“This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.”
How later courts described this case
- “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.”
- requiring consideration of “‘(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3
- “The HPS had the opportunity to observe Mr. Scotchel’s testimony and found that much of his testimony lacked credibility. The HPS was also able to hear and observe the testimony of several witnesses which the HPS found to be credible.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2026 Term
FILED
No. 24-376 March 27, 2026
released at 3:00 p.m.
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Petitioner,
v.
PHILLIP S. ISNER,
Respondent.
Lawyer Disciplinary Proceeding
Nos. 22-02-471, 22-02-484, 23-02-163, 23-02-262,
23-02-362, 24-02-047, and 24-02-050
LAW LICENSE SUSPENDED AND OTHER SANCTIONS
Submitted: January 27, 2026
Filed: March 27, 2026
Rachael L. Fletcher Cipoletti, Esq. Jeremy B. Cooper, Esq.
Chief Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Blackwater Law PLLC
Renee N. Frymyer, Esq. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Attorney for Respondent
Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Lawyer Disciplinary Board
CHIEF JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record
made before the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee] as to questions of law, questions of
application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives
respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee’s] recommendations while
ultimately exercising its own independent judgment. On the other hand, substantial
deference is given to the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless such
findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.” Syllabus Point 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. McCorkle, 192
W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).
2. “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make
the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’
licenses to practice law.” Syllabus Point 3, Comm. on Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Blair,
174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984).
3. “Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure[] . . . requires
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to prove the allegations of the formal charge by clear
and convincing evidence.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194
W. Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995).
i
4. “Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in imposing sanctions and provides as
follows: ‘In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise
provided in these rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] or Board
[Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer
has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession;
(2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of
the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of
any aggravating or mitigating factors.’” Syllabus Point 4, Off. of Law. Disciplinary Couns.
v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998).
5. “In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical
violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the
respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an
effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public
confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.” Syllabus Point 3, Comm. on
Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).
ii
BUNN, Chief Justice:
The Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“HPS”)
found that respondent Phillip S. Isner committed twenty-five1 violations of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct arising from a seven-count Statement of Charges
issued in July 2024. The Statement of Charges alleges primarily that Mr. Isner failed to
properly communicate with his clients, diligently and competently expedite litigation
consistent with their interests, timely prepare orders as required by tribunal rules, and
perfect an appeal. The HPS recommended that Mr. Isner be suspended from the practice of
law for one year, refund $2,500 to one client, and pay the costs associated with these
proceedings. Mr. Isner objects to the HPS’s recommendation, challenging its findings as
to Counts 2 and 6 and its recommended sanction. The Office of Lawyer Disciplinary
Counsel (hereinafter “ODC”) argues in support of the HPS’s findings and
recommendations in their entirety.
Based on this Court’s independent review, we find that Mr. Isner committed
twenty-four violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from the allegations
contained in the Statement of Charges and the evidence presented to the HPS. We accept
1
Although ODC calculates twenty-eight violations, we attribute this discrepancy to
a lack of clarity in the Statement of Charges. We find that the Statement of Charges
separately alleges, and the HPS found, twenty-four violations as well as an additional,
uncharged violation in Count 2, for a total of twenty-five violations. Because we reject one
violation contained in Count 5, we find twenty-four separate violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. See discussion infra.
1
the HPS’s recommended sanctions and suspend Mr. Isner from the practice of law for one
year, along with other sanctions as more fully set forth herein.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Isner was admitted to the West Virginia State Bar in 2003 and practices
in Elkins, West Virginia; he contends his practice currently consists of eighty percent abuse
and neglect litigation and the remainder criminal defense. This Court previously
admonished Mr. Isner in 2017 and 2020 for multiple violations of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.3 regarding diligence and Rule 1.4 regarding
communication with clients, among other related violations. In July 2022, the Investigative
Panel of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board issued a three-count Statement of Charges against
Mr. Isner alleging violations of most of the same Rules implicated in the current 2024
charges, including additional violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4. The Court
reprimanded him for nine violations and ordered two years’ supervised practice that
commenced in August 2023.2
The 2024 Statement of Charges at issue here involves seven complaints (two
of which are related) alleging Mr. Isner’s lack of diligence, competence, and his failure to
2
In February 2025, the Court found Mr. Isner in contempt of our disciplinary order
requiring him to pay the costs of the proceedings, provide proof of compliance with his
enhanced continuing legal education requirement, and submit monthly supervision reports
to ODC. Mr. Isner purged himself of this contempt and resumed his supervised practice.
