Cooper

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLINT COOPER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1005

HYDRIL USA DISTRIBUTION, SECTION "E" (5)

LLC, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant QGOG

Constellation US LLC (“Defendant”).1 Plaintiff Clint Cooper (“Plaintiff”) did not file an

opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the Court considers Defendant’s statement of

uncontested facts to be admitted pursuant to LR 56.2. Although the dispositive motion is

unopposed, summary judgment is not automatic, and the Court must determine whether

Defendant has shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff while working as a

seaman aboard the LONE STAR vessel.3 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that much of

the crew working on board the LONE STAR were employed or under the control of

Defendant.4 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s negligent failure to properly train and

supervise the employees working aboard the vessel contributed to his injuries.5 However,

Defendant argues it played no role in the operation of the LONE STAR.6 Defendant argues

1 R. Doc. 22.

2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. P. 56(a).

3 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 9.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 R. Doc. 22-1 at p. 3.

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its business activities consist of identifying new potential contractors and vendors in the

United States that may be eligible to do work for its parent companies, Constellation

Services Ltd. and Constellation Oil Services Holding S.A.7 Defendant argues its work is

limited to commercial and marketing services, not technical or operational services

related to any vessel.8

The following facts are undisputed. Defendant is a Texas limited liability company

registered and in good standing with the State of Texas.9 Defendant’s only employee is

Mr. Seung Han Ryoo.10 Mr. Ryoo has never been on board the LONE STAR.11 Defendant

does not own the LONE STAR and does not, and did not at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged

accident, operate the LONE STAR.12 Plaintiff performed his work on board the LONE

STAR pursuant to a contract between his employer, Hydril USA Distrubtion LLC

(“Hydril”) and Lone Star Offshore, Ltd;13 Defendant did not enter into a contract with

Hydril at any time.14

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”15 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”16

When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the

7 Id. at p. 2. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant explain the Constellation affiliates’ role in the operation of the

LONE STAR.

8 Id.

9 R. Doc. 22-2 at ¶ ¶ 1, 2.

10 Id. at ¶ 4.

11 Id. at ¶ 7.

12 Id. at ¶ ¶ 8-9.

13 Id. at ¶ 11.

14 Id. at ¶ 10.

15 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

16 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).

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evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing

the evidence.”17 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.18

There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving

party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.19

If the dispositive issue is one for which the moving party will bear the burden of

persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”20 If the

moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party

successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving

party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the

record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material

fact does indeed exist.21

On the other hand, if the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party

will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of

production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element

of the nonmovant’s claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to

establish an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.22 When proceeding under the

17 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008); see

also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).

18 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

19 Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).

20 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.

v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).

21 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.

22 Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987)

(citing Justice Brennan’s statement of the summary judgment standard in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and

requiring the Movers to submit affirmative evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s

claim or, alternatively, demonstrate the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential

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first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the

movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.23 When, however, the

movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the

ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim,

the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s

attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by

the moving party.”24 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to

demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.25 If the

movant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the

nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving

party’s papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue

for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further

discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”26 “Summary judgment should be

granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after

the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its

ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for

element); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Celotex,

and requiring the movant to make an affirmative presentation to negate the nonmovant’s claims on

summary judgment); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (2016) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision, the majority and

dissent both agreed as to how the summary-judgment burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how

the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).

23 Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1980); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).

24 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332.

25 Id at 332-33.

26 Id. at 332-33 n.3.

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trial.”27

Still, “unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.

The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the

record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the claim.

“‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in

search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”28

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence

claim.

Because Plaintiff alleges that he was a seaman injured on board a vessel at sea, his

claims against Defendant arise under the general maritime law.29 To recover under

general maritime law for negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a duty owed

by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) there was a breach of duty, (3) the plaintiff sustained

an injury, and (4) there is a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury.30

In Matter of Savage Inland Marine, LLC, the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas found that a defendant entity which did not have any personnel working

on a vessel and that was not involved in the operation of the vessel owed no duty to a

plaintiff injured in an accident on that vessel.31 Similarly, in Bolden v. Offshore Exp., Inc.,

this Court dismissed a negligence claim against a third party vessel owner when the

27 Id.; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289.

28 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,

Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).

29 Matter of Savage Inland Marine, LLC, 539 F. Supp. 3d 629, 647 (E.D. Tex. 2021).

30 Id.

31 539 F. Supp. 3d 629, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2021)( “[Defendant] had no crew present on board the EMS 368 at

the time or place of the Incident, and [Defendant] was not participating in the operation to resecure the

Savage Fleet at the time of the Incident. [Defendant] was not even aware of Wood’s injuries until Savage

provided notice of its limitation action six months after the incident. Thus, [Defendant] was a non-present,

non-actor and owed no duty. . .”).

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owner did not employ the plaintiff and did not supervise, direct, or control any of the work

on the platform where the plaintiffs injury occurred.32

In this case, Defendant did not own, charter, or operate the LONE STAR.33

Moreover, Defendant and its sole employee were not involved in the LONE STAR’s,

Hydril’s, or Plaintiffs operations at the time of the incident.34 As it is undisputed that

Defendant played no role in the activities or operations of the vessel where Plaintiff

suffered his injuries, Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff, and the Court will dismiss

Plaintiffs negligence claim against it.35

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.°° Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of April, 2026.

SUSIE oath

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32 No. 91-2160, 1992 WL 275417, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 8, 1992).

33 R, Doc. 22-2 at 1 4 7-9.

34 Td,

35 The only other possible basis under which Plaintiff could assert a claim against Defendant would be under

an alter ego theory of liability. However, Plaintiff has not alleged an alter ego theory of liability in his

complaint, nor has he pleaded any facts that could possibly state an alter ego claim.

36 R. Doc. 22.