State v. Redmond

[Cite as State v. Redmond, 2026-Ohio-1348.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

: Case No. 24CA42

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

:

v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT

: ENTRY

KEVIN A. REDMOND, :

: RELEASED: 04/03/2026

Defendant-Appellant. :

APPEARANCES:

Max Hersch, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

Jeffery C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alisa Turner, Ross

County Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal of a Ross County Court of Common Pleas

judgment entry in which Kevin A. Redmond (“Redmond”) pleaded guilty to two

counts of aggravated possession of drugs, possession of a fentanyl-related

compound, and possession of cocaine. On appeal, Redmond asserts that the

trial court erred in denying his motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction to

impose a sentence.

{¶2} Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the law, and the facts, we

conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Redmond and did not err

in denying his motion to vacate the sentence. Therefore, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

Ross App. No. 24CA42 2

BACKGROUND

{¶3} On September 16, 2022, a Ross County Grand Jury indicted

Redmond on two counts of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.11, third and fifth-degree felonies; possession of a fentanyl-related

compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fourth-degree felony; and possession of

cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fifth-degree felony (“Ross County drug

offenses”).

{¶4} On September 8, 2022, Redmond pleaded not guilty to the Ross

County drug charges and was released on his own recognizance.

{¶5} On December 2, 2022, a motion to suppress hearing was held

regarding the Ross County drug offenses, to which Redmond arrived late.

Redmond also tested positive for drugs and was otherwise non-compliant with

his pretrial supervision because he had not been calling in weekly. Thus, the

court raised his bond and remanded Redmond to jail.

{¶6} On December 19, 2022, Redmond pleaded guilty to the Ross County

drug indictment as charged. The court ordered a presentence investigation and

set his sentencing hearing for February 6, 2023. The court then remanded

Redmond to Pickaway County where criminal charges were pending against him.

{¶7} Redmond failed to appear at the February 6, 2023 sentencing

hearing for the guilty plea for the Ross County drug offenses. Consequently, the

court issued a warrant for his arrest and placed his case on the court’s inactive

docket.

Ross App. No. 24CA42 3

{¶8} In January 2024, Redmond pleaded guilty in Franklin County to

criminal charges in case nos. 22CR342, 22CR5593, 23CR5292. The court

sentenced Redmond to an aggregate two-to-three-year prison term for these

offenses. On January 30, 2024, Redmond was remanded to the Madison County

Correctional Facility to begin serving that sentence.

{¶9} Eventually, the Ross County Court of Common Pleas discovered

Redmond’s whereabouts and on October 17, 2024, ordered him to be transferred

from prison to court for sentencing on the Ross County drug offenses on

November 8, 2024.

{¶10} At Redmond’s sentencing hearing, his counsel moved to dismiss

Redmond’s conviction pursuant to R.C. 2941.401.1 Counsel stated that he

believed that R.C. 2941.401 “governs when cases that are pending when a

person is serving time in a state correctional facility.” The court responded that it

believed that R.C. 2941.401 permitted an incarcerated offender to seek a

disposition for an untried indictment. Therefore, the court opined that R.C.

2941.401 did not apply because sentencing was the issue in this case.

Redmond’s counsel agreed but noted that Redmond’s sentence was still

pending.

{¶11} The court then informed Redmond’s counsel that he was “going to

need to make for the record when you said [the warden] provided the notice to

the prosecutor and when it was provided[.]” Redmond’s counsel responded:

Yes, uh, I know that the documents that I was provided today was

dated February six. I don’t know if that was the date that it was

1

Acting pro se, Redmond had previously filed with the court seeking relief under R.C. 2941.401,

which was still pending at his sentencing.

Ross App. No. 24CA42 4

provided to the prosecutor’s office by the prison by the warden,

um but I don’t I do not believe the the warden provided a copy of

this to the court or myself, but my understanding is that the

prosecutor’s office did at some point in February of this year get

this notice.

The court stated: “Well, it’s – should be accompanied by a certificate from the

warden stating the term of commitment under which he is held and the time

served the remaining time, did, was any of that complied with? Do you have the

certificate from the warden?”

{¶12} Counsel submitted two documents to the court, which were titled:

Notice of Untried Indictments, Information or Complaint and Rights to Request

Disposition” and “Inmate’s Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for

Disposition of Indictments, Information or Complaints[.]” Both documents

referenced Redmond’s aggravated possession of drugs to which he pleaded

guilty herein.

