks a rational
basis.
DHS is neither required to accept the explanation for the adverse CPARS evaluation, nor
precluded from considering the CPARS evaluation when assessing past performance. See, e.g.,
Colonial Press Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 788 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Merely
12
because some explanation was provided for [the plaintiff’s] late deliveries does not mean the
contracting officer was required to accept these explanations, nor did it change [the plaintiff’s]
historical past performance.”). An agency’s evaluation of past performance may be based on a
“reasonable perception of inadequate prior performance,” even if the contractor disputes the facts
upon which the past performance evaluation is based. SDS Int’l v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl.
742, 756 (2001). AFIS cannot show a likelihood of success on this claim.
2. FACTOR 2
The plaintiff raises multiple challenges to DHS’s evaluation of AFIS under Factor 2 (oral
presentation) for the student-services contract. AFIS contends that it was assigned three
weaknesses based on unstated criteria and was erroneously assessed four additional weaknesses.
AFIS’s claims are plausible, but the transcript of the oral presentation is not sufficiently clear,
and AFIS has not met its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits at this
stage. Resolution of these claims is reserved pending a complete administrative record.
Similarly, the plaintiff challenges DHS’s evaluation of AFIS under Factor 2 (oral
presentation) for the facilities-operation contract. AFIS asserts that it was assigned three
weaknesses for unstated criteria and was mistakenly assessed with an additional weakness.
Because the administrative record lacks a transcript of AFIS’s oral presentation for this contract,
it is not possible to determine whether these claims have merit at this stage.
AFIS also alleges disparate treatment in the evaluation of Factor 2 for the student-
services contract, arguing that although both Dawson and AFIS committed to daily equipment
inspections, only Dawson received a strength for this feature. While both offerors referenced
daily inspections, their approaches differed. Dawson’s proposal detailed a process for analyzing
data trends and tailoring maintenance schedules to optimize equipment performance, which DHS
considered a strength for its potential to extend equipment lifecycles. See Tab 6a, PI Appx 2122;
Tab 10, PI Appx 2938. AFIS’s submission merely noted that its team would conduct daily
inspections and maintenance on ranges, without describing how these inspections would be
managed or anticipated benefits. AFIS has not shown that its presentation was indistinguishable
from Dawson’s and therefore cannot show disparate treatment. See Office Design Grp. v. United
States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
AFIS also alleges disparate treatment by DHS under Factor 2 of the facilities-operation
contract, asserting that AFIS was assigned a weakness for the absence of its janitorial manager
during the oral presentation, when Dawson was not penalized for the absence of its janitorial
manager. DHS assigned AFIS a weakness, noting “[j]anitorial [m]anager was not present for the
oral presentation, thus resulting in minimal information of the janitorial plan for requirement.”
Tab 10 at 2937. AFIS was assigned a weakness not from the absence of its manager but from the
lack of substantive information it provided. By contrast, although Dawson’s janitorial manager
was also absent from the oral presentation, Dawson provided detailed information, earning a
strength. See Tab 10 at 2939. The record shows that Dawson’s presentation was far more
detailed than that of AFIS. AFIS has not demonstrated disparate treatment.
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3. FACTOR 3
AFIS argues that under the Student Services contract AFIS was erroneously assigned a
weakness for its program manager not meeting the years of experience or required dining
experience. Further, Dawson’s program manager did not meet the requirements needed but it
was assigned a strength. Similarly, under the Facilities contract, AFIS argues it received a
weakness for its senior Heating/Ventilation/Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) Technician not having
the required certification, but AFIS noted in its proposal that its HVAC Technician would
receive the certification within six months of the contract start date. AFIS also argues that DHS
erroneously assigned a weakness to its environmental safety manager for not having any relevant
experience. Lastly, AFIS argues that Dawson’s grounds-maintenance manager did not meet the
minimum years of experience required but Dawson was not assessed a weakness for it. These
claims involving key personnel are not especially strong; even if AFIS is correct about them,
they are insufficient to support a preliminary injunction because they do not, even combined, call
into question DHS’s overall rationales for Factor 3. They will be resolved on the parties’ cross-
motions for judgment on the administrative record, after a full administrative record is produced.
4. FACTOR 5
AFIS makes two arguments on the price evaluations. First, it argues that DHS’s
evaluation of Dawson’s proposed pricing for both contracts was unreasonable. Second, it argues
that the the best-value tradeoff analysis for each contract was arbitrary and capricious because it
was based on the flawed underlying evaluation of the other factors.
The crux of AFIS’s challenge to DHS’s evaluation of Dawson’s pricing is a flawed price
reasonableness analysis. A price reasonableness analysis is designed “to protect the public from
paying a price that is too high for what is being procured.” DynCorp Int’l, LLC v. United States,
10 F.4th 1300, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Determining a reasonable price “is a judgment based on
the specifics of the government’s needs.” Id. Therefore, “‘agencies enjoy wide latitude’” when
evaluating price reasonableness. Id. (quoting Agile Defense, Inc. v. United States, 959 F.3d
1379, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
For both contracts, DHS performed an analysis of the various elements of Dawson’s
pricing proposals. They are not the most detailed analyses ever seen, but they address the salient
aspects of Dawson’s proposals. For both contracts, DHS also concluded that the higher price of
Dawson’s proposals was justified and provided best value to the government. Given the latitude
agencies enjoy in evaluating price reasonableness, DHS’s analysis of Dawson’s price on both
contracts is satisfactory. (Tab 13 at 2963; Tab 17 at 2988.)
DHS also compared Dawson’s proposed prices to the IGE for each contract and found
that the technical strengths and soundness of Dawson’s proposals supported the conclusion that
its proposed pricing was reasonable, and the proposals justified the price premium. Under the
FAR, an agency has “discretion to choose the test it uses when conducing a price reasonableness
analysis to ensure that the agency pays a fair and reasonable price.” See DynCorp Int’l, LLC v.
United States, 10 F.4th 1300, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2021). DHS used its discretion and documented a
rational basis for its decision.
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The challenge to DHS’s evaluation of Dawson’s pricing is rejected.
As for AFIS’s challenge to the best-value trade-off decisions, it is derivative of and
dependent on AFIS’s other claims. See IT Enter. Sols. JV, LLC v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl.
158, 174 (2017). Resolution of this claim is reserved for the motions for judgment on the
administrative record, when the unresolved arguments presented by AFIS are addressed.
5. AGENCY NEGOTIATIONS
The plaintiff argues that DHS awarded Dawson contracts for requirements that differed
from those solicited and improperly conducted negotiations with Dawson alone regarding the
changed requirements.
Dawson’s president acknowledged on March 5, 2026, prior to contract award on March
6, 2026, that his company had been negotiating with DHS over the contracts. (ECF 1-1 at ¶¶
5,7.) According to the plaintiff, these negotiations included Dawson and DHS working together
to “substantially revise[] the structure, requirements, and proposed pricing for both
contract.” (ECF 26-1 at 36.) The pricing for the awarded contracts is higher than the pricing
Dawson had proposed. AFIS argues that the contracts DHS awarded do not match the
requirements DHS solicited, reflecting an unfair bidding process because not all offerors were
given the opportunity to bid on common requirements transparently advertised to them.
The defendants argue that the source-selection decisions were made on February 12,
2026. At that point, Dawson was the awardee of the contracts, even though they were not
formally awarded until March 6, 2026. Discussions with Dawson only began after February 26,
2026, when FLETC received the DHS memorandum directing the termination of all ASRC
contracts. The defendants represent that the discussions did not involve substantial revisions to
the contracts. Compare Tab 1a, PI Appx 1-19, with Tab 25, PI Appx 3687-700. They argue that
the objective of the negotiations was to accelerate the awardee’s transition period to
accommodate the February 26 memorandum directing FLETC to terminate the incumbent
contract early. The defendants argue that an agency is permitted to communicate with an
incoming contractor prior to award to ensure there is no lapse in services.
None of the post-negotiation contract changes constitute a substantive alteration to the
contracts’ requirements. The topics of the negotiations, reflected in the document Dawson
provided to DHS (AR Tab 24), were primarily dedicated to aligning contract language with the
terms of the solicitation, removing outdated FAR clauses, and adjusting the transition period.
While the plaintiff contends that the contract price increased following these discussions, any
price changes appear to be tied to two exceptional circumstances: the decision to shorten the
transition period and the lapse of appropriations for DHS. A comparison of Dawson’s pricing
proposals to the values of the contract line items (“CLINS”) reveals either no change or only
minimal adjustments that reflect minor modifications attributable to the expedited transition, not
a fundamental repricing.
The plaintiff also challenges the inclusion of a clause providing that:
the Contractor’s execution of this award and any commencement of performance
shall not constitute a waiver of the Contractor’s right to seek a bilateral modification
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and/or submit a priced request for adjustment (REA or similar) for Government-
directed acceleration, immediate-start work, or scope deltas beyond the mutually
agreed baseline.
AR Tab 25 at 3699; AR Tab 26 at 3865.
Although AFIS characterizes this provision as a “blank check” for Dawson to alter the
contract price, such provisions are reflected in the FAR and are standard in government
contracts, preserving the contractor’s right to seek additional compensation for government-
directed changes. FAR 43.103. This addition does not represent a material change to the
solicitation.
Even assuming that the contract was materially changed, AFIS cannot establish
prejudice. AFIS claims its pricing for the alleged changed requirements would have been even
more competitive than its pricing for the solicited requirements. (ECF 26-1 at 37-38.) The
record belies this argument. DHS fully considered AFIS’s incumbent status and the pricing
advantages that status provided but still did not select AFIS. The student-services contract
evaluation noted: “Incumbent experience at the FLETC site supports a seamless transition with
no lag in service; personnel familiar with FLETC operations.” Tab 14 at 2968. The price
evaluation similarly noted: “Phase-in cost = $0.00; Incumbent.” Tab 16 at 2982. The facilities-
operation contract evaluation similarly recognized AFIS’s incumbent status. Tab 10 at 2936-37;
Tab 12 at 2955. The Source Selection document expressly acknowledged AFIS’s institutional
knowledge of FLETC Charleston. Tab 13 at 2961. Because AFIS’s pricing and incumbent
advantages were already fully considered and found insufficient, AFIS cannot demonstrate
prejudice from not being included in discussions that produced the challenged contract
modifications. When “there is no evidence that the [agency’s] award decision would have
changed, . . . it is unlikely [a] court will find prejudice.” Candle Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed.
Cl. 658, 665 (1998). Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot show it is likely to succeed on this claim.
B. IRREPARABLE HARM
The plaintiff argues that it will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not
issued. Central to these arguments is the competitive advantage the plaintiff loses if the
transition to Dawson takes place. AFIS argues that it offers a fully staffed, highly trained team
already in place. AFIS fears that 30-40 percent of its incumbent staff, including two key
personnel who are now employed by AFIS but are listed in the key personnel section of
Dawson’s offer, will be lost if the new contract proceeds. AFIS argues that if it were to succeed
on the merits and then win the contracts after re-evaluation of the proposals, the harm to its
competitive advantage as the incumbent and its inability to transition back into performance of
the new contracts with its current staff would constitute irreparable harm.
The defendant argues that AFIS’s argument is the same argument any incumbent would
experience upon the loss of a successor contract. Further, the primary support cited by the
plaintiff identifies as irreparable harm only the loss of “key personnel,” not merely some of its
incumbent staff. See NetStar-1 Government Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed Cl. 729,
735 (2011). The defendant argues AFIS has not shown a likely loss of its key personnel.
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An injunction is inappropriate when “the harms alleged by plaintiff are the sorts of things
that any incumbent would experience upon the loss of a successor contract.” CRAssociates, Inc.
v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 23, 26 (2012). “No federal contractor has a right to maintain its
incumbency in perpetuity. It follows, a fortiori, that the potential loss of the benefits of
incumbency does not give plaintiff some sort of automatic right to a stay pending
appeal.” Id. Specifically, an incumbent who loses employees because of a contract award loss
does not automatically receive injunctive relief. In PGBA, LLC v. United States, Judge Lettow
noted that although the loss of employees causes “significant” harm, an incumbent contractor’s
“reliance on the loss of its current employees as a basis for irreparable injury would require this
Court to consider any incumbent contractor’s loss of a successor contract to be irreparable
harm.” 60 Fed. Cl. 196, 221, reconsideration denied, 60 Fed. Cl. 567, aff’d, 389 F.3d 1219 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
The plaintiff’s loss of approximately 30-40 percent of its workforce and the competitive
advantage that comes with being an incumbent is not sufficient to show irreparable harm. While
the loss of two “key personnel” edges the plaintiff closer to a showing of irreparable harm, the
plaintiff has failed to show it will not get those two employees back upon being awarded the
contract, or that it would be unable to find employees of a similar skill set to fill those key spots.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury
and to preserve the [ ] court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the
merits.” Canal Authority of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). In
essence, a preliminary injunction ensures that the court can issue the relief sought and make the
plaintiff whole, regardless of how much time passes between the filing of a complaint and the
court’s decision.
In its complaint, AFIS challenges numerous errors in DHS’s evaluation of its proposals
and in Dawson’s proposals, rendering those evaluations, and the best-value trade-off decisions
based on them, arbitrary and capricious. Those challenges can be fully addressed and remedied
on cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The complaint does not seek relief
from harm arising from the transition from the previous contracts. True, if not for the erroneous
evaluations, AFIS can argue, there would be no transitions, but that alone is not enough to justify
blocking the orderly and routine operations of the agency.
The claim for a preliminary injunction must be evaluated through the lens of the claims
raised in the complaint. Here, those claims can be remedied and complete relief through a
reevaluation awarded if the plaintiff prevails on the merits. Extraordinary preliminary relief is
not required to enable the plaintiff to be afforded the relief it seeks.
AFIS has shown it is likely to prevail on the current record on its claims under Factors 1
and 4, but if the record remains as it is, the remedy for the agency’s arbitrary and capricious
evaluations of those factors can be remedied in full in conjunction with a final decision on
AFIS’s other claims. Preliminary relief is not appropriate when the remedy would be a remand
for reevaluation of both parties’ sets of offers. Otherwise, AFIS has not shown that it is losing
more than its competitive advantage as an incumbent, which cannot support a claim of
irreparable harm.
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C. THE BALANCE OF HARMS
The defendant argues that the harm, both operational and financial, to DHS from an
injunction would be significant. FLETC has already expended approximately $3,000,000 in
transitioning services to Dawson over the last month, and this sum would be lost if the transition
were enjoined. (28-1 at ¶ 21.) It would cost approximately $2,000,000 monthly if FLETC were
enjoined from proceeding with the transition and required to extend the existing contract. Id.
The defendant also argues that a preliminary injunction would harm FLETC’s ability to fulfill its
mission, as the uncertainty will make it hard to fill positions and perform maintenance.
Dawson argues that it will be harmed from an injunction. It is currently working towards
the transition of services to Dawson. A work stoppage would result in disruptions to Dawson’s
workforce, causing material, service, and labor inefficiencies and strained vendor relationships.
Dawson would be forced to divert personnel from other business developments. (ECF 29-
3.) Dawson also asserts that while that cost from delay could be recouped through an equitable
adjustment, a delay would require Dawson to rely on a line of credit, which would otherwise be
used for other purposes. Id.
On this record, the defendants would suffer more from an injunction. AFIS can have any
errors corrected and the competitive balance restored through a successful motion for judgment
on the administrative record. It will have lost nothing (although the current contractor, AFFS,
will be harmed financially, it is not party to this suit). The disruption to the defendants from an
injunction at this stage would be substantial. That harm may be even more substantial if AFIS
prevails in this litigation at a later stage, and the defendants will not be heard to argue that the
balance of harms for a permanent injunction is substantial because Dawson has been performing
for several months. That will be the defendants’ burden to bear at that time. This factor supports
the denial of the preliminary injunction.
D. PUBLIC INTEREST
AFIS argues that the public’s interest “in honest, open, and fair competition in the
procurement process is compromised whenever an agency abuses its discretion in evaluating a
contractor’s bid.” NetStar-1, 98 Fed. Cl. at 735 (quoting PGBA, 57 Fed. Cl. at 663). The
plaintiff relies primarily on a DHS memorandum distributed internally directing agency
components to terminate all contracts with ASRC affiliates, like ASIF.
The defendant argues that FLETC will be harmed by an injunction. It argues that the
public interest is served by ensuring DHS’s law enforcement training facilities can meet the
training needs of its students. A decline in the quality of facilities maintenance or student
services could affect the health and safety of trainees, as well as the efficiency and quality of
their training.
The public interest is served by ensuring that the new contracts represent the best overall
value to the government, and that the procurement process is honest, open, and fair, while
minimizing delays and their attendant costs associated.
AFIS relies on emails and references to the DHS memorandum to suggest that the
contracting process was biased. The record is not sufficiently developed to support argument,
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and the timeline undercuts it, as the decision to award the contracts to Dawson predate the
memorandum. If the record reflected that the DHS directive had influenced or interfered with
the evaluation of the offers at issue or with the awards to Dawson, the public interest in
preserving the integrity of the competitive process would strongly favor the plaintiff. The
record, as it currently exists, belies the claim.
As AFIS has not shown that the procurement process was corrupted or biased, the public
interest favors the regular order. Dawson prevailed in the competition. Unless AFIS can show
error in the competition, and it may still do so, the public interest does not support an injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
AFIS has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of some of its claims; on
others, it may still prevail on a fuller record, but the record at this stage does not permit a finding
that it is likely to prevail. AFIS has shown on this record that it is likely to succeed on its claim
that the evaluations of Dawson’s proposals under Factors 1 and 4 were arbitrary and capricious.
AFIS cannot show, however, that it will be irreparably harmed by this error, as it can be
remedied by requiring DHS to reevaluate the proposals and conduct a new best-value
determination with the revised ratings. If AFIS prevails on its motion for judgment on the
administrative record, the agency will be required to reevaluate the existing proposals. That
remedy can offer AFIS the relief it seeks. The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
s/ Richard A. Hertling
Richard A. Hertling
Judge
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