Jane Doe 1 v. Steven Sloan

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

JANE DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STEVEN V. SLOAN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

Nos. 1:23-cv-01035, -36 & -37 — Jonathan E. Hawley, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 17, 2026 — DECIDED APRIL 14, 2026

____________________

Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and TAIBLESON,

Circuit Judges.

TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge. In 2019, law enforcement in the

small town of Toulon, Illinois, was investigating a collection

of sexually explicit images of local underage girls stored on

an online file-sharing service. As part of that investigation, of-

ficers sent a link to the files to Jason Musselman, an “auxiliary

police officer” and IT employee for the Toulon Police Depart-

ment. Musselman was supposed to help police identify the

2 Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

underage girls, and he did. But he also kept the images for his

own use—a fact discovered years later, when Musselman was

investigated for and convicted of other child pornography of-

fenses.

Musselman is currently serving a 35-year sentence for cre-

ating, possessing, and sharing child pornography. In addi-

tion, nine of Musselman’s victims sued him under state tort

law and a federal law that allows victims of child pornogra-

phy offenses to recover from perpetrators; those claims are

continuing in the district court and are not at issue in this ap-

peal. The victim-plaintiffs also sued two local police officers

and their employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the

officers violated their substantive due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment when they gave Musselman ac-

cess to their sexually explicit images. The district judge

granted defendants’ motions to dismiss those § 1983 claims,

and plaintiffs appeal those dismissals.

We affirm the judgment below. Although Musselman’s

crimes were vile, plaintiffs have not alleged a viable substan-

tive due process claim.

I. Background 1

In January of 2019, the Stark County, Illinois, Sheriff’s Of-

fice learned about a Dropbox file referred to as “Blue Breeze,”

which contained sexually explicit images of local underage

1 At the motion to dismiss stage, the court takes all well-pleaded alle-

gations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

See Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir.

2012). We therefore recite here the pertinent “factual allegations of the op-

erative complaint without vouching for their truth.” Nelson v. City of Chi-

cago, 992 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2021).

Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919 3

girls. Defendant Steven Sloan, the Sheriff of Stark County, as-

signed the Blue Breeze investigation to defendant Gary Bent,

who was both a Deputy Sheriff of Stark County and Chief of

the Toulon Police Department. Toulon is a small town and the

county seat of Stark County.

Deputy Bent sought Musselman’s help with the Blue

Breeze investigation. At the time, Musselman was an auxil-

iary police officer for the Toulon Police Department. Mussel-

man also worked as the “I.T. person for the department,” and

he had previously served as Stark County’s Emergency Ser-

vices Disaster Agency (“ESDA”) Director. In these capacities,

Musselman had “regularly participated in official investiga-

tions … that involved the internet and electronic information

technology.” Musselman was not, however, a formal em-

ployee of the Stark County Sheriff’s Office, nor had he re-

ceived training in investigative protocols for handling child

pornographic materials. 2

Musselman agreed to help identify the girls depicted in

the Blue Breeze images, and Deputy Bent provided him with

the Dropbox link. Musselman reviewed the images, and, as

promised, helped with identifications. But—unbeknownst to

the other defendants—Musselman kept the images on his per-

sonal computer for his own viewing and distribution.

A few years later, in 2021, law enforcement began investi-

gating Musselman for child pornography offenses, including

creating child pornography using a hidden camera in a

2 Plaintiffs emphasize that when Musselman returned his ESDA lap-

top to the County in 2015, it contained “an image of children or young

adults engaged in acts of sexual conduct,” as well as indicia that other

pornographic images had been deleted.

4 Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

tanning bed in his home. During that investigation, agents

discovered Blue Breeze images in Musselman’s possession,

including nude or partially nude images of at least one of the

plaintiffs here. Musselman pleaded guilty to child pornogra-

phy offenses and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment.

Plaintiffs sued Musselman in three separate civil actions

that have been consolidated for discovery proceedings and

for purposes of this appeal. The complaints alleged claims un-

der 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a), which provides a cause of action for

victims of certain crimes committed against minors, and un-

der Illinois common law for intrusion upon seclusion. Plain-

tiffs later added claims against Sheriff Sloan, Deputy Bent,

Stark County, and the City of Toulon, alleging intrusion upon

seclusion under Illinois law and violations of their Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Sheriff Sloan, Deputy Bent, Stark County, and the City

of Toulon moved to dismiss these claims.

The district court granted these motions to dismiss in part.

The judge dismissed all the § 1983 claims on the grounds that

plaintiffs had failed to allege a violation of a recognized con-

stitutional right. Even if they had, the district judge found that

any such right was not clearly established, meaning that qual-

ified immunity would shield Sheriff Sloan and Deputy Bent

from liability. The district court also dismissed the intrusion-

upon-seclusion claims against Sheriff Sloan, Deputy Bent, and

Stark County, but not against the City of Toulon. The district

court granted plaintiffs’ motion for final judgment under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 54(b), and plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of

their § 1983 claims.

Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919 5

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Nelson v.

City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2021). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plau-

sible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

On appeal, plaintiffs maintain that their complaints raise cog-

nizable substantive due process claims.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, lib-

erty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. Under longstanding Supreme Court prece-

dent, that clause protects not only procedural rights but also

some substantive ones—specifically, “a select list of funda-

mental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Consti-

tution” but that are “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradi-

tion” and “essential to our Nation’s ‘scheme of ordered lib-

erty.’” Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 237

(2022) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). It is that type

of fundamental substantive right under the Due Process

Clause that plaintiffs seek to vindicate through their § 1983

claims.

Generally, § 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue state actors who

violate their “rights” under “the Constitution and laws” of the

United States. But a “person seeking relief under section 1983

for a violation of h[er] Fourteenth Amendment right to sub-

stantive due process faces a difficult task.” Robbin v. City of

Berwyn, 108 F.4th 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

Articulating a substantive due process right requires “a ‘care-

ful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”

6 Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

claimed to be violated. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

721 (1997) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Christensen v. County of

Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2007). Once articulated, that

specific interest must be grounded in “[o]ur Nation’s history,

legal traditions, and practices.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.

Both the Supreme Court and our court have cautioned that

the “scope of substantive due process is very limited,” and

that judges should be “reluctant to expand the concept.” Cam-

pos v. Cook County, 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations

omitted).

The parties debate at length about how to define the al-

leged right that defendants violated when they gave Mussel-

man access to the plaintiffs’ images. The complaints use vari-

ous formulations to describe the claimed right, including the

“right to the privacy of sexual highly personal matters” and

the “right to avoid the nonconsensual dissemination of access

to Plaintiff[s’] private sexual images.” But plaintiffs do not de-

fend those formulations on appeal, and for good reason: They

are too broad to capture the precise interest at stake here be-

cause they omit key factual details that are critical to “set[ting]

the boundaries of the liberty interest” at stake. Doe v. City of

Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc); cf., e.g.,

Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2023) (“A general recog-

nition of a privacy right in certain medical or sexual infor-

mation is not enough to show a more specific privacy right in

one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or

child welfare investigation, especially one involving allegations

of child sexual abuse.” (emphasis added)).

The district court improved on the complaints’ formula-

tions, defining the right as “the right to be free from one’s

nude photos that are the subject of an ongoing criminal

Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919 7

investigation being disclosed in furtherance of the investiga-

tion to individuals without actual authority to access them.”

Plaintiffs suggest adding to this formulation that the pictures

depicted minors and that the recipient permanently retained

the pictures without authority. 3 Defendants, for their part, ad-

vocate for a formulation that specifies that the pictures were

“already created” and that the recipient was an individual

working on the investigation.

As this debate reflects, defining the claimed right in a case

like this one is not an exact science. The district judge’s for-

mulation seems about right. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at

723 (defining “right to commit suicide which itself includes a

right to assistance in doing so”); K.C. v. Individual Members of

Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 121 F.4th 604, 624 (7th Cir. 2024) (de-

fining parents’ “right to access gender transition procedures

for their children”); City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 769 (defining

“right to enter the parks to loiter or for other innocent pur-

poses”). And both plaintiffs and defendants propose reason-

able additions, including that the nude images were of minors

and that the officers did not create the images themselves. But

further wordsmithing would be wasted here, because none of

these formulations describes a fundamental liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause.

Plaintiffs rely on case law to carry their burden of showing

that their claimed right reflects “a liberty deeply rooted in our

3 Specifically, plaintiffs propose to define the right as: “The right to be

free from one’s nude photos taken while a minor and constituting child

sexual assault material that are the subject of an ongoing criminal investi-

gation being given copies of the nude photos in furtherance of the inves-

tigation to individuals without actual authority to permanently retain cop-

ies of them.”

8 Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

history and tradition.” Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 834 (7th

Cir. 1999). But none of their cases support such a historical

tradition.

To start, plaintiffs principally rely on York v. Story, 324 F.2d

450 (9th Cir. 1963), to argue that the Due Process Clause cre-

ates a constitutional privacy right that prohibits defendants’

conduct here. But York—a Ninth Circuit case that predated

Glucksberg’s definition of substantive due process—involved

egregious police conduct quite distinct from Sheriff Sloan’s

and Deputy Bent’s actions. The York plaintiff went to the po-

lice department to file assault charges, where a male officer

took her to a locked room and, over her objections, directed

her to undress and pose in revealing positions while he took

pictures of her without “any lawful or legitimate purpose.”

Id. at 452. The officer later told the York plaintiff that the pic-

tures had not come out. Id. But that was a lie: The officer cir-

culated the pictures within the police department, and two

other officers subsequently made and circulated more cop-

ies—all without any investigative purpose. Id. The Ninth Cir-

cuit observed that taking the photographs might have consti-

tuted an “unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amend-

ment. Id. at 454. But it ultimately concluded that the entire

course of conduct violated the plaintiff’s privacy rights under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

454–56.

To complement York, plaintiffs rely on Whalen v. Roe, 429

U.S. 589 (1977), and “its Seventh Circuit progeny,” particu-

larly Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2010). But those

cases are even further afield. In Whalen, the Supreme Court

considered “whether the State of New York may record … the

names and addresses of all persons who have obtained,

Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919 9

pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain drugs.” 429 U.S. at

591. In the course of answering that question (yes), the Court

observed that its constitutional “privacy” cases have involved

both “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-

sonal matters” and “the interest in independence in making

certain kinds of important decisions.” Id. at 599–600. Citing

Whalen, we then observed in Wolfe that there may be “a con-

stitutional right to the privacy of medical, sexual, financial,

and perhaps other categories of highly personal infor-

mation”—but noted that the Supreme Court “has seemed

more interested in limiting” such a right “than in its recogni-

tion and enforcement.” Wolfe, 619 F.3d at 785–86 (holding

plaintiff’s Due Process privacy rights were not violated when

defendants publicly disclosed that plaintiff was the subject of

confidential investigations for violations of state law).

To describe these cases is to distinguish them, both factu-

ally and legally. Unlike Sheriff Sloan and Deputy Bent, the

York defendants executed an arguably unconstitutional

Fourth Amendment “search”—implicating a constitutional

provision that has no application here—and then distributed

those images outside the context of any investigation. Whalen

and Wolfe offer only broad observations about “privacy” in

the context of disputes that bear no resemblance to this one.

And all these cases predate the Supreme Court’s recent and

extensive treatment of a constitutional “privacy right” and

substantive due process, Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 235–40, without

engaging in the careful historical analysis that is now re-

quired. Thus, none of plaintiffs’ cases, nor any we can find,

demonstrate a fundamental liberty interest against the police

sharing, in the course of an investigation, sexually explicit im-

ages of minors with an untrained auxiliary officer who is in-

vestigating those images.

10 Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919

That means that for plaintiffs’ claims to prevail, we would

have “to break new ground” and recognize plaintiffs’ claimed

right as one protected by the Due Process Clause for the first

time—a request that requires us to “exercise the utmost care.”

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citation omitted). Identifying

rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra-

dition” and without which “neither liberty nor justice would

exist” as we know it, id. at 720–21 (citations omitted), requires

“a careful analysis of the history of the right at issue.” Dobbs,

597 U.S. at 238; see also id. at 239 (“Historical inquiries of this

nature are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a

new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process

Clause.”). But plaintiffs have made no effort to conduct that

historical inquiry or to show that their claimed right satisfies

the Glucksberg criteria. Without a principled grounding in his-

tory, tradition, or precedent, we decline to recognize a new

substantive due process right today.

We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the seriousness

of plaintiffs’ allegations and the real harm that Musselman

caused. As defendants acknowledged at oral argument, their

handling of the Blue Breeze files left much to be desired. But

the Due Process Clause is not a vehicle for judges to fashion

evidence-sharing protocols in child pornography cases. Not

every wrong is a constitutional one, and plaintiffs continue to

press their statutory and common-law tort claims below. See

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,

202 (1989) (Due Process Clause “does not transform every tort

committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation”).

The district court correctly dismissed the § 1983 claims,

and its judgment is

AFFIRMED.