{¶13} Counsel then commented:

I know there has been some case law on this issue, I believe there,

the standard is if the inmate has substantially complied with his

portion of it which I believe is if he contacts the warden provides

the necessary information to the warden, if the warden then fails

to follow the direction of the statute, I think that, that is held against

the State and not the, not the person incarcerated.

{¶14} The court responded: “None of this shows any compliance, but you

can have it back. All of this is referring to the speedy trial portion of this. The

trial occurred. That’s the guilty plea. I don’t see anything in this, in this section or

in any of the annotations that indicates that I am reading this wrong. We’re going

to go straight to disposition.”

Ross App. No. 24CA42 5

{¶15} The court imposed four one-year prison terms to be served

concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the prison term he was serving

for the Franklin County offenses.

{¶16} Citing Crim.R. 32(A) and Neal v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 201 (1963),

Redmond filed a motion alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence

him because the delay between when he was “available” to be sentenced and his

sentencing was unreasonable. Therefore, he moved the court to dismiss his

sentence. The court denied the motion by entry without comment.

{¶17} Redmond now appeals his sentence to this court.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED KEVIN REDMOND’S MOTION

CHALLENGING ITS JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE. NOV. 21, 2024

ENTRY; CRIM.R.32(A); NEAL V. MAXWELL, 175 OHIO ST. 201 (1963).

{¶18} Redmond claims that the delay between the time he was “available”

to be sentenced, which he claims was when he was incarcerated on January 30,

2024, until November 8, 2024, when he was sentenced, resulted in an

unreasonable eight-and-one-half-month delay in his sentencing. Redmond cites

Crim.R. 32(A), which states: that a “[s]entence shall be imposed without

unnecessary delay.” He also cites Neal, which states that “the time for

pronouncing sentence is within the discretion of the court, and a delay for a

reasonable time does not invalidate the sentence.” 175 Ohio St. 201, 202 (1963).

Quoting State v. Ventura, Redmond claims that “ ‘Ohio appellate courts have

taken this statement in Neal and inferred that while a reasonable delay does not

Ross App. No. 24CA42 6

invalidate a sentence, an unreasonable delay in sentencing can invalidate a

defendant's sentence.’ ” 2016-Ohio-5151, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.).

{¶19} Redmond claims that whether a delay deprives a court of jurisdiction

to sentence a defendant depends on the facts of each case. Redmond cites

cases with sentencing delays ranging from months to years, suggesting that

courts not only examine the length of the delay, but the reasons behind the

delay.

{¶20} Redmond argues that the record in this case fails to reveal a valid

justification for the eight-and-one-half-month delay in his sentencing. Even

examining the record most favorably to the State, Redmond claims there was, at

a minimum, an eight-month delay from when the State knew he was available for

sentencing and when the court summoned him for sentencing. Redmond

maintains that during his sentencing hearing, his counsel informed the court that

he had given his warden written notice requesting a disposition for the Ross

County drug offenses, which was sent to the prosecutor’s office “at some point in

February of this year.” The State did not object to this assertion; thus, Redmond

argues it should be deemed admitted.

{¶21} Redmond claims that the court did not act to sentence him until it

sua sponte issued an order on October 17, 2024, directing that he be transported

for sentencing in November of 2024. Redmond maintains that cases have held

that a 6 to 12-month delay between a plea and sentencing is unreasonable

without justification, potentially depriving the court of jurisdiction to impose a

sentence.

Ross App. No. 24CA42 7

{¶22} Under these circumstances, Redmond claims that the eight-and-

one-half-month delay in his sentencing was unreasonable. Therefore, he asserts

that the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him, and the trial court’s judgment

should be reversed, vacating his sentence.

{¶23} In response, the State first argues that because the Supreme Court

in Maxwell held “that the time of pronouncing sentence is within the discretion of

the court, and a delay for a reasonable time does not invalidate the sentence[,]”

that our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to impose a sentence in reasonable time.

{¶24} The State’s analysis maintains that there was a 704-day delay from

the date that Redmond pleaded guilty (December 19, 2022) until he was

sentenced (November 21, 2024).

{¶25} The State first argues that the 704-day delay was not unreasonable

because a majority of the delay was attributable to Redmond. The State

maintains that Redmond willfully failed to appear for sentencing on February 6,

2023, triggering a warrant that remained active until November 8, 2024, while he

continued committing felony drug offenses. Thus, the State maintains that

because Redmond was responsible for the majority of the delay, it was not

unreasonable.

{¶26} Alternatively, the State claims that Redmond “acquiesced” to the

delay that he seeks to attribute to the State. The State claims that Redmond

wanted a delay from February 12, 2024 to October 17, 2024. The State claims

Redmond filed a motion under R.C. 2941.401, which in part states:

Ross App. No. 24CA42 8

When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a

correctional institution of this state, and when during the

continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this

state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the

prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred

eighty days after the prisoner causes to be delivered to the

prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter

is pending.

The State claims that Redmond was anticipating that the 180-day period would run

before he was sentenced.

{¶27} The State also claims that the court acted promptly to sentence

Redmond once his location was known to the court.

{¶28} Finally, the State argues that the delay was not unreasonable

because Redmond was not prejudiced by the delay. Redmond was in prison

during the delay and was destined to remain there serving his Franklin County

sentences until October 2025. There was no basis for believing that Redmond

would get a lesser sentence if he was sentenced sooner.

LAW

{¶29} In relevant part, Ohio Criminal Rule 32(A) provides that a

"[s]entence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay." In Neal v. Maxwell,

the Supreme court stated that "it is well established that the time of pronouncing

sentence is within the discretion of the trial court, and a delay for a reasonable

time does not invalidate the sentence" 175 Ohio St. 201, 202 (1963). “Based on

the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Neal, Ohio ‘appellate courts have held

that a delay in sentencing must be reasonable in order to be valid . . . ’ ”

(Ellipses original.). State v. Pete, 2023-Ohio-4406, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), quoting State

v. Miller, 2012-Ohio-2132, ¶ 7 (3rd Dist.); See State v. Hruby, 2011-Ohio-3848, ¶

Ross App. No. 24CA42 9

10 (6th Dist.); State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-1218 (7th Dist.); State v. Johnson,

2003-Ohio-6261, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). Therefore, “ ‘[a]n unreasonable delay

between a plea and a sentencing, which cannot be attributed to the defendant,

will invalidate that sentence.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Martinez, 2010-Ohio-2007, ¶

6 (6th Dist.), citing Brown at ¶ 31. See State v. Owens, 2009-Ohio-1508, ¶ 27

(7th Dist.); State v. Hawkins, 2011-Ohio-74, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). However, when

delays are attributable to the defendant's own conduct, such as failure to appear

at sentencing, courts have found the delays reasonable and upheld jurisdiction.

See Martinez at ¶ 17.

{¶30} Courts determine whether a delay is unreasonable by considering

the facts of each case. Pete at ¶ 19, citing State v. Barklay, 1996 WL 111804, *2

(2d Dist. Mar. 15, 1996). “Courts have examined the reasons for the delay in this

analysis.” Id., citing State v. Ventura, 2016-Ohio-5151 (1st Dist.); Barklay at *2;

Brown at ¶ 29; Johnson at ¶ 16.

{¶31} “Where there has been an unreasonable delay in sentencing, Ohio

appellate courts have concluded that the trial court has no jurisdiction to

sentence the defendant.” State v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-5057, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.),

citing Brown at ¶ 31. Thus, “the remedy for an unreasonable delay in sentencing

is not a resentencing hearing; rather, it is the vacation of the sentence.” Owens,

at ¶ 33 (7th Dist.), citing Brown at ¶ 31; Johnson, 2003-Ohio-6261 at ¶ 18).

ANALYSIS

{¶32} Redmond’s own recitation of the facts repeatedly acknowledges that

the initial delay in the sentencing process was caused by his conduct—

Ross App. No. 24CA42 10

specifically, his failure to appear for his original sentencing hearing, which led to

the issuance of a bench warrant on February 10, 2023. Redmond was, by his

own admission, at fault for this substantial initial period of delay, as he did not

appear and was subsequently indicted on new criminal charges in other

jurisdictions. Prior to January 30, 2024, Redmond remained at-large, facing

active warrants and allegedly continued to commit new criminal offenses.

{¶33} Redmond now claims that the delay between the time he became

available for sentencing (January 30, 2024) until November 8, 2024, when he

was sentenced, resulted in an unreasonable eight-and-one-half-month delay.

Redmond claimed that he provided two documents pursuant to R.C. 2941.401 in

February of 2024, requesting final disposition of his case and, thus, making the

State aware of his location. Because the State was aware of his location and his

request for disposition, Redmond argues that any failure to sentence him from

that point forward was no longer attributable to him. Therefore, the question

before us is whether the single notices allegedly provided by Redmond pursuant

to R.C. 2941.401 in February of 2024 effectively relieved him of any attribution of

the delay in sentencing.

{¶34} R.C. 2941.401 states:

When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment

in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the

continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this

state any untried indictment . . . against the prisoner, the prisoner

shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after the

prisoner causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and

the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice

of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and a request for a

final disposition to be made of the matter . . . The request of the

Ross App. No. 24CA42 11

prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden or

superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of

commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time

served and remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount

of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner,

and any decisions of the adult parole authority relating to the

prisoner.

The written notice and request for final disposition shall be

given or sent by the prisoner to the warden or superintendent

having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it with

the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by

registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. . .

The warden or superintendent having custody of the

prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner in writing of the source

and contents of any untried indictment, information, or complaint

against the prisoner, concerning which the warden or

superintendent has knowledge, and of the prisoner's right to make

a request for final disposition thereof.

(Emphasis added).

{¶35} The Supreme Court has recognized that “R.C. 2941.401 delineates

how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an

untried indictment.” State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3647, ¶ 1. Redmond had no

pending, untried indictment in Ross County, Ohio. He had no speedy trial rights

that he was trying to enforce. Redmond had already pleaded guilty to the drug

charges at issue herein. He was awaiting sentencing. Therefore, we agree with

the trial court, that R.C. 2941.401 had no application in his case.

{¶36} We also find that Redmond’s ill-fated attempt to request a

disposition under R.C. 2941.401 failed to put either the Ross County Prosecutor

or the Ross County Court of Common Pleas on notice of his availability to be

sentenced for his underlying guilty plea. Redmond’s counsel admitted at the

Ross App. No. 24CA42 12

sentencing hearing herein that he did not believe that the warden informed him or

the trial court of his client’s request for a disposition.

{¶37} At his sentencing hearing, Redmond did submit to the trial court

what appeared to be the documents required under R.C. 2941.401. However, he

never testified or offered to testify that he had submitted a written request to the

warden for a disposition in his Ross County drug offense case. Redmond also

offered no testimony or an affidavit from the warden indicating that the warden

received a written request from Redmond seeking a disposition, or if he did that

he forwarded any such request to the Ross County Prosecutor or the Ross

County Court of Common Pleas. See R.C. 2941.401. And unless there was an

agreement authorizing an alternative method, which we are not aware of, the

written request and certificate were required to be sent to the prosecutor and the

court by “registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Redmond has

offered no return receipt that would indicate these documents were delivered to

the prosector or the court.

{¶38} The only evidence supporting that anyone received notice of a

request from Redmond for a disposition, is his counsel’s statement at sentencing

that he “believe[d] that the notice was provided to the prosecutor’s office[.]” In

light of all the aforementioned, we find that lone statement is insufficient to

determine that the prosecutor or the State had been notified that Redmond was

available to be sentenced because he was incarcerated, and “the prosecutor

ha[d] no reason to seek out appellant in the state penal system.” Martinez, 2010-

Ohio-2007, at ¶ 17 (6th Dist.).

Ross App. No. 24CA42 13

{¶39} In essence, the record shows that Redmond may have provided

written notice to the warden requesting final disposition of the Ross County Case

under R.C. 2941.401, but this notice—or its receipt by the prosecution—

remained ambiguous and was not formally asserted until the November 8, 2024,

hearing. The trial court only scheduled the sentencing after acting on its own

motion in October 2024, indicating limited initiative from Redmond’s side in

seeking a timely sentencing. As a result, a significant portion of the delay

between January and October 2024 remains tied to inaction or lack of diligence

by Redmond in promptly alerting the court or seeking action. Consequently, the

evidence indicates that the delay in sentencing was largely due to Redmond’s

actions.

{¶40} Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial

court’s decision to deny Redmond’s motion to vacate his sentence was justified,

as the delay was significantly attributable to Redmond. Therefore, we overrule

Redmond’s sole assignment of error, affirm Redmond’s sentence, and dismiss all

pending motions.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Ross App. No. 24CA42 14

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall

pay the costs. Further, all pending motions are dismissed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the

Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________

Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the

date of filing with the clerk.