2
communicate and expedite litigation, among other associated rule violations. In general,
the complainants allege that they retained Mr. Isner to do work which he did not timely or
competently perform, that he did not communicate with them, that he failed to appear for
appointments, and was otherwise unreachable to discuss their cases; three complain of his
failure to return property or money at end of his representation. Apart from certain of the
violations alleged in Counts 2 and 6, Mr. Isner admitted the majority of the alleged rule
violations in either his answer to the Statement of Charges or by conceding them in the
proposed findings he submitted following the evidentiary hearing before the HPS.3
Count 1—Danielle George
Mr. Isner represented Ms. George in domestic litigation for approximately
two years. Her 2022 disciplinary complaint alleged that Mr. Isner was found in contempt
six times for failure to timely file orders. Ms. George also complained that she could not
reach Mr. Isner by phone, that he failed to calendar court dates and timely advise her of
cancelled hearings, that he lost photos and other documents related to her case, and that he
failed to timely and properly prepare a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”).
Before the HPS, Ms. George testified that she worried the notices of contempt would be
held against her by the family court, and her concern was compounded by Mr. Isner’s
consistent refusal to return her phone calls to discuss the notices.
3
In many of those admissions, however, Mr. Isner characterized the violations as
merely “technical violations.”
3
Mr. Isner denied being found in contempt in Ms. George’s case, explaining
that when an order is not timely submitted,4 the family court issues a “Notice of
Contempt/Rule to Show Cause,” which is then dismissed if an order is submitted before a
date certain. Although the record contains multiple notices of contempt, Mr. Isner claimed
to have escaped a finding of contempt by submitting the orders after receipt of the notices.
However, contrary to Mr. Isner’s assertion, the record contains one “Order Finding
Contempt” that was issued after Mr. Isner failed to appear for a show cause hearing
regarding his failure to timely submit an order.5 Before the HPS, Mr. Isner admitted that
he “absolutely” did not timely prepare the QDRO but claimed to have many documented
phone calls and texts with Ms. George demonstrating his responsiveness.6
Nonetheless, Mr. Isner admitted that he violated Rule 1.3’s7 diligence
requirement by failing to timely prepare and submit the QDRO, the communication
4
Rule 22(b) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court provides that
“[a]n attorney assigned to prepare an order or proposed findings shall deliver the order or
findings to the court no later than ten days after the conclusion of the hearing[.]”
5
Further, the notices of contempt submitted into evidence by ODC indicate that they
were not perfunctorily issued by the court upon non-receipt of an order, as claimed by Mr.
Isner. Instead, the notices state they were issued after Mr. Isner “failed to respond to calls
and emails” from the court about the outstanding orders.
6
Although on May 11, 2023, Mr. Isner claimed to have prepared two QDROs in
Ms. George’s case, the docket sheet contained in the record reflects that a proposed QDRO
was not submitted until June 6, 2023.
7
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 1.3.
4
requirements contained in Rules 1.4 (a)(3)8 and 1.4 (a)(4)9 by failing to provide information
and respond to Ms. George’s inquiries, and Rule 3.4(c)’s10 prohibition on knowing
disobedience of tribunal rules by his failure to timely submit orders. The HPS also found a
Rule 1.16(d)11 violation resulting from Mr. Isner’s failure to return Ms. George’s photos
and other papers at the end of his representation.
Count 2—Adam Kramer
In his December 2022 complaint, Mr. Kramer alleged that Mr. Isner
represented him in multiple family court matters during which Mr. Isner regularly failed to
show up to scheduled meetings or respond to emails or calls, appeared at hearings
unprepared, failed to return Mr. Kramer’s personal property including baby photos and a
journal, and failed to pay a guardian ad litem bill despite being provided funds for that
purpose by Mr. Kramer. Mr. Kramer complained that Mr. Isner’s work often took much
longer than anticipated or promised and required correction when it was finally completed;
8
“A lawyer shall[] . . . (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter[.]” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 1.4(a)(3).
9
“A lawyer shall[] . . . (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information[.]” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 1.4 (a)(4).
10
“A lawyer shall not[] . . . (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of
a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]”
W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 3.4(c).
11
“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled [.]” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 1.16(d).
5
while deadlines approached, Mr. Kramer alleged he could not reach Mr. Isner by phone to
inquire about the status of his case.
Before the HPS, Mr. Kramer testified that Mr. Isner’s communication was
“[s]poradic at best” and that Mr. Isner “rarely” returned phone calls. Mr. Kramer testified
that one of the orders Mr. Isner failed to prepare for over a year was designed to reduce his
child support and, because of the delay, Mr. Kramer paid three times the amount he was
supposed to pay during that time. Mr. Kramer’s wife also testified, confirming that Mr.
Isner failed to appear for meetings, was late for appointments, failed to return calls, and
that she and Mr. Kramer repeatedly requested billing statements that were not provided.
She testified that Mr. Isner lost a text thread that she felt was critical to their case and that
it was “embarrassing” to have to learn what was happening in the case from opposing
counsel. Because of Mr. Isner’s failure to timely perform work or respond to their inquiries,
Mrs. Kramer testified that she and Mr. Kramer felt “helpless”; Mr. Kramer attributed his
current estrangement from his child, in part, to Mr. Isner’s lack of expediency.
Mr. Isner responded that Mr. Kramer had retained him on multiple occasions
from 2017 until 2022 and that the source of Mr. Kramer’s frustration was a parenting plan
mediation in which the mediator failed to memorialize the agreement, allegedly allowing
the other party to renege. See infra n.23. Mr. Isner testified that Mr. Kramer was
unreasonable in his demands and expectations, but in response to his concerns, Mr. Isner
agreed to reduce his bill. Mr. Isner claimed that he had “countless” texts and phone calls
6
with Mr. Kramer, many of which were not billed, and that Mr. Kramer’s complaints about
litigation delays reflected Mr. Kramer’s lack of legal knowledge. Regardless, Mr. Isner
conceded that he was “overwhelmed” during his representation of Mr. Kramer but
maintained that certain of the delays were “strategic.”
Mr. Isner admitted no rule violations as to Count 2. However, the HPS found
violations of Rule 1.3 for dilatory handling of the case, missing appointments, and delay in
providing the requested bill and paying the guardian ad litem. For failing to respond to Mr.
Kramer’s inquiries and keep him informed, the HPS found violations of Rules 1.4(a)(3)
and Rule 1.4(a)(4). Although not alleged in the Statement of Charges, the HPS found an
additional violation of Rule 1.16(d) because Mr. Isner failed to return photos and other
papers to Mr. Kramer at the end of his representation.
Counts 3 and 4—ODC and Joy Timbrook
In her June 2023 complaint, Joy Timbrook alleged that she hired Mr. Isner
in July 2022 to intervene in a juvenile matter involving custody of her grandchild. The
circuit court denied the request for intervention in October 2022 and on November 24,
2022, Mr. Isner timely filed a notice of appeal of that order. Ms. Timbrook alleged she
heard nothing further about the matter until she attempted to contact Mr. Isner in May 2023
to ensure nothing would occur in the case over the summer due to an impending surgery.
Although Mr. Isner’s office staff communicated Mr. Isner’s belief that he did not anticipate
a “court date” in the next couple of months, Ms. Timbrook sensed something was amiss
7
and contacted this Court’s clerk’s office which advised that her appeal was dismissed in
April 2023 for failure to perfect the appeal. Our Clerk referred the matter to ODC, and it
opened a complaint.
Ms. Timbrook claimed Mr. Isner then evaded her call until she advised his
office that she had spoken with our Court, at which point Mr. Isner agreed to speak with
her. Mr. Isner explained that he did not inform her of the dismissal sooner because he was
trying to craft a “fix” for the dismissal. Before the HPS, Ms. Timbrook testified that while
Mr. Isner was allegedly trying to “fix” his failure to perfect the appeal, the adoption process
for her grandchild began and was finalized shortly thereafter, foreclosing future custody
efforts. She testified that the dismissal of the appeal “devastated” her and caused health
problems.12
Mr. Isner responded that, when registering with the Court’s e-filing system
he mistakenly utilized his general office email address instead of his individual office email
address, causing him to be unaware of the issuance of a scheduling order in the appeal. Mr.
12
Ms. Timbrook further testified that Mr. Isner promised a refund, which she had
not received as of the filing of her disciplinary complaint. Mr. Isner subsequently issued a
refund check, but it was rejected for insufficient funds, prompting Mr. Isner’s staff member
to personally deliver a refund.
8
Isner denied attempting to avoid Ms. Timbrook’s call about the appeal dismissal but
conceded that he was “not prepared” to speak with her about the dismissal.13
Mr. Isner admitted to each of the rule violations alleged in these Counts. As
to ODC’s complaint, the HPS found violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3 for Mr. Isner’s lack of
competence14 and diligence, Rule 3.215 for his failure to expedite litigation, and Rule
8.4(d)16 for misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. As to Ms. Timbrook’s
complaint, the HPS found additional violations of Rule 1.4(a)(3) for Mr. Isner’s failure to
notify Ms. Timbrook that the appeal was dismissed and Rule 8.4(c)17 for misconduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by misleading her about the status
of the case.
13
Mr. Isner testified that he contacted Jeremy Cooper, Esq., to assist Ms. Timbrook
with any available relief against him, offering to pay his fees, but Ms. Timbrook claims Mr.
Cooper failed to return her call. We note that Mr. Cooper now represents Mr. Isner in these
proceedings involving Ms. Timbrook’s complaint.
14
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1.
15
“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interest of the client.” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 3.2.
16
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] . . . (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 8.4(d).
17
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] . . . (c) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 8.4(c).
9
Count 5—David Cox
In his 2023 complaint, Mr. Cox alleged that Mr. Isner represented his
estranged wife in a family court proceeding in which Mr. Cox was self-represented. Similar
to the allegations in Count 1, Mr. Cox complained that Mr. Isner “dr[ug] his feet” and was
late in filing “almost every” order in the case, resulting in multiple notices of contempt as
previously described. As in Count 1, Mr. Isner admitted that he failed to file orders within
the requisite time frame but denied being held in contempt after he ultimately submitted
the orders. Mr. Isner maintained that preparing the orders in the case was “exceptionally
difficult[]” because Mr. Cox was self-represented and had a penchant for filing complaints
against the involved parties; however, Mr. Isner denied that his delay prejudiced the case
or Mr. Cox. For his failure to timely prepare the orders, Mr. Isner admitted to violations of
Rule 1.3 for his lack of diligence, as well as Rule 3.4(c) prohibiting knowing disobedience
of a tribunal rule and Rule 8.4(d) for misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Count 6—Ronald Kesner
In his 2024 complaint, Mr. Kesner alleged that he initially paid Mr. Isner a
$2,500 retainer in 2019 for assistance with his parents’ estate. After filing a will contest,
Mr. Kesner claims Mr. Isner “didn’t do anything with it,” and refused to return phone calls
or meet with him. Before the HPS, Mr. Kesner detailed work he did on his own to expedite
his case including providing a list of deponents, setting up a room for the depositions, and
filing the action himself. He claimed Mr. Isner was always late for scheduled meetings—
once failing to show at all—and requested a full refund of his retainer.
10
Mr. Isner clarified that Mr. Kesner initially retained him to “investigat[e]”
his mother’s estate, which investigation was completed in 2016. Mr. Kesner then retained
Mr. Isner to file an action to contest his father’s will in 2021, paying a $2,500 flat fee. Mr.
Isner admitted to delays and dormancies in the case, but denied any intentional evasion of
Mr. Kesner, asserting that he conducted “regular” meetings and phone calls with him from
May 2021 until the time of the disciplinary complaint. Before the HPS, Mr. Isner
apologized to Mr. Kesner and offered him a full refund but noted that he also represented
Mr. Kesner in a criminal matter which was favorably resolved at no charge.
Although he now challenges Count 6 in its entirety, Mr. Isner admitted to
violations of Rule 1.3 and Rule 3.2 for general neglect of Mr. Kesner’s case in his answer
to the Statement of Charges. Although he disputes the alleged lack of communication with
Mr. Kesner, the HPS found Mr. Isner violated Rules 1.4(a)(3) and 1.4(a)(4) by failing to
respond to Mr. Kesner’s inquiries and keep him informed.
Count 7—Linda Taylor
In her 2024 complaint, Ms. Taylor alleged that in September 2023 she paid
Mr. Isner a $4,000 retainer for assistance in obtaining temporary custody of her
granddaughters. After weeks of trying without success to reach Mr. Isner, he told her the
case “was not what he thought” and would refund her retainer on December 1, 2023. After
he failed to issue a refund, Ms. Taylor filed a complaint with ODC; Mr. Isner then sent her
a full refund along with his response to her complaint.
11
Mr. Isner responded that he believed Ms. Taylor was seeking his assistance
with an abuse and neglect proceeding, but after much difficulty learned it was a
guardianship. He allegedly conducted legal research to determine if Ms. Taylor had
standing to intervene in a guardianship case and claimed not to have any communication
from her until November 2023 when she sought a refund. Although he agreed to only a
partial refund because of time expended in the “research and strategy phase[,]” Mr. Isner
admitted he failed to timely issue a refund and therefore violated Rule 1.16(d). Mr. Isner
also admitted violating Rules 1.4(a)(3) and 1.4(a)(4) by failing to respond to Ms. Taylor’s
inquiries and keep her informed.
Based on these twenty-five violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
the HPS determined that Mr. Isner’s misconduct violated duties to his clients, the public,
the legal system, and the profession. See W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary Proc. 3.16; Syl. Pt.
4, Off. of Law. Disciplinary Couns. v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998)
(requiring consideration of “‘(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client,
to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted
intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of the actual or potential injury
caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating
factors[,]’” in fashioning a sanction).
Because of his prior discipline for the same conduct, the HPS found Mr. Isner
acted “knowingly” and “with conscious awareness” of the consequences of his conduct,
12
causing “delay[] [and] frustration,” and resulting in “a sense of lost justice, and loss of trust
in lawyers and the legal system.” The HPS found his prior disciplinary offenses and pattern
of misconduct aggravating, but his cooperative attitude and remorse mitigating.
The HPS recommended a one-year suspension and refund of $2,500 to Mr.
Kesner, as well as payment of costs for these proceedings. Citing his admitted lack of
malpractice insurance, the HPS emphasized that Mr. Isner’s former clients “have no other
recourse but the assurance that [Mr. Isner] will not be able to use his law license to inflict
harm upon future clients.” Mr. Isner objected to the HPS’s recommendations, and the
matter was placed on the Court’s argument docket for our review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court gives “substantial deference” to the HPS’s findings of fact, but
those findings must be “supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Comm. On Legal Ethics of W. Va. v. McCorkle, 192
W.Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994). And while the Court gives the HPS’s recommendation
“respectful consideration,” we maintain plenary review as the final arbiter of lawyer
discipline. Id.; see Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. On Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Blair, 174 W. Va.
494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984) (“This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and
must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of
attorneys’ licenses to practice law.”).
13
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Isner challenges the HPS’s findings as to Counts 2 and 6 and its ultimate
discipline. He argues that ODC failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he
violated duties to Mr. Kramer and Mr. Kesner and that the HPS’s recommended suspension
exceeds sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct. Because Mr. Isner admitted the
remaining violations and our review reveals that they are well-founded, with the exception
of one violation contained in Count 5, see text infra, we accept the HPS’s findings as to
those violations and limit our analysis to Counts 2 and 6.
A. Counts 2 and 6—the Kramer and Kesner matters
We begin with Mr. Isner’s challenge to the HPS’s findings of fact as to
Counts 2 and 6 involving Mr. Kramer and Mr. Kesner, respectively.18 Mr. Isner argues that
ODC failed to establish the rule violations alleged in these Counts because it offered only
uncorroborated testimony from the complainants. Mr. Isner attacks their credibility,
arguing that Mr. Kramer and Mr. Kesner are laypersons without the knowledge to
18
As noted above and memorialized in the HPS’s recommendation, Mr. Isner
admitted violations of Rules 1.3 and 3.2 in his answer to the Statement of Charges with
respect to Mr. Kesner, denying only the communication violations. He does not
acknowledge or address those admissions.
14
understand litigation practicalities and strategies19 and who, despite his alleged neglect of
their cases and inquiries, continued to retain him for various matters over the years.
As Mr. Isner correctly observes, our Rules require ODC to prove allegations
of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. W. Va. Rules of Law. Disciplinary Proc.
3.7; Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850
(1995). However, the record reflects that Mr. Isner failed to file discovery in accordance
with the scheduling order issued by the HPS. As a result, the HPS granted ODC’s motion
to exclude all witnesses, exhibits, or mitigating evidence offered by Mr. Isner at his
evidentiary hearing—a motion Mr. Isner did not oppose. While he was permitted to testify
on his own behalf and cross-examine the complainants, Mr. Isner was not permitted to offer
additional witnesses or introduce evidence to contradict the complainants’ testimony.
Although Mr. Isner attacks the adequacy of ODC’s evidence, this self-
inflicted evidentiary prohibition leaves him ill-equipped to rebut ODC’s evidence or
corroborate his denials of misconduct. Mr. Isner testified that he was adequately responsive
to Mr. Kramer and Mr. Kesner, that their expectations were unreasonable, and that their
litigation suffered not from a lack of diligence but from inevitabilities and factors beyond
his control. Yet he offered nothing but his own self-serving denials, uncorroborated by any
19
For example, regarding his alleged lack of diligence and failure to expedite Mr.
Kesner’s litigation matters, Mr. Isner proposed that the HPS dispense with those charges
because they constituted nothing more than Mr. Kesner’s “suppositions as a layperson”—
despite having admitted those violations in his answer.
15
documentation of calls, emails, or the work performed in Mr. Kramer’s and Mr. Kesner’s
cases to contradict their claims. This lack of corroboration rendered the complainants’
allegations a pure credibility issue that the HPS resolved in the complainants’ favor. The
Court has often reminded that the HPS “is in a better position than this Court to resolve the
factual disputes which may arise in a case[]” because it “hears the testimony of the
witnesses firsthand and, being much closer to the pulse of the hearing, is much better
situated to resolve such issues as credibility.” McCorkle, 192 W. Va. at 290, 452 S.E.2d at
381 (footnote omitted); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Harris, 251 W. Va. 376, 380, 914 S.E.2d
249, 253 (2025) (deferring to HPS’s dismissal of charges due to complainant’s lack of
credibility); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Curnutte, 251 W. Va. 839, 847, 916 S.E.2d 681, 689
(2025) (“The HPS resolved that credibility issue, and we defer to its resolution.”); Law.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Scotchel, 234 W. Va. 627, 645, 768 S.E.2d 730, 748 (2014) (“The HPS
had the opportunity to observe Mr. Scotchel’s testimony and found that much of his
testimony lacked credibility. The HPS was also able to hear and observe the testimony of
several witnesses which the HPS found to be credible.”).
Mr. Isner’s arguments and proposed findings also confirm that his objection
to the HPS’s findings is grounded in credibility determinations. For example, with respect
to Mr. Kramer’s complaints, Mr. Isner argues the HPS should have rejected those rule
violations and found that “[i]t is hard to find Mr. Kramer credible as he hired [Isner] on at
least two additional occasions spanning a period of 6-7 years. If [Mr. Isner’s]
communication was a [sic] bad as he claimed, it seems unlikely he would have hired [Mr.
16
Isner] three separate times.” (Emphasis added). He further argues that the HPS should have
found his own testimony “regarding the reasonableness of Mr. Kramer’s demands as it
relates to communication to be credible[]” and that “[w]ith no corroborating evidence and
only the testimony of the Kramers to support this claim,” no violation of Rule 1.3 or 1.4
was established. (Emphasis added).20 Likewise, with respect to Mr. Kesner’s complaints,
Mr. Isner argues the HPS should have found an absence of clear and convincing evidence
that he “fail[ed] to keep Mr. Kesner informed in light of the conflicting testimony between
Mr. Kesner and [Mr. Isner] and the overall lack of credibility of Mr. Kesner’s claims[.]”
(Emphasis added).
Due to his own neglect, Mr. Isner was foreclosed from offering any evidence
to contradict the complainants’ thematically consistent testimony about his refusal to return
phone calls, provide timely information, attend scheduled meetings, or timely perform
promised work—even across years of representation in various matters. Contrary to Mr.
Isner’s arguments, it was his own testimony that lacked corroboration while the
complainants’ testimony was corroborated across the various counts. Client after client
shared virtually identical complaints about Mr. Isner’s refusal to return phone calls, keep
them informed about their cases, and timely and properly perform promised work, most of
20
Similarly, with respect to the missing photographs and papers, Mr. Isner argues
that the HPS should have found that “[i]f the photo album was not returned . . . it seems
illogical to believe that Mr. Kramer would have sought [Mr. Isner’s] representation with
two subsequent matters. Finally, [Mr. Isner] would have no motive to keep photographs of
Mr. Kramer’s family.” (Emphasis added).
17
which Mr. Isner admitted in either his answer or proposed findings. We therefore adopt the
HPS’s findings and associated Rule violations as to Counts 2 and 6.
B. Count 5—the Rule 1.3 violation
Despite Mr. Isner’s admission to each of the rule violations alleged in this
Count, we pause to more closely consider Rule 1.3. Mr. Isner admitted three rule violations
resulting from his failure to timely prepare family court orders in the case, including a
violation of Rule 1.3’s diligence requirement. Before this Court, he argues only that there
was no harm in his failure to do so, as part of the required Jordan analysis. However, as
we have recently observed with respect to judicial disciplinary matters, “blind acceptance
of . . . admissions or stipulations may undermine the integrity and consistency of the
disciplinary process where they are not well-founded.” In re Boso, 252 W. Va. 224, ___,
921 S.E.2d 679, 686 (2025).
Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” We recently emphasized that this obligation runs to a
lawyer’s client, as stated in the Rule, and limited its application in that regard. See Harris,
251 W. Va. at 394, 914 S.E.2d at 267 (finding no Rule 1.3 violation where lawyer acted as
trustee because the rule “describe[s] the duties of diligence and expedition of litigation a
lawyer owes to his client.” (footnote omitted)).
18
As indicated above, Mr. Cox was not Mr. Isner’s client, but rather was the
opposing party in divorce proceedings who complained of Mr. Isner’s untimely submission
of orders in the case. While Mr. Isner’s admitted misconduct violates obligations to the
tribunal and to the administration of justice under Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), ODC presented
no evidence that Mr. Isner’s client objected to or was harmed by this conduct. Mr. Isner’s
client ostensibly made no formal complaint, nor did she testify in the proceedings below;
in fact, Mr. Cox himself did not testify. During oral argument, ODC urged this Court to
“presume” commensurate harm to a client where an opposing party complains of delay.
But the “presumption” of harm to a lawyer’s client based solely on the complaints of an
opposing party neither logically follows nor holds ODC to its burden of proof. We therefore
reject the Rule 1.3 violation found by the HPS as to Count 5.
C. Sanction
In his opposition to the HPS’s recommended one-year suspension, Mr. Isner
argues primarily that his misconduct was not “knowing,” as found by the HPS, but merely
negligent. He further argues that his misconduct caused little to no harm on the whole, and
that a one-year suspension exceeds the discipline rendered in similar cases. More generally,
Mr. Isner insists these violations are the residue of the “practice management shortcomings,
isolated delays, and communication lapses” that the discipline arising from his 2022
charges—and particularly his supervised practice—has already addressed. He contends
19
that a one-year suspension will derail the significant progress and improvements he has
made since his supervised practice began in August 2023.21
First, we reject Mr. Isner’s characterization of his misconduct as simple
negligence. His disciplinary history and the numerous complaints in this matter reflect an
unrelenting refusal to communicate with his clients and diligently perform work, even after
receiving multiple ethics complaints for this behavior for which he was required to answer
before disciplinary authorities and this Court. This same type of misconduct dates back as
far as 2017 and, contrary to Mr. Isner’s assertions, did not abruptly cease after he began
his supervised practice. Ms. Taylor’s complaints about Mr. Isner’s lack of responsiveness
and failure to promptly refund her retainer occurred during his supervised practice. And
while the remainder occurred before his supervised practice began in August 2023, most
of the misconduct occurred while his most recent 2022 disciplinary complaint for the same
misconduct was pending. We agree with the HPS’s conclusion that Mr. Isner’s refusal to
improve his communication and diligence even in the face of disciplinary action for those
same failures demonstrates “conscious awareness” of the ramifications and therefore a
knowing violation of those rules.
We also conclude that a one-year suspension is appropriate for the twenty-
four violations in this case and consistent with discipline rendered in similar cases. In
21
Mr. Isner claims that since his prior disciplinary matter he has met regularly with
his supervisor, hired a consultant to review his practice, narrowed the scope of his practice,
billed more regularly, and better controlled his caseload.
20
Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Morgan, 228 W. Va. 114, 717 S.E.2d 898 (2011), the Court
suspended an attorney for one year for similar misconduct resulting in ten rule violations
and affecting four different clients. Like Mr. Isner, Mr. Morgan was previously
admonished for failure to communicate with clients and demonstrated an ongoing pattern
and practice of that misconduct, warranting a one-year suspension. Id. at 120, 717 S.E.2d
at 904. More recently, in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Thorn, 236 W.Va. 681, 783 S.E.2d
321 (2016), we suspended a lawyer for one year for violations primarily resulting from a
lack of diligence, competence, communication, and improper fee handling. These
violations affected eleven separate clients and, while the resulting forty-three violations
exceed that of Mr. Isner’s, we found that Mr. Thorn’s misconduct was largely negligent
and that his depression was a significant mitigating factor. Id. at 697-98, 783 S.E.2d at 337-
38.
We further find the cases cited by Mr. Isner—Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
Curnutte and Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Davis, No. 20-0871, 2022 WL 421119 (W. Va.
Feb. 11, 2022) (memorandum decision)—too dissimilar to be persuasive. Mr. Isner argues
that Curnutte involved similar violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4 affecting four
clients, yet we suspended Mr. Curnutte for only six months despite a previous ninety-day
suspension. Likewise, he argues that Davis involved an experienced attorney with a prior
suspension, knowing violations, a persistent failure to cooperate with ODC, and no
mitigating factors, yet we also suspended him for only six months.
21
However, Curnutte involved only two affected clients22 and one complaint
arising from misconduct as a mediator—fewer than the six affected individuals here. Id. at
843-45, 916 S.E.2d at 685-87. And while Mr. Curnutte had previously been suspended, it
was not for the same type of professional neglect involved in that matter, thereby lacking
the pattern and practice Mr. Isner’s misconduct demonstrates. Id. at 851-52, 916 S.E.2d at
693-94. 23 Davis is an even less persuasive comparator because it involved only six rule
violations arising out of one client matter. 2022 WL 421119, at *1. Although Mr. Davis’s
“considerable history of virtually identical professional shortcomings[]” more closely
resembles Mr. Isner’s, his misconduct in that case had a substantially more limited impact
than Mr. Isner’s. Id. at *7.
In that regard, we reject Mr. Isner’s position that, aside from Ms. Timbrook’s
unperfected appeal, the “actual or potential injury” to the complainants was negligible.
Jordan, 204 W. Va. at 495, 513 S.E.2d at 722, Syl. Pt. 4. The complainants expressed
unremitting concern and frustration throughout their litigation due to the lack of
information and progress, exacerbated by their inability to reach or speak with Mr. Isner
22
One of the additional counts resulted in only a violation of Rule 8.1(b) for Mr.
Curnutte’s failure to respond to the complaint, rather than any client-related misconduct.
Id. at 845, 916 S.E.2d at 687.
23
Mr. Isner’s choice to direct us to the Curnutte matter is curious given that Mr.
Curnutte was disciplined, in part, for his failure to memorialize the settlement resulting
from the mediation involving Mr. Kramer, as discussed above. Unhelpful to Mr. Isner’s
cause, our opinion disciplining Mr. Curnutte states that he only agreed to prepare the
agreement in the first instance because he was “‘pretty sure Mr. Isner would not carry
through with preparing [it].’” Curnutte, 251 W. Va. at 849, 916 S.E.2d at 691.
22
about those concerns. Nearly all the complainants’ cases involved domestic or child
custody issues that present significant emotional turmoil under the best of circumstances.
To be neglected by the lawyer hired to guide and protect a client’s interests is profoundly
harmful to the trust placed in not only a specific lawyer, but the legal profession and system
as a whole. In addition to the demonstrable damage to Ms. Timbrook’s case, the harm to
these clients weighs heavily in our consideration of the appropriate sanction.
Finally, while we agree with the HPS that Mr. Isner was remorseful and
generally cooperative in the underlying proceedings, his sustained pattern of misconduct
for nearly a decade, along with his disciplinary history, necessitate suspension. We
commend Mr. Isner for his interest in continuing his practice management improvements,
however, our prior supervised practice requirement did not grant him immunity from
discipline for complaints not yet adjudicated.24 Even if Mr. Isner had comprehensively
addressed the practice management shortcomings to which he attributes the underlying
complaints, lawyer discipline is not merely corrective:
In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for
ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps
would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also
whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an
effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same
time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the
legal profession.
24
This reference to unadjudicated complaints, however, pertains only to the charges
presently before the Court. We expressly decline ODC’s suggestion that we may consider
pending charges that have not yet been presented to the HPS.
23
Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358
S.E.2d 234 (1987).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we impose the following sanctions: 1) Mr. Isner
is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and is directed to abide by the
mandates imposed pursuant to Rule 3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure;
2) Mr. Isner must issue a refund to Ronald Kesner in the amount of $2,500.00; and 3) prior
to being reinstated to the practice of law, Mr. Isner must reimburse the costs of these
proceedings to the Lawyer Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedure.
Law license suspended and other sanctions imposed.
24