R. Brown v. PPB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Raymond Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1815 C.D. 2024

: Submitted: March 3, 2026

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: April 15, 2026

Raymond Brown (Brown) petitions for review of the December 3, 2024 order

(Order) of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) that denied his administrative

appeal of a May 30, 2024 Board decision (Decision) recommitting him as a

convicted parole violator (CPV) and denying him credit for time spent at liberty on

parole. Additionally, Brown’s appointed counsel, Dana E. Greenspan, Esq.

(Counsel), filed a no-merit letter and an Application to Withdraw as Counsel

(Application to Withdraw) under Turner.1 After review, we grant Counsel’s

Application to Withdraw, and affirm the Board’s Order.

1

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2017, following convictions for aggravated assault, unlawful restraint with

risk of serious bodily injury, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, simple

assault, and two counts of endangering the welfare of children, Brown received an

aggregate sentence of 9 ½ years to 19 years’ imprisonment, with a maximum

sentence date of March 22, 2030. Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 3. The Board granted

Brown conditional parole by order dated May 17, 2021, and on August 11, 2021,

released him from State Correctional Institution (SCI) Mercer to reside at Self Help

Movement, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 7-12, 17. Prior to release, Brown

signed Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole (Conditions), which included the

following: “If you are convicted of a crime committed while on parole/reparole, the

Board has the authority, after an appropriate hearing, to recommit you to serve the

balance of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when

paroled/reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on parole.” Id. at 13. Brown

also signed Special Conditions of Parole (Special Conditions), acknowledging his

placement on domestic violence protocol. Id. at 22.

On July 20, 2022, the Board ordered Brown to stay away from his child’s

mother because of the filing of a Protection from Abuse (PFA) petition, which was

later dismissed. Id. at 55. On the same date, the Board placed Brown on GPS

monitoring, with a warning to stay more than 300 feet from the mother’s home. Id.

at 30, 31, 55. On February 9, 2023, the Board again placed Brown on GPS

monitoring because of another PFA action filed against him, and Brown signed

additional Special Conditions to “remain in compliance with the [PFA] order issued

against him.” Id. at 34-35, 55.

2

On June 22, 2023, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued a

warrant for Brown for violation of a parole condition, failure to refrain from

assaultive behavior. Id. at 39. On October 18, 2023, the Board determined the

Department failed to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the

evidence, ordered Brown to continue on parole, and canceled the warrant, effective

October 27, 2023. Id. at 40-42.

On November 6, 2023, the Philadelphia Police Department arrested Brown in

connection with incidents occurring on June 14, 2023 and June 17, 2023 and charged

him with several crimes, including two counts of indirect criminal contempt under

the PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a), (PFA contempt) relative to each incident. Id. at

51, 53, 58-74. The trial court set bail at $25,000 for each case, but Brown never

posted bail. Id. at 60, 69. On that same date, the Department issued a second warrant

for Brown’s committal. Id. at 43. On December 12, 2023, the Board ordered Brown

to remain detained pending the disposition of the criminal charges. Id. at 44.

On April 9, 2024, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County (Municipal

Court) found Brown guilty of the PFA contempt counts, dismissed the remaining

charges, and sentenced him to serve three months to six months of incarceration with

credit for time served, followed by six months of consecutive probation. Id. at 58-

74. On April 26, 2024, the Board provided Brown notice of charges and notice of a

revocation hearing. Id. at 48-49. On that same date, Brown waived his rights to

counsel, a panel hearing, and a revocation hearing; he also admitted to the PFA

contempt convictions. Id. at 45-47. As part of the written waiver (Waiver), Brown

acknowledged: “I understand and agree that this admission is binding and may only

be withdrawn if I submit a written withdrawal to my supervising agent, within ten

3

(10) calendar days of the date written above [April 26, 2024].” Id. at 45. Brown did

not submit a written withdrawal within 10 days of April 26, 2024.

Based on Brown’s Waiver, the Board canceled a revocation hearing,

scheduled for June 30, 2024, and the hearing examiner issued a report. Id. at 75-87.

The Board issued its Decision to “recommit [Brown] to [an SCI] as a [CPV] to serve

a recommitment period of 6 months,” and determined a new recommitment

maximum date of August 10, 2032. Id. at 88-89 (capitalization omitted). The Board

listed as its reasons: convictions in a court of record, poor adjustment under

supervision, and failure to comply with sanctions. Id. The Board did not award

credit for time spent at liberty on parole because Brown’s “behavior reflects

domestic violence issues that warrant denying credit for time at liberty on parole.”

Id. at 89 (capitalization omitted).

Brown filed an administrative appeal of the Board’s Decision. The Board

denied the administrative appeal and affirmed the Board’s Decision. Id. at 107-10.

Brown now appeals the Board’s Order. On appeal, Brown raises three issues

for our review. First, Brown alleges the Board erred in not providing a revocation

hearing despite his timely submission of a written withdrawal of his waiver.

Brown’s Br. at 4. Second, Brown claims the Board abused its discretion in

recommitting him when “he was not convicted in a court of record,” and in

misapplying an offense gravity score (OGS) of 1 under the 8th Edition of the

Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines). Id. Lastly, Brown contends the

Board abused its discretion in denying him credit for time in good standing on parole

as the record does not contain convictions for domestic violence. Id.

4

Additionally, this Court appointed Counsel for Brown, and afforded Counsel

time to file an Amended Petition for Review. Thereafter, Counsel filed an

Application to Withdraw and a Turner letter.2

II. Turner Letter and Application to Withdraw

Before considering the merits of Brown’s appeal, we must first address

Counsel’s Turner letter and Application to Withdraw. Where court-appointed

counsel believes the petitioner’s case lacks merit, this Court may permit counsel to

withdraw from the representation if counsel submits a Turner letter that “detail[s]

the nature and extent of [counsel’s] review and list[s] each issue the petitioner

wished to have raised, with counsel’s explanation of why those issues [are]

meritless.” Turner, 544 A.2d at 928. Further, we must confirm counsel satisfied the

following procedural requirements: (1) counsel notified the petitioner of the request

to withdraw; (2) counsel provided the petitioner with a copy of a Turner letter; and

(3) counsel advised the petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or file a brief on

his own behalf. Miskovitch v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2013). Where counsel satisfies the procedural requirements, we conduct

an independent review of the issues and, if we concur in counsel’s assessment, we

may grant counsel leave to withdraw. Hont v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 680 A.2d

47, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Here, Counsel satisfied the technical requirements of Turner. Counsel’s letter

sets forth the relevant factual and procedural history. Counsel states that, following

review of the record and relevant case law and statutes, and after consultation with

Brown, “[i]n preparing the appellate brief . . . counsel has come to the conclusion

2

“Turner letter” references our Supreme Court’s decision in Turner, 544 A.2d at 928-29, wherein

the Court set forth “the appropriate procedures under Pennsylvania law” for “the withdrawal of

court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”

5

that the issues raised in the Petition for Review lack merit and that there exists no

legal basis to challenge the Parole Board determination.” Turner Letter at 1.

Counsel analyzes the issues Brown raised in his administrative appeal. Counsel

provided Brown a copy of the Turner letter informing him of his right to retain

substitute counsel and his right to file a pro se brief with this Court. Id. at 10. Thus,

Counsel complied with Turner’s technical requirements to withdraw from

representation. Accordingly, we now independently review the merits of Brown’s

Petition for Review.

III. Discussion

We review the actions of the Board to determine whether substantial evidence

supports the Board’s decision, whether the Board committed an error of law, or

whether the Board violated a parolee’s constitutional rights. Bailey v. Pa. Parole

Bd., 323 A.3d 259, 263 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (quotation omitted). “ʻSubstantial

evidence’ has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and “requires something more than a

scintilla creating a mere suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.”

Chapman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 484 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

When presented with a question of law, such as statutory interpretation, our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.

& Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 473 (Pa. 2017). Where the law grants the Board discretion,

we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 473-74.

A. Waiver of Right to Revocation Hearing

First, we address Brown’s contention the Board erred in failing to provide a

revocation hearing. The United States Supreme Court has recognized due process

requires a timely revocation hearing before the parole authority’s revocation

6

decision, at which the parolee must have, following proper notice to him, an

opportunity to appear and to present evidence. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

487-88 (1972). Section 71.4 of the Board’s Regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 71.4,

enumerates a 120-day timeframe for the revocation hearing following a triggering

event, and recognizes the parolee’s right to waive that hearing. 37 Pa. Code § 71.4.

Here, Brown does not contest that, on April 26, 2024, he waived in writing

his right to a revocation hearing. Brown’s Br. at 9. Nor does Brown dispute the

validity of the waiver form. Id. Rather, Brown asserts that on May 3, 2024, within

the requisite 10-day period, he submitted a written waiver withdrawal form

(Withdrawal) to parole staff, which staff did not process. Id. at 9-10. Brown

included a copy of this alleged two-page Withdrawal as “Exhibit A” to his

administrative appeal, along with purported proof of mailing “to his parole officer

Edward Jones and a copy to M. Ortiz” as “Exhibit B” (Exhibit B). C.R. at 96-97,

99-100.

Contrary to Brown’s assertions, the Certified Record does not contain any

indicia that Brown’s supervising agent received the purported Withdrawal within 10

calendar days of April 26, 2024, as required by the language of the Waiver.

Similarly, the Certified Record contains no evidence the Board ever received the

Withdrawal. Moreover, Brown’s own evidence, Exhibit B, reflects a postmark date

of June 16, 2024, well beyond the 10-day calendar period. Thus, we discern no error

by the Board in finding Brown waived his right to a revocation hearing.

B. Propriety of Recommitment

Preliminarily, Brown contends the Board cannot recommit him because the

Municipal Court is not a court of record under Section 6138(a)(1) of the Prisons and

Parole Code (Code), 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1), and his PFA contempt convictions

constitute summary offenses. Brown’s Br. at 11-12 (citing Chesson v. Pa. Bd. of

7

Prob. & Parole, 47 A.3d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)). Section 6138(a)(1), in pertinent

part, endows the Board with discretion to revoke an offender’s parole for conviction

of a crime punishable by imprisonment “in a court of record.”

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1).

In Chesson, we determined a conviction for a summary offense before the

Municipal Court of Philadelphia, normally a court of record, does not constitute a

conviction in a “court of record” for purposes of Section 6138(a)(1) of the Code.

Chesson, 47 A.3d at 880 (emphasis added). Brown attempts to pigeonhole his PFA

contempt convictions into this window. However, because PFA contempt carries a

maximum sentence punishable by up to six months of incarceration, the courts of

this Commonwealth have treated it as a misdemeanor. See Commonwealth v. Bartic,

303 A.3d 124, 133 (Pa. Super. 2023) (appellant permitted to petition for allowance

of appeal because a conviction for indirect criminal contempt under Section 6114 of

the PFA is a misdemeanor).3 Moreover, our Supreme Court has clearly recognized

the impropriety of summarily punishing PFA contempt convictions. Commonwealth

v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d 196, 205 (Pa. 2022) (“indirect criminal contempt cannot be

punished summarily” because, unlike direct contempt where the conduct occurs

within the court’s immediate view, indirect criminal contempt includes the right to

a trial by jury for determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Because Brown

has supplied no authority to support whether the Municipal Court’s convictions for

non-summary crimes constitute convictions “in a court of record,” we discern no

error by the Board.

3

Although Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, they may provide

persuasive authority where they address analogous legal issues. DeSantis v. Lenox Place Condo

Assoc., Inc., 316 A.3d 1119, 1121 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).

8

Additionally, Brown asserts the Board erred in recommitting him to a term of

six months of incarceration, based upon an OGS of 1, because the Sentencing

Guidelines do not ascribe any OGS to PFA contempt. The Board concedes the

Sentencing Guidelines do not designate an OGS for PFA Contempt; however, the

Board asserts it appropriately utilized an OGS of 1, the lowest OGS, for Brown’s

convictions. Board’s Br. at 18.

We have held a PFA contempt was a criminal conviction sufficient to

warrant recommittal as a CPV under the Code. See Dunkelberger v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.

& Parole, 593 A.2d 8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Section 311.5(b)(1) of

the State Parole Recommitment Guidelines (Recommitment Guidelines),

204 Pa. Code, § 311.5(b)(1), enumerates the following specific provisions for

CPVs, such as Brown, in pertinent part:

(1) Convicted violator recommitment ranges are to be considered by the

Board in the exercise of its discretion, while accounting for the

following factors:

(i) The seriousness of the initial conviction offense. Seriousness

is based on the determination under the State parole guidelines

whether the person is designated as a violent or non-violent

offender.

(ii) The level of seriousness of the new conviction offense. The

seriousness of the new conviction offense is determined by

identifying the highest OGS assignment under the 8 th Edition

Sentencing Guidelines of all new conviction offenses, and then

determining the corresponding sentencing level for that

offense. . . . Summary offenses are assigned the lowest offense

gravity score (OGS 1) and the corresponding sentencing level

(Level A). . . .

(iii) The time required to receive treatment and programming to

meet the rehabilitative needs of the paroled person. The

9

corrective programming required to address the needs of the

paroled person associated with the recommitment, which

begins after a hearing or waiver of a hearing, may require a

recommitment period shorter or longer than the recommended

recommitment range.

204 Pa. Code § 311.5(b)(1). The table in Section 311.6(b) of the Recommitment

Guidelines identifies a CPV recommitment range of one to six months for new

convictions with OGS 1 to OGS 3, committed by both non-violent and violent

offenders. 204 Pa. Code § 311.6(b). This is the least amount of recommitment time

for a CPV. Id.

Here, the Board applied a recommitment range of one to six months, the

lowest recommittal range. C.R. at 108. Despite Brown’s contention the Sentencing

Guidelines do not identify an OGS for PFA contempt, the Recommitment Guidelines

identify an OGS of 1 for summary offenses. 204 Pa. Code § 311.5(b)(1). Similarly,

Brown received the benefit of the application of the lowest OGS and recommittal

range for his convictions, which cannot be summarily punished. See Bartic, 303

A.3d at 133; Stevenson, 283 A.3d at 205. Further, the Board did not exercise its

discretion to exceed the recommended range. 204 Pa. Code, § 311.5(b)(1)(iii).

When the recommitment period falls within the presumptive range, a parolee cannot

challenge the Board’s decision. Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 574 A.2d 558

(Pa. 1990). Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in recommitting

Brown for six months.

C. Credit for Time at Liberty on Parole

Lastly, we address Brown’s contention the Board abused its discretion by

denying him credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole. The Code provides if

the Board determines to recommit a parolee as a CPV, as it did with Brown, “the

offender shall be recommitted to serve the remainder of the term which the offender

10

would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and, except as

provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on

parole.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2). Except in certain limited circumstances, none of

which apply here, Paragraph 2.1 of Section 6138(a) of the Code endows the Board

with discretion to award an offender credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole.

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1).

In Pittman, our Supreme Court concluded the Board must provide an

explanation for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time served at liberty

on parole. Pittman, 159 A.3d at 474-75. The Supreme Court explained, “an

appellate court hearing the matter must have [a] method to assess the Board’s

exercise of discretion,” and a single sentence will often suffice. Id. at 474, 475 n.12.

Additionally, this Court has determined the Board’s reasons must be “documented

by the record.” Plummer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 216 A.3d 1207, 1212 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2019).

Here, the hearing examiner’s report included a checked box indicating “[t]he

offender’s behavior reflects domestic violence issues that warrant denying credit for

time at liberty on parole.” C.R. at 80. Brown argues the inadequacy of the Board’s

stated reason, contending the Certified Record does not “[reflect] domestic issues,”

because it does not contain any PFA complaints or PFA findings of abuse. Brown’s

Br. at 16. Brown also relies upon the Board’s October 18, 2023 determination that

he did not engage in assaultive behavior, as well as the Municipal Court’s dismissal

of burglary and robbery charges. Id. at 16. We disagree.

Our review of the record supports the Board’s articulated reason for denying

credit. Before his release from incarceration, Brown signed the Conditions, wherein

he acknowledged the Board’s authority, upon recommittal for conviction of a new

11

crime, to deny him credit for time spent at liberty on parole. While on parole

supervision for aggravated assault and related offenses, and while subject to the

Special Conditions for domestic violence protocol and for PFA protocol, Brown

received two new PFA contempt convictions. On two separate occasions, Brown

was placed on GPS monitoring, related to PFA incidents. The Board followed

Pittman by supplying a rationale for its decision to deny Brown credit for time spent

at liberty on parole, and the record supported the rationale. Thus, the Board did not

abuse its discretion by denying Brown credit for time spent at liberty on parole.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Counsel fulfilled the requirements of

Turner, and our independent review confirms Brown’s arguments lack merit.

Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s Application to Withdraw. Additionally, we

conclude the Board did not err or abuse its discretion, and we affirm the Board’s

Order.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge

12

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Raymond Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1815 C.D. 2024

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of April 2026, the April 25, 2025 Application to

Withdraw as Counsel filed by Dana E. Greenspan, Esq. is GRANTED and the

December 3, 2024 order of the Pennsylvania Parole Board is AFFIRMED.